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The aim of the thesis is the inquiry into the experience of the self in terms of the relation 
between Being (meaning) and Nothingness (non-meaning). This experience will be 
thought solely in accordance with the problem of nihilism. Nihilism is to be taken as the 
experience of existence as meaningless and phenomena as uniformly insignificant due to 
the restriction of alternate manners of self-understanding through the forgetting of the 
origin of meaning. The approach will not be to solve or resolve the problem but explore 
an alternative disclosure of nihilistic phenomena that renders it non-problematic. 
Heidegger and Nishitani's thought on Ereignis (the integral relation of man and 
Being/Nothingness) and  Śūnyatā (the absolute nothingness of which the individual is a 
mask/expression) will be compared to provide a framework for understanding the 
experience of nothingness as nihilism in terms of its essential role in the human 
experience of meaning.  
 A comparative approach has been chosen in order to question Heidegger's 
characterization of nihilism as bound to the development of Western thought over the 
history of metaphysics, instead aiming to understand Western nihilism as originating in a 
universal experience of nothingness integral to the disclosure of meaning. The 
comparison is between these specific thinkers as not only do both explicitly engage with 
the problem of nihilism but both critique modernity with great insight yet one eye closed. 
The thesis argues both thinkers mis-characterize nihilism due to fundamental tensions in 
the way their core concepts are both ontological (what is), existential (how this is 
realized), and ethical (how it should be realized), and how their true meaning is the unity 
of these senses.  
 These tensions provide the context for all other issues addressed, which are 
divided into two related themes. Firstly, the tension between their thought's portrayal as 
simply phenomenological (a description of experience as lived) and its projective aspects 
(a description of how we should live, a projective retrieval of the essential nature of man). 
Secondly, how both thinkers claim the self-overcoming of nihilism requires the dual 
transformation of man and society, yet the relation of these transformations is 
underdeveloped. In Heidegger due to the problem of mediating the relation between the 
singularity of Sein and the communal nature of its Da, and for Nishitani the relation 
between absolute nothingness and its individual personal mask (the true self as personal-
sive-impersonal). The thesis argues these tensions result in Heidegger and Nishitani 
overlooking that nihilism already contains its own counter-tendency within each nihilistic 
phenomena they identify. This will then be used to explore the possibility of an alternate 
manner of overcoming nihilism to the way they chart, one that enframes what they 
critique of nihilistic phenomena as inherent to disclosure and consonant with the core of 
their project. 
Nihility as Integral 
Both an aim and presupposition of the thesis is to indicate nihility as integral to all human 
disclosure and nihilism as one mode of experiencing the nothingness of self and a prior 
phenomenon to the history of metaphysics. Not only do the traits of nihilistic experience 
common to both Heidegger and Nishitani indicate the nature of nihility, but so do those 
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of its self-transformation into an alternate experience of nihility. Whilst nothingness 
(Ereignis/Śūnyatā) only manifests in a finite historical (socio-cultural) context the 
thematizing of the experience of nihility can indicate a more universal primordial 
experience of reality, such as to be found in the shared elements of anxiety and the Great 
Doubt that also indicate an affinity between what follows from such experiences. The 
intent is not to argue for a step back out of Western metaphysics into Eastern mysticism, 
but that as nihilism is not identical with nor resulting from the oblivion of Being through 
metaphysics a retrieval of the Greek origin of metaphysics is a possible but not necessary 
source for the diffusion of the problem. The relation of the historical Greek origin of 
metaphysics with the ahistorical ontological origin of nihilism will be addressed in 
chapter 2.3 on the relation of the danger and that which saves as taking place prior to their 
realization within ontic intellectual traditions. 
 Whilst Heidegger characterizes nihilism as a Western destiny and Being as 
historical he also offers a notion of the human that appears to be valid for the whole 
species throughout its history. Heidegger's discussion of Dasein implies a universal 
structure of human existence that allows for a commonality in various intellectual 
traditions that deal with this phenomenon and a constructive synthesis of these traditions 
to better indicate and experience this commonality. Whilst Heidegger laments that the 
global destiny of Gestell obscures the ground of Eastern thought Nishitani's project can 
be seen as the retrieval of this ground and correlate to Heidegger's own retrieval of the 
Greek as a “precondition of the inevitable dialogue with the East Asian world”1, thus that 
some form of universal statement regarding the nature of self and its relation to the 
experience of nihilism can be formulated. Yet Heidegger also makes statements on 
fundamental ontology based on the analysis of uniquely German terms. Whilst he accepts 
it can seem “that the understanding of the nature of the thingness...may be based on the 
accidents of an etymological game.”2 the historically conditioned nature of all meaning 
and thought means he is also correct in believing “that etymology has the standing 
mandate first to give thought to the essential content involved in what dictionary words, 
as words, denote by implication”3. Nishitani seems to go further, claiming that the 
‘elemental mode of the understanding of meaning’ is to be found in Japanese thought, yet 
he also finds such elemental words in other languages such as the English term 
'realization'. 
However, although both thinkers try to address the unsayable by indication rather than 
direct representation ineffability is not identity. Being and Śūnyatā as both reached 
indirectly through beings or illusory reality are both beyond thematic conceptualization, 
as the ground of metaphysics and conventional thought respectively, but direct experience 
of Śūnyatā through its self-identity with self implies an element of universality that can 
be attested to in a manner that historical Being as withdrawal lacks. Śūnyatā’s portrayal 
as the true form of reality introduces both a kind of essentialism and the possibility of 
direct knowledge (albeit in the form of a ‘knowing of non-knowing’) of such an essence 
that implies a greater universality to the human condition than expressed in the work of 
Heidegger. Such universality should not be seen in terms of general categories or 
uniformity; Heisig characterizes Nishitani not as reaching for “an abstract, generic idea 
of the human – his approach remains fixed on the individual – but that he has reached a 
point in individual consciousness that a shifting of cultural and historical conditions 
cannot reach, however much they may stimulate is to reach that point.”4 
 
1 Martin Heidegger, The Question Concerning Technology, and Other Essays (HarperCollins, 1982), 158.  
2 "The Thing," in Poetry, Language, Thought (Perennical Classics, 2001), 172. 
3 Ibid., 173. 
4 James Heisig, Philosophers of Nothingness: An Essay on the Kyoto School (University of Hawai'i Press, 2001), 219. 
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This element of universality leads to a slight tension in Nishitani’s work. On the one hand 
he believes that Western thought must be revitalised through the retrieval of its own 
resources (for him, mainly those of the Christian tradition). On the other he believes in 
both the neccesity and validity of a world-philosophy that tackles problems endemic to 
the human condition that take different ontic forms in different cultures but are best 
expressed in the Buddhist tradition that was also to be a resource for the West. Van Bragt 
portrays this as a balancing act between Nishitani’s beliefs that “the true view of reality 
and the only hope for the global culture of the future is to be found (or at the very least 
strongly prefigured) in the Eastern heritage”5 but that nihilism in its historical form is a 
primarily a Western phenomena that must be countered from within so that “the West has 
nowhere to go but in the direction of the Eastern (Buddhist) ideal, but it cannot do so 
except from its own Western (Christian) premises.”6 Nihilism and its relation to the 
human essence as constituted in relation to nothingness may be universal, and for 
Nishitani best approached through a radicalizing of nihility along the Buddhist model, but 
as its specific forms are culturally embedded so too must be its overcoming. Despite this 
Nishitani holds Buddhist thought as having universal validity in explicating the essence 
of the human condition, and the next chapter will address how successful the ‘balancing 
act’ is in regard to his stance on his own presuppositions. 
Whilst universality of ontological constitution is a presupposition of the thesis, so is the 
fact that it may only be reached through the culturally bounded forms of nihilism it has 
manifested as, and that indicate this common source to be retrieved through the projective 
dialogue between traditions (a theme taken up more expressly in chapter 2.3. 
Texts and Interpretation 
These two thinkers have been chosen as both deal explicitly with the relevant concept of 
nothingness as this relates to self and world and also place themselves as culminating a 
narrative of nothingnesses realization within an intellectual tradition. Both also try to 
articulate the inexpressible in different ways, both failing at this impossible task in a 
beneficial manner, opening up other ways through their critique's limitations. The thesis 
will not concern itself whether any affinities between Heidegger and Nishitani are the 
result of influence or appropriation, as to “To search for influences and dependencies 
among thinkers is to misunderstand thinking. Every thinker is dependent – upon the 
address of Being”7. Regardless of whether such appropriations did take place the 
condition for their possibility is the shared context of concern rooted in fundamental 
human experience and the thesis presumes the problem of nihilism is independent enough 
from the two thinkers traditions to form a horizon of comparison for them; that the 
experiences of nothingness and nihilism charted by Heidegger and Nishitani share 
common origin. 
Although proceeding by way of textual analysis comparison is the method not the goal. 
This accords with Nishitani’s overall project as his “interest is not primarily comparison, 
but the resolution of certain philosophical problems”8. A classic text or thinker is one that 
stands the test of time, and does this as they stand open to many interpretations of their 
meaning, possessing a depth that allows each age to find something new and take what is 
classic for its own. The meaning of a text or thought lies in its relation to the tradition that 
it transmits and forms, its appropriation by later ages. Classics in this sense are not 
reproduced in thought but continually created through violent interpretation. To be a 
 
5 Keiji Nishitani, Religion and Nothingness, trans. J.V. Bragt (University of California Press, 1983), xxxvii. 
6 Ibid. 
7 Martin Heidegger, Early Greek Thinking (Harper & Row, 1984), 55. 
8 T. P. Kasulis, "Whence and Whither: Philosophical Reflections on Nishitani’s View of History," in The Religious 
Philosophy of Nishitani Keiji: Encounter with Emptiness, ed. T. Unno (Asian Humanities Press, 1989), 259. 
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classic is to invite violence, and to weather generations of it is to prove a classic and move 
from theory to the realm of art. 
Projection and Violence 
Heidegger's narrative of the history of metaphysics is itself an act of interpretative 
violence to bring out the unthought in ways unintended by those thinkers, as "while a 
right elucidation never understands the text better than the author understood it, it does 
surely understand it differently."9 This leads to Hodge characterizing Heidegger's reading 
of texts as a 'duplicitous dialogue' not seeking their intrinsic meaning “but a release of a 
new one, supposedly hidden within the text through the duplicitous operations of the 
sendings of being.”10 Hodge argues Heidegger's readings form a prospective history 
guided by his ethical commitments in which “He is using these readings to address 
himself to current and future conditions, understood to be in a state of extreme crisis”11 
opening him up to accusations that he reads modern oppositions back into the tradition 
and then declares the tradition to lead to them. 
 Such interpretation enframes the meaning of the text in terms of the projective 
moment Heidegger believes his own work stands in; a projection conditioned by his own 
thrown situation. New interpretations are a response to new concerns; Heidegger’s 
violence was due to a concern with the fate of Being thus drew out what was unsaid yet 
ignored some of what was explicitly voiced. Heidegger must himself be interpreted in 
similar fashion to bring out what Hodge calls the unthought ethical element in his thought 
to highlight its futural element, and that I will later define as the axiological element to 
highlight its presuppositions. The criteria for judging such interpretation can only come 
from the new projected criteria, themselves guided by that which came before. Whilst 
Heidegger's narrative of nihilism in terms of the history of metaphysics will be addressed 
in later chapters it must be noted at the outset that the ontology of nothingness first 
elucidated both conditions and is conditioned by the projective elements in Heidegger 
and Nishitani's thought that themselves depend upon yet also first realize the 'dangers' of 
nihility. 
Texts 
The aim is not for any sense of finality but to trace a way of understanding and 
experiencing indebted to but not ultimately constrained by those of Heidegger and 
Nishitani. To bring out an element at odds with other parts of the authors corpus, partly 
engaging in an immanent critique to explore a neglected possibility that underlies the 
work as what is unsaid. The tendency is always to find what we seek as we regard the 
philosophy of others from the perspective of our own concerns, especially when not 
seeking to lay out a correct or final interpretation of the thinkers in question but instead 
chart an experience of nothingness. As such the interpretation will hopefully remain open 
enough to follow the way of the texts and proceed with them even when appearing 
contrary, yet not surrender the possibility in the matter of thought to be explored even 
when it goes against the texts intended meaning. 
 The focus will be on Heidegger's later works and the attempt made to address the 
matter of thought indicated by these texts rather than treating each as discrete. A possible 
critique of this approach is that in taking Heidegger's thought as a unitary whole, treating 
the jug, chalice and pitcher from The Thing, The Question Concerning Technology, and 
Discourse on Thinking respectively as a single extended discussion, I am forcefully 
subsuming such thought into Nishitani's framework and ignoring vital textual variations. 
 
9 Heidegger, The Question Concerning Technology, and Other Essays, 58. 
10 J. Hodge, Heidegger and Ethics (Taylor & Francis, 2012), 119. 
11 Ibid., 154. 
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My approach will doubtlessly lead to the loss of certain nuances across the development 
of Heidegger's thought, but such is necessary in the attempt to indicate the continuity and 
structure of disclosure indicated throughout Heidegger's texts. Heidegger's later texts tend 
to reflect his projective interests more than his formally descriptive early works and it is 
thus fitting that their insights be wrested from them for ones own purposes. 
The main text of Nishitani’s to be considered is Religion and Nothingness, as to a greater 
extent than The Self-Overcoming of Nihilism it reflects his own interpretation of Zen 
rather than commentating solely upon Western thinkers. In his own words this text does 
“not possess the systematic unity of a work written from beginning to end with a definite 
plan. Still, the work will, I hope, reveal a unity of thought throughout”12. This lack of a 
systematic unity means that elements of his thought are often repeated throughout the 
chapters with differences in phrasing, terminology and emphasis that can lead to 
occasional contradictions (many surface, but some problematic as will be discussed in the 
following chapter) and can make it difficult to do justice to an element of his thought 
without dealing with its treatment in each essay. This results from Nishitani’s intention to 
trace a way towards the realization of Śūnyatā rather than formulate a concrete position. 
As with Heidegger the attempt has been made to treat the themes present throughout all 
the essays as unified strands explicating facets or aspects of the process of Śūnyatā. The 
terminology and characterization most pertinent to the aims of the thesis will be used 
when a single idea is given a variety of formulations. 
Ways of Thought 
Heisig also sums up the potential frustration in dealing with Nishitani's thought as a way 
in which “arguments do not proceed along a straight line, and indeed at times seem to be 
going around in circles...this way of argumentation lies at the core of Nishitani’s 
philosophy as an exercise in awakening”13, and “While the conclusion of the argument is 
clear, its logical progress is not always clear, and the circularity can be annoying when 
one wants explicit rational connections”14. Often one idea is reformulated and repeated 
numerous times over several pages yet apparently important steps in the argument 
skipped over as if they were self-evident. There is often a sense that an unexamined 
presupposition is covered up through reformulating premises and insights that, although 
possibly valid, are not examined and defended as much as they should be. Despite his 
view that traditional philosophical arguments and traditional Zen are “the same thing in 
different form”15 Nishitani tends to eschew the former form when it comes to the assertion 
of core presuppositions. 
Rather than tackling traditional philosophical problems in a traditional manner 
both thinkers explore an understanding of ourselves and the world by charting a way of 
thought16. Heidegger characterizes his thought as both ‘underway’ and ‘a way’ with the 
connotation that it is only one of numerous valid paths to walk whose destination is as yet 
unclear; a single way of experiencing the call to thought. Such thought rejects singular 
definitive interpretations to tarry in ambiguity and multiple meanings, “To maintain such 
tension and fluidity in thinking is to resist the long-standing tendency to settle for one 
explanation, one voice, one truth.”17 That the way is exploratory and without true goal in 
 
12 Nishitani, Religion and Nothingness, xlvii. 
13 Heisig, Philosophers of Nothingness: An Essay on the Kyoto School, 188-9.  
14Ibid., 223. 
15Ibid., 249. 
16Their methodologies can be likened to Nagarjuna, who in charting the middle way did not so much attempt to 
construct a position contrary to those he critiqued but instead engaged in a process of thought that would liberate the 
thinker from damaging ways of thought and hold them open to a revelation concerning the nature of śūnyatā. 
17 Gail Stenstad, "Revolutionary Thinking," in Feminist Interpretations of Martin Heidegger, ed. N.J. Holland and P. 
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part explains Heidegger's changing of core terminology that remains unified only by its 
concern with topic under question. Reflection on the characterization of thought as a way 
we are called to will feature prominently in chapter 2.5 and the conclusion of the thesis, 
notably the differences in their approaches to this method and how true they are to it. The 
possible limits of this methodology and the manner of critique appropriate to it is to be 
considered here. 
The downside to this approach is that in proceeding by way of negation the movement 
seems to be away rather than towards, and ambiguity carries with it the inherent and 
essential danger of misinterpretation. Such tentative exploration of new ways opens 
possibilities rather than decides between them and can appear lacking in concrete content, 
leaving a vagueness filled by new phrases pushing at the constraints of that which came 
before. Heidegger's thought seems to undergo a perennial beginning leading only to a 
restarting on this way away that can make use of the last journey’s trail-marks in an 
attempt to once more move from the transfigured point of departure, now rendered now 
less familiar, to an unknown destination. Such a journey never ends with a final position 
as "even the most genuine question is never stilled by the answer found."18 Whether his 
way of thought is befitting to the question of meaning "is something each one may judge 
after he himself has tried to go the designated way, or even better, after he has gone a 
better way, that is, a way befitting the question."19  To understand Heidegger one must 
follow him on his way, thus to an extent be invested in the veracity of the 'away' and 
already move within the horizon of thought laid out by him. Whilst "the way is not already 
there for us to follow, but comes into being as we go along it."20 and should remain 
preparatory, provisional and contingent chapter 2.5 will consider whether Heidegger's 
way in fact leads to a prefigured destination (a position of a unique kind), and the manner 
in which the way back to Ereignis (thus Ereignis 'itself') only 'is' when we realize it as 
such will be a constant theme of the thesis. 
This is partly why Nishitani characterizes Śūnyatā as both existential and ontological, 
although providing a theory of the conditions required for the manifestation of meaning 
this manifestation occurs in the manner of an existential movement that also provides for 
the transformative overcoming of nihilism. That Śūnyatā can only be realized 
existentially (and through such a realization its ontological role made manifest) not only 
makes it difficult to separate out the strands of Nishitani’s work but also renders it opaque 
to purely intellectual apprehension as only through its existential realization is the notion 
truly understood in transfiguring the essence of those who encounter it. The dual nature 
of realization and Śūnyatā as existential-ontological are dealt with at length later, but it is 
worth noting now the methodological difficulties of this approach. 
Existential as opposed to theoretical apprehension brings with it the problems endemic to 
all forms of quietism; the validity of a method that simply charts out a way of 
experiencing often involves a lack of argumentation capable of convincing those who do 
not share in that experiential attestation, it lacks the objective verifiability that Heidegger 
held as less rigorous than true ‘thought’21. This problem is unavoidable as in the realm of 
fundamental ontology "one cannot prove anything, but one can point out a great deal"22. 
Approaching ontology through existential self-awareness shifts investigating the nature 
 
Huntington (Pennsylvania State University Press, 2010), 345. 
18 Martin Heidegger, What Is Metaphysics? (Jovian Press, 2018), 44. 
19 "Letter on Humanism," in Basic Writings (HarperCollins, 1993), 247. 
20 Joan Stambaugh, "Heidegger, Daoism, and Metaphysics," in Heidegger and Asian Thought, ed. G. Parkes (Motilal 
Banarsidass, 1992), 82. 
21In “My Philosophical Starting Point” Nishitani explicitly places the personal experience of nihilism, death and 
despair as what started him on his way; an experience not necessarily shareable by all. 
22 Martin Heidegger, Identity and Difference, trans. J. Stambaugh (University of Chicago Press, 2002), 22. 
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of reality towards inquiry into the manner in which we experience the relation of self and 
reality. Nishitani takes this approach as paradigmatic and his thought often seems to go 
so far as to render reality and awareness of it as ontologically self-identical even whilst 
denying all forms of idealism and materialism. Whilst this relational view of Da and Sein 
brings him into affinity with Heidegger, his arguably more radical view of this relation of 
self-identity is to be seen later as bringing new attendant difficulties. 
Heidegger and Nishitani's thought are not intended as provable theories but as ways 
through a state of being viewed as detrimental, and whilst Heidegger stops short of 
portraying his way as any kind of solution to nihilism Nishitani is less hesitant when 
talking of the self-overcoming of nihilism in such terms. Since solutions are only provable 
through their trial the onus is as much on the reader when it comes to ascertaining the 
validity of their approaches as it is on them. What renders this problematic is the 
connotation of universal ultimate truth Nishitani attributes to Śūnyatā. There seems to be 
little grounds for disagreement with them from within when to not share their experience 
of nothingness is to be in denial; when anxiety is attested to by the fleeing of those who 
deny it, and one who does not encounter nihility as the abyss of the everyday shows that 
“Nihility makes its presence felt in the very fact that he does not encounter nihility”23. 
Heidegger and Nishitani are engaged in a sort of meta-philosophy, and just as metaphysics 
cannot penetrate or question its own ground so too does traditional philosophy have 
difficulty in addressing the thought that concerns itself with the ground of philosophy and 
its horizons. Their thought can only be truly critiqued from within and from the same way 
they trace, a violent interpretation that appropriates them to one's own way. Meaningful 
critique best comes from charting a rival way in line with a similar experience of thought, 
to take the leap out of metaphysics with their aid and concentrate on internal 
contradictions and tensions along the way, ending up somewhere different due to a 
different thrown situation. Their thought is a guidebook to approaching a matter of 
thought rather than presenting a theory or definite position, it is to aid fellow travelers 
who can make use of the path they have cut. Heidegger invites those who want to find 
their own path, despite sometimes retreating into fiat style claims that invite adherents. 
Although conditioned by the tradition that precedes it this new thought cannot take its 
measure from its roots but instead from the unknown and not yet bloomed fruits for which 
it seeks to create the conditions for. Every way of thought is a projective interpretation 
that throws forward its own criteria for adjudication, in this manner Nishitani's way can 
be seen as less open and the difference between them on this point will be returned to in 
the conclusion. 
Because of this method the most viable path of critique relates to the success of the texts 
in inspiring their readers. Stenson claims that the work of both Heidegger and Nishitani 
“reveals the meaning it seeks to communicate by transforming the mode of being-in-the-
world of the person who gets the message.”24 This leads him to describe Religion and 
Nothingness as “an intricate Zen kōan in which question after question is raised on the 
level of intellection in order to spill us into another order of awareness.”25  This manner 
of presentation of Nishitani’s thought is not incidental as to “to confront the ‘meaning of 
Being’, one must experience the deconstruction of common language, a destruction of 
ordinary everyday patterns of thought”26. The poetic paradoxical saying of a kōan is the 
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manner in which the fields of consciousness and nihility are broken through, the text is 
not (and could not be) a description of Śūnyatā, but is an instance of Śūnyatā when 
engaged with in the manner of a personal realization. A kōan is not an argument, it is a 
tactic to indicate the unthinkable and incite a moment of insight in which “One is suddenly 
and paradoxically aware of ultimate truth within the structures of conventional truth both 
affirming and negating those same structures.”27 that opens the way for enlightenment 
through realizing the mutual emptiness of self and world. One does not make sense of a 
kōan but sets it aside as a valueless vehicle that has aided one to reach a new position, as 
steps along a way the thought in the text "instead of furnishing representations and 
concepts, experiences and tests itself as a transformation of its relatedness to Being."28 As 
a tool of enlightenment rather than the attempt to construct a systematic position the most 
fundamental critique of Religion and Nothingness itself (and not the thought it represents) 
would relate to its success in transforming its readers, or even more narrowly, as each 
kōan was crafted to aid the enlightenment of those in a single situation, those readers who 
the text was intended to address. Although the thesis concerns the thought and not the text 
a potential problem with this manner of presentation is discussed in the next chapter. 
Whilst the kōan paradigm is helpful in approaching Religion and Nothingness there is a 
limit to how far the similarity can be taken. Nishitani combines historical treatment of 
philosophers with existential self-examination, the former always in service to the latter 
as “it has often been the case that philosophy and its thinking has only found its own rest 
or repose in a return to the mystical,”29 yet Nishitani holds his “central concern has been 
to think the problem of nothingness. In other words, to approach it as a problem of 
philosophy”30, by which he means Western philosophy. As such the text combines 
transformative experiential attestation with formal academic rigour, even whilst 
performing a critique of the limited rationality and theoretical onus of the latter. This 
combination is frequently found in Zen, which whilst opposed to intellectual theory and 
suspicious of languages ability to truly grasp reality has spilt much ink in theorizing as to 
the limits of theory, it speaks loudly of the need for silence and it is “an obvious fact that 
the history of Zen is replete with practically every kind of literary production”  31 full of 
utterances. As such it could be seen as a polemical attitude, not anti-theory per se but anti 
the primacy of theory, and some of the emphases within Religion and Nothingness that 
seem to favour one side of dichotomous relations may be better seen within a polemical 
framework. A broadly similar approach will later be taken on Heidegger's reflections on 
the nature of meditative and calculative thought. 
Religion and Nothingness may resemble a kōan in being an aid to enlightenment, but it 
takes the form of more traditional philosophy and brings with it theoretical doctrinal 
assertions that also invite more traditional rational critiques. Whilst both Heidegger and 
Nishitani question reason the former asks as to the possibility of "a thinking outside of 
the distinction of rational and irrational",32 the latter posits a thinking of the self-identity 
of such opposed terms. The ambiguous relation of rational critique and experiential 
attestation in Zen practice leads Nishitani to alternate between invoking reason and 
repudiating it in a manner that is at times troublesome. His overt critiques of reason and 
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admonishments to go ‘beyond’ reason as found on the field of consciousness can be seen 
in the context of Zen’s portrayal as a kind of ‘hyper-reason’, not an irrational negation of 
reason but its self-transcendence. For Nishitani the essence of reason is the union of the 
knower and known that is only possible upon the field of Śūnyatā, and he never seeks to 
move beyond this broad understanding or imply irrationality in terms of it. Thurman notes 
that “the ‘reason’ he often talks about and associates with personality and so on, is clearly 
the primarily substantivistic aspect of reason or logos that is concerned with world 
construction and order. At other times he refers to the critical reason involved in modern 
subjectivism, referring primarily to Kant’s Copernican revolution in getting beyond 
substance to subject.”33 It is the narrow historical conception of reason upon the field of 
consciousness that is critiqued, a critique utilizing reason itself as can be seen in the 
presentation of the Zen Great Doubt as a radicalization of Cartesian doubt that “is clearly 
not a rejection of reason, but an intensification of reasoning and inquiry to a point where 
it breaks through its imagic lenses into the realm of nihility and then the field of 
emptiness”34. But despite radicalizing rational inquiry Nishitani still draws a limit to it 
that may be too severe considering the ramifications of the leap he invokes and the 
religious form he gives it. His striving for a “balance between reason and letting go of 
reason”35 can seem unbalanced and leads to problems within his paradoxes and resolution 
of dichotomies that will be addressed later.36 
For example; when he speaks of the conversion to affirmation he claims “It is something 
of which we cannot ask why. There can be no conceivable reason for it...If a reason is to 
be sought, it can only be as the traditional religions have all sought it...in God or in the 
Buddha...But a reason that is on the side of God or Buddha is not the sort of reason man 
is after when he asks why...After all, we can do no other than to say: it is so...all that is 
left is that or thus. All we can say is that such is the way Existenz is.”37 It is one thing to 
agree that a rose is without why, but when it comes to the existential conversion of the 
human way of being it would seem insufficient warrant that such a leap is necessitated by 
the current condition; we may agree with the leap from but not the leap to. Nishitani’s 
critique of and moving beyond the field of reason does not render him immune to rational 
critique that is conducted in a parallel fashion to his own use of reason, from within the 
new horizon he opens up. If Śūnyatā is to reconcile all dichotomies through overcoming 
the very notion of duality; if Śūnyatā as the process of disclosure is not apart from what 
it discloses but constituted with it (as Ereignis is with metaphysics), and part of what it 
discloses is reason itself even whilst moving beyond reason through the negation of the 
field of consciousness, then at no point can the requirements of rationality be truly absent 
within the field of Śūnyatā. Jones suggests a division of spheres, that “Kyoto philosophers 
grant traditional logic legitimacy in certain areas, such as physical sciences, but insist on 
their dialectic in other areas, such as religion and the investigation of self-
consciousness.”38 but this called into doubt by Nishitani's insistence that science and 
religion cannot be partitioned and that fields are self-identical. Nishitani cannot draw a 
limit to the applicability of the sphere of reason without reinforcing dichotomous thinking 
as integral to Śūnyatā. He provides a single image of the ‘suchness’ that cannot be 
questioned in terms of traditional reason, but beyond the sphere of reason he seems to 
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have few resources when it comes to alternative experiences of reality in its ‘suchness’ 
that differ from his own but stand in the same horizon, except to claim that such are false 
experiences as their form of revelation is at variance with the manner of experiential 
attestations he ties to traditional religious themes. Despite the emphasis given to planetary 
dialogue between traditions by both Nishitani and commentators on his work it would 
seem to remain a dialogue between those who share a fundamental attunement that, as in 
a horizon beyond the reasons why, has difficulty forming a dialogue with those whose 
experience attests in a different manner. 
Nihilism as 'Problem' 
The provisional guiding definition of nihilism is to be the experience of existence as 
meaningless, a way of self-understanding, that as such can lead beyond itself without 
having been `solved` or overcome. Nihilism stems from an experience of Nothingness as 
integral to Being, as a certain aspect of this experience comes to dominate then 
meaninglessness comes to the fore, essentially making nihilism a form of self-experience 
or attunement we find ourselves in when nihility manifests in a limited fashion. If nihilism 
is a manner of experiencing the nothingness of self then to talk of the `problem` of 
nihilism implies reality itself is a problem placing the perspective of man as having 
precedence over reality. Nihilism as an experience of nihility stems from an experience 
of Being and just as “The ‘mystery’ of Being can in no way be solved, as if it were a 
‘problem’”39 nor can nihilism as an experience of this mysterious wonder. Instead 
nihilism is to be transformed from its own origin into a different manner of experiencing 
nihility as that origin, Heidegger and Nishitani offer alternative ways of experiencing this 
Nothingness; an attending to a more primordial or originary experience of Nothingness 
as Ereignis or Śūnyatā. Nothingness is thus the condition for both nihilism and salvation 
as the realization of identity with reality (samsāra-sive-nirvāna). Such an experience 
seeks to transform lived human existence by expressing the experience of Nothingness in 
a non-nihilistic vocabulary. Problems of the attestation to such primordial experiences 
will be later addressed, as will the horizon for their comparison given that adjudication 
between nihilism and the alternate ways they chart appears to require a further axiological 
assumption through which such experiences and paradigms can be judged. 
 Heidegger does not talk of the problem of technology, he talks of the question 
concerning it and questioning  implies a puzzlement; why do we experience reality 
nihilistically, especially given our nature as revealers of meaning? The question of 
nihilism is thus the question of the self and its possibilities, accordingly "In regard to the 
essence of nihilism there is no prospect and no meaningful claim to a cure."40 Questioning 
builds a way and to be on a way is to undergo an experience; the issue is not the problem 
of nihilism but what the nihilistic way of experience tells us of  Ereignis and Śūnyatā thus 
of ourselves and how we can more fully realize that self. Both Heidegger and Nishitani 
think through the self-transformation of nihilism from the nihility that is its shared origin 
with that which saves; strictly speaking neither has recourse to condemn nihilism as it is 
a dispensation or gift of Being, and nirvāna is nothing other than samsāra. Neither are 
critical of nihility or even nihilism as such, but only the inauthentic elements within 
nihilistic disclosure that obscure the more primordial origin of nihility, with authentic 
nihility as indicative of reality being celebrated as much as it is critiqued. Yet at times 
both Heidegger and Nishitani appear to be untrue to their own thought in that, through 
virtue of their own historical perspectives, their stances towards nihilism do not cohere 
with their theories as to its possibilities. Despite sharing the over-riding concern with 
 
39 James  Perotti, Heidegger on the Divine: The Thinker, the Poet, and God (Ohio University Press, 1974), 63. 
40 Martin Heidegger, "The Question of Being," in Philosophical and Political Writings: Martin Heidegger, ed. M. 
Stassen (Bloomsbury Academic, 2003), 37. 
 xi 
nihilism there remains a great difference in biases and presuppositions between myself 
and the thinkers in question, specifically the role of current manifestations of nihilism as 
criteria for the new epochal understanding, leading to an alternate way consonant with 
their own being the culmination of the thesis. 
 Heidegger claimed he had “never spoken against technology, nor against the so-
called demonic elements in technology”41 seeking only to understand the essence of 
technology that “challenges man and, in opposition to which, he is not free any longer – 
that something is being announced here, namely a relationship of Being to man – and that 
this relationship, which is concealed in the essence of technology, may come to light 
someday in its undisguised form.”42 These comments by Heidegger raise two points. 
 Firstly, that their tone is at odds with other of his statements. Whilst neither 
Heidegger nor Nishitani want to master technology or science for rational ends, nor call 
for reactionary policies, their thought and its presentation do differ allowing for easy 
misappropriation. They possibly adopt a polemical tone to question an epoch obscuring 
their true aims and ontologies. For example, the Memorial Address in Discourse on 
Thinking can easily be taken as speaking against technological thought and its 'attack' on 
nature that characterizes the current historical epoch. Elements in Heidegger's works that 
can be seen as speaking against technology are to be read in light of his claims that Gestell 
(thus nihilism) is to be understood not countered or worked against; that as not against 
technology he is not against the historical manifestation of nihility as nihilism since this 
is a process of withdrawal inherent to disclosure, it is how Being is and as already noted 
reality cannot be a problem. 
 Secondly, the idea that the relationship of man and Being concealed by technology 
(Ereignis as their mutual appropriation) could appear in an 'undisguised' form seems both 
integral to Heidegger's project yet innately unable to to come to light in this way since 
the concealment integral to disclosure means Being must withdraw to disclose beings and 
such disclosure through withdrawal is what Being is. Heidegger and Nishitani's critiques 
as both ontological and axiological (a theme to be addressed in chapter 1.1 and 
throughout) means there is a question of ends to be addressed. Such undisguised Ereignis 
will later be assessed as forming the projective criteria for the epochal transformation 
Heidegger's thought aims towards, and as itself self-identical with the nihility that enables 
the disclosure of meaning which only 'is' as its present nihilistic manifestation in Gestell. 
This identity of Ereignis and Gestell ; of both the saving power and supreme danger, is 
mirrored in Nishitani's view of samsāra-sive-nirvāna and this strong sense of identity is a 
guiding presupposition of what follows. Accordingly nihilism in this thesis will not be 
thought as different from the realization of Śūnyatā or that which saves. 
 Neither Heidegger nor Nishitani place enough emphasis on the beneficial 
elements of nihilism as the realization of nihility that are to be preserved in the saving 
power or field of Śūnyatā. The tone of their presentation and attempt to reach 
'undisguised' Ereignis obscures elements of Gestell (or for Nishitani science as nihility) 
that once retained in authentic form can give concrete content to the originary experience 
of Śūnyatā and Ereignis. This leads to the appearances of core tensions in their work that 
are to be inquired into, such as the precedence of elemental subjectivity and unbalanced 
paradoxes in Nishitani. Comparative critique of their thought is intended to use each to 
highlight this tendency within the other and indicate how their respective notions of 
nihilism can inform the others projective thought. 
 
 










1.1 Ereignis and Śūnyatā  
 
This chapter will first offer a preliminary definition of what is meant by the constituent 
terms in the phrase ‘ontology of nothingness’ in relation to Heidegger before moving on 
to how for Nishitani  Śūnyatā as absolute nothingness is to be approached through the 
overcoming of duality and dichotomous thinking, along the way raising shared broad 
problems that will be thematic in following chapters. The following chapters will proceed 
to consider what this understanding means for Śūnyatā in terms of the specific duality of 
subject-object in relation to the reality of things and self, as well as world as the relation 
of disclosure between them alongside consideration of similar themes in Heidegger's 
work. The identity of these in Śūnyatā as the self-realization of reality is to indicate the 
absolute nothingness of self and world through the self-identity of which meaning arises. 
Heideggerian Ontology 
Ontology is defined as the study of Being, yet the meaning, spelling and even use of this 
latter term changes throughout Heidegger's works. Despite being the avowed concern of 
his earlier works the term ontology is itself later dropped by Heidegger for its lingering 
metaphysical connotations. But whilst the fundamental ontology of Being and Time is 
later criticized for suggesting that Being itself is reached through transcending beings and 
determined by Dasein the problem of transcendence as concerning “what makes it 
ontologically possible for entities to be encountered within-the-world”,1 encountered as 
beings, remained a constant theme. 
 Being names that which in virtue of which entities are rendered beings, “that on 
the basis of which entities are already understood”.2 When entities are understood “we 
say that they have meaning...Meaning is that wherein the intelligibility of something 
maintains itself. That which can be Articulated in a disclosure by which we understand, 
we call 'meaning'."3 The Being of beings is their meaningfulness and the meaning of 
Being itself is the horizon in which this meaningfulness is grasped, not that which is but 
that which enables the meaning of that which is and is prior to any specific conception of 
meaning or what we take the metaphysical constitution of beings to be (their beingness, 
Seiendheit). Being comprises the horizon of understanding for the intelligibility of beings, 
it dictates the range of meanings beings can have for us. The thesis  thus follows Sheehan 
in claiming Sein essentially can be taken as 'meaning' so the phrase 'the being of beings' 
means “the meaningful presence of things to human concerns”4 so that “Heidegger's 
discourse about 'being' is to be understood as a discourse about meaningfulness, one that 
ultimately focused on the source of meaningfulness.”5 Meaning is how we take beings to 
be in our comportment towards them and does not inhere in entities, all non-Dasein are 
unmeaning (nothingness); the sheer present-at-hand that can 'assault Dasein's Being'. 
Dasein's meaning itself originates in Being through which entities are revealed as beings  
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and thus "can be appropriated in understanding, or can remain relegated to non-
understanding"6 and remain un-meaning present-at-hand entities. 
Ereignis 
By the time of Identity and Difference Ereignis as the "belonging together that concerns 
man and Being."7 replaces Being as Heidegger's guiding term, thinking the relation of Da 
and Sein rather than trying to reach Being through analysis of Dasein. Being (Sein) is not 
Beingness (Seiendheit), but nor is it Ereignis that gives Sein. These three usages are 
sometimes conflated throughout Heidegger's work as the way progresses back to its origin 
in appropriation, inquiry into each must progress through the others as each only is 
through the other; from the Seiendheit of beings, to Sein, to Ereignis as the appropriative 
process that originates meaning in relation with the unmeaning of Da. Ereignis gives 
Being and is only this giving, Ereignis has no meaning beyond the Sein it enables, and 
Sein no meaning beyond the beingness of the beings it enables disclosure of; Ereignis 
only is in the manner in which appropriation occurs (only as a specific epoch). 
 Ereignis speaks the hypen of Da-Sein that gives both and replaces Dasein as the 
essence of the human constituting the horizon for the meaning of Being through this 
relation. Despite this Heidegger's prime concern remained the conditions of possibility 
for meaning and the regional ontology of Dasein remains fundamental ontology as "Being 
is present and abodes only as it concerns man through the claim it makes on him. For it 
is man, open toward Being, who alone lets Being arrive as presence."8 There ‘is’ neither 
Being nor the essence of humanity outside of their relation to each other. The relation is 
prior to what it relates, Da and Sein can only understood in terms of their mutual 
belonging so that "In truth, we can then not even say any longer that 'Being' and 'man' 'be' 
the same in the sense that they belong together; for in so saying we still let both be for 
themselves."9 Ereignis refers to a relation between meaningfulness and those that 
experience meaning that comprises  the horizon needed for beings to manifest as 
meaningful through the lived human existence it enables; it equally names Being and 
Nothingness, meaning and unmeaning, through their mutual interpenetration. 
 Ereignis would also seem to involve more than two elements; Da, Sein and entities 
are all gathered together in appropriation and related to nothingness, yet the third is not 
constituted solely by this relation. Being not only requires man as an ontic entity but also 
requires prior entities to be revealed as beings. Without Ereignis or Being we cannot say 
entities 'are' but their 'notness' is not a total lack of existence and Ereignis is dependent 
upon this notness of entities. Heidegger does not address the nature of the entities that are 
appropriated to the same extent as he does the Da and Sein, possible viewing such an 
interpretation as too derivative of scientific objectivity, yet implies this element in his talk 
of the inherent possibilities required for releasement. This theme will emerge more in 
chapter 1.2 and section 3 in relation to the gathering of jitai upon its homeground and the 
possibility of scientific disclosures allowing for elemental objectivity. 
 Ontology as the study of Being can thus be called thought of Ereignis as the origin 
and possibility of meaning (as opposed to any specific epochal meaning), including the 
related topics of both the meaning of the self and the role the self plays in disclosing 
meaning. Ontology does not define Being but asks “Whereon is each answer to the 
question of being based i.e., wherein, after all, is the unconcealment of Being  
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grounded?”10; how the relation of meaning and unmeaning in appropriation makes it 
possible for beings to show themselves. 
 
Nothingness 
A definition is an ascription of a meaning, nothingness is to partly name the process that 
enables such ascriptions of meaning; as thinking must be about something nothingness 
can only be approached obliquely through its relation to the experience of meaning it is a 
condition for. Whilst not a term that conceptual representation can give any objective 
reference, and as an abstract noun impossible to coherently define except in terms of 
general negation, Heidegger’s identifying of Nothingness with Being means that a partial 
definition has already been given above. Meditative reflection upon Being must dwell 
upon the nihilating of the nothing and "because it thinks Being, thinking thinks the 
nothing"11; Being and Nothing belong together so must be dealt with at a single stroke. 
But that both he and Nishitani also kept them as separate terms indicates a difference of 
emphasis within the process of the disclosure of meaning. 
In Being and Time the ontological meaning of nothingness is said to remain obscure yet 
“Ontology and logic, to be sure, have exacted a great deal from the ‘not’ and have thus 
made its possibilities visible in a piecemeal fashion",12 but to understand the question of 
nothingness is said to first require "taking the meaning of Being in general as a theme and 
clarifying it”.13 The nothingness behind the 'not' is not explicitly thought in Being and 
Time yet constitutes Dasein in its nullity and guilt, it structures the authentic temporality 
of Dasein that provides the horizon for the disclosure of Being. This ontological 
uncertainty regarding the ‘not’ swiftly gives way to the claim “that the nothing is more 
original than the ‘not’ and negation,”14 and that "nothingness...is nothing negative. It 
belongs to being present. Being and nothingness are not side by side. One intercedes on 
behalf of the other...Being 'is' just as little as nothingness, but both are."15 As integral to 
the meaning of beings and at one with the disclosure of them rather than in opposition to 
or the negation of them, “The nothing does not remain the indeterminate opposite of 
beings but reveals itself as belonging to the Being of beings,” 16 a belonging realized 
through the Da-Sein relation in which man as place-holder for nothingness “is holding 
the place open for the complete other of being, so that in its openness there can be such a 
thing as being present (Being)." 17 The Being of beings is only made manifest when 
Dasein attends to the difference between beings and non-being in nihilation, that both 
meaning and non-meaning are separate to that which has meaning (that which ‘is’), and 
form the horizon that enables things ‘to be’. The difference between what ‘is’ and that 
which allows it to ‘be’ was, in Being and Time, said to be the ontological difference 
between Being and beings. By the writing of What is Metaphysics? the previously 
ontologically uncertain ‘not’ had come to fulfil this role, that beings are not nothingness 
is that through virtue of which beings can ‘be’. The question of the meaning of Being is 
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pertinently; “Why does the forgetfulness of Being dominate, and from where does it 
come?”18; a question dealt with in section 2 of the thesis. 
 Nothingness first strikes the ear with the connotation of negation; a literal no-thing 
(not-anything) that refers to a specific absence of something which could or should be 
there, an abstract exaggeration of which would be a total absence as the counter-concept 
to the totality of entities. No-thing can also be heard as no specific thing, as an absence 
of exclusive distinctions or differentiations that commonly delimit entities; neither simple 
negation of existence nor a being; "Nothing is never nothing; it is just as little a 
something...it is Being itself".19 In this sense Nothingness is heard with a similar 
resonance as Being for both share that they are no specific being, and in some ontologies 
as non-differentiated  they enable possible differentiated manifestations (one example of 
this could be the Vedantic Brahman describable only as neti-neti, ‘not this’). Every 
revealing is also a concealing of alternate possibilities thus permeated by a ‘not’ that 
pertains to finite possibility and freedom; Being is constituted equally by what is absent 
as what is present and so its meanings remain contingent and inherently plural. This aspect 
of nothingness as positive potential, as concealed possibilities that have not-yet been 
articulated as meaning, can also be seen in Śūnyatā having as its Sanskrit root ‘svabhva’ 
(hollow or swollen, pregnant with possibility) and the non-differentiation encountered in 
anxious experience of the field of nihility when the erasure of meaningful significance 
leads to an experience of non-differentiation in meaning. 
 When properly encountered as the condition for the possibility of disclosure 
nothingness shows itself as an aspect of the appropriative process of Ereignis; un-meaning 
is shown to be one with meaning; "Nothing, conceived as the pure 'Other' than what-is, is 
the veil of Being."20 Whilst Heidegger often uses the term Being for the entire process of 
the disclosure of meaning it most properly names the revealing aspect, with nothingness 
naming the withdrawal and concealment (un-meaning) of Being through which beings 
are revealed as meaningful. Being and nothingness can thus be seen as two facets of the 
same process described with a difference of priority or emphasis yet each notion contains 
the other, both indicate a relation of strife between meaning and non-meaning that allows 
for the disclosure of meaning. The relation between meaning and un-meaning; revealing 
and concealing, Being and Nothingness, is what makes possible the meaningful 
disclosures of Da-Sein. 
Ontology of Nothingness 
The integral relation of Being and Nothingness would seem to make the phrase 'ontology 
of nothingness' a redundancy; but the intent of the phrase is to highlight both how un-
meaning is an essential condition of possibility for the manifestation of meaning and is 
the feature of disclosure that gives rise to the experience of nihilism from within Ereignis 
itself. The ontology of nothingness thus inquires into how the man-Being relation (Da-
Sein) is constituted by or related to Nothingness; how the nihility of self, beings and world 
enable Ereignis through the strife and identity of meaning and unmeaning resulting in the 
realization of nihilism. The Da-Sein relation as constituting the essential human self 
means that ontology is self-inquiry, what it means for us to be who we are. The thinking 
of Ereignis as the mutual constitution of man and Being (Da-Sein) is reflection on the 
relation of self and meaning. 
Śūnyatā 
Whilst Nishitani avoids term ontology Asakura holds that his thought “must be seen as 
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ontological in nature”21 as it moves from beings to their Being as empty so that “The 
being of beings presents itself in our /// meditation as our awareness of the ontological 
deepens and develops.”22 The definition of the essence of religion Nishitani gives at the 
start of Religion and Nothingness emerges throughout the work to encapsulate his 
understanding of Śūnyatā in terms of the process of self-identity between the self and 
reality is clearly ontological in nature. Yet he also uses the term ‘religion’ throughout the 
text to denote both aspects of, or perspectives within, that reality and ontic religions in 
the traditional narrow definition of the term. This highlights two related flaws that run 
throughout his work; his tendency to favour one element in the overcoming of 
dichotomies, and how the lack of a systematic unity can lead to a conflation of the 
ontological, existential, axiological and ontic senses of his core terms. 
Nishitani holds the essence of religion to be “the self-awareness of reality, or, more 
correctly, the real self-realization of reality. By the ‘self-awareness of reality’ I mean both 
our becoming aware of reality and, at the same time, the reality realizing itself in our 
awareness.”23 ‘Realize’ is here to be taken as both denoting ‘actualize’ and ‘understand’, 
it is always with this dual resonance that the term is used both in his text and this thesis. 
He goes on to claim that “our ability to perceive reality means that reality realizes 
(actualizes) itself in us; that this in turn is the only way that we can realize (appropriate 
through understanding) the fact that reality is so realizing itself in us; and that in so doing 
the self-realization of reality takes place.”24 Self and reality are only realized through a 
mutual appropriation prior to any individual existence;  that “The real perception of reality 
is our real mode of being itself and constitutes the realness that is the true reality of our 
existence” meaning “the self-realization of reality can only take place by causing our 
existence to become truly real”25. This conjunction of the realization of the true self and 
reality matches Heideggerian ontology as in Dasein's coming to awareness of the mutual 
appropriation of self and reality (inquiry into awareness of our awareness) Ereignis comes 
to self-awareness; reality realizing itself in our awareness as we become aware of it. 
Yet throughout Religion and Nothingness the term 'religion' is used in three distinct 
senses; the ontological definition that is Śūnyatā, the teleological worldview (or life axis) 
of existence that is only one element of the wider understanding, and the ontic religions 
through which the first two elements partly arise to awareness. The latter two uses have 
a corresponding opposed understanding of science; either the nihility of the mechanistic 
worldview (the death axis, which along with the life axis are the poles between which 
modern man is pulled and that must be reconciled for our existence to be transformed), 
or the institutions and individuals engaged is the scientific enterprise. With the primary 
ontological understanding of religion no such opposed understanding seems possible, just 
as Gestell is not the opposite of Ereignis but occurs within its horizon. At times it is not 
made clear which of these usages is being invoked, they oscillate, merge and are used to 
support each other even when they are more properly seen as conflicting or as only one 
incomplete aspect of one another. 
 Each element of his understanding of religion would seem to need its own term, 
and the use of the same term for the process of fundamental reality and one view within 
reality to which another view is opposed can give the impression that Nishitani prioritizes 
religion as a worldview or ontic phenomenon over their dichotomous opposites due to the 
use of the same term for the ontological process that encompasses both sides of these 
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oppositions. The reality of Śūnyatā is not capable of opposition to secular or scientific 
thought since Śūnyatā is to overcome the very notion of such duality, but the ambivalence 
of his usage complicates his claim that “The problem of religion and science is the most 
fundamental problem facing contemporary man.”26 This use of the term religion is clearly 
different to the overarching ontological definition and will be addressed in depth in the 
chapters on nihilism. 
 This same trend is also found in Nishitani's use of the term Śūnyatā that as 
encapsulating Nishitani’s ontological definition of religion is a broad unifying term 
denoting; the self-identity of absolute emptiness and being as suchness, self-emptying as 
the process of meanings manifestation that discloses this suchness, true self-realization 
as the realization of elemental subjectivity (the self as mask of absolute nothingness), and 
Buddhist practice within the framework of the Great Compassion. This unity is a legacy 
of Nagarjuna, who Inada characterizes as identifying three facets of experiential reality; 
“the empirically grounded relational nature of the rise of all perceptions or events, the 
nonempirical "empty" nature in virtue of the dynamically relational or dependent nature, 
and the total or holistic nature of an enlightened way of life”27 so that sunyata or 
“emptiness is a unifying principle without which the whole experiential process would 
not be what it is.” 28  The various understandings of Śūnyatā can be distinguished within 
conventional thought but the true meaning of the term lies with their self-identity. In line 
with this understanding the term ‘Śūnyatā’ is to be used solely to designate being-sive-
nothingness understood as a process of self-identity, emptiness for the facet of that 
process when artificially considered as separate. The term religion will be restricted to its 
traditional Western usage of denoting specific belief systems. Religion in its essential 
ontological definition will be replaced with Śūnyatā or referred to as 'ontological religion', 
and in its perspectival sense with the terms life axis or teleological perspective. This 
should not unduly distort Nishitani's work as he uses all such terms as synonyms for his 
various conceptions of religion. 
Soku / sive 
Śūnyatā does not merely involve the overcoming of specific dualities and dichotomies, 
but the  overcoming of the very notion of duality and dichotomous thinking. The 
standpoint does not begin from “a separation of subject and object and then work toward 
their reunification”29 and nor is a simple monism, instead it preserves the differentiation 
of constituents within a relation of self-identity. The use of the term sive (Jap. Soku) is 
intended to demonstrate this and when “Put between two contradictory concepts...it is 
meant to draw off the total reality of the two poles into itself as their constitutive and 
ontologically prior unity. It indicates the only point or ‘place’ at which the opposites are 
realized and display their true reality.”30, not in the form of joining or alternating between 
the elements but a simultaneous superimposition in which both aspects are equally real. 
Whilst not directly commensurate with the appropriative event of Ereignis the hyphen of 
Da-Sein can be thought in a similar sense of mutual constitution as that of the sive 
relation; an identity of belonging rather than uniformity. 
Jones holds that the Kyoto thinkers “grant the legitimacy of this dialectic without 
question, and invoke it often",31 and whilst paradox is essential to reality they fail to spell 
out when and why it is valid. Jones points out Nishitani does not overcome every 
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dichotomy and never “uses the dialectic to relate abstract and concrete, atheism and 
theism, enlightened and unenlightened, dynamic and static, "real" contradiction and 
"merely formal logical" contradiction." 32 (Abe does use the phrasing sacred-sive-profane 
in relation to Christ, but in basing the relation within the symbolism of a religion does not 
go as far as atheism-sive-theism) Jones concludes that soku may more resemble “a 
rhetorical device rather than a genuine logical relation”; 33 a tool/way towards 
enlightenment that seeks to achieve a fundamental attunement, yet which cannot be used 
to question these goals. Such a logic of non-self is held by Jones to be preferable to 
traditional logic when it comes to existential realities that are always in state of becoming 
so refer to something they are not, viewing this separation of logics as perfectly valid34  
and contributing to a worthwhile understanding of reality.35 Yet this retains a dichotomy 
within sunyata regarding reason and logic, a division of conventional and ultimate reality 
that leads to a problematic regarding the role of reason within sunyata to be returned to 
later. 
The soku relation can be elucidated by Nishitani’s treatment of life and death, whilst the 
content of these ideas is to be addressed later the form of the relation highlights how “in 
truth reality is two-layered...It is not as if only one of the representations were true, so 
that all the others could be reduced to it. Reality eludes all such attempts at reduction. In 
the same sense, the aspect of life and the aspect of death are equally real, and reality is 
that which appears now as life and now as death. It is both life and death, and at the same 
time is neither life nor death. It is what we have to call the nonduality of life and death.”36 
Śūnyatā as nondual reality adopts the standpoint of the sive so that “Everything can be 
seen as a kind of ‘double exposure’ of life and death, of being and nihility.”37 Both 
constituents of a dichotomous relation are shown through the sive relation to be a self-
identity of illusion and reality, of self and non-self, and this relation of self-identity in 
non-self-identity is the true form of their suchness. The nature of this claim is explicated 
throughout the section and provides the context for Nishitani's formulation samsāra-sive-
nirvāna that is to be vital for sections 2 and 3. For now an example of the vital role of the 
sive relation in the theory of Śūnyatā and how it indicates ‘suchness’ is to be considered, 
an example pertaining to the relation of emptiness and being that also highlights a case of 
the ‘semantic drift’ in relation to Nishitani’s core concepts mentioned earlier. 
Nothingness and Emptiness 
Nishitani says of true emptiness that “it is to be realized as something united to and self-
identical with being”38 and that “the phrase ‘being-sive-nothingness’ requires that one 
take up the stance of the ‘sive’ and from there view being as being and nothingness as 
nothingness”39. Nothingness is not seen here as the negation of being but as paradoxically 
identical to being even whilst maintaining its own identity. This idea is at the heart of the 
examination of jitai (non-substantial sunbstantiality) as both reality and illusion in the 
next chapter, but is a relation sometimes obscured by variations in Nishitani’s use of the 
terms nothingness, emptiness and Śūnyatā. Nishitani often uses the phrases ‘absolute 
nothingness’, emptiness and Śūnyatā interchangeably (sometimes using being-sive-
emptiness rather than being-sive-nothingness). Jitai and non-self are also sometimes 
spoken of as a state of emptiness rather than in terms of their relation in the self-emptying 
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process of world. The emptiness or nothingness of the formulation being-sive-
nothingness that is self-identical with being must be distinguished from the absolute 
emptiness of Śūnyatā that encompasses both sides of that sive relation. Both Śūnyatā and 
the emptiness of the sive relation are referred to as emptied of representation and in this 
sense absolute emptiness. Emptiness not yet understood in terms of the sive relation is 
termed relative emptiness, but the use of the phrase ‘self-emptying’ often blurs the 
conventional usage distinction between Śūnyatā and the emptiness of the sive relation, 
although in truth they are always self-identical. 
Śūnyatā as absolute emptiness is distinguished from relative emptiness in that “Emptiness 
in the sense of Śūnyatā is emptiness only when it empties itself even of the standpoint 
that represents it as some ‘thing’ that is emptiness”.40 Such self-emptying emptiness is 
only present as the process of emptying rather than any ‘state’ of being already empty. 
Emptying is the process of meanings manifestation and in this manner is correlate to 
Ereignis as an ongoing event of appropriation, both Ereignis and Śūnyatā are existential 
ontologies; a manifestation of meaning arising only in identity with a process of self-
realization. Both express a limit-condition that is only indicated by the ‘things’ they 
enable as “things as they are in themselves, where they are on their homeground, just 
what they are and in their suchness, are one with emptiness. For the field of emptiness 
stands opened at the very point that things emerge into being.”41  Being only shows itself 
through beings, and in doing so also withdraws, when both the presence and absence are 
seen as dwelling together within the sive then the field of emptiness as entire process is 
realized, and with it the true being / suchness of beings. 
Śūnyatā as the horizon for disclosure that is self-identical with what is disclosed embraces 
both existence and non-existence (thing and no-thing), and this self-identity is what 
emerges through and makes possible the process of meanings manifestation. It is only as 
so self-emptied of all representation and objectivity that emptiness “is at bottom one with 
being, even as being is at bottom one with emptiness. At the elemental source where being 
appears as one with emptiness, at the home-ground of being, emptiness appears as one 
with being”42. Śūnyatā in its truest sense, from the standpoint of the sive, is no more 
emptiness than it is being and could be formulated just as easily in terms of absolute being 
as absolute nothingness (indeed the be-ification of jitai to be considered does just this). 
Just as when Heidegger speaks of Being this most truly indicates a process relating Being 
and Nothingness so too in the case of Śūnyatā as ‘absolute emptiness’ a term is used for 
the ontologically primordial that is more reminiscent of one side of the relation it 
comprises, a relation of two elements that are not contradictory but self-identical in their 
differentiation and thus constituted solely by their relation in that process. 
Abe claims Zen has a tradition of “strong criticism of attachment to emptiness”43, but the 
occasional lack of systematic use of terminology does lead to elements of similar 
reification or favouring of one side of various sive relations. For example Abe’s 
statements such as “the standpoint of emptiness or Śūnyatā in Zen is not a negative but 
an affirmative one”44, when it is not negative or affirmative but negation-sive-affirmation 
overcoming the duality between negation and affirmation, may arise from alternating 
between conventional usages of terms like negative and affirmative and stricter usages 
relating to Śūnyatā proper. 





43 Frederick Franck, The Buddha Eye: An Anthology of the Kyoto School and Its Contemporaries (World Wisdom, 






presentation; “Buddhists emphasize ‘emptiness’ and say that everything is empty…quite 
misleading...I think that ‘Everything is empty’ may be more adequately rendered in this 
way: ‘Everything is just as it is’.”45 This ‘just as it is’ indicates the ‘suchness’ of self and 
things that is made manifest through self-emptying to reveal “not that the self is empty, 
but that emptiness is self, not that things are empty, but that emptiness is things”46; 
suchness denoting the identity of Śūnyatā with both self and world. This helps capture 
the notion of Śūnyatā as being-sive-emptiness, the emphasis should perhaps not be so 
much on emptiness (or Being for Heidegger) but the role they play in the process of 
Being-sive-Nothingness that is as much one aspect as the other. Even in clarifying 
Śūnyatā through suchness an uncertainty of presentation remains within Abe’s essay in 
such claims as “the realization of suchness is the positive aspect of the realization of 
emptiness”47. Although I would disagree with this phrasing and would prefer to use 
Nishitani’s terminology and phrase it ‘suchness is emptiness-sive-being’ Abe’s assertion 
that suchness gives a ‘positive’ content to the process of self-emptying and prevents the 
process having a null or negative effect of simply stripping away ego is informative; the 
non-self of Śūnyatā is to be seen as original suchness of self instead of a literal ‘no’ self. 
For Abe this suchness is not a static state (neither past, present nor future), but the 
dynamic beginning and culmination of an ongoing ethical endeavour in which “When 
you realize your own suchness, you realize the suchness of everything at once”48 so that 
“Everything is now truly empty, and this means that all things make themselves present 
here and now, just as they are, in their original reality. They present themselves in their 
suchness, their tathatā.” 49   
Nishitani-sive-Heidegger 
This broad approach to absolute nothingness as self-emptying brings Nishitani and 
Heidegger along the same way, despite Nishitani clarifying the distinction of relative and 
absolute nothingness partly through oblique critique of Heidegger as thinking nothingness 
only in its relative form within the confines of What is Metaphysics? In relation to the 
nihiliation of das Nichts Waldenfels notes that “While Nishitani agrees with Heidegger’s 
approach as far as it goes, he cannot hide the fact that for him it does not go far enough.”50 
Despite finding Heidegger to be closer to the reality of being-sive-nothingness than his 
Western contemporaries in taking nothingness as the ground of the self he holds that 
Heidegger retains the bias of self-existence even whilst the self is seen as a realization of 
nothingness through anxiety; “in Heidegger’s talk of self-existence as ‘held suspended in 
nothingness’...traces of the representation of nothingness as some ‘thing’ that is 
nothingness still remain”51. Nishitani seems to critique Heidegger mainly on the basis of 
his use of phrases such as ‘being-upheld in nothingness’ and the ‘abyss of nothingness’ 
in relation to the meaning of Dasein, claiming that if Dasein is suspended in nothingness 
then nothingness is still an external object to Dasein as its negation, that nothingness is 
still objectified as an ‘other’ to existence even if only to a small extent. 
Steffney, although not comparing Heidegger to Nishitani specifically, broadly agrees with 
his critique of Heidegger in that “despite his efforts to transcend Western metaphysical 
thinking, Heidegger is still confined to its limitations by thinking of man in relational - 
even though it be integral – terms”52. That Da and Sein, and Being and Nothingness, are 
 
45 Ibid., 209. 
46 Unno, The Religious Philosophy of Nishitani Keiji: Encounter with Emptiness, 30.  
47 Franck, The Buddha Eye: An Anthology of the Kyoto School and Its Contemporaries, 213.  
48 Ibid.  
49Nishitani, Religion and Nothingness, 34. 
50 AbNoth 69 
51Nishitani, Religion and Nothingness, 96. 
52 John Steffney, "Transmetaphysical Thinking in Heidegger and Zen Buddhism," Philosophy East and West 27, no. 3 





constituted by their relations to one another that allow for the disclosure of meaning does 
not go far enough towards the self-identity of these aspects for Steffney, who does see a 
more radical self-identity within Zen thought. As much is held to be exhibited by the 
guiding question of ‘Why are there beings at all and not much rather the nothing?’ that 
shows dualistic thinking, so that nothingness still stands beyond man and Being, whereas 
“Zen would say that, though phenomenally a difference can be perceived, ultimately no 
difference exists.”53. But the guiding question that is claimed as dualistic is only the start 
of a path of thought that leads to the self-identity of Being and Nothingness, a kōan to 
spur thought along its way. Steffney claims that “Nonbeing hides within 
Being...Nonbeing hides behind beings”54 implies a duality absent from a Zen thought that 
“insists on transcending the very notions of Being and Nonbeing, of concealment and 
unconcealment.”55 and is paradoxical not integral. But this integral relation harbours the 
same ‘paradoxical’ identity as the being-sive-nothingness of Śūnyatā, both are a relational 
process of self-identity, and I find it hard to see how such an ‘integral’ relation is less of 
a self-identity. Steffney seems to overlook that for Heidegger being and nothingness are 
aspects of the Being process (Ereignis) and takes them to be distinct and related, and in 
line with Nishitani holds that no matter how integral or mutually constituting a relation is 
it remains too dualistic and objectified. 
In Heidegger's later texts this self-identity is thought more explicitly as a belonging prior 
to its constituents bringing it nearer to thought of Śūnyatā than any merely integral 
relation. Da and Sein only are as mutually appropriated and it is "From this 
belonging...man and Being have first received those determinations of essence by which 
man and Being are grasped metaphysically in philosophy."56 Like Śūnyatā Ereignis 
always manifests as an awareness self-identical with the fields of awareness it gives so 
that in this appropriation “we witness a belonging together of man and Being in which 
the letting belong first determines the manner of the 'together' and its unity." 57  
Such constitutive belonging aligns Heidegger's thought with Nishitani's claim of the 
personal self as the mask of absolute nothingness to be discussed in chapter 1.4. Ereignis 
as the hyphen of Da-Sein, like the sive, is more primordial than integral and before self-
identity is realized or thought that appropriative belonging itself must be heard. As also 
speaking being-sive-nothingness Ereignis indicates withdrawal, thus the nothingness that 
is the essence of nihilism, as innate to disclosure. That "The oblivion belongs to the 
difference because the difference belongs to the oblivion," 58 implies nihilism as Gestell 
is itself self-identical with Sein and integral to the Ereignis process, the role of this in the 
narrative of nihilism's emergence and relation to that which saves is to be explicated in 
section 2. 
I am more inclined to agree with Dallmayr’s judgement that Nishitani’s criticism of 
Heidegger is “dubious or at least puzzling...his comments can hardly be reconciled with 
Heidegger’s texts”59. That nothingness is realized, in Nishitani’s sense of the term, in 
anxiety attests to it as constituting Da-Sein as the interrelation that makes possible the 
manifestation of beings in such a manner that the ‘suspendedness’ of Dasein in nonbeing 
denotes “Dasein’s exposure not to an alien domain outside of being but to its own intrinsic 
abyss”60. Dallmayr goes on to point out that Heidegger explicitly states nothingness is not 
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an ‘is’ but as possibilizing the disclosure of beings is an integral part of their essence; “In 
the Being of beings the nihiliation of the nothing occurs”.61 Nothingness is accordingly 
not even portrayed as a ‘thing’ in a marginal sense but is “a ‘nihilating’ potency 
participating obliquely in the ongoing happening or disclosure of being”62, as one aspect 
of the dual process of disclosure. Neither Being, Dasein nor Ereignis can be seen as 
entities held in relation, but are solely constituted as a relational process. The relation 
between Dasein and its nothingness (its ontological meaning) is accordingly one of self-
identity, the process of nihilation is how beings are disclosed and the disclosure of beings 
is the essence of Dasein, so the nothingness that is experienced in nihilation is most 
properly experienced as the very homeground of Dasein. For Dallmayr the relation of 
being and nothingness in Heidegger’s work fits the paradigm of the sive relation as a 
‘discordant mutuality’, a self-identity that resists uniformity whilst revealing the process 
in which both come to realization through and as the other, thus paralleling the non-
duality of Nishitani’s thought rather than relying on integral relations. 
Ereignis as naming the essence of the human as an integral relation to nothingness would 
then parallel the relation of self and absolute nothingness in Religion and Nothingness in 
naming the true self of elemental subjectivity. Nishitani’s critique seems to take nihilation 
as a process Dasein is part of but that as a process remains apart from Dasein, integral not 
identical in Steffney’s sense. Such ‘relational’ themes and the favouring of either element 
of being-sive-nothingness within Heidegger’s thought seem to result from the caprices of 
language rather than the core of his ideas. At times the constraints of language compel the 
treatment of the constituents of the relation as discrete but the concern is always the unity 
of the relation, the sive of Being and Nothingness, of Da and Sein, even when it seems 
necessary to treat one of the constituents on its own terms. Another casualty in 
Heidegger's struggle against the nature of metaphysical language is the reification implied 
in 'es gibt'; that "the 'it' that here 'gives' is Being itself"63. The 'it' only is in terms of an 
appropriative relation so is not reified into a being, as it only 'is' in terms of Da-Sein so it 
is that which we are mask of as process/event rather than a 'being', yet cannot be spoken 
of otherwise. That thought is of Sein not Seiendheit means "how Being is must remain an 
open question for the careful attention of thinking”64 and the Da-Sein relation cannot be 
captured in assertions only indicated poetically, nature of such essential language and its 
relation to the coming to pass of the hyphen taken up in section 3. 
 The Nishitani interpretation that follows can fall within the broadly Heideggerian 
understanding of the Da-Sein relation (and vice versa), and I am unsure if Steffney would 
consider Nishitani as too integral and ‘non-Zen’ by the standards of his own Zen 
interpretation. The parallels that are to be drawn between Heidegger and Nishitani should 
demonstrate a shared overcoming of the very notion of duality in regards to such 
fundamental elements of the disclosive process, yet also some shared problems in their 
approach given the context of their aims. Ereignis comprises both being and nothingness 
and both are concealed in the event of giving; yet Nishitani prioritizes nothingness and 
Heidegger being, both can be seen as referring one back to the other and failing to achieve 
nonduality in presentation. Whether this results in them failing to move beyond 
representative thought to a true self-emptying of both presence and absence that leaves 
them self-identical yet not reduced to the other will be questioned throughout the 
following chapters. The possibility that this leads Heidegger to overlook the preservation 
of Sein's withdrawal/oblivion in the saving epoch is to be considered in chaps 2.6 and 
section 3. 
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It can also be claimed that Nishitani strays dangerously close to similar reification of 
nothingness, the imperfect metaphors he criticizes Heidegger for using often seem similar 
to his own. He states Śūnyatā “can also be termed an absolute transcendence of being, as 
it absolutely denies and distances itself from any standpoint shackled in any way 
whatsoever to being. In this sense, emptiness can well be described as ‘outside’ of and 
absolutely ‘other’ than the standpoint shackled to being, provided we avoid the 
misconception that emptiness is some ‘thing’ distinct from being and subsisting ‘outside’ 
of it.”65 Whilst warning against such misconceptions his dualistic terminology allows for 
similar critiques as those he makes of Heidegger when removed from the overall context 
of his thought. At times his phrases invite integral interpretations themselves; “emptiness 
can only appear as a self-identity with being, in a relationship of sive by which both being 
and emptiness are seen as co-present from the start and structurally inseparable from one 
another”66, that it is only a self-identity in appearance, a structural relation of co-presence. 
The improvement of Nishitani by Heideggerian notions is pointed to by Dallmayr when 
he claims that in relation to these dualistic traces “Attention  to Heidegger's  writings...can  
rescue  these statements  from  opacity  or contradiction, thereby enhancing   the   
persuasiveness of  Nishitani's work--just  as the  latter  can  serve  to elucidate Heidegger's 
exploration of being-sive-nothingness as an ontological happening (or Ereignis).”67 Both 
thinkers stray into metaphysical phrasing at times, and can aid one another in the 
identification and eradication of these by providing context for one another’s thought. 
And, as will soon be seen, also highlight problems in the characterization of these self-
identities in each others thought that may otherwise remain hidden. 
Such metaphysical remnants and lingering reification can also be partly attributed to the 
inclusion of being within Śūnyatā that leads to Nishitani’s ascription of positive content 
to the term in defiance of Nagarjuna’s warnings against wandering back into the realm of 
self-being. In identifying Śūnyatā as the ‘suchness’ of reality Nishitani not only moves 
the term towards a positive doctrine rather than a negative methodology but in retaining 
the emphasis on liberation and compassion through enlightenment, subsuming the 
positive ontological doctrine to existential and ethical concerns, gives more concrete 
ethical content to enlightenment beyond traditional non-discriminative practices. 
Nishitani seemingly adopts a position through elucidating and deepening the 
understanding of original non-position. Heisig’s claim that for Nishitani Śūnyatā “is not 
so much a philosophical ‘position’ as it is the achievement of an original self-awareness”68 
that dispels ignorance overly downplays the strength of Nishitani’s claims and the 
philosophically systematic manner in which he tries to portray them but does highlight 
how he blends numerous strands of Buddhist thought into a paradoxical Zen unity of 
silence and theory. In taking a more ‘positive’ stand on Śūnyatā Nishitani only deepens 
the understanding of the human condition and manages to preserve the original core of 
the idea whilst using it to explain more thoroughly the origin of meaning and relation to 
meaninglessness. His building upon Nagarjuna's thought on the self-identity of samsāra-
sive-nirvāna will later be seen as indicating the necessity of taking a position for non-
position to be practically realized. 
Awareness and Realization 
Whilst many of Nishitani’s spatial metaphors, such as of circumference, circles and 
centres seem overly metaphysical his metaphor of fields invokes how “our everyday idea 
of ‘place’ is not a mere nonexistent ‘nothing’ and yet neither is it an existent ‘something’. 
It is more in the nature of what Jaspers calls an ‘encompassing’ that allows things to exist 
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where they are: each on its own, and yet all together in a sort of oneness.”69 Field is not a 
background but a homeground that constitutes things not just sets the stage for them, 
“defining their most intimate relationships and thus constitutive of their very reality”70. 
Gilkey finds Nishitani’s language to revolve around  “the very symbolic metaphor of a 
medium...In each case the medium is that in and through which entities are immanent 
within them”71. Such fields/mediums are other to the collective entities they provide a 
horizon for, leading to Nishitani’s possibly misleading statements on absolute 
transcendence, yet do not exist apart from such entities. 
 Nishitani defines the field of Śūnyatā through the negation of the successive fields, 
yet through the self-identical incorporation of previous fields Śūnyatā is given a more 
positive content than its traditional formulation. The progression of integral stages 
Steffney finds in Heidegger’s thought; Dasein to Being-Nonbeing to Ereignis, is related 
to similarly problematic integral language in Nishitani’s discussion of Śūnyatā as a ‘field’ 
that emerges from a progression from the field of consciousness to that of nihility before 
reaching Śūnyatā. This progression is not a linear succession of states but a progressive 
deepening of awareness that reveals the fields to be self-identical as simultaneous 
possibilities of disclosure. Each progresses to a deeper level of self-awareness propelled 
by reflection on the problems inherent within them. From the field of consciousness with 
the self-enclosed egoistic self, subject-object dichotomy and attendant  paradox of 
representation, through the field of nihility or relative nothingness that nullifies such 
representations to realize nothingness as the ground of the self opening the way for  the 
field of Śūnyatā as the absolute emptiness of being-sive-nothingness where both self and 
world, subject and object, return to their shared homeground. This progressive realization 
moves by way of negation, only to radically negate negation to arrive at Śūnyatā as 
affirmation-sive-negation, “that ‘absolute emptiness’ in which nihilizing emptiness would 
itself be emptied”72 eliminating the traces of reification that remain in relative nothingness 
as external to the self so that it is “not that the self is empty, but that emptiness is the self; 
not that things are empty, but that emptiness is things”73. 
The understanding of each field is preserved as equally real within the realization of 
reality in Śūnyatā, as will be seen the self-conscious self of the field of consciousness ‘is’ 
only as the absolutely empty non-self of Śūnyatā, and vice-versa. Each field is equally 
real and interdependent, none exists except as the unity of them. Yet neither are the fields 
given equal ontological priority, Śūnyatā is the field upon which the other two fields can 
be represented yet cannot itself be represented upon them. Whilst self-identical with them 
Śūnyatā is also ontologically primary (as the condition of possibility for what they take 
as meaning), yet is not a transcendent reality different from the everyday, but just this 
reality in its suchness. 
Whilst Nishitani’s concern is the emergence of Śūnyatā as a result of the deepening self-
realization exhibited in each field, my primary concern is how the experience of nihilism 
related to nihility arises from the ‘ultimate’ ontological reality found upon the field of 
Śūnyatā. Despite its characterization as a field that is radically real nihility is more of a 
transitional stage than those of consciousness or Śūnyatā, a movement between the 
conventional understanding of the field of consciousness and the more radically real 
‘suchness’ of Śūnyatā. “We call it the standpoint of nihility, but in fact it is not a field one 
can stand on in the proper sense of the term. It is no more than a spot we have to ‘run 
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quickly across’”74, it is radically real yet for this very reason cannot be maintained as a 
position. Its transitional character is due to nothingness remaining to an extent objectified 
as external to the self, not yet being ‘owned’ by the self to the core of its existence. It 
remains the negation of existence thus in an external relation to it rendering everyday 
experience too problematic for such a negation to be sustained as a worldview, although 
it will later be questioned whether Nishitani does full justice to the self-identity of nihility 
and Śūnyatā implied by his thought. 
The movement between the fields through immanent critique of key metaphysical 
thinkers often resembles Heidegger’s history of metaphysics, a parallel to be explored 
more in section 2. The extent and nature of the retention of prior fields within Śūnyatā is 
to be explored more fully in chapter 2.4 to provide context for section 3); that samsāra-
sive-nirvāna speaks of the identity of Gestell and the saving power. 
 This identity of the everyday reality of intellectual discrimination and the true reality of 
suchness in Śūnyatā, that whilst we cannot cognize emptiness all that we can cognize is 
indeed truly empty, can be seen as building upon Nagarjuna’s two truth doctrine that may 
illuminate Nishitani’s thought. Nagarjuna posited that reality was neither existence nor 
non-existence but as Śūnyatā was real on two levels of truth; the conventional everyday 
truths of empirical experience, and the non-conceptual ultimate truth of things as they 
really are. Both are real but from the perspective of the latter the former can be seen to be 
empty of own being and limited in its ability to articulate ultimate reality whilst ultimate 
truth can still articulate conventional reality in its suchness. The self-being that was 
denied as ultimate truth was thus reasserted as true and meaningful in the sense of 
conventional truths, but at the same time these truths were ultimately empty and non-
existent. Since Nagarjuna also held samsāra and nirvāna as self-identical these levels of 
truth were also and the reality of phenomena required them both, the self-being that was 
denied by traditional Buddhist thought was reinstated as reality but only as conditioned 
by the ultimate truth of their dependence and illusory nature, an ultimate truth unreachable 
through experience or conventional thought. 'Emptiness' itself is therefore only a 
conventional verbal truth, only a description rather than true status for reality and not to 
be reified as it is only an  ‘illusory’ description of a reality that is beyond even Śūnyatā, 
thus absolute Śūnyatā as ‘self-emptying’. The difference between the two levels of truth 
was held as experiential not ontological, in the ignorance of the everyday we experience 
conventional truth only attaining to the realization of ultimate truth through 
enlightenment as insight into emptiness. Without this self-identity Śūnyatā would simply 
be an integral relation along the lines Steffney critiques. 
The related ‘double exposure’ of the sive relation and the identity of these three fields is 
reminiscent of numerous strands in modern Western philosophy relating to language and 
perspectivism; Wittgenstein's language games, Nietzsche's perspectivism and Rorty’s 
thought on the impossibility of final vocabularies can all help elucidate the broad feel of 
Nishitani’s thought whilst highlighting an important difference.. In Nishitani’s discussion 
of the various horizons on which we can encounter the laws of nature the viability of the 
various contextual vocabularies on the level of conventional truth is asserted, “The laws 
of nature...become manifest on various dimensions and various fields, and we encounter 
them on all these dimensions. We encounter them as much on the field of instinct, where 
man finds himself on par with a dog, and on the field of physical inertia, where man finds 
himself on par with a crust of bread, as we do on the field of our technological 
activities”75. Seemingly contradictory approaches and ways of understanding the same 
phenomena are held as equally constitutive of reality, whether these vocabularies pertain 
 






to the field of consciousness, nihility or Śūnyatā, whether they relate to one aspect or 
another of a sive relation. Within the self-identity of the competing vocabularies a final 
vocabulary of enlightenment as the process that gives rise to such perspectives is found; 
the experience of Śūnyatā as a final framework for all such vocabularies. Śūnyatā as 
fundamental ontology both grounds the contextual vocabularies of regional ontologies 
and speaks of their equal claim to reality/truth despite their illusory nature. This is 
indicative of the essentialism Nishitani operates with in reference to Śūnyatā, a movement 
against the relativism of the postmodern age towards a foundation for world culture; the 
relation of self-identity between Śūnyatā (or Ereignis) and the contextual vocabularies 
they make possible in terms of reality-sive-illusion is to be returned to in chap 2.6 and 
section 3 in terms of samsāra-sive-nirvāna; Gestell as the saving power. 
Heidegger-sive-Nishitani 
Whilst Nishitani's critique of Heidegger is defused through the nature of Ereignis this 
solution also highlights a shared problem concerning the paradoxical nature of both 
Śūnyatā and Ereignis; namely both only are as existentially realized but also act as the 
precondition for such a realization. How does a relation of appropriation come to pass if 
neither element precede that relation, and what does this tell us about the responsibility 
for epochal transitions to and from nihilism? Heidegger talks of Being's need for man; 
"Being is present and abodes only as it concerns man through the claim it makes on him. 
For it is man, open toward Being, who alone lets Being arrive as presence," 76 so that Sein 
is equally appropriated to man as man is to Sein. In discussing the Ereignis relation as 
equally constitutive Heidegger stresses the dependence of both elements upon the other, 
but also at times seems to favour Sein. Ereignis only is as the epochal understanding it 
grants, Being is nothing other than the disclosure of beings it enables, this identity of the 
ontological and existential is why Heidegger speaks of Being's need for man. But need 
implies desire and agency; what does it mean to claim the realization of meaning needs 
itself? What is the 'it' prior to the realizing/giving? 
 Despite needing its Da the destinal sending of Sein is also said to happen 'without 
mediation', complicating the nature of the preparation Heidegger also holds as required 
for the new epoch. Being does not cause beings but could be characterized as self-causing 
since "Being brings itself to pass into its epoch"77 so that "Only Being 'is', only in Being 
and as Being does that which the 'is' names bring itself to pass; that which is, is Being 
from out of its essence." 78  Accordingly the forgetfulness of Being in nihilism does not 
result from a human lack but is integral to the way in which Being grants its truth. "The 
oblivion does not happen to the difference only afterward, in consequence of the 
forgetfulness of human thinking,"79 as withdrawal is integral to the disclosure of meaning. 
The self-disclosure of Sein in Ereignis that names both the danger of nihilism and the turn 
to that which saves is called by Heidegger 'insight into that which is'. This insight is not 
the beholding of beingness but "the disclosing coming-to-pass of the constellation of the 
turning within the coming to presence of Being itself, and that within the epoch of 
Enframing" 80 that marks the turning point in epochal understanding. Yet such self-
disclosure occurs through the understanding of Da so that "In insight, men are the ones 
who are caught sight of" 81 and the traces of Ereignis in Gestell are first glimpsed in 
human nature yet requires that man "renounces human self-will and projects  
 
76 Heidegger, Identity and Difference, 31. 
77 The Question Concerning Technology, and Other Essays, 44. 
78 Ibid. 
79 Identity and Difference, 46. 






himself toward that insight, away from himself"82 and towards the divinities so that we 
may be gathered to the fourfold as mortals. 
 We say too little of Being if "we leave out the being present in the essence of man 
and thereby fail to recognize that this essence itself helps to determine 'Being'. "83 Whilst 
"man is not only affected by nihilism but has an essential share in it" 84 the manner of this 
co-responsibility is given varying interpretations, and there is a tendency to emphasize 
man's role in the accomplishment of nihilism yet emphasize Being's when it comes to the 
saving epoch. For instance Weinmayr places the onus on man’s desire for permanence 
rather than Being's withdrawal as such;  the mutual presencing of jointure is overlooked 
because "man, increasingly struggles against its transitoriness, insists on its continuance, 
on its unbounded presence, and thus begins to establish itself against and eclipse other 
beings."85 This brings Heidegger more into accordance with Buddhist thought on willful 
desire for permanence as the root of dukkha in which removed from simultaneity of 
jointure beings are "continuously unconcealed and present, but in a kind of presence 
whose only criterion is the significance and use of beings for the subject." 86 But such 
insistence on permanence and rejection of transitory lingering also reduces the oblivion 
of Being to a result of man's faculties. 
 In describing how subjectivity becomes determinative of modernity Heidegger 
says "What is decisive is that man himself expressly takes up this position as one 
constituted by himself, that he intentionally maintains it as that taken up by himself...Man 
makes depend upon himself the way in which he must take his stand in relation to 
whatever is as the objective," 87  and in doing so begins the new epoch. This seems to go 
beyond pure response to an epochal sending; the possibility for man to do so may depend 
upon the withdrawal of Being, but the necessity for him to do so would contradict the 
very sense of terms such as 'expressly' and 'intentionally'. 
 The relation of will, desire and representation in the modern age seems to increase 
the emphasis on man's responsibility for the oblivion of Being as well as constituting that 
oblivion raising the issue of how our actions and decisions can directly 'effect' the manner 
of our appropriation. Man as subject "founds and confirms himself as the authoritative 
measure for all standards of measure with which whatever can be accounted as certain...is 
measured off and measured out"88 and in so becoming subject man "can determine and 
realize the essence of subjectivity, always in keeping with the way in which he himself 
conceives and wills himself."89 Yet the extent to which man is compelled to will his 
subjective freedom and determine its essence by the withdrawal of Being in metaphysics 
remains unclear; could such withdrawal have been accomplished differently, or the 
transition to subjectivity refused by man, and if not what would this mean for Heidegger's 
proposed 'solution' to our coming-to-presence as subjective will? 
 Despite laying out the history of metaphysics in terms of pivotal thinkers 
Heidegger states "that does not mean in any way that metaphysics at any given time is 
the accomplishment and possession of the thinker as a personality within the public 
framework of creative cultural activity." 90 Yet the death of God as resulting from the 
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sending of Being is "an act accomplished through man" 91 through the transformation of 
man. It is an accomplishment (realizing) of man, thus a self-transformation (self-
realization); whilst Heidegger says it is accomplished through man the death of God "is 
accomplished in the making secure of the constant reserve by means of which man makes 
secure for himself material, bodily, psychic, and spiritual resources, and this for the sake 
of his own security."92 That the claim is accomplished in 'material and psychic resources', 
and is nothing other than this accomplishing, indicates that Ereignis only occurs 
existentially and psychologically so whilst not caused by man's actions is nothing beyond 
them. The accomplishment of man is 'in order to' correspond to Being, which seems to 
separate out the through and by; the correspondence is achieved by man as one element 
in the Ereignis that is accomplished through both man and Being. 
 Whilst Sein is not caused by Da the relation of Da-Sein comes about by one 
element of the relation bringing itself into accordance with the other. Heidegger ends The 
Turn by asking if insight will come to pass and if we will "correspond to that insight, 
through a looking that looks into the essence of technology and becomes aware of Being 
itself within it?";93 but as Ereignis grants this insight and only comes to pass through 
appropriating Da that which we are to correspond to (thus must be prior to us) has that 
correspondence as the condition for its possibility. The onus of responsibility for Ereignis 
varies whether the emphasis is placed on man's accomplishment of correspondence or the 
prior nature of that we are to correspond to. 
Man as Individual and Collective 
The epochs of metaphysics are not the accomplishments of individual poets and thinkers 
alone; they must also attend to Being as Saying which as a shared horizon for 
understanding also requires a collective accomplishment. Although Da-Sein most 
properly names the integral relation between man and Being in Being and Time Dasein 
would seem to have a referent in the embodied human entity, but exactly what it is that 
has this relation to Being seems somewhat indefinite. The portrayal of Dasein in Being 
and Time seems replete with explicit connotations of selfhood and the necessity of Dasein 
occurring as a specific kind of being as its antecedent condition. A vagueness arises as 
there seems to be no individual-plural distinction; it might refer to an individual human 
or humanity in general, or indeed certain collections of humans as in the Dasein of a 
people or nation. The former individual notion seems more prominent in Being and Time 
where Dasein is characterised as “in each case mine” 94 and where “one must always use 
a personal pronoun when one addresses it: ‘I am’, ‘you are’.” 95  It seems hard to deny 
that Dasein is a replacement term for the human self in Being and Time when Heidegger 
claims that “Dasein is an entity which in each case I myself am,” 96 indicating Dasein as 
entity as much as relation. As "Being-with is in every case a characteristic of one's own 
Dasein; Dasein-with characterizes the Dasein of Others to the extent that it is freed by its 
world for a Being-with"97 Olafson claims Heidegger's discussions of Dasein “make sense 
only on the assumption that there are many such entities.”98 But at times phrases are used 
that open the possibility of it also relating to a community of entities; “we are it, each of  
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us, we ourselves”, 99 so the term could still designate both a plurality and a singular 
collective, and is clearly intended in a collective sense at times. 
 The use in later works of the indefinite article ‘man’ in place of Dasein seems to 
de-emphasize the individuality; talk of the Dasein of a people becomes more common 
until a collective human noun takes its place, possibly due to “Heidegger's desire to 
address the question of who 'we' are on the basis of a concrete place, time, and community 
rather than in the name of an abstract 'humanity' or 'Dasein'.”100 This later conception de-
emphasized the quality of ‘mineness’ and connotations of selfhood to focus more on the 
relational nature of Dasein in terms of how Being has been understood throughout the 
history of metaphysics. The collective notion of man and the approach of a people to the 
world exemplified by its greatest thinkers is a conception more suited to a relation with 
an understanding that is epochal rather than determined by an individuals projects. 
 The communal nature of Dasein as a plurality of understandings of Being leads 
Olafson to claim the core tension in Heidegger's thought is between the singularity of 
Being and plurality of Dasein; that this unity is never adequately explained and the 
attempt to reconcile the singularity of Sein with the plurality of Da led to Heidegger 
separating existence and presence and “to assert as complete an independence of being 
from entities as possible”.101 Like Olafson so too does Hoffman hold there is a tension in 
Heidegger “between those individualistic and subjectivistic aspects of Heidegger’s 
philosophy, on the one hand, and his simultaneous stress on the inevitably public character 
of intelligibility and significance, on the other.”102 A similar problematic will be seen to 
emerge over the following chapters in both the relation between absolute nothingness and 
its individual personal mask as well as the relation of the gathering of individual jitai and 
that of the circuminsessional totality. 
 Despite its dropping from Heidegger’s philosophical vocabulary for the sake of 
convenience the term Dasein is to be retained when discussing Being and Time, even 
though it most truly names a relation that later relegates its referent in that text to the Da 
side of the relation. Although the term is retained its meaning is to be taken in light of 
elements from later works rather than Being and Time alone, and it will be held to be 
commensurate with Heidegger’s later use of the term ‘man’. Regardless of the sense in 
which 'man' is to be heard man does not choose to be subject as this is a destining, but as 
subject we actively accomplish subjectivity through willing; the self does not choose or 
will subjectivity but accomplishes subjectivity through its wilful choice and so has a 
shared partial responsibility for the modern epoch as finite and thrown. Whilst man cannot 
inaugurate the epochal sending our requirement to its accomplishment would seem to go 
beyond being passively appropriated.  
 The difficulty of reconciling this singularity and plurality, thus the relation of 
precedence, leads to contrary claims by both Heidegger and commentators; that Gestell 
“was the inevitable result of the clever animal’s craving for power.”103 but that “modern 
humanity came to regard itself as the ground or foundation for entities resulted not from 
human decision…but instead from the self-concealment of being itself”104 The primacy 
of Being in the mutually constitutive Da-Sein relation seems inconsistent with the way 
Being only is as the existential realization of the disclosure it allows. Not only does Sein 
determine man's understanding but the existential realization of this understanding is 
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equally determinative of Sein; Sein is fundamentally not 'other' to man understood in his 
mortality (they are divided at the level of conventional not ultimate truth) as what calls 
us to thought is the absolute nothingness of self. There can be no causal connection 
between Da and Sein as we are this relation and whether we ‘cause’ the change in relation 
or the change in the relation ‘causes’ us seems too related to instrumentalist thinking in 
terms of means-ends and what can be done to change the relation. Gestell does not 
originate in human action or will, but is nothing beyond this action and will; as Dasein is 
its world existingly we create the thrown situation as much as we are the result of it. 
 Heidegger's earlier comments on Sein are partially mediated in light of this, 
reinterpreted as way-points; variations in nuance leading to the true thought of 
appropriation wherein errancy stems from the relation rather than either constituent. 
Whilst this reconciles Heidegger's contradictory remarks on the relation of priority 
between Da and Sein the manner in which epochal transformation takes place remains 
paradoxical and will be seen to mirror the problematic of Śūnyatā's realization; that the 
existential realization of Śūnyatā is its own condition of possibility due to the ontology 
of nothingness only being as existentially realized. 
 The inter-referential nature of self, to be explicated over later chapters, collapses 
the distinction between the individual and collective senses of the term; an individuals 
sense of identity is always also both collective and stems from a non-differentiated 
universal nihility (the absolute nothingness of non-self discussed in chapter 1.4). Dasein 
is always both an individual personal self and equally a plural, collective, epochal 
understanding; the problems and possibilities of this characterization are dealt with more 
in chapter 2.5. The total nature of an epochal understanding of Being as disclosed by a 
collective Dasein marked by a plurality of understandings raises problems regarding the 
viability of Gestell's characterization as the supreme danger that will also be expanded 
upon in chapter 2.5 and stems from how Ereignis in its ontological sense only is in terms 
of a collective existential realization. The manner in which our reflection upon such 
appropriation is accomplished through renunciation and determines the nature of an 
epochal understanding is to be explicated more thoroughly in chapters 3.1, 3.2 and 3.3, 
of the thesis in terms of reflection, poetry and dwelling. Such determination of Sein by 
Da is a pre-requisite for the coherence of any recommendation Heidegger makes as to 
how and why we should think. The ethical consequences of the self only being as claimed, 
both in terms of our responsibility for the ontic ethical stance of treating others as 
standing-reserve and whether the paradigms of the poet and thinker provide a model of 
responsibility adequate to an ontic ethics will be returned to in chapter 3.5. 
 The relation of Being and entities also remains problematic; beings and Being 
only are as realized in human awareness, yet entities are independent of this realization. 
Without Being there would be no beings and vice-versa, but entities are also required for 
Being yet not vice-versa. The extent to which non-Dasein entities are also determinative 
of Sein and form an element of the Ereignis relation is integral to the coherence of 
Heidegger's understanding of releasement and Nishitani's notion of koto. Whether their 
thought on the present-at-hand and homeground of jitai accounts for this relation is to be 
questioned over the following chapters before addressing its relation to the un-meaning 
of nihilism in section 2 and the retention of this absence of meaning within the saving 
epochal understanding in section 3. 
Ereignis and Śūnyatā as Ontological, Existential, Psychological, Axiological and Ethical 
Whilst the term ontology seems most apt in describing the thought of Heidegger and 
Nishitani their guiding ideas can be equally contextualized as existential, psychological, 







Sunyata only is as the self-emptying of attachments, thus a lived emptiness. The relation 
of the fields seems to be a process of existential self-negation to reach true self-awareness 
as an affirmation-sive-negation of the self. The charting of the increasing awareness of 
this unitary process of disclosure makes Religion and Nothingness understood as a kōan 
“Nishitani’s Buddhist interpretation of Western civilization’s existentialist awakening”105 
that leads to true emptiness as "nothing less than what reaches awareness in all of us as 
our own absolute self-nature. In addition, this emptiness is the point at which each and 
every entity that is said to exist becomes manifest: as what it is in itself, in the form of its 
true suchness".106  In the realization of Śūnyatā "self-nature as true self-awareness – and 
the selfness of each and every thing in the form of its suchness come about 
simultaneously, or rather in unison, or perhaps better still, self-identically”107 Śūnyatā is 
the realization of the equiprimordiality of the suchness of self and things, disclosing both 
how they truly are through a deepening of self-awareness. 
 In such ontological-existential unity Śūnyatā “is entirely united to and self-
identical with what we ourselves are as body and mind” 108. The impossibility of the 
separation of these elements means Śūnyatā is only truly reached when it is realized 
existentially within the self. This is why Nishitani’s claims that the religious quest as this 
process of self-realization can only be understood from within and leads to Gilkey’s 
characterization of Śūnyatā as essentially “an immanent-transcendent, 
universal...ontological principle as well as an existential, subjective principle in and 
through which we exist.”109 It is through this dual conception of Śūnyatā as the 
“conjunction of the real and our realization of the real”110 that the flaws and paradoxes of 
the field of consciousness are to be resolved through the overcoming of duality. 
 So too is Ereignis only realized through our comportments; Being needs beings 
with both given at a single stroke, inseparable. Whether in Thing or artwork Being only 
is when realized through the prism of the ontic; "within a being that is to be brought forth 
only in such a way that the conflict opens up in this being...Truth establishes itself in a 
being in such a way, indeed, that this being itself occupies the Open of truth."111 The 
paramount such being is human being, Sein is in need of Da for Ereignis to give meaning 
and "in each case Dasein is its Self only in existing"112 so that in relation to “All the 
structures of Being which belong to Dasein...To characterize these ontologically is to do 
so existentially.” 113 Sein only is when realized as such through the self, since disclosure 
is always projective fundamental ontology is inseparable from ontic existential 
commitment so that “The question of being reveals and is revealed by the ethos of 
Dasein.”114 Accordingly Da, Sein and the totality of human entities are unitary because 
“While Dasein is the site at which being reveals itself, the site at which Dasein reveals 
itself is human being, individual and collective.”115 Not only is the self of Dasein itself 
always an embodied ontic being (thus assertions as to the nature of its existence a form 
of psychology) but as Dasein is an inter-subjective self ontological statements carry with 
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them social and ethical consequences and presuppositions leading Hodge to claim  
“Heidegger definitively rejects any separation between...ethical and moral aspects of 
freedom and...ontological and metaphysical aspects.”116   
Axiological / Ethical 
Whilst Hodge characterizes Heidegger's concern with futural flourishing as the repressed 
ethical element of his thought I believe that as conditioned by a presupposition of how 
Ereignis should be realized it can also be characterized as the concealed axiological 
element. By axiological it is meant that the 'ought' and 'is' are simultaneously given so 
that both Heidegger and Nishitani start from an imperative and conception of what should 
be, one that is fixed throughout their way of thought and guides it. This identity of 'is' and 
'ought' means their ontology is also a self-validating normative ethics (albeit one 
ungoverned by strict universal principles); a way of living is being recommended on the 
basis of how things are so that an existential imperative accompanies their ontologies in 
that Ereignis and Śūnyatā only are as realized yet also imply a responsibility for them to 
be so realized. Despite his critique of ‘values’ if the term is taken in a looser sense than 
the technical place it is given by Heidegger in the history of metaphysics, as what guides 
us to the desirable outcome, then Heidegger himself clearly held certain values close to 
his heart. In general that Being be guarded against oblivion and thus humanity retain its 
true nature, and in specific that the saving epochal understanding to be prepared for take 
a certain form. 
 This makes it unclear whether the human self is only Dasein when engaged in that 
relation as the Da for Sein; whether the human self can ever lose or not be in this relation 
to Being. Regardless of whether the characterization is of Dasein as being-in-the-world 
or man as mortal dweller, Heidegger always maintained that “disclosedness is that basic 
character of Dasein according to which it is its ‘there’.”117 Dasein cannot escape its nature 
as disclosedness, any attempt to cover it up or flee into the everyday disclosures of das 
Man is defined as opposition to more ontologically originary authentic disclosures as the 
concealment of it, disclosure not only founds the concealments but is itself founded by 
its wresting of possibilities from such inauthentic disclosure. Yet Ereignis tries to think 
from within an authentic experience of Being rather than the more neutral stance of Being 
and Time, giving Heidegger's work a more polemical tone than that of pure 
phenomenological description. Strauss held the true Turn in Heidegger's thought came 
with the realization that the existential analytic could not be an objective investigation 
into universal structures as “commitment can only be understood by an understanding 
which is itself committed”118. This can be seen in how Da-Sein defines the essence of 
man, yet “Heidegger speaks of the goal of his work as the transformation of the person 
into Dasein, that is, into accepting oneself as thrown-open as the clearing for the sake of 
meaning.”119  
 For Heidegger's characterization of Gestell as danger to be coherent it must be 
possible for man to no longer be defined in terms of this relation.  In the later works Da-
Sein seems to more become a task we are called to accomplish (although elements of this 
understanding are also to be found in Being and Time) rather than an immutable we can 
never truly flee from. Heidegger at times both explicitly and implicitly suggests that we 
are only Dasein when we find things uncanny and are restlessly compelled to think, "that 
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only so long as the clearing of Being propriates does Being convey itself to man”120. To 
be Dasein is then an accomplishment that we are called to realize; an essence that only is 
when realized as such, a dynamic way we come-to-presence rather than how we are 
always present. Man may then only be Dasein sporadically; it may be sufficient for our 
being to be at issue only in satori-like moments of decision and self-realization rather than 
continually held open in a state of zazen. Another possibility is that we are more true to 
our nature when attending to Being and allowing beings to manifest according to their 
own possibilities, but even when it is common meanings or meaninglessness that is 
manifesting we are still the arena in which such takes place, indeed such disclosure of 
non-meaning is equally integral to our lived existence. The coherence of Heidegger's 
narrative of danger that renders Da-Sein a task rather than our inherent constitution is to 
be taken up in section 2. 
 This axiological element is far more explicit in the work of Nishitani given his 
over-riding concern with an already achieved form of Enlightenment, Nishitani’s 
ontology is from the very start an ethics and despite denoting an ontological reality 
Śūnyatā also functions in an ethically normative sense through these elements of 
liberation and compassion. For Nishitani the guiding question of Religion and 
Nothingness, ‘What is Religion?’, is asked in the sense of “the quest...for the ‘home-
ground’ of religion, where religion emerges from man  himself, as a subject, as a self 
living in the present.”121 His claim that “the fundamental meaning of religion – what 
religion is – is not to be conceived of in terms of an understanding of what it has been”122 
instead on what it ought to be, with the ought clarifying what has been, means his 
interpretation of religion is a projective retrieval that despite being accepted as such is 
often portrayed as an absolute. The ultimate reality of Śūnyatā is an unquestioned 
presupposition the equal of the objective presupposition he criticizes in modern science, 
perhaps due to his own earnest experience of it. Śūnyatā and the Zen aim of enlightenment 
through deepening self-awareness are not an end-point for his reflections, despite his 
treatment of it as the culmination of the process of self-realization, but his starting point; 
the framework he uses to address the problems of modernity. He holds this presupposition 
to be validated in an experience, but one that cannot be assumed for his readers if Religion 
and Nothingness is seen as a kōan to instigate such an experience of self-realization.   
 King notes that Buddhism was originally purely existential-axiological, concerned 
only with curing a condition stemming from unquestioned Brahmanism assumptions, 
asking "how then are we to regard some of the words developed Buddhism uses about its 
ultimates-ultimates of some sort or other? Are they ontological/metaphysical in fact or 
only disguised forms of the existential/experiential? Or are they both at the same time"123 
King concludes that due to the shared inexpressibility of reality and its experience 
Śūnyatā “performs all the functions of a full-scale substantial Ultimacy, both ontological 
and experiential, but like a mystic ultimate...can neither be conceived, nor attacked, nor 
proven, nor denied, but only experienced by the (Buddhist) believer”.124 Streng connects 
this  relationship between ontological claims and normative prescriptions directly to 
Nishitani, to claim that experience of ultimate reality is moulded by a founding 
attunement as “reflective human beings often recognize that what is seen as real is 
connected to the act of giving value”125 in the face of a transitory process. Streng 
concludes Nishitai's ontology is pervaded and conditioned by his axiology leading to an 
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imperative towards “full awareness of the transience and interrelated arising of 
existence”126 as “the communication of a sense of reality is an expression of a process of 
evaluation (which can be defined by its axiological structure). Where onto-logies are 
given to help people understand the nature of authentic living, they expose not only 
conceptual systems but also processes of valuing whereby that reality is given form and 
content.”127 Yet Streng does not address how the imperative towards awareness of sunyata 
as essential reality is complicated by the claim it is only essential reality when we realize 
it as such. This conflation of experience and reality raises issues of warrant and criteria 
dealt with in chapter 2.6 and and relates to the problem of experiential attestation touched 
upon in the introduction and returned to in more depth in anxiety chapter. 
Conclusion 
This chapter has outlined how both Śūnyatā and Ereignis are at a single stroke; 
ontological as concerning the conditions of possibility for meaning (the absolute 
emptiness of suchness) the ontic-existential realization of this meaning in a certain way 
which in terms of human experience is psychological (the self-emptying that realizes 
suchness), and axiological/ethical as concerning the 'ought' or need for this realization. 
Essentially this unity speaks of the possibility of, realization of and impetus for a self-
transformation in the experience of nihility. These aspects are self-identical and separated 
out only for the convenience of conventional thought, just as the light that enables sight 
can only itself be seen prismatically Ereignis and Śūnyatā can only be grasped when 
diluted by such concepts but are properly speaking prior to such divisions. Nishitani at 
times prioritizes one aspect over the others but consistently and explicitly stresses their 
self-identity, whilst Heidegger emphasizes the ontological yet also relies upon this unity. 
 The relation between these senses raises problems that are to be thematic throughout the 
thesis (most explicitly in chaps 2.6 and section 3), essentially that there is a tension between their 
philosophy as generally phenomenological (a description of experience as lived) yet also 
projective (a description of how we should live). Heidegger at times in his later works speaks as 
if he is still engaging in the Existential Analytic; simply offering a phenomenological account that 
is in a sense beyond why as it contains no imperative. Yet through his concern with the danger of 
technology he also offers an account of how we should be, moving from the conditions of 
possibility for meaning to assertions as to the form such meaning should take (although not its 
content). Heidegger says man only is as long as he is mortal, we are only mortal when we 
accomplish our share in the Fourfold, yet at times Heidegger says there has not yet been a Thing 
so that man is not yet mortal and not yet man leaving the 'ought' of mortality unclear. Man seem 
to be meant as both a noun and verb, yet the relation between these senses is not always clear and 
at times are discussed as only one or the other. The ontological aspect seems to be taken as 
validating the axiological aspect; yet in light of the existential aspect does not precede it leading 
to a paradox within such realization. 
 In relation to nihilism this unity means that whilst nihilism is not to be seen simply in 
terms of its ontic consequences, but addressed through reflection on our essence as relation to the 
truth of Being, nihilism only is through such ontic consequences. The ontic consequences of 
nihilism; its psychological, social, political and ethical elements, are self-identical with the 
ontological origin of nihilism and the self-transformation of nihilism can only come to pass 
through these very same consequences. Reflection or meditative thought upon such origin is only 
authentic when self-identical with its ontic-existential realization, psychological transformation, 
and the experience of the normative call to such reflection. The relation of this unity will guide 
the later interpretation of Gestell and dwelling in sections 2 and 3. 
 The chapters in this first section will consider the ontological aspect as discrete. 
The emptiness of phenomena, both things and self, will be explicated through inquiry into their 
self-identity as the condition for the possibility of the disclosure of meaning. Beginning with 
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phenomena as empty (the in-itself of a thing as jitai ), moving on to the identity of Śūnyatā and 
self, to the relation of phenomena and self as world, the nature of the experiential attestation of 
this in discussion of koto as the culmination of this treatment, then finally to deal with issues 
surrounding the primacy of the self resulting from the view of ontology as self-realization. The 
emptiness of self and things (their ‘suchness’), their relation as world and how this allows for the 
disclosure as a ‘knowing if non-knowing’ are all identical facets of a unitary process but are to be 
treated in stages whilst bearing in mind this inherent unity. 
1.3 Jitai  
On the field of Śūnyatā the mode of being of beings (their beingness) is termed ‘jitai ’ (in-
itself) and can be seen as denoting suchness understood as the reality or being of a thing 
on its own homeground, how it is for-itself. Whilst for Heidegger beingness pertains to 
regional ontologies, or is always confined to a specific epochal understanding of the 
reality of the real, and belongs to the Da-Sein relation rather than entities in-themselves 
for Nishitani jitai is a primordial form of beingness that applies to the true reality of the 
real. This mode of being is characterized by its freedom from the possibility of 
representation and objectification and replaces both traditional notions of substance 
(jittai) and subject (shutai). In Religion and Nothingness the notion of jitai is largely 
elucidated through examining the essence of fire and is first mentioned as a brief 
clarification of how self is constituted by non-self in a relation of non-duality that absolute 
selfhood “is absolutely death-sive-life, life-sive-death; absolutely being-sive-
nothingness, nothingness-sive-being.”128 Both death and life belong to the self in one 
stroke, equally manifesting within each moment and this is said to indicate “the central 
meaning of emptiness.”129 The themes of gathering and interpenetration apply equally to 
jitai and world (the latter dealt with in chapter 1.5) constituting the self internally as well 
as externally. The connecting of jitai to the self-identity of death-sive-life also relates jitai 
as suchness to the relation of reality on the field of nihility in Nishitani's essay Science 
and Zen that is to be dealt with in chapters 2.2 and 2.4, namely the reconciliation of 
science and religion that preserves the essence of nihilism within Śūnyatā; that “All living 
things can be seen under the Form of death without thereby being separated from their 
proper Form of life. The real appearance of these things must be seen at ground to rest on 
the basis of absolute being-sive-nothingness, nothingness-sive-being, or of the absolute 
non-duality of life and death.”130 As the self-identity of things realized non-objectively 
jitai is intended to be the true mode of being for both the self and entities, how they 
manifest in their suchness. Abe holds that “In the notion of jitai , the true reality of things 
is fully realized as it is. Thus for Nishitani, jitai or ‘in itself’ is simply another term for 
Śūnyatā.”131 Jitai as the true manifestation of reality is thus chosen as the starting point 
for explicating the wider process of Śūnyatā, it will first be considered in relation to 
entities in general before moving on to the nature of the self as emptiness. Parallels 
between jitai and Heidegger's early thought on Zeug are taken up in chapter 1.6, the 
relation of jitai to the presence-at-hand of entities not-yet in relation to the world of Dasein 
is to be considered in section 3 in connection to possible improvements in Nishitani's 
understanding of the relation between nihility and Śūnyatā after chaps 2.5 and anxiety 
chapter consider the relation of the present-at-hand to the plurality of meaningful 
disclosures. 
 Whilst emerging through the critique of previous notions of substance, and 
remaining grounded in Buddhist denials of self-subsistent independent being, jitai is also 
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characterized as ‘non-substantial substantiality’132 in which “everything appears once 
again as possessed of substance”133, a reappearance of substantiality as constituted in 
unison with emptiness, a self-identity of self and non-self nature. Jitai thus denotes the 
nonduality of self-identity (being) and non-self-identity (nothingness). This ‘be-ification’ 
after the ‘nullification’ of nihility is part of the movement of negation-sive-affirmation 
that explicates the core assertion of the self-identity of form and emptiness and represents 
Nishitani’s previously mentioned moving of Śūnyatā towards a positive ‘position’. 
Nishitani’s return to the concept of self-being possibly “seems at first worrisome”134 as a 
re-instating of what was shown as empty. But within the broad context indicated in the 
last chapter can be seen as indicating the relation of conventional and ultimate realities in 
the thought of Nagarjuna that heavily informs Nishitani’s conception of jitai, a conception 
that draws a deeper and more explicit connection between those levels of reality in 
elucidating the manner of their disclosure, so that “The assertion that being is only being 
in unison with emptiness belongs in its fullest and most proper sense to the point of view 
that speaks of the ‘substance’ of things.”135 The return of substantial self-being occurs 
only within the context of the self-identity of conventional experience upon the field of 
consciousness and the emptiness of ultimate reality, a self-identity of suchness. 
The Critique of Substance 
Despite jitai incorporating the notion of substance its elucidation begins from the critique 
of how substance is understood upon the field of consciousness to show the necessity of 
moving towards jitai as the nonduality of being and nothingness. Nishitani understands 
substance as what “is used to point out the essence of a thing, the self-identity in which a 
thing is what it is in itself. In other words, it is the being of a being.”136 This understanding 
of substance (in altered form) remains within the formulation being-sive-nothingness, yet 
whilst substance indicates the mode of being of jitai it also “invariably restricts the 
selfness of a thing to the way that thing is disclosed to us on the field of reason”137, 
overlooking how such beingness is also constituted by nothingness. Nishitani’s critique 
of substance revolves around the assumption that substance as how a thing presents itself 
to us is the sole constituent of selfness upon the field of consciousness, that appearance 
is taken for reality, the viability of this assumption and its kinship to Heidegger's narrative 
is considered in chapter 2.5. 
 The categories of subject and substance as denoting what preserves self-identity 
as the ground of changing properties are said by Nishitani to have consistently determined 
Western notions of Being so that “being is looked upon as substance because, from the 
very outset, beings are looked upon as objects”138. The Being of beings is thus seen as 
substance as beings are represented as objects from the perspective of the self-conscious 
subject upon the field of consciousness, a critique of Western metaphysics that revolves 
around the forgetting of the ontological difference mirroring Heidegger's critique of 
scientific representation that is to be dealt with in chaps 2.2 and section 3. Accordingly 
substance “can only be grasped through thinking”139 such as in Descartes meditation on 
the self-identity of wax beneath its changing surface properties. Nishitani claims that 
reason is held to be the union of the subjective and objective but that because of the 
objectification of self and thing upon the field of consciousness  “time and again through 
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the course of history traces of the duality of seer and seen have survived in contemplation 
or intellectual intuition.”140 The transformation of the notions of substance and reason 
upon the field of consciousness are thus an attempt to bring reason into its own essential  
being through its self-transcendence, as was discussed in the introduction concerning 
Nishitani’s relation to rational argumentation. 
 Such dualities within reason upon the field of consciousness can be seen in the 
division of ‘actual’ and ‘essential’ being; actual being is that a thing is (its existence) and 
essential being is what a thing is. In focussing on the concept of substance traditional 
ontology (Nishitani uses both Plato and Aristotle as paradigmatic examples) seeks to 
reach actual being through essential being, existence by way of essence understood in 
terms of how it becomes present to subjective consciousness. Elucidating this through the 
example of fire Nishitani holds that its substance, its essential being that distinguishes it 
from other beings, resides in “the power and activity of combustion.” 141 Such combustion 
as the form/eidos of fire is its mode of being only in relation to how it presents or displays 
itself to the subject, combustion is indeed part of the ontological constitution of fire but 
only in “terms of logos, as something that can be explained in terms of ‘logical’ structures 
or interpreted ‘theoretically’. It is given as something that can be viewed from the 
standpoint of reason.”142 Combustion is claimed as only the objective representation of 
fire, the form it presents or discloses to the subject on the field of consciousness. 
 Heidegger indicates that Western metaphysics also begins from such a division in 
taking Being as ground; "that from which beings as such are what they are in their 
becoming, perishing, and persisting as something that can be known, handled and worked 
upon"143. Metaphysics as the search for ground also begins from the essential whatness 
of presence and "starting from what is present, represents it in its presence and thus 
exhibits it as grounded by its ground." For both the metaphysical reason of the field of 
consciousness concerns itself solely with essential being as ground. The traditional 
understanding of substance thereby only indicates “the eidetic form in which the thing 
discloses itself to us”144, which whilst an aspect on the sive relation that forms the in-
itself overlooks that which withdraws and is concealed behind the form yet renders such 
possible. This approach of the actual via way of the essential leads reason on the field of 
consciousness to reinforce the division between seer and seen; “It does not put one 
directly in touch with the home-ground of a thing, with the thing itself”145; it forgets the 
ontological difference concealing the homeground of jitai as that which makes possible 
beingness and thus necessarily fails to reach Being through beingness in similar fashion 
to how metaphysics cannot reach its own ground. 
The Paradox of Representation 
This duality that remains leads to disclosure upon the field of consciousness entailing a 
paradox in relation to representation that forms the core of Nishitani’s critique of 
traditional ontologies; namely that “An object is nothing other than something that has 
been represented as an object, and even the very idea of something independent of 
representation can only come about as a representation.”146 This paradox stems from the 
objectification of beings that is inherent to the field of consciousness on which “are all 
‘received’ as objective entities by the self-conscious ego posited as a subjective entity.”147 
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Both substance and self are thus objectified as representations, obscuring their true 
suchness through the dichotomization of subject and object that prevails throughout the 
representational thought of metaphysics. 
 This paradox is said to have been made explicit in the West through the work of 
Kant, whose thought is seen by Nishitani as a natural progression from the limited nature 
of an ontology of substance. Despite Kant’s awareness of the limitations of representation 
“as we see in the sharp distinction between the phenomenal world and the world of things-
in-themselves”148, Kant is said to have still dealt with representation as the substance 
aspect of non-substantiality, as what the thing shows to us. The phenomenal-noumenal 
distinction has the effect of entrenching further the estrangement of self and world 
through the subject-object dichotomy. Nishitani holds that as  “Kant looks on things from 
the very outset as objects; or, to put it the other way around, his standpoint is that of 
representation.”149, he remains in the same field of traditional ontologies that saw 
knowledge as correspondence of concepts to things only changing the relation of 
correspondence. Despite the qualifications Nishitani makes in his critique of Kant it 
remains an overly metaphysical interpretation overlooking that for Kant objectivity and 
substance are transcendental principles rather than assertions as to reality in-itself or 
suchness, and can be seen as explicitly dealing with the phenomenal as the conventional 
reality of the field of consciousness. The accuracy of his interpretation, its fidelity to 
Kant's work and possible defences in light of it, are not the primary concern; what it 
highlights regarding the nature of the field of consciousness and relation of this to Śūnyatā 
is. The issue is what the interpretation says regarding Nishitani's own attempt to negate 
objectivity and, as will emerge over the following chapters, whether this negation is 
lacking a true self-identity (sive) with affirmation leading to problems with Nishitani's 
thought on elemental subjectivity. 
 Heidegger takes a similar approach to Nishitani in asserting that “The thing-in-
itself means for Kant: the object-in-itself.”150 Here the being of a thing in-itself still 
signifies solely objectivity, albeit "that the object is an object in itself without reference 
to the human act of representing it...‘Thing-in-itself’ thought in a rigorously Kantian way, 
means an object that is no object for us, because it is supposed to stand, stay put, without 
a possible before: for the human representational act that encounters it”151 and thus an 
objectivity defined by subjective representation yet also in a sense prior to and seperate 
from such representation. Whilst what ‘thing’ means for Heidegger in this context is to 
be dealt with in the next chapter both thinkers can be seen as sharing the view that the 
noumenal remains upon the field of consciousness despite its changed relation to the 
representations of the subject. Despite this not being a simple inversion along the lines of 
idealism Nishitani holds that Kant remains upon the field of consciousness  and objective 
presupposition with the only change being “that the relationship between the object and 
its representation which operated as a covert basis in the former was made overt in the 
latter and there given approval”152. The paradox is exposed but whether a representation 
confirms to the object or the object to the representation does not alter the presupposition 
of the objective-representational view. But this making explicit of the paradox is held as 
deepening the understanding of subjectivity by rendering the self as subject resistant to 
objective comprehension opening the way for the subjectivization of ecstatic nihility, it is 
an opening of the way towards the Great Doubt. 
 Nishitani holds that this paradox entails that suchness as “original selfness must 
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lie beyond the reach of reason and be impervious to thought”153, or at least to that thought 
which is limited to the substantivistic reason of the field of consciousness. Realism and 
materialism are said to not reach selfness as “this manner of representation stems from a 
field on which the subjective and objective are set in opposition to each other, from the 
field of objects and their representations”154 so does not escape the paradox as such a 
position “has yet to elude the contradiction of being represented as something lying 
beyond representation”155. The warrant for this ‘must’ seems to rely upon the prehension 
of original selfness upon the field of Śūnyatā, the necessity of overstepping the field of 
consciousness stems from its inability to reach the thing in-itself, and yet the warrant for 
Śūnyatā is that it satisfies this ‘must’. Unno claims the paradox exposes the main flaw of 
the field of consciousness as that “a thing is lifted up from the elemental mode of being 
and transformed into an object re-presented to the subject”156 resulting in only abstract 
conceptual knowledge, but such criticism assume the possibility and reality of an 
elemental mode whose attestation is to come from the process of realization that it is also 
to render possible, and does not by itself indicate the necessity of such realization (the 
sive that joins understanding and apprehension). The field of consciousness fails to reach 
the elemental truth of reason as the nonduality of seer and seen due to the inherence of 
the subject-object duality within it that leads to alienation, an assumption regarding the 
essence of reason that parallels those Nishitani critiques. Such presuppositions are explicit 
in Nishitani’s claim that the key to the resolution of the paradox “is contained in 
something that has been present in the Eastern mind since ancient times”,157 an instance 
of his conflation of the Zen tradition with a possible artificial construction of Eastern 
thought as a whole that was mentioned in the introduction. As was noted at the end of the 
previous chapter concerning the imperative for the progression through the fields such 
assumptions are not necessarily invalid, but are not justified any more or less than the 
core presupposition of the field of consciousness itself in relation to what is to be accepted 
as real and pertain to the conflation of the existential and ontological senses of Śūnyatā 
to be returned to in chapter 2.6. 
Non-Substance and Emptiness 
The separation of self and things through the subject-object duality on the field of 
consciousness is said to entail “that we are drawn to things, and that we in turn draw 
things to ourselves. (In this sense, ‘will’, or desire and attachment, can also be posited at 
the ground of ‘representation’.)”158; that things are beyond our reach as objects are 
compelled towards them and desirous of attaining what is beyond our grasp upon the field 
of consciousness. Nishitani’s inclusion of an element of desire and attachment in such 
disclosure seems in a way ambiguous. Whilst in line with traditional Buddhist views of 
conventional discriminations stemming from the grasping of false ego and self-
attachment the subject-object duality and representation seem required for such wilful 
desires; if they are posited a stemming from the ground of representation then this is 
coherent, if they are ‘at’ the ground in the sense of contributing then this seems more 
problematic. Such drawing together of the subject and object pertains to the partial 
overcoming of the paradox of representation upon the field of nihility. As non-
objectifiable the nothingness aspect cannot be grasped representationally and in so 
withdrawing from the grasp of the field of consciousness directs attention upon that field 
solely to the substance/being aspect, repelling attention from the nothing aspect of the 
nondual in-itself to allow for the disclosure of things as objects of consciousness. The 
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paradox of representation is partially overcome in nihility as things are rendered unreal 
in nihilation, they can no longer appear as external actuality (objects) or representations 
and it is through the nullification of nihility revealing the in-itself as unreachable upon 
the field of consciousness (that relies upon its withdrawal) that fire is rendered non-
objective as non-combustion bringing to awareness on the field of nihility the nothingness 
aspect of being-sive-nothingness. As such nihilation can only ever be transitional it is in 
turn transfigured through be-ification into the self-emptying of being-sive-nothingness, 
of non-substantial substantiality.  
Whilst the essential being of fire for us (how fire represents itself to others) is combustion 
Nishitani holds that the self-identity of fire in-itself (how it represents itself to itself) is 
its non-combustion, that it does not burn itself. Since how fire presents itself to itself is 
its self-identity on its own homeground then “the words, 'Fire does not burn fire', speak 
of the essential being of fire. They also mean that fire does actually burn and that there is 
actually a fire burning.”159 The nonduality of being-sive-nothingness is also the 
nonduality of essential and actual being, the essential being of non-combustion (non-self-
identity) and the actual being of combustion (self-identity). The simultaneity of 
combustion and non-combustion of fire in-itself dissolves the duality of actual and 
essential being. Fire’s not burning itself is both its essential being in-itself and makes 
possible its actual being for us, if its non-combustion is taken as the nothingness (or 
empty) aspect of being-sive-nothingness then the self-identity of fire as the identity of its 
actual and essential being is expressed by its nature as empty, but such expression is never 
apart from fire as combustion so that “The two are here one and the same.”160 Self-nature 
(beingness) is grounded on non-self-nature as self-emptying, this identity is the 
transfiguration of substantiality as non-substantial substantiality. This notion of 
substantiality is later explicated in terms of samadhi as gathering. 
The nature of non-combustion is unsurprisingly defined largely through the negation of 
substance as what makes self-identity possible. Despite that “this non-combustion is not 
something apart from combustion: fire is non-combustive in its very act of combustion”161 
non-combustion is given a seeming ontological priority in that “Self-nature is such as it 
is only as the self-nature of non-self-nature. The true self-identity of fire does not emerge 
from the self-identity it enjoys in combustion as a ‘substance’ or a ‘self-nature’, but only 
from the absolute negation of that self-identity, from its non-combustion”162. The 
definition through negation seems to stray into the realm of relative nothingness by 
identifying true self-nature overly with emptiness understood as negation. As was said in 
previous chapters throughout Religion and Nothingness a self-identity is continually 
asserted in the formula being-sive-nothingness even as one aspect of that process is 
seemingly prioritized. This prioritization cannot be one of value, reality or truth (despite 
occasional references to true reality self-nature remains equally real in line with 
Nagarjuna’s two truths doctrine) but must be an ontological priority concerned with what 
enables the manifestation of the substantial or actual being  aspect of the sive relation. 
The self-identity of combustion and non-combustion as “paradox bespeaks the selfness 
by virtue of which the fire is on its own home-ground in the act of combustion”,163 unlike 
the paradox of representation this paradox is seen as fundamentally unproblematic and 
the relation of paradox to real reality remains unclear given Nishitani's ambiguous stance 
on the self-identity of reason and Śūnyatā, the wording of this later quote also  
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emphasizing the ontological identity of self and non-self over the priority of the emptiness 
aspect. 
 The problem of the priority of negation could be seen as the issue of whether 
emptiness as non-objectivity escapes from the paradox of representation or remains 
within its sphere as the negation of a representation. Negation of a representation seems 
to remain within the paradox of representation itself, a relative nothingness on the field 
of nihility that is not yet a self-emptied emptiness. Non-self nature in relation to jitai is 
clarified by Abe as relating to “the thing itself in its original mode of being, and which is 
grasped entirely ‘non-objectively’ from its ‘within’- more strictly speaking, from neither 
without nor within”164, the non-objective is only realizable from a non-subjective 
position, emptied of representation. It is the same reality as substance but viewed ‘non-
subjectively’. Non-combustion cannot be negation in the sense of absence (no-
combustion) or any phenomenal extinguishing. Jitai as true in-itself must be “completely 
free from all representation – representation not only in terms of the subject-object 
duality, but also in terms of nihility which overcomes that duality”165. The ‘be-ification’ 
that is a return to substantiality as non-substantial implies the total surpassing of negation 
and duality whilst jitai as elucidated by fire as non-combustion seems still to rest on a 
homeground of relative nihility through the negation of its self-identity. 
In relation to non-self nature Gilkey asks “Why, in this experience of them (and their lack 
of powers) are we said to be finally in touch with fire in itself and water in itself?”166 a 
criticism that is flawed yet highlights the difficulty of Nishitani’s resolution to the paradox 
of representation. Gilkey treats non-combustion as a phenomenal experience of fire, but 
fire’s not burning of itself cannot be the negation of its phenomenal persistence (that there 
is no combustion) as this remains on the representational level of the field of 
consciousness. Non-combustion cannot be something we experience in a correlate 
manner to our experience of combustion. As the attempt to indicate the non-objective 
mode of being of the in-itself non-combustion is not something we encounter, it must be 
what enables us to encounter combustion, in a way we encounter it through not-
encountering it in the experience of combustion167. But Gilkey does highlight the 
difficulty in understanding what Nishitani means by non-combustion and how he comes 
to term it as negation. Gilkey claims that Nishitani assumes “that difference represents or 
is identical with absolute negation”168, that the in-itself of fire is not combustion (is not 
the representation fire presents to us) does not immediately entail negation but only 
difference. The assertion that the self-identity of fire in-itself, as it presents itself to itself, 
is non-combustion requires the realization of emptiness through what is later termed the 
‘knowing of non-knowing’ and cannot be used to ground or entail that realization. 
 As was said earlier Nishitani claims a ‘must’ for the priority and nature of non-
self, it is far from certain that Nishitani succeeds in justifying any such statement. He 
rightly states that such an apparently contradictory position does not fall straightforwardly 
to the paradox of representation, and if the field of consciousness is overstepped the 
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‘strangeness’ of his position evaporates. But a more coherent and forceful experience of 
the non-objective needs to be offered to make his position more than an abstract 
theoretical possibility; and as beyond representation and conceptualization the sense in 
which non-combustion can be the negation of (as opposed to simply other than) 
representation remains unclear, as does why non-substance is not conceivable as the 
noumenal unknown. Jitai as non-objective requires an experiential attestation non-
reducible to conceptualized theory that is not yet provided by the account of how it 
renders possible the substantial forms of the field of consciousness. This is the same 
problem as discussed in relation to the necessity of the progression through the fields of 
awareness, the paradox of representation leads to the necessity of jitai as beyond reason 
but as discussed in the introduction Nishitani places this necessity beyond the demands 
of reason and doubt so that jitai “is simply itself, cut off from every How and Why and 
Wherefore”.169 Such attestation is to be dealt with in anxiety chapter as linked to the 
notion of presence-at-hand as unmeaning, not as the negation of any specific meaning, 
revealing or notion of substantiality but a prior condition of concealment for the revealing 
Jitai and its necessity (and by extension the nature of world to be considered over the 
following chapters) cannot come in postulate form as what is required to render possible 
being-sive-nothingness as the only viable solution to the paradox of representation; that 
such emptiness is arrived from working backwards from experience of nonduality in 
compassion does not verify the realization of such non-objectivity separate from a 
specific experience of nihility that as cut off from every 'why' cannot be justified in 
communal discourse and renders ontological reality dependent upon an individual's 
coming-to-awareness. 
Reality-sive-Illusion 
The relation of self-identity between self and non-self nature is further elucidated later in 
Religion and Nothingness when it is said that as being-sive-nothingness jitai or “the 
elemental mode of being, as such, is illusory appearance”170 The formulation of jitai in 
terms of reality-sive-illusion is more reminiscent of Nagarjuna’s two truths doctrine in 
the claim that appearances are not representative images of a thing that appears, reality 
and illusoriness are self-identical and the in-itself is nothing beyond appearance. In 
moving away from the remnants of relative nothingness such a characterization may 
better express what is meant by jitai . Illusion is here said to be ‘for us’ in same manner 
as substance, the form of a thing as it appears to us on the field of consciousness, and 
reality is the non-objective mode of being of the thing in-itself. The language and relation 
of negation between the aspects remains but such negation is contextualized more in terms 
of an otherness or difference, the non- denoting not a direct negation but a mutual 
negation, just as the in-itself was the negation of substance “the shapes of things that 
appear on the fields of sensation and reason…are a negation of the ‘position’ (or self-
positing) of things”171. 
 This mutual negation is indicated as implying self-identity through the sive 
relation so that “all sensory modes and all supersensory eidetic forms of a thing are not 
to be seen apart from the ‘position’ (the self-positing mode of being) of the thing. They 
are all appearances of the thing itself”172, the form is not selfness but emanates from 
selfness and selfness is no other than this emanation so that “each reality in its suchness 
just as it is constitutes phenomenal appearance”173. Such negation would then relate to 
the nihilation that renders beings brute entities, not a negation of any specific meaning 
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but the homeground of non-objectivity that 'is' as the impossibility of incorporation into 
a meaningful totality; the nihility of the present-at-hand revealed by anxiety. The non-self 
of jitai could then be paralleled to the concealed possibilities of Being that as "the 'non-' 
of the primordial nonessence of truth, as untruth, points to the still unexperienced domain 
of the truth of Being (not merely of beings)."174 In the unconcealment of emanation only 
one aspect of intelligibility comes to presence concealing all other nuances as well as non-
objectivity as the ground for disclosure. The mystery of Being, that it conceals itself in 
revealing thus leading to its own oblivion, and the homeground of jitai , that which the 
thing hides from us in appearing yet is the source of such illusory appearances, are the 
preconditions for the establishing of the conventional truths of the field of consciousness. 
This language of emanation retains the priority of the nothingness aspect in being-sive-
nothingness (or illusion-sive-reality) in regards to the disclosure of both aspects as 
suchness is nothing more than the images conveyed yet is not reducible to those images 
in the same manner that illusion as the form presented to us seems ontologically reducible; 
the reality behind the illusory appearances is 'nothing'. This pattern of relations is the 
weaving together of the manners of disclosure across the three fields discussed earlier, 
only the appearance aspect of illusion appears on the field of consciousness, only the 
suchness of non-self (brute presence-at-hand before taken up into context of world) on 
field of nihility, both in their sive relation is grasped on the field of Śūnyatā. All are the 
same reality realized through a different mode of our being, through deepening levels of 
self-awareness. 
 In its appearing, or emanation, each thing is asserting its self-identity and 
“becomes manifest in its suchness in its very act of affirming itself, according to its own 
particular potential”175, the process of disclosure begins to take on a more active 
connotation of a thing gathering and settling itself through its own activity that is self-
identical with its appearance for us as illusion. The non-substantial substantiality of jitai 
takes on an element of agency, and despite the denial of Śūnyatā as a regression to a prior 
state such gathering indicates that a thing “recovers once again its power of concentration 
for gathering itself into itself”176. This self-gathering agency would also seem to act as a 
precondition for Heidegger's thought on releasement, a connection taken up in chap 2.6 
and section 3. Such recovery relates to the ‘settling’ of a thing upon its homeground, that 
in taking a position “They centre in on themselves and do not get scattered.”177 ‘Scattered’ 
here refers to the process of nullification on the field of nihility so that the settling of 
samadhi is the ‘be-ification’ referred to earlier, so that recovery is not the moving between 
discrete objective or temporal states but pertains to the realization of the self-identity of 
the fields of disclosure; it is a recovery of awareness joined to manifestation within the 
process of realization. ‘Samadhi’ originally designated the focusing of the mind in 
meditation to overstep the ego but Nishitani claims “it also applies to the mode of being 
of a thing in itself when it has settled into its own position”178 so that jitai is also ‘samadhi-
being’ as indicating a thing has settled into a specific thing (asserted its self-identity). This 
spreading of what was originally a mental activity (albeit one of mental non-activity) to 
the process of manifestation of things merges Nagarjuna’s notion of two truths with later 
Chinese Buddhist theories of mind and grounds Nishitani’s assertion of the self-identity 
of self and reality, with the former arguably being taken as paradigmatic. This theme  of 
the priority of the self through the joining of manifestation and awareness within 
realization is to be developed more later along with the nature of gathering, but for now 
it must be asked whether such emanation through gathering falls into inconsistency 
 
174 Heidegger, The Essence of Truth: On Plato's Cave Allegory and Theaetetus, 131. 
175 Nishitani, Religion and Nothingness, 131.    
176 Ibid., 123.   
177 Ibid., 128.    





through ‘representing’ the ‘non-objective’; whether Nishitani falls back into viewing the 
in-itself of jitai as the object-in-itself that Heidegger finds in Kant and whether such a 
retreat is not both necessary and beneficial. 
 Despite assertions of self-identity dualistic metaphors or implied causality remain, 
discussions of circles and circumferences, of appearances as “radiations from the things 
themselves, like rays of light issuing from a common source”179. Not only do such 
descriptions seem inadequate, mere representations of what is self-emptied of 
representation, but often seem simply misleading in invoking images of causality and 
duality that Nishitani’s thought seems striving to overcome. The division of within and 
without that is to be overcome through the sive relation is seemingly reinforced and 
remains in the idea that “things posit themselves as they are and in such a way as not to 
permit contact from the outside”180, introducing a gulf between self and things akin to the 
subject-object duality. The self-identity of reality and illusion, of being and nothingness, 
often hovers dangerously close to representation as a dualistic relation. It could be seen 
that such ‘outside’ is to be overcome through the self-identities of self and world that are 
to follow, but such is intended to overcome all notion of ‘within’ and ‘without’ rather than 
simply to bring both constituents of a relation within. The subject-object duality also 
seems to remain in statements such as “the shapes of things as objects of sense intuition 
and rational thinking are reflected within ourselves as things that have left their own 
home-ground in order to move into a relationship with us, a relationship that may be 
likened to a beam of light radiating from its source”181. Such phrases may be intended to 
illuminate rather than perfectly express that which is empty, but invoke a relational (even 
if integral as for Steffney) state between what is to be asserted as self-identical. The true 
nature of this relational self-identity is examined in chapter 1.5, but there seems to be a 
residual tension of thought, a lingering estrangement, that is soon to blossom into a more 
far reaching problematic concerning the relation of self and world.  
Overcoming the Paradox of Representation 
That the reality of reality-sive-illusion is similar to Kantian noumenal reality is denied by 
Nishitani, claiming that jitai as the thing in-itself “is altogether different from the Kantian 
notion of the ‘thing-in-itself’”182 as “There is no distinction here between the 
phenomenon and the thing-in-itself. The original thing is the thing that appears to us as 
what it is, without front side or back.”183 If the in-itself were simply to be denoting the 
limitations of knowledge or reason they would be the ‘hidden aspect of things’ and thus 
“imply a view of things from where we stand. On its own home-ground, a thing has no 
front and no back. It is purely and simply itself, as it is in its selfness and nothing more”184. 
Jitai is here differentiated from an interpretation in terms of the object-in-itself as it is not 
divorced from representation yet neither dependent upon it. The in-itself is more illusory 
than the noumenal as its suchness is no more than illusory appearance, thus the noumenal 
and phenomenal are held to be self-identical in a more thorough-going sense than is found 
in the work of Kant. This seems an unfairly dualistic interpretation of Kant, for whom the 
noumenal is not ontologically distinct from the phenomenal but instead arguably self-
identical in a similar sense with the phenomenal as how the noumenal's emanations are 
experienced upon the field of consciousness; self-identical aspects only distinguishable 
epistemologically upon different fields of awareness or truth. 
 A criticism along similar lines to the one Nishitani makes of Kant would also seem 
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to pertain to the presentation of unconcealment in Heidegger’s thought, and provides for 
a more pertinent distinction that Nishitani’s critique of the relative nothingness of What 
is Metaphysics? Both concealment and unconcealment as the process of a beings coming 
to presence imply a similar standpoint towards things in terms of what a being shows to 
us, yet Nishitani seems to require that jitai as non-objective indicates things separate from 
their disclosure, even as he draws that disclosure into a more radical self-identity with the 
manifestation of the in-itself through realization as manifestation-sive-apprehension that 
over following chapters will be seen to make even the homeground of jitai dependent 
upon its knowing by the self. 
 Whilst at times Nishitani’s critique of Kantianism can seem overly harsh this 
stems from his understanding of ontology in terms of realization (manifestation-sive-
apprehension) so that the phenomenal and noumenal are not conceivable as self-identical 
in an ontological sense as the noumenal mode of being of the thing-in-itself is irretrievable 
separated from its apprehension as phenomenal manifestation. The main difference 
between the noumenal and the in-itself would seem to lay in the latter’s encounterability 
upon the field of Śūnyatā where as “the thing itself is always and ever manifest as such, 
its realization is able to come about.”185 This is portrayed by Nishitani as a further and 
more radical Copernican Revolution in which the object is no longer made to correspond 
to the subject, but the self does not revert in a simple sense to compliance with the object; 
rather it is a ‘non-cognitive knowing of the non-objective thing in itself’186; the realization 
(manifestation-sive-apprehension) of the thing in its suchness by and with a self 
constituted by non-self. Nishitani’s critique of Kant seems decidedly Schopenhaurian on 
this point, that direct experience of the Kantian noumenal is made possible since the 
essence of the self is self-identical with this noumenal in-itself and therefore directly 
experiencable. Whilst Nishitani never mentions Schopenhauer the latter’s knowledge and 
affinity with Buddhism in general is well-established. 
 This realization of the thing in itself as reality-sive-illusion has as its condition of 
possibility the self-identity of self and reality that allows for the nonduality of seer and 
seen Nishitani claims to be the true essence of reason, yet also provides for the possibility 
of that self-identity. Through jitai as a form of gathering or samadhi the direct knowledge 
of the thing in-itself that Nishitani terms a ‘knowing of non-knowing’ and is defined as 
“the gathering together and concentration on a single point of the light of all things. Or 
better still, it is a reverting to the point where things themselves are all gathered into 
one”187 is initially made possible. This direct knowledge of jitai is the realization of the 
in-itself through the mutual manifestation of self and things through a process of 
gathering that overcomes the notion of duality regarding subjects and objects building on 
and furthering the overcoming of the duality inherent in the paradox of representation. 
The paradox of representation is only overcome through direct encounter with an absolute 
emptiness emptied of representation, yet as the condition of its own possibility (through 
the self-identity of the ontological and existential) this encounter is itself a paradoxical 
realization; a paradox Nishitani places beyond 'why' and reason despite not doing the 
same for the paradox of representation. Such direct knowledge will be returned to in 
chapter 1.7 on koto as non-knowing, and the problems of reliance upon such attestation 
in anxiety chap. 
 The success of jitai as the resolution of the paradox of representation is a 
judgement that must be left pending, whether jitai as the in-itself operates as a reification 
of reality beyond representation and slips back into metaphysics, whether freedom from 
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objectivity is possible or desirable given the problems of elemental subjectivity soon to 
be addressed. Despite its flaws jitai opens the way for such a resolution but requires 
greater attestation and explication as to how it makes possible a disclosure of direct 
contact with the in-itself, more strictly speaking an explication of the nature of such direct 
encounter and how it is possibilized solely by such a conception. Such an explication is 
to be the feature of chapter 1.5, the attempt to think the plurality of the referential totality 
of world in its relation to the singularity and unity of  jitai and self in terms of samadhi. 
This problematic relates to the tension between the singularity of Sein and plurality of Da 
in Heidegger's thought mentioned in chapter 1.1 but having dealt with how jitai pertains 
to the being of entities (as replacing jittai or substance) it is first required to show how 
this understanding relates more specifically to jitai as replacing subjectivity (shutai) as 
the true mode of being of the self. Only a non-conceptual existential emptiness, an 
emptiness encountered at one with the self, can resolve the paradox by providing for our 
capacity to have direct experience of the emptiness aspect of reality-sive-illusion. 
 
1.4 Self 
As an existential progression towards enlightenment through emancipation from false 
notions of the self Nishitani’s theory of self as ontologically self-identical with absolute 
nothingness provides the point of encounter with the in-itself that constitutes the 
realization of both self and reality. As such it is the primary condition for the possibility 
of essential religion as the real self-realization of reality. This relation of self and absolute 
nothingness also speaks the integral belonging of Da and Sein; and will later be seen as 
facing the same problems of reconciling singularity and plurality, as well as sharing a 
pattern of deepening self-awareness upon the fields whose identity and differences are 
revealed in meditative thought/reflection. 
 Whilst providing for the direct encounter with the in-itself such an encounter 
cannot be an everyday experience of some faculty or drive, it cannot be intuited in the 
manner of a universal Schopenhauerian Will as a form of metaphysical entity or ground. 
But neither is the true self  “a Kantian ‘thing in itself’ that cannot be known except 
through…indirect pointers. It can be known, but only as formless, not as a thing, not as 
consciousness”188; it is a direct experience of the horizon of disclosure (of the integral 
relation of Ereignis) for such conceptions that is thus knowable but not in a correlate sense 
to knowledge/experience of beings or anything it makes possible. The empty self that is 
self-identical with the realization of reality provides the horizon for disclosure of 
conventional thought upon the field of consciousness and thus is not to be reached through 
the introspection that takes place upon that field, even if its coming to awareness begins 
from that field and is self-identical with it. Instead it is reached through a 'knowing of 
non-knowing' the conditions of which are to be explicated over both this chapter and 
chapters 1.5-6 before being fully addressed in chapter 1.7. The impossibility of reaching 
the true self by ‘stepping back’ through introspection is a common one in Buddhism, 
making the relation between insight and transformation one of mutual dependence and 
requirement, with little indication of how this process of mutual enablement operates. 
Heisig claims this merging of a system of critical doubt aimed at liberation and 
description of the direct awareness of self mirrors Nagarjuna’s ‘no-position’ view in not 
giving “an epistemology or ontology of the self so much as a permanent critique of all 
such ways of thinking.”189 Philosophical critique and critical doubt are utilized to prepare 
the way for the liberation of the self through the transitional field of nihility but cannot 
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achieve such liberation, leaving his reflections on the encounter with the true self “more 
mystical in tone than philosophical.”190, nowhere is the difficulty of attestation mentioned 
previously more pertinent than in relation to Nishitani’s theory of the self. 
 Like all his thought Nishitani’s theory of self remains heavily rooted in Buddhist 
doctrine, but the centrality of the notion of empty self in all Buddhist schools does not 
obscure the great variety of ways such doctrines can be interpreted in relation to what 
constitutes emptiness and self. Broadly speaking the denial of self-subsistent being in 
relation to the self meant that the self was thought of as ‘anatman’ (non-self), a transitory 
phenomena that lacks inherent existence and is constituted by the interplay of the 
skandhas (matter/form, sensation, perception, volition, mind) that are themselves empty 
of self-being. Self as a persistent existing identity (subjective ego) was here seen as 
resulting from grammatical convention and ignorance concerning the true nature of 
experience; in truth self was an illusion generated by the continuity of mental experiences 
within the interplay of transitory phenomena. Even as empty this remained a form of self 
(even if a formless form) so the term non-self (as negation of substantive self) is generally 
favoured over no-self (which would entail a denial even of illusory self), although there 
is much doctrinal divergence in early Zen concerning what the ‘pure’ or ‘universal’ mind 
behind the illusion consisted of. No brief or generic picture could do justice to the variety 
and depth of the historical theories of self that Nishitani draws from, but highlights that 
although it may be a foregone conclusion that Nishitani will hold the self to be constituted 
by emptiness even consistent reference to non-self hides an abundance of understandings, 
and that what self refers to often remains ambiguous. Since nothingness (and thus non-
self) in the context of this thesis is given a more limited definition as unmeaning how this 
specific understanding of nothingness relates to anatman and Śūnyatā in general will 
emerge throughout this and the following chapters; specifically how Dasein as constituted 
by nihility and entities lack of inherent meaning (there sheer presence-at-hand) can inform 
Nishitani's thought. 
 Heisig lays out three broad ways non-self is treated by the Kyoto thinkers; a 
meditative principle for deliverance from illusion, selfless moral action, and a 
metaphysical or ontological doctrine. He holds that whilst not necessarily implying or 
requiring each other the attempt was made to unify these conceptions into “the same sort 
of singular and univocal meaning that Western philosophy has always required of an idea 
of the subject”191 yet that not even Nishitani “clearly states the univocal definition of no-
self (or its correlatives, true self and non-ego) that they were assuming as necessary”192. 
This general characterization is at odds with other themes of Nishitani’s work that he 
clarifies; namely that Śūnyatā as uniting ontological and existential understandings 
through the twofold definition of realization indicates the bringing together of these three 
broad approaches to non-self. As was said at the start of chapter 1.2 the ontological 
doctrine of the emptiness of reality, its rising to awareness through experience of the 
empty self behind illusion, and the ethical consequences of this are all mutually implied 
in Śūnyatā as the real self-realization of reality’s coming to awareness. It is in this process 
that the ‘univocal definition of no-self’ emerges as rendered possible by Nishitani’s more 
explicitly narrow theory of self as identity with absolute nothingness. Although at times 
there remains an ambiguity relating to the notion of human self-hood that is to emerge in 
later discussion of anthropocentrism. Despite having a unity of thought through his 
guiding understanding of essential religion it is true that there is a lack of systematic unity 
in Nishitani’s use of the terms self, ego and subject (and their various negations).These 
various meanings of self are to emerge through initial consideration of the self on each of 
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the fields of disclosure before moving towards the self-identity with absolute nothingness, 
beginning with his critique of the self on the field of consciousness. 
Self as Realized through Critique 
Nishitani claims that “The idea of man as person is without doubt the highest conception 
of man yet to appear”193 and connects this conception of personhood with the 
development of modern subjectivity in Western thought. The implication of this is that 
the ‘self’ originally designated by the anatman doctrine is not the same self of modern 
subjectivity that Nishitani’s own theory of self is aiming to overcome. This problem of 
reconciling the historical location of self to be overcome with Śūnyatā and the ahistorical 
nature of original Buddhist doctrines will be more thoroughly considered later in relation 
to nihilism. For now it can be said that as a kōan for the modern age Religion and 
Nothingness’s notion of what comprises the conventional self is limited to the ego of 
modern subjectivity. 
 The critique of the subject (shutai) mirrors the previous critique of substance 
(jittai) in that just as substance indicates the in-itself of a thing only as ‘for us’ (as 
representation) the notion of subject “merely points to man in himself insofar as he is laid 
bare to himself within himself, on the field of his own consciousness.”194 Subjectivity is 
only the self as it appears to the self upon the field on consciousness as standing opposed 
to the world and objects. Nishitani points to the work of Descartes and Kant as indicating 
how this understanding of self emerged to become seen as self-evident and entails that 
through the Copernican Revolution in modernity “the subject that lies at the ground of 
the various faculties of consciousness has come at the same time...to lie at the ground of 
the visible world and all things therein”195. As for the critique of objectivity the 
importance of Nishitani's interpretation of Kant is not its fidelity but what it highlights 
regarding Nishitani's conception of modern subjectivity; that personhood as the highest 
conception yet to appear carries with it the flawed presupposition of the centrality of the 
subjective or egoistic self within the phenomenal world of the field of consciousness 
being taken for a similar centrality in awareness of true reality. Although this subject-
dependence is seen as the culmination (and beginning of self-nullification) of the subject-
object duality the nature of the critique of subjectivity as ground for the world of objects 
is problematic for Nishitani, as shall be later discussed in reference to the ontological 
priority he also seems to give the awareness of self. 
 The core of the critique is that in the self only grasping itself from within, only 
seeing itself from within itself, the field of consciousness is taken as both conventional 
and ultimate reality resulting in the self’s enclosing within itself and estrangement from 
the suchness of both self and things. The egocentric self-centred perspective leads to the 
prioritizing of the subjective self and represents “form of captivity or self-attachment”196, 
incapable of moving beyond its own representations (of both itself and objects) to the true 
awareness required to overcome the paradox of representation. Such a conception of self 
is an artificial illusory construct resulting from the inherent subject-object division of the 
field of consciousness, an incapacity necessary to and befitting its nature along the same 
lines as metaphysics inability to think its own ground. The seeming self-evidence of this 
traditional notion of subjectivity is attributed to the tendency to reification of the self into 
ego that is constitutive of the very nature of self, as falling is of Dasein as the metaphysical 
animal, so that despite the impossibility of viewing subjectivity objectively “the self 
shows a constant tendency to comprehend itself representationally as some ‘thing’ that is 
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called ‘I’.”197 Such an inherent tendency towards self-attachment arises as  “ego and 
person from the very outset entail inward self-reflection, without which they cannot come 
into being as ego and person, it is only natural that this kind of self-immanent self-
prehension should come about”198 through the proximal everyday experience of 
conventional reality upon the field of consciousness. The self-attachment of the field of 
consciousness is natural and proper to the form of disclosure upon that field; it is hard to 
fathom how persons could operate at the level of conventional reality without recourse to 
such a mode of being. 
 This conventional truth upon the field of consciousness is just as real as the 
Śūnyatā that constitutes its possibility, and the egoistic mode of self upon this field is not 
only ineliminable but justified within the context of applicability for such an egoistic 
vocabulary. In the same manner that inauthenticity is not pejorative, rather only the 
covering up of what renders it possible and the obscuring of the authentic mode of being 
that constitutes the self in concert with the inauthentic is condemned, it is only certain 
features of this egoistic mode of being that seem problematic. Namely; the mistaken 
identity of the field of consciousness for the sole-reality that brings with it the constant 
danger of “a confinement that inevitably ushers in the narcissistic mode of grasping the 
self wherein the self gets caught up in itself”199. Such self-attachment obscures the self-
identity of the personal self with the absolute nothingness that in their mutual constitution 
comprise the self-realization of reality allowing for such realization to surpass the 
estrangement stemming from the paradox of representation. This obscuring of the self's 
true nature and closing down of other possibilities of self-understanding will later be 
expanded and clarified through Heidegger's more rigorous analysis of the relation 
between Gestell and Ereignis in chapter 2.2, for now it can be noted that Nishitani's 
account of the process of self-realization mirrors that of metaphysics self-surmounting. A 
key shared feature is that whilst the self’s reification of itself through the egoistic mode 
of being is always an act of the self “it is not something we are free to do as we 
please...The force of destiny is at work here, impelling us to be and to act in this 
manner.”200, a destiny that is not “something that simply rules over us and controls us 
from without. Nor is it merely something like blind will. It is a destiny that appears only 
in the shape of the acts we ourselves perform, only as one with our own actions.”201 The 
self-identity of the self and Śūnyatā, of Da and its Sein, makes the grasping of the self on 
the field of consciousness (the slipping into the inauthentic subjective self) a force that 
acts through us and as us. The nature of and relation between the self-understanding of 
the field of consciousness and the free relation of Da and Sein once the illusory necessity 
of Gestell is exposed raises issue to be addressed in chapter 2.3 concerning the 
inevitability that governs the narrative behind the history of metaphysics. The manner in 
which this is both accomplished by the self yet beyond the power of the self was touched 
upon in chapter 1.1 and is to be the main focus if section 3 concerning the manner of our 
resposibility for preparing the way for the saving epoch. 
 Such self-attachment is shattered in the nullification of the field of nihility that 
renders the self non-differentiated from the world as both self and thing, subjects and 
objects, are rendered into a single question deprived of meaning. The ego as an object of 
its own representation is rendered non-objective as non-ego along with the entities that 
are deprived of the simple self-identity of substance. The attempt of the self to reach itself 
representationally upon the field of consciousness falls victim to its own form of the 
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paradox of representation so that “the human ego-self falls into an ever-deepening 
dilemma. At the extreme point of this dilemma…the human ego must die.”202, a claim 
that echoes the problems of warrant and attestation for the necessity of the progression 
through the fields that are to be questioned more thoroughly in anxiety chapter and 2.6. 
This nullification is prefigured within Kant’s rendering of the subject as central; not only 
was the radical non-objectivity of the subject thus posited but limits were also drawn to 
the competence of the self. This opened the way for the combining of both subject and 
objects into a single doubt as the nullification of the self is thus transferred into the objects 
that are its representations but in a reciprocal manner so that “the insertion of nihility at 
the ground of things means, in fact, that nihility looms up from the ground of all existing 
things, assaults us, and inserts itself into the ground of our existence.”203 The 
incomprehensibility of self and things in nihility arises from their previous reification as 
objects obscuring their essential nature and unity, and if the subject is the representer of 
objects the nullification of objects also reveals the nullity at the ground of the subject. 
The paradox of representation passes away on the field of nihility as both self and things 
are no longer objects so that “their cognition cease to be problems; the problem is the 
reality of things and the self.”204 There is a paradigm shift away from epistemological 
concern of how objects can be known by a subject to concern with the suchness of both 
and the manner in which they manifest; the conditions for their mutual realization. The 
experience of the transitional field of nihility will be returned to in anxiety chapter, for 
now the main concern is the nature of the realization this transition leads to. 
Self as Absolute Nothingness 
As with the jitai of entities in general the field of nihility leads here to a re-emergence of 
what was nullified so that a transfigured subjectivity, a non-subjective subjectivity to 
parallel and allow contact with the non-substantial substantiality, also features in 
discussion of the true self. Subjectivity, like substance, is not to be simply negated but 
transformed and recontextualised within the process of Śūnyatā as an aspect of the self-
realization of reality, the illusory ego is drawn into the sive relation with the reality of the 
empty self; the everyday inauthentic self with the authentic Da disclosed as nothingness 
in anxiety. The difference of jitai as replacing subject to jitai in the context of replacing 
substance lies in that here the absolute nothingness of reality is directly encountered at 
the homeground of the self allowing for the encounter through self-identity with things 
as equally realized through such nothingness. 
 The negation of the ego through the nihilizing experience of non-self leads to the 
breaking of self-enclosure “from within and the personal self discloses itself as 
subjectivity in its elemental sense, as truly absolute selfhood.”205, the experiential aspect 
of which will be dealt with in anxiety chapter. The term elemental in respect to 
subjectivity in Religion and Nothingness is translated from a character more literally 
rendered as ‘fountainhead’ or ‘root source’ and “carries the sense of the primal spring of 
life from which subjectivity flows.”206 Elemental subjectivity as the absolute selfhood of 
non-subjective subjectivity is thereby portrayed as what renders possible the subjective 
ego of the field of consciousness, an understanding of nihility as ontological origin that 
will emerge as the keystone to the self-transformation of nihilism and the relation of 
danger and saving in chapter 2.4. 
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 Such elemental subjectivity is neither self-confined as personal ego nor dispersed 
and nullified as non-ego but denotes the self as “in unison with absolute nothingness, 
which is its original mode of being.”207 Despite the ultimate reality of Śūnyatā being an 
unquestioned assumption for Nishitani this original state is only realized through a 
process of affirmation-sive-negation so that its primordiality is ontological not 
chronological, the consequences of this for the historical emergence of nihilism are 
returned to in chapters 2.3 and 2.4. True personhood is therefore “a phenomena that 
appears out of what cannot itself be called personal”208, the essence of the human is not 
here constituted in or by a relation to the non-human but is the direct manifestation of the 
non-personal. A self-identity beyond any form of integral relation that interprets the 
human self in terms of that which it is not but does not thereby reduce the self to be 
explained in terms of anything other to or transcending the self and world. Instead there 
is a moving beyond duality to provide for the self-identity of self and world, a moving 
beyond both the duality of ego and its negation in the non-ego of nihility to the self-
identity of these mods of awareness upon a deeper field. It is through this elemental 
subjectivity that “opens up as nonobjectifiable nothingness in the conversion that takes 
place within personality.”209 that the subject-object duality is to be overcome in the direct 
encounter with things in themselves. The absolute self-identity between the illusory ontic 
world and the true self as the realization of absolute nothingness leads to the self as non-
objectifiable nothingness transcending the outer-inner division of self-world, “The ‘outer 
world’ emerges here as a self-realization of nonobjectifiable nothingness, or, rather, 
makes itself present such as it is, in oneness with nothingness.”210 
 Nishitani finds such a primordial understanding of personhood in the notion of 
'persona' as originally meaning 'mask', a mask behind which is nothing so that person is 
the mask of nothingness with ontic personal states occurring on the stage of nothingness 
as its expression. This conception will later be linked to Hodge's interpretation of the Da 
as requiring the question of the human must be kept open as opposed to the fixed 
metaphysical understandings of the human it makes possible, thus that self is no-specific-
thing and this is the true essence of the human. The horizon for possibility the field of 
nihility reveals then shows such fixed understandings of the human to be the  mask of 
Da-Sein as the true essence of the human. The connections between these understandings 
will be addressed more in chapters 2.2 and 2.6 regarding humanism. 
 The self-identity of reality and illusion, being-sive-nothingness, means that 
“Person is an appearance with nothing at all behind it to make an appearance.”211 This 
nothingness that constitutes the self as its mask is described as wholly other to and the 
absolute negation of person yet “it is not some ‘thing’ or some entity different from 
person.”212, as an absolute nothingness it is emptied of any objective representation that 
could lead to a relation of duality between self and non-self. Paralleling the non-
substantial substantiality of jitai as reality-sive-illusion “’Being self in not being self’ 
means that the being of the self as a personal, conscious, corporeal human and the 
existence of the self as subject are essentially illusory appearances…put the other way 
around, it is precisely on the field of Śūnyatā that these phenomena, at one with emptiness, 
are nothing less than actual reality at an essential level”.213 
As personal consciousness the true self is always radically individual, yet as a unity with 
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absolute nothingness the same self is radically impersonal, “self and other, while 
remaining absolutely two as persons, are at the same time and in there very duality 
absolutely nondual in their nonhumanity, in their impersonality…This is the standpoint 
of absolute selfhood, of the true self that is personal-sive-impersonal, impersonal-sive-
personal.”214 The nature of the personal-sive-impersonal pertains to the connection of the 
ontology of self to both its ethical ramifications and the opposition of religion and science 
understood as opposing teleological and mechanistic worldviews; it is principally related 
to the context of the I-Thou relation rather than the more general relation between self 
and things. The concern of this chapter is the ontological relation between self, things and 
world as constituted by nothingness and I find myself agreeing with Heisig that “the I-
you relationship in Nishitani is given a place of special importance but does not form part 
of the paradigm of all of reality. In a word, interpersonal encounter is made the 
handmaiden of self-awareness, and within it the ‘other’ is viewed as a dimension of no-
self.”215 Nishitani’s theory of self moves towards the identity of phenomenon and 
resolving of estrangement between self and world, a facet of this includes the alienation 
between selves but whilst the I-Thou relation, like MitSein, is constitutive of the self it 
does not play an integral role within the process of Śūnyatā and within the immediate 
context of Religion and Nothingness is secondary to the more general relation between 
phenomena. The relation between selves upon the field of Śūnyatā is grounded by the 
ontological considerations of this chapter but the implications of the personal-sive-
impersonal for the I-Thou relation in terms of ethics and personal freedom will be dealt 
with later in connection to the overcoming of nihilism and ethics. But it should be noted 
that this bears on Heidegger's problematic of reconciling singularity and plurality, a theme 
that in section 2 will emerge as of vital consequence for the manner of nihilisms self-
transformation. 
 In relation to the identity of mask and nothingness a similar problem to that noted 
in consideration to jitai in general resurfaces, given the lingering terminology of otherness 
and negation does Nishitani’s portrayal of this relation escape from the representation of 
a relative nothingness? Whilst self-identical with the field of consciousness the strenuous 
denials of true emptiness’s duality or opposition to the egoistic self are occasionally 
contradicted in the reappearance of divisive language such as “insofar as personality and 
consciousness can be what they are only in oneness with absolute nothingness, the same 
complete oneness stands ecstatically outside of personality and consciousness.”216 The 
self in its suchness is self-identical with the subjective self, yet in its role as the ecstatic 
ground of that aspect still seems portrayed as ‘outside’ and external to it, the same traces 
of representation in its description that Nishitani criticizes Heidegger for remain equally 
present and worrying in Religion and Nothingness. 
 The self-identity of self and nothingness lies in that “Were nothingness to be 
thought of apart from its mask, it would become an idea. Were we to deal with the mask 
apart from nothingness, person could not avoid becoming self-centred”217, but in 
describing the self-identity as ecstatically grounded in a unity ‘outside’ or ontologically 
prior to the unified aspects there is a persistent risk of rendering absolute nothingness into 
just such an idea. This may be an unavoidable danger inherent within language, as was 
discussed in chapters 1.1 and 1.2, but it is also a trace that seems to emerge at several 
points in Nishitani’s work, and these residual dualities and ambiguities increasingly 
contribute to the persistence of the primacy of the self in the process of disclosure through 
the dual nature of realization; the sive between manifestation and apprehension is a 
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lurking paradox that seemingly concerns Nishitani less than others whose flaws are cited 
as necessitating this very paradox. Whilst the appearance of the non-objective mode of 
being of jitai is possibilized by the field of Śūnyatā the non-objective mode of the self is 
more radically related to absolute nothingness as its manifestation, and increasingly 
emerges as grounding the manifestation of the non-objective in-itself in a similar manner 
to the pre-nihility critique of Kantian thought. The re-emergence of a transfigured 
substance and subject at times seems too reminiscent of a simple restating of the dualistic 
estrangement Śūnyatā moves beyond. 
 The overcoming of duality cannot be the simple passing from ego to non-ego as 
this just reinforces their duality in simple negation. The extinction or death of the ego 
upon the field of nihility that is to explicated in anxiety chapter is the passing of self-
awareness from the field upon which the ego is constituted towards an awareness of the 
simultaneity of ego and non-ego; of reality-sive-illusion. The true self is not just the 
negation of ego but arises from that existential realization of negation; “It must reach self-
awareness as something come from the self’s absolute negation of itself. It is not the case 
that the self is merely not self (that it is non-ego). It must be the case rather that the self 
is the self because it is not the self.”218, yet is only non-self once realized as such despite 
such realization being made possible by the primordiality of Śūnyatā. Non-self is not just 
the negation of subjective ego but is also the ontological ground of subjectivity as the true 
self is existentially realized only as the overcoming of the self-confined ego through the 
experience of non-self. When this experience of the negation of self is realized as self-
sive-nonself rather than as simply self or its negation then the true self as self-identical 
with absolute nothingness is manifested through this experience. The self-centred egoistic 
self is negated in the sense that is revealed as illusory, as lacking in self-being, and this 
negation is “precisely that existential self-awareness wherein the true self is realized as 
an emergence from the non-ego”219. But such self-awareness retains the negated illusory 
aspect of self in the qualified sense of conventional reality that is not to be seen as dual 
with the ultimate reality of suchness, person as the mask of absolute nothingness is both 
real and illusory so that “Man thus comes into being as an absolute nothingness –sive- 
being rooted elementally in the personal mode of being.”220. Both aspects of self arise 
from this relation, but again the ontological priority is given to the process whereby non-
self negates the egoistic self; the illusory aspect arises “because all the activities of man 
become manifest as themselves only in unison with absolute nothingness”221  and in this 
the self is also radically real, indeed its actions are “the most real of realities because they 
are nothing other than the manifestation of absolute selfhood.”222 The ‘most real of 
realities’ carries here a connotation of the greater ontological stature Nishitani attributes 
to the self in the process of disclosure. As constituted by the relation of self and non-self 
this true self is seen as the manifestation of absolute nothingness (Śūnyatā) in a seemingly 
more thorough-going sense than the jitai that pertains to entities other than the self-aware 
subject. 
 Whilst in reference to jitai absolute nothingness enables the true manifestation of 
the thing-itself in its suchness, in reference to the self the realization of the non-objective 
self is “self-revelation as the manifestation of absolute nothingness”223 in which 
“nothingness really becomes actualized in the self as the true self.”224 Realization as both 
the understanding and actualization means that when the self understands itself as self-
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sive-nonself, as self-identical with absolute nothingness, then the self is “that in which 
absolute nothingness becomes manifest.”225 The field of Śūnyatā is that on or through 
which things appear in their suchness, but it is that which the self in its suchness appears 
as, Śūnyatā as the self-realization of reality manifests through the personal subject’s 
realization of their non-subjective nature. Nishitani critiqued Kant for ultimately 
portraying the object in-itself as still an object for the subject, yet jitai as the non-objective 
in-itself only is in its suchness on the field of Śūnyatā thus for the elemental subjectivity 
that is Śūnyatā. The mode of being of the in-itself on its homeground was earlier said to 
be characterized as a form of ‘samadhi’, in relation to the self in-itself Nishitani goes so 
far to characterize this as King Samadhi; the self amongst jitai is the paramount samadhi 
so that “The point at which the non-objective mode of being of things as they are in 
themselves takes hold of its ground lies at the homeground of our self”226. The primacy 
of subjectivity is negated in the critique of ego, only to be affirmed in terms of elemental 
subjectivity; and whilst such affirmation-sive-negation is a key principle in Nishitani's 
thought to be truly balanced the sive relation between them must also preserve the 
negation within the subsequent affirmation rather than simply returning to a conditioned 
form of affirmation (a similar problematic will be addressed in chapter 2.4 concerning the 
relation between calculative and meditative thought and how such affirmation-sive-
negation impacts the relation between the danger and that which saves). 
Self-realization as Resolution to the Paradox of Representation 
The non-objective knowing of the thing in-itself that was earlier said to be necessary to 
overcome the paradox of representation is made possible since despite that “things are 
thoroughly substantial and the self is thoroughly subjective...things and self are not 
different, but one ‘in itself’”227.  This single in-itself is not meant  in the sense of a 
unification of opposites but a prior nondualistic ontological unity as sketched out in terms 
of Ereignis in chapters 1.1 and 1.2. The realization of this unity arises with the self’s 
realization of its own nature so that the real non-subjective self is the self-awareness of 
emptiness; “True emptiness is nothing less than what reaches awareness in all of us as 
our own absolute self-nature”228 once the mutual belonging of Da and Sein is revealed 
through the nililations of anxiety and epochal nihilism. When elemental subjectivity is 
realized as the ontological ground of selfhood through the process of self-negation then 
the self becomes the self-expression Śūnyatā, true selfhood is the mutual realization of 
both self and reality so that the suchness of non-objective things in themselves is realized 
through the self in the process of the self coming to true self-awareness of itself, a notion 
to be later compared to releasement. It is through the real self-realization of elemental 
subjectivity that “each and every entity that is said to exist becomes manifest: as what it 
is in itself”229; the manner in which this is accomplished is to be explicated more fully in 
section 3 after further consideration of the conditions of its possibility in terms of both 
world and transitional nihility. 
This is the nondual existential and ontological nature of Nishitani’s theory of self. The 
ontology is not simply a tool of liberation in the service of an existential awakening, nor 
is the process of existential realization the understanding of an objective antecedent truth. 
The self-realization that transforms the subject is the manifestation of the ontology of 
nothingness, and the ontology of nothingness is only manifested in the self-realization 
that attains to elemental subjectivity. This is what is meant by realization as both 
understanding and manifestation, that “Absolute nothingness…is not possible as a 
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nothingness that is thought but only as a nothingness that is lived.”230 The realization of 
self as nothingness, thus the manifestation of nothingness as the suchness of all 
phenomena, is always an existential experience of the loss of the ego-centred perspective 
as is to be outlined in anxiety chap. The real self-realization of reality is a broad ontology 
of self possibilized by the narrower ontology of self that is also its attestation. 
Stenson considers this in terms of an ontological psychology that builds upon the 
Buddhist psychology of Enlightenment, and whilst Nishitani stresses that he is offering 
an ontology not an empirical psychology (claiming that his use of samadhi is ontological 
not psychological) he draws his ideas from a tradition with a strong psychological element 
that remins within his thought. For Stenson the emptied self denotes “ a clearing in a 
dense fog of neurotic egoism…if the fog lifts – if the self is emptied of its egoistic and 
willful self-centredness – the clearing becomes an illumination (an insight, revelation, 
conversion, satori) in which…the ‘suchness’ (tathatā) of things appears.”231 An 
appearance that is accordingly nondual with its realization and not ontologically prior to 
it as indicated in Nishitani’s denials of material realism. This leads Srenson to conclude 
that “Heidegger’s poetic image of the ‘authentic’ self as a ‘clearing’, and Nishitani’s 
Buddhist image of the ‘true’ self as ‘empty’ are psychologically and ontologically 
related...their analyses of Dasein (their existential psychologies) are mutually supportive 
and they use them to arrive at compatible ontological conclusions.”232   
If true self-awareness is the realization of the non-objective mode of jitai through the 
nonduality of self and things, if “The transfiguration of the world from ‘illusion’ to 
‘reality’, is due to a transformation of the self”233 then the existential-ontological unity 
that is denoted by the sive of apprehension-sive-manifestation needs greater clarification 
to complete the overcoming of the paradox of representation rendered possible by the 
mutual nothingness of self and things. The coming to awareness of elemental subjectivity 
is both the condition of possibility for the manifestation of suchness, yet the nonduality 
of self and emptiness (being-sive-nothingness) that comprises suchness is also presented 
as required for the realization of elemental subjectivity as the self’s self-identity with 
absolute nothingness. The paradoxical nature of the sive relation of realization is the core 
of Nishitani’s thought as encapsulated in the definition of essential religion and leads to 
both the representative remnants and lingering priority of the self in the ontological 
constitution of  the in-itself upon the field of Śūnyatā, mitigating his critique of the 
subject-dependence of traditional ontology. This difficulty is echoed in chapter 1.2's 
discussion of the priority of the Da-Sein relation and the possibility of its obscurement in 
nihilism and ensuing self-transformation, once these chapters have laid out the 
ontological possibility of such changes sections 2+3 deal with the manner in which the 
forgetting and remembrance respectively are realized. 
Two main problems remain in the overcoming of the paradox of representation; the 
relation of manifestation and apprehension within the self-realization of reality, and the 
nature of the experience or direct encounter with the absolute nothingness of elemental 
subjectivity that such realization as the overcoming of the paradox of realization relies 
on. Phrased differently; how the identity of self and things in their non-objectivity (or 
mutual samadhi) is constituted as world, and the given that “True nothingness is a living 
nothingness, and a living nothingness can only be self-attested”234 then what is the form 
of this self-attestation? The  basis for the answers to such questions are now to be sought 
in Nishitani’s explication of the mutual gathering of world, before moving onto 
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consideration of how koto as non-knowing thinks the sive of realization and the 
problematic nature of the self-attestation of nothingness. 
1.5 Nishitani's World / Circuminsessional Knowing 
The relation of world as the totality of both things and self in Nishitani’s thought is a 
reinterpretation of the Buddhist doctrine of Pratityasamutpada that has been translated 
into a great variety of English phrases; dependent origination, conditioned co-production, 
dependent co-origination, origin in dependence, reciprocal dependency, contingent co-
arising, interconnectedness and non-obstructed interrelationship. The doctrine is most 
commonly illuminated through the Hua-Yen school’s metaphor of the jewelled net in the 
palace of the god Indra; a vast net formed by gems that are empty and reflective so that 
each mirrors the light of all the others, a light with no source external to this mirroring 
and determined by the gems that reflect it constituting reality itself as this infinite 
mirroring. Each gem as phenomena is empty of own-being and exists in-itself only as an 
interplay of reflected appearances, each constituting all the others even as they are 
constituted by them. Phenomena thus ‘are’ only in relation to all other phenomena, as the 
light they mirror in virtue of their empty nature, by reflecting the emptiness of all other 
phenomena. As interdependent all phenomena are equally themselves and every other, 
related not by linear causality but as a network of mutual manifestation. The net and light 
can be seen as relating to the field of sunyata that does not exist apart from the phenomena 
whose mirroring it possibilizes and yet is constituted by. 
Nishitani’s explication of the idea remains grounded in the thought represented by this 
metaphor but expands its explanation in light of the nonduality of the sive between empty 
phenomenon and their mirroring and of his characterization of jitai as samadhi-being. 
Such differences may have prompted Van Bragt’s decision to use the theological phrase 
‘circuminsessional interpenetration’ (denoting the relation within the Trinity) for the 
Japanese ‘egoteki kankei’ (more literally rendered as ‘reciprocal interpenetration’), rather 
than a completely new or more traditional translation. A number of commentators such 
as Dallmayr have attributed the “borrowing from Christian theology”235 directly to 
Nishitani and then attempted to move the term away from its Christian roots to a more 
general mystical setting; for example Stenson claims the term “is but a Western name for 
a mystical principle that is apparent in many traditional cultures. It is the concept of pars 
pro toto: that, in mystical experience, the whole of the sacred is present in every one of 
its parts.”236 Whilst I believe the theological overtones of the phrase are unhelpful they 
are also obscure enough for the phrase to be retained for the sake of convenience, the term 
is somewhat unwieldy but to non-theologians strikes the ear as suitably connotation free 
to receive its meaning from the Religion and Nothingness alone. 
Gathering  of Jitai  
As was said in chapter 1.3's discussion of jitai Nishitani calls the in-itself samadhi-being, 
bringing in elements of both the active role of things in their disclosure (in how they 
represent themselves rather than just being apprehended representationally) and the 
connotations of an originally mental term being used as paradigm for disclosure. As 
meditative practice samadhi is a technique intended to bring an awareness both of the 
emptiness and interconnectedness of the self whilst remaining immediately engaged with 
this process as that awareness. Nishitani’s extending of the idea builds upon the thought 
of Dogen; that realization does not emerge as a result of Zen practice but is self-identical 
with it, in Dogen’s terms that enlightenment and zazen (Zen meditation) are one and the 
same. Samadhi accordingly pertains to the realization of reality in both its connotations, 
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its understanding and manifestation, the ontological and existential are unified in the 
process of sunyata as the reflective samdhi of self and all things in the world. The activity 
of samadhi in Nishitani’s altered sense of gathering or settling is the self-positing of a 
thing as jitai , the mode of being of a thing on its homeground that makes possible both 
its representation and relatedness to others. It is through this “act of con-centration by 
which every being gathers itself within itself – in other words, the ‘beingness’ of a 
‘being’”237 as a non-objective in-itself that non-representational apprehension of the thing 
in-itself is possible through the relational aspect Nishitani gives to samadhi, that gathering 
is also a mirroring and that in gathering itself a phenomena is also a gathering of all other 
things. 
In the mode of samadhi-being a thing gathers itself into its own centre and this is both the 
possibility of and possibilized by the gathering of all things into a world. The gathering 
of a thing in jitai is self-identical with the gathering of world, the claim that “where each 
thing in itself is concentrated in itself, all things of necessity concentrate themselves into 
one”238 provides the framework for Nishitani’s resolution to the paradox of representation 
through the mutual self-realization of self and things in the coming to awareness of reality. 
In the mode of being of jitai as the positing of self-identity through samadhi “That a thing 
is means that it is absolutely unique”239; the being of a being resides in its uniqueness as 
an in-itself as absolute centre, but as such non-substantial substantiality the thing in-itself 
is only an absolute centre in a relation of identity with all other absolute centres. That all 
things are equally absolute in this sense means a things unique self-identity also 
constitutes the totality of circuminsessional relations that comprise the world so that 
“wherever a thing is, the world worlds.”240 The circuminsessional form of the relation of 
self-identity that comprises world requires that which is so related to be constituted as 
being-sive-nothingness; the condition of possibility for this mutual realization that 
resolves the dilemmas of the field of consciousness is the “self in itself: a self that is not 
itself in being itself, a self that is not a self”241 that was explicated in the previous chapters. 
The self-positing of a thing for itself and in itself was first introduced to break the 
dependence of phenomena on the representations of the subject stemming from the self-
centred mode of being on the field of consciousness. Such gathering is portrayed in a 
manner that can be seen as a radical form of self-centredness, a turning of each in-itself 
into an absolute centre through its gathering as a centring of itself upon its homeground. 
This settling is said not to be the simple self-centredness of the field of consciousness, it 
is a non-self-centred self-centredness that does not exclude or remain confined from other 
such centres comprising a unity that preserves radical differentiation. 
The necessity of retaining differentiation as opposed to the uniformity of phenomena that 
Nishitani likens to the ‘absolute One’ “conceived of in terms of a negation of the 
multiplicity and differentiation of existing things as deceptive and illusory 
appearances”242 is because upon the field of sunyata illusory appearance is suchness as a 
re-affirmation of illusory appearance through the negation of nihlity. Such uniform unity 
begins from, and remains upon, the field of reason and is thus metaphysical in the 
Heideggerian sense as beings remain self-enclosed and are only unified through 
“returning to the unity of an absolute One that is, in turn, itself a being.”243 Such reductive 
uniformity cannot account for, or escape from, the egoistic self-identity of phenomena 
and by treating the non-differentiated as an abstract being, understanding Being in terms 
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of a unifying highest being, falls into the same difficulties of traditional substance views 
in forgetting the ontological difference. Nishitani claims this form of uniformity is 
rendered impossible once the field of nihility is passed through on the way to realization 
of sunyata. Nihility is here portrayed as a field of isolation that disperses the unity that 
grounds the meaning of beings through the nullification of the meaningful relations of 
conventional understanding.  In indicating that only “when a thing has lost any point to 
be reduced to, only when it has nothing more to rely on, can it be thrown back upon 
itself”244, nihility is reminiscent of a universal interpretation of Heidegerrian death. The 
individualization of ownmost being in nihility that in Being and Time was characteristic 
of Dasein as the only being that faces death applies here to all beings, for in Nishitani’s 
ontology every being’s being is at issue for that being in virtue of its samadhi-being. 
Nullification here seems to have a twofold sense that did not emerge earlier. Nihility 
moves toward the overcoming of the estrangement of subject and object by gathering the 
self and all things in the world into ‘a single question mark’ that seems akin to the 
‘absolute One’ as a uniform meaninglessness that does not differentiate between the 
subject and object, between what Dasein is anxious for and in the face of. Yet this shared 
absence of meaning retains an element of self-enclosure in which “all things appear 
isolated from one another by an abyss. Each thing has its being as a one-and-only, a 
solitariness absolutely shut up within itself. We call such a state of absolute self-enclosure 
‘nihilistic’.”245 Deprived of meaning phenomena cannot relate themselves to each other 
and are experienced as radically differentiated even whilst the meaning that could 
differentiate them is nullified. Such a paradoxical union of multiplicity and non-
differentiation would seem to bring nihility closer than ever to the characterization of 
sunyata, even for a transitional stage. 
Gathering of World 
The circuminsessional relation of the field of sunyata moves beyond the radical 
differentiation or isolation of nihility without thereby returning to notion of simple 
uniformity (given how he formulated previous considerations of jitai Nishitani could have 
phrased such as ‘non-uniform uniformity’). Each thing as centred is the unity that also 
gathers whilst being gathered, “Each and every thing becomes the centre of all things and, 
in that sense, becomes an absolute centre”246. The gathering of of absolute centres into 
one that preserves the uniqueness of each is likened by Nishitani to a relation of mutual 
servitude that seems paradoxical, in which “all things are master and servant to one 
another”247, simultaneously in a relation of both mastery and servitude to all other 
phenomenon so “that a thing is – its absolute autonomy – comes about only in unison 
with a subordination of all other things”248, yet paradoxically at the same time this 
autonomy is constituted by subordination to all other things. The characterization of the 
circuminsessional relation in terms of a master-servant relation brings both a personalized 
element to the non-sentient things within the network of world and emphasizes how as an 
existential realization the relationship grounds the later ethics of compassion. The relation 
of master and servant implies a duty to others (whether selves or things) and carries a 
sense of solicitude as entailing that the autonomy of elemental subjectivity arises through 
subordination to others in the I-Thou relationship. Dallmayr finds that “This linkage of 
selfness or autonomy and openness to otherness or difference is at the heart of the 
standpoint of sunyata”249, and the relation of this responsibility to the axiological nature 
of sunyata is to be addressed in chapter 2.6. The ethical elements of existential self-
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emptying in this relation (its interpersonal context as the I-Thou relation and MitSein) 
will be returned to in chapter 3.5, what is of concern now is the form of the ontological 
aspect of self-emptying and the manner in which this constitutes the mutual realization of 
phenomenon in general. 
That a thing is a servant means “it lies at the ground of all other things, that it is a 
constitutive element in the being of every other thing”250, in making the other being what 
it is in-itself it upholds that being as its servant and thus “possesses no substantiality in 
the ordinary sense, that it is a non-self-nature”251. In upholding others in servitude it 
empties itself of its own self-nature so that other things can attain their self-nature, yet at 
the same time all other things empty themselves so that they may uphold that thing as 
their master; the self-emptying that constitutes a thing on its homeground occurs in unison 
with the self-emptying of all other things. Abe elucidates this as meaning that within the 
multiplicity of absolute centres “self-centredness realized at the standpoint of sunyata is 
a selfless self-centredness in which the self and other are completely non-dual within the 
nexus of reciprocal interpenetration, and thus the self-centredness and other-centredness 
are dynamically one”252; through a dynamic of self-emptying. That all phenomena are 
master-sive-servant is related to the simultaneous affirmation and negation of their nature 
as both real and illusory. Affirmation-sive-negation correlates to the being-sive-
nothingness of jitai ; the relation of affirmation and negation within the self-identity of 
reality and illusion of the thing in-itself pertains also to its interrelation as world so that 
each phenomena is affirmed (negating all others) and also negated (affirming all others). 
Unno characterizes such negation and affirmation both within and between the jitai as 
“the basis of the relationship between master and servant”253 and the manner in which 
they are related as self-identical to both prevent uniformity yet allow for the direct 
encounter required for the overcoming of the paradox of representation. 
 That on its homeground a thing in-itself in its suchness is not itself, that all things 
are themselves in not being themselves, means that as non-self they are surrendering their 
self-identity in servitude and also being constituted in their self-identity by the servitude 
of what they are not so that “the totality of things in the world, and also the world 
itself…are in their phantomness-sive-suchness by virtue of the circuminsessional 
interpenetration whereby all are in each”254. Whilst the mutual dependency of the 
circuminsessional relationship is possibilized by the non-self nature of jitai the 
circuminsessional relation is also what makes non-self possible. Non-self (lack of own 
being) arises due to a things being upheld by all else upon its homeground, which arises 
due to non-self; they are equiprimordial as constituted in mutual realization. Because of 
this sunyata is characterized as a twofold field through which “all things as they are in 
themselves gather themselves together into one: the field of the possibility of the world” 
and also “a given thing gathers itself together: the field of the possibility of the existence 
of things.”255 These two gatherings or samadhi’s of self-sive-other as world and being-
sive-nothingness as jitai are self-identical; jitai , circuminsession, being-sive-nothingness, 
all are differing phrases for the same ontological process of the real self-realization of 
reality as self-emptying, they differ only in the emphasis they give to aspects of this 
process. 
 This mutual gathering of all things to one’s own homeground and being gathered 
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by all things to their own homeground is termed the worlding of the world. The mutual 
constitution of jitai and circuminsessional world “means that in the being of things, the 
world worlds, and that things are in the world”256, all things gather themselves into 
themselves yet also through this gather all things into the world; through the gathering of 
the thing (thinging of the thing) there is the gathering of things into world (the worlding 
of the world). That the claim “being is only being in unison with emptiness belongs in its 
fullest and most proper sense to the point of view that speaks of the ‘substance’ of 
things”257 with jitai as non-substantial substantiality as this mode of being, is joined with 
the claim that “The being of things in themselves is essentially circuminsessional. This is 
what we mean by speaking of beings as ‘being that is in unison with emptiness’”258 entails 
the mutual mirroring of thing and world in line with Stenson’s starting characterization 
of circuminsession as a mystical principle. Nishitani’s assertion that “the very tiniest 
thing, to the extent that it ‘is’, displays in its act of being the whole web of 
circuminsessional interpenetration that links all things together. In its being...the world 
‘worlds’”259 leads Kasulis to attribute to him the belief “that each thing in the universe is 
equally and fully expressive of the most profound spiritual truth”260 as through each 
things self-emptying (that Kasulis terms kenosis) into world it is world. Although this 
would seem perfectly consonant with Nishitani’s phrasing it will soon emerge as 
problematic in light of some of his other claims, and the difference between Kasulis’ and 
Abe’s take on these claims is to be addressed in chapter 2.6.   
 For now this can be seen as clarifying the issue of difference and negation that 
Gilkey raises in relation to jitai . That a thing on its homeground must also be at the 
homeground of all else entails negation through the subordination of the self in the 
master-servant circuminsessional relation. This can be seen as a reformulation of 
Nishitani's claim (at the start of chapter 1.3) that death and life manifest equally in each 
moment; the self-negation of death that disperses the self to the homeground of others is 
non-dual with the settling of jitao on its on homeground. As self-emptying each 
phenomenon negates itself and through this is affirmed by the self-negation of others “that 
a thing is not itself means that, while continuing to be itself, it is in the home-ground of 
everything else…That a thing is itself means that all other things, while continuing to be 
themselves, are in the home-ground of that thing”261. The non-objective mode of being, 
the non-self of jitai requires interpenetration with all other such non-objective in-
themselves, and this mutual gathering or mirroring through self-emptying is the mode of 
being of things in the world, it is how a world is gathered. The circuminsessional relation 
is a reformulation of the traditional reciprocal interrelation doctrine in terms of self-
emptying as a process of the manifestation of beings. The gathering of all things into a 
world mirrors the gathering of a thing in itself, each thing empties itself in service to the 
gathering of others and this is how it gathers itself as self-emptying upon its own 
homeground upon the field of sunyata. The paradox of representation is overcome 
through a further paradox of mutual realization in which “The centre is both nowhere and 
everywhere; it is everywhere because it is nowhere.”262  
 This step further towards the resolution of the paradox of representation comes 
with the extending of gathering to include the relation of world; the necessity of jitai is 
explicated through its relation to what it renders possible. This gathering through self-
emptying in the form of the master-servant relation also clarifies elemental subjectivity; 
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“To the extent that the being of the self is present in the homeground of all other things, 
the self is not the self…This is elemental self-awareness.”263 The self’s self-identity with 
emptiness that provides the direct encounter with the nothingness (or non-self-nature) of 
things to attain direct non-objective knowledge of them takes the form of mutual 
constitution through circuminsessional interpenetration that (in line with the meaning of 
‘elemental’ as root-source) also gives rise to the conventional egoistic self. Because of 
this giving rise to the disclosures of the field of consciousness Nishitani characterizes 
circuminsessional interpenetration as the most essential of all relationships that enables 
all later ontic or metaphysical understandings of world, the fundamental interrelation of 
things through mutual self-emptying that gathers each thing and world is the ontological 
pre-condition for any view of the world as a meaningful totality. Such gathering is only 
possible “on a field of emptiness where being is seen as being-sive-nothingness, 
nothingness-sive-being, where the reality of beings at the same time bears the stamp of 
illusion”264; the meaningfulness of world through circuminsessional realization is made 
possible through the nothingness (non-self) aspect of the process of sunyata as the self-
realization of reality as and through self-emptying. Ontological nothingness is thus the 
precondition for the manifestation of the relations that render a world meaningful by 
enabling the interpenetration of gathering. 
The Precedence of Self 
No sooner does Nishitani outline this radical mutual subordination that renders everything 
equal yet absolutely itself in the process of manifesting meaningful world than he seems 
to take a backwards step and attribute ontological priority to the self in-itself, even whilst 
consistently reasserting ontological equivalency in the circuminsessional relationship. 
For Nishitani sunyata denotes the self-realization of reality through the mutual gathering 
of jitai and world, but as was discussed last chapter there is a sense in which sunyata is 
also that which the self manifests as even whilst things appear on or through sunyata 
leading to the self being termed the paramount samadhi. This ambivalence now blossoms 
fully in his claim that “The field of sunyata within which the world and things become 
possible opens up at the home-ground of the self as a self that is truly on the home-ground 
of the self itself, that is, the original self in itself. As a field of ‘possibility’, the home-
ground of the self in the self precedes the world and things.”265, in an ontological not 
chronological sense, so that “The self has its home-ground at a point disengaged from the 
world and things”266. Nishitani's criticizes European existentialism for retaining an 
ecstatic ground of nothingness that is thus still a represented relative nothingness, but the 
absolute nothingness that is elemental subjectivity here also seems to transcend the world 
and remain an objectified self that receives its autonomy from its self-constitution apart 
from the world rather than through its equiprimordial circuminsessional subordination 
within it. Nishitani stresses that it is not the self but the home-ground of the self; non-self, 
the absolute nothingness that gives rise to person as mask yet does not exist apart from 
this mask, that is the ontological prior ground to world and things. It was through this 
non-objective non-self that the paradox of representation was to be overcome and the 
duality of subject and object, self and world, reconciled through return to their primordial 
unity through direct encounter with the absolute emptiness of self-emptying that 
constitutes the homeground of all things. Yet within the circuminsessional relation that 
was to provide for the possibility of such unity, the knowing as non-knowing of the non-
objective in-itself, an element of duality returns whose nature seems more integral to 
Nishitani’s thought than previous invocations of metaphysical analogy or lingering traces 
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of representative emptiness through the difficulties of expressing a non-representative 
absolute nothingness; such traces can now be seen as deriving from the prioritized role of 
the self-awareness in realization. Although repeatedly conditioned by denials of priority 
and reassurances of total mutual ontological dependence his comments on the nature of 
the self in circuminsessional worlding are clearly dualistic in thought not just 
presentation. 
Nishitani has already said the world ‘worlds’ in the homeground of even the tiniest thing, 
but seems to go further to claim that the very possibility for this worlding (and thus of all 
things) rests only in the home-ground of the self as non-self, that the mutual gathering is 
made possible by “the self of each man as at bottom preceding the world and things.”267 
But even as elemental subjectivity he states we remain ‘things’ in the world and in not 
being the self  “on the field of sunyata the selfness of the self has its being in the home-
ground of all other things”268, and this is what is said to render impossible the self-
centredness of ego as “the absolute negation of that very self-centredness enables the field 
of sunyata to open up in the first place”269. ‘To be’ elemental subjectivity that precedes 
world and things requires that all things in the world already be gathered at the 
homeground of the self that precedes world and things. This seems to be a problematic 
facet of the paradox that is circuminsessional interpenetration; the ontological priority of 
the homeground of the self lies in its opening the field of sunyata and possibilizing the 
manifestation of world and things, but what renders impossible self-centredness (i.e the 
field of sunyata) is portrayed as requiring the  rendering impossible of self-centredness. 
 Nishitani begins from ontological equivalency in the circuminsessional 
relationship to asserting an ontological priority of the homeground of the self, then 
reasserts that the home-ground of the self is at the homeground of all other things in a 
relation of equivilancy; “so far as our self is at the home-ground of all things, that is, on 
the field of sunyata, all things are also at the home-ground of the self”270 requiring the 
field of sunyata already be opened up by the self’s self-realization, before again reversing 
to re-emphasize the ontological priority of self. This priority seems more far-reaching 
than the usual master-servant circuminsessional relation as the homeground of the self is 
providing the possibility for this relation in a way that the homeground of all other things 
do not provide for the homeground of the self, and yet Nishitani also maintains that the 
homeground of the self is opened up by something that it is the ontological precondition 
for. The intended paradox of the circuminsessional relation seems to shelter and rely on a 
further paradox that is not quite reconcilable with that relation as the resolution to the 
previous paradox of representation. The circuminsessional relation is intended to account 
for the non-objective knowledge of the non-objective thing in itself by explaining the 
ontologically prior unity of non-self and jitai through mutual self-emptying, a role that is 
rendered problematic by reassertions of the ontological priority of the self. 
 The relation of apprehension and manifestation within realization is admittedly 
paradoxical through the sive formulation and it might be argued that as the priority of the 
self and its disengagement from things and world are accompanied by denials of the very 
same that Nishitani is simply remaining true to the circuminsessional paradox of the 
master and servant. But the ontological priority given to the self seems to be of a different 
nature to the priority at work within the circuminsessional relation, and the estrangement 
of the self from the world lacks a correlative estrangement of things from self beyond the 
already discussed post-nihility preservation of radical multiplicity. The division of the 
subjective self and objective thing that resulted in the paradox of representation seems 
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replaced by a no less divisive paradox of the relation between the homeground of non-
self and non-objective thing in-itself; and despite Nishitani’s ambiguous relation to reason 
as previously discussed his viewing of some paradoxes as problematic and others as 
indicative of reality remains troublingly inconsistent. The illusory self of egoistic self-
consciousness is brought into identity with the illusory appearances of the thing in-itself 
but only through taking a step back into a similar problematic. As stated in chapter 1.4 
the impossibility of reaching the true self through such retreats to a prior horizon is a 
traditional tenet of Buddhist practice, and in the movement to elemental subjectivity 
Nishitani seems to attempt just such a regression and so retain traces of relative nihility 
in sunyata as the ultimate horizon of disclosure. 
Time  
The ontological precedence of elemental subjectivity is attributed to and elucidated by 
the relation of the self and time. The self ‘as self’ is said to lie radically in time, and as 
‘not a self’ (emptiness) be “ecstatically outside of time”271, thus have the ontological 
precedence required to ground the gathering of world as a temporal system. The first 
element is characterized by our relation to the samsaric cycle; “On our own home-
ground…we live and die birth-and-death. We do not simply live in time: we live time. 
From one moment in time to the next we are making time to be time”272, thus would seem 
to be a correlate understanding with Heidegger’s notion of the temporality of Dasein as 
the unity of the ecstases, of death as the end of Dasein shadowing every moment and all 
actions relying on the retrieval of the thrown situation of our birth. However, the first 
element is self-identical with the second, to live as temporality “means to stand 
ecstatically outside of time and outside of that cycle. It means to precede the world and 
things”273 and to be this self-identity of inside and outside of time is for us to be on our 
homeground outside the world with nothing to rely on thus absolutely free. The identity 
of these understandings of time leads to the same paradox noted above in relation to the 
circuminsessional relation being preceding by what it makes possible. 
 Moreover, the self’s precedence is said to come from its ecstatic transcendence of 
time, not only is this one of the most explicit statements of the estrangement of self and 
world but the circuminsessional relation of world is also portrayed as similarly ecstatic. 
The essence of time on its homeground is characterized in line with the circuminsessional 
relation of world that requires reality-sive-illusion in a parallel manner to the homeground 
of the thing in-itself; “all time enters into each moment of time passing from one moment 
to the next. In this circuminsessional interpenetration of time…the whole of time is 
phantom like…But in spite of this…each time, in its very actuality, is the suchness of this 
time or that time.”274 The simultaneity of each moment in time brings the relation of 
moments into correlation with the relation of phenomena within world, and it is this 
circuminsessional relation of world that grounds illusory samsaric time by opening up the 
present moment through the interpenetration with all other moments. This simultaneity 
of time is again portrayed along similar lines to Heidegger’s notion of temporality in 
Being and Time, that each moment is opened by the unity of the three ecstases allowing 
us to encounter the past through retrieval and the future through projection within the 
present moment. Circuminsessional interpenetration constitutes both the spatial and 
temporal being of things in the “elemental relativity of existence”275, through 
incorporating the element of possibility the world that is gathered by interrelation also 
interpenetrates with all possible worlds. Not only is the entire world reflected in one facet 
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of the mirrored net but all conceivable worlds are also so reflected, in itself within the 
circuminsessional totality of world a thing contains at its homeground all possible 
manifestations of meaning without thereby “ceasing to be the real world that it is of 
itself.”276  The world that is preceded by the self through the self’s ecstatic transcendence 
of time would also seem ecstatic in the same sense through the interpenetration of all 
times and possibilities within the circuminsessional gathering of world. If the world 
derives this ecstatic nature from self-identity with the elemental self that precedes it then 
the claiming of the self’s ecstatic transcendence of time is a restating of its priority not 
the explanation for it, such transcending of the unity of world is what the relation to time 
is meant to explain and cannot be used to explain the essence of time itself. 
 The ecstatic transcendence of the self outside of time as leading to the precedence 
of the self is later restated in stronger terms in discussion of King Samadhi as the temporal 
Existenz of dropped-off body and mind. Here the master servant relation is made one-
sided; it is the realization of the self in King Samadhi through which “Each and every 
thing, in being in itself on its own home-ground (dharma-like) is originally preserved 
by…a master who has risen to a position of self-awareness in his own domain of 
boundless emptiness.”277 The kingliness of King Samadhi is metaphorically attributed to 
the awareness in Existenz that actualizes the field of sunyata and “whose position as 
sovereign is inconceivable without a land for him to rule over…a domain initially opened 
up and kept open by virtue of that power, for which his position as monarch is a sort of 
self-realization…Only Existenz in King Samadhi throws open the field of emptiness 
existentially while at the same time taking a stand on that field”278. The self as paramount 
samadhi that precedes the world is attributed to the true self as the existential realization 
of nothingness that opens the field of sunyata as the homeground of the self; whilst the 
samadhi of jitai is required to constitute the self it does not attain to mastery over King 
Samadhi in virtue of lacking a lived existence thus subverts the previous characterization 
of the master-servant relation. 
 Sunyata for Nishitani is not the field for the manifestation of reality, nor its 
apprehension, but the self-identity of these as the self-realization of reality; the sive of 
realization renders sunyata both ontological and existential leading to the precedence of 
the self as that which sunyata is realized as yet jitai is realized through. Waldenfels locates 
the priority of the self “in that man is the being in which, by reason of his self-
consciousness, the ‘fact’ of the transitoriness of all being becomes a ‘problem’ to be 
solved”279, and that this problem is the meaning of our existence; that through us nihilism 
or samsara is realized as us, and thus enlightenment and nirvana also. The self “is a being 
united with emptiness in a self-awareness according to which emptiness is self...by virtue 
of that self-awareness, which is nearer to the elemental that anything else, it precedes the 
world and all things”280. That the self-awareness of the true self is more elemental than 
the thing in-itself upon the field of sunyata is because “Dasein, when it emerges into its 
nature from non-ego, is the realization of this field”281 its ontological precedence stems 
from that it is uniquely self-aware of the process of sunyata as the essence of the self is 
such awareness. But this non-self (elemental self-awareness) as condition for possibility 
of world is self-identical with the self as a thing/phenomena amongst others, thus itself 
dependent upon that world. The relation of temporality to the self and world does not 
seem to clarify or explain the issue as Nishitani intends, at most remaining a restating of 
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the precedence of the self in terms of the same paradox and estrangement whilst the denial 
of existence separate from its realization through apprehension, makes things radically 
dependent on the self in more thoroughgoing sense than the subject dependence of the 
field of consciousness. The relation of the precedence of elemental subjectivity in relation 
to awareness and the axiological implications of this will be returned to in chapter 2.6. 
Knowing of Non-Knowing 
At the end of the chapter 1.4 it was said two problems remained for the overcoming of 
the paradox of representation; the manner in which manifestation and apprehension are 
related in the self-realization of reality (the identity of self and things as non-objective), 
and the nature of the direct experience with the nothingness of elemental subjectivity that 
attests to the ontology of nothingness. The sive of realization has been elucidated as made 
possible through the circuminsessional relation of world that is self-identical with the 
gathering of jitai , but in so elucidating has only increased the ontological precedence of 
the self raising the issue of whether Nishitani so sharply distinguishes self from other 
phenomena as their ground that a new dichotomy emerges leaving the estrangement of 
self and world of the field of consciousness fundamentally in place. In prioritizing the self 
yet retaining its dependence upon the world Nishitani renders problematic how 
experience of such elemental self-awareness comes to pass if it relies upon what it 
precedes for its possibility. This was touched onin relation to Heidegger in chapter 1.2 
and his thought shall soon be turned to clarify this issue, but first the knowing of non-
knowing that is made possible by the circuminsessional relation and yet also seen as 
necessary for it and is to replace the representation of the field of consciousness must be 
further explicated. 
 In relation to his circuminsessional understanding of world as sunyata Nishitani 
remarks that “The question will no doubt arise as to whether this is possible, and if so, 
how”282; how is suchness and ‘in emptiness’ possible. Formulating the problem in terms 
of his Zen predecessors he asks; “What mode of being renders it possible for all things to 
come forth and practice and confirm the self...What does it mean that hills and rivers, the 
earth, plants and trees, tiles and stones, all constitute the original part of the self, that they 
have all arisen out of the realm of that original part?”283 Stressing the possibility for his 
position in terms of what it means or entails Nishitani sets forth an ontology in terms of 
the conditions of possibility for the meaning of the identity of Being and Nothingness. In 
addressing the possibility of his position Nishitani clarifies and explains it more 
thoroughly rather than laying out more conventional arguments for its necessity, but such 
positions may be self-validating and contain within themselves their own criteria for 
necessity so that explanation and justification are not so easily divided. The ambiguity in 
the relation of necessity and possibility regarding how he justifies his position, and 
whether justification is appropriate in this context, is to be returned to in chapter 2.6. 
 The formulation of the question of the possibility of the circuminsessional 
understanding of world in terms of the confirmation of the self indicates the precedence 
of elemental subjectivity as at the heart of the issue of the possibility of the field of 
sunyata; the possibility of sunyata lays in the realization of the elemental subjectivity that 
is as sunyata so that such possibility relies upon the necessity of sunyata itself. Such 
necessity stems from trying to describe the mode of beings on own homeground (in 
themselves) and resolving the question of nihility; it is a necessity stemming from an 
experience that requires and inaugurates the process of sunyata's self-realization. 
Nishitani’s ontology is not purely ontological but incorporates existential themes, notions 
of normative value and ethical injunction that complicate the issue of sunyata’s necessity.  
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 Whilst nihility is the experience of the neccesity of sunyata; how its need and the 
beginning of the self-realization of reality is encountered, the confirmation of the self by 
all things is the experiential attestation of the culmination of such self-realization. It is 
how sunyata is known in experience and this manner of circuminsessional knowing that 
attests to the possibility of sunyata must be considered before moving on to the 
experiences of nihility and nihilism. 
 The ‘knowing of non-knowing’ that is the precondition for the objective 
knowledge of the field of consciousness occurs through the interpenetration of the 
homegrounds of self and things as world, through the mutual manifestation of the 
emanations of things in-themselves and of persona understood in terms of the mask of 
absolute nothingness. Only when the knower and known are both an ‘absolutely non-
objective self-in-itself’ constituted through the circuminsessional relation can the 
objective knowledge and dualities of the field of consciousness be surpassed to realize 
the suchness of both as the real self-realization of reality. On the homeground of the self 
as elemental awareness, prior to consciousness and nullification, the knowing of non-
knowing as “an elemental and truly original intellection comes about...that arises at the 
very point at which ‘all things advance to confirm the self’ or that ‘hills and rivers, the 
earth, plants and trees, tiles and stones, all these are the self’s original part’.”284 Such 
confirmation is the self-identity of the true self and all other jitai in their suchness, the 
‘original countenance’ of elemental subjectivity that precedes the world and is confirmed 
by it in its paradoxical self-identity with world that is both equiprimordial and subsequent 
to such subjectivity. 
 Nishitani says of such non-knowing that in it ‘knowledge and praxis are one’, the 
ontological and existential are joined in self-identity, and that here the fields of 
consciousness and nihility are grounded by the field of sunyata with which they are self-
identical and does not exist other than as their objectivity and negation. The real self-
realization of reality that is revealed in the knowing of non-knowing emerges through the 
realization of the true self in the awareness of that knowing, both preceding and 
constituted with what is thereby revealed as the progression through the fields of 
awareness to their identity. As was stressed at the beginning of the consideration of 
sunyata this is a unitary process in which jitai , circuminsession and non-knowing can 
only be divided on the level of conventional thought and the self-realization of reality is 
unity of these aspects. 
 The sive of realization indicates this unity; that “To know things such as they are 
is to restore things to their own home-ground…The identity of ‘being’ and ‘knowing’ is 
more primal than traditional metaphysics has taken it to be.”285 This identity of being and 
knowing indicates the precedence of awareness in the manifestation of things as the 
presencing of world. The mutual dependence of reality and awareness is a radicalization 
of subject dependence as existence itself becomes dependent upon elemental subjectivity 
rather than only the phenomenal appearance of such existence; if Being and Knowledge 
are the Same then to be is to be known in the manner of non-knowing as circuminsessional 
presencing. 
 Due to this unity of Being and Knowledge Unno finds sunyata most essentially 
explicated in terms of koto as the description of the process of knowing of non-knowing. 
As how the suchness of a phenomena manifests in the mind of one who is aware of the 
phenomena in its suchness to apprehend the koto is to apprehend reality ‘in itself’, as it 
is in its suchness. The paradox of representation is overcome through an existential 
epistemology wherein awareness is joined with a sense of the real manifesting within our 
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awareness in such a way as to transform both ourselves and that of which we become 
aware. Within this appropriative apprehension the reality of jitai is affirmed in the 
transformation of awareness so that “Each of these realities realizes itself through my 
awareness, and my awareness is deepened and expanded through each reality thus 
realized”286. 
 Unno explicates this identity through the theory of emptiness from the original 
Prajńāpāramitā literature as having both epistemological and ontological aspects “The 
first aspect is that of prajńā or transcendental knowing, and the second is that of Śūnyatā 
or emptiness”287. Prajna “contains the contradictory opposites : non-knowing and true 
knowing which work together. Epistemologically, this is what Nishitani calls the 
‘knowing of non-knowing’”288 that is the negation of (subject-object cognition) joined 
with the apprehension of the in-itself. Sunyata “is also constituted of contradictory 
opposites : no-thing and thing-as-it-is, whether called thatness or suchness”289, the joining 
of the relative emptiness of no-self with the absolute emptiness of suchness. Both aspects 
are combined by Nishitani into his own notion of sunyata, the epistemological and 
ontological division is one of convenience and both “the knowing of non-knowing and 
the substantiality of non-substantiality characterize the ‘in-itself’ of each reality, the self-
realization of things non-objectively in the field of emptiness”290. I have been 
characterizing sunyata as both existential and ontological, Unno’s characterization of 
sunyata as epistemological-ontological is a variation of this in which the real self-
realization of reality means that the manifestation (realization) of a being is not separate 
from true understanding (realization) of that being. Since such knowing (the prajna 
aspect) occurs through transformations in self-awareness and is thus realized as and 
through existential anxiety its terming as existential rather than epistemological seems 
more apt, but this represents a variation in emphasis of presentation rather than thought. 
 This identity within koto as the attestation and form of circuminsessional knowing 
thus mutual realization is now to be considered as the conclusion of Nishitani’s ontology 
of nothingness. Such knowing is counterposed to the objectivity of ‘modern science’ as 
certainty in coherence with objective reality, but the theme of such certainty and 
coherence is soon to be seen as emerging also within the thought of Nishitani. 
Koto 
Koto is first indicated obliquely through Nishitani’s invocation of the poet Bashō on 
learning of the bamboo from the bamboo; that “The Japanese word for ‘learn’ (narau) 
carries the sense of ‘taking after’ something, of making an effort to stand essentially in 
the same mode of being as the thing one wishes to learn about.”291 Such an attuning of 
oneself to the suchness of what is to be known indicates that the knowing of non-knowing 
involves an existential conversion of self-awareness that constitutes realization as 
manifestation-sive-apprehension. This is the transfigured sense of compliance between 
subjects and objects, a compliance not of theoretical knowledge but of ‘knowing by 
becoming’, an existential compliance whereby on the field of sunyata the self in-itself 
brings itself to stand in the mode of being whereby what is to be known (thus realized) 
manifests in its suchness. 
 Nishitani finds this reinforced in the literal sense of understanding as ‘obtaining 
the mind of’, “the ‘meaning’ of a given koto (a term signifying either ‘matter’ or ‘affair’, 
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as well as ‘word’) can also be called its ‘mind’, or kokoro. In solving a riddle, for instance, 
we say that we have ‘obtained its mind’ when we have understood what it means.”292 To 
understand or know something is for that koto (matter) to be appropriated at the 
homeground of the self and for the self to be appropriated at the homeground of what is 
thus understood. Understanding or apprehending  in the context of the knowing of non-
knowing is a mutual mirroring of the knower and known in terms of the circuminsessional 
relation in which the non-objective self and non-objective in-itself attain to one another 
in mutual realization, “the obtaining of mind (understanding) is aboriginal as the sort of 
realization wherein a koto takes possession of us and transfers into us, even as we in turn 
really transfer over into the koto”293. The paradox of representation is overcome in the 
identity of understanding and manifestation in realization as the correspondence of 
subjects and objects is replaced with the notion that in the process of being-sive-
nothingness the projection of ‘appearance’ is self-identical with ‘suchness’ so that in 
apprehending the appearance (being) of a thing the manifestation of its suchness 
(emptiness) also occurs as an aspect of the process that is self-identical with the self. In 
other words there is direct encounter between the knower and known as both are 
constituted by their mutual manifestation in the process of realization as appropriative 
worlding. 
 Nishitani denies that the fact “our self is at bottom prior to the world and things, 
and therein lies the roothold of the possibility of the world and the existence of things”294 
is Kantian (the compliance of subject to object) as it is prior to the division between the 
phenomenal and the noumenal as the manifestation of things as jitai (in themselves) “rests 
in our own homeground: on the field of sunyata”295 and in their noumenal suchness are 
self-identical with their phenomenal appearance. The relation of the true self to the thing 
in-itself no longer operates within this understanding of knowledge as cognition of objects 
but from a relation of mutual appropriation through the self-identity of homegrounds. 
True emptiness is both the awareness of elemental subjectivity and the manifestation of 
the suchness of entities, the real self-realization of reality is the identity of the realization 
of the true self and the disclosure of beings as they really are. Both facets are disclosed in 
koto as the knowing of non-knowing as non-objective knowledge of the non-objective in-
itself, revealing the self-identity of emptiness and form, of the noumenal and phenomenal. 
Such non-knowing as the mutual manifestation of knowing and known is none other than 
conventional knowledge yet also grounds such knowledge so “that the standpoint of 
emptiness unites what is dichotomized in ordinary consciousness”296, the reality-sive-
illusion that speaks the unity of the fields of awareness. An element of  the rational subject 
remains in elemental subjectivity  through Nishitani’s understanding of essential reason 
as the union of the seer and seen; and it is as the manifestation of this “‘oneness of minds 
and things’ that Buddhism calls emptiness”297 that such subjectivity retains precedence as 
the non-discriminating knowledge that allows manifestation of suchness. 
 Non-knowing as circuminsessional is the “gathering together and concentration 
on a single point of the light of all things...a reverting to the point where things themselves 
are all gathered into one.”298 Such an identity arises through the replacement of the light 
of reason with that of the natural light of the emanation of the in-itself that in chapter 1.3 
was said to invoke a notion of causality and estrangement ill at ease with the core aim of 
Nishitani’s thought. The Kantian element of compliance that is repudiated here makes a 
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mitigated return in that the essential reality of suchness, the ‘mind’ of the ‘matter’ to be 
obtained, is directly experienced (albeit in a non-representative manner) and the knowing 
of non-knowing is in this way a compliance of the knower to the self-positing on the in-
itself upon its homeground. The subject-object framework of the paradox of 
representation in Kantian thought is surpassed but in so doing is transfigured into the 
convergence of knowledge with suchness; knowledge is not compliance to object nor 
subject but to the mirrored light that is the gathering of world in such a manner as to 
enable such presencing. 
 Whilst this seems to shift emphasis from subjective reason the gathering of world 
has already been seen as originating from the elemental subjectivity that precedes it. The 
mutual compliance of knower and known within koto is the self-realization of reality and 
such realization renders knowledge compliance with the suchness of presencing that 
originates in the elemental awareness that precedes presencing; non-knowing occurs 
within true self-nature as that nature. It is through such knowing of non-knowing that the 
self as absolute nothingness is known, the Knowledge that is self-identical with Being is 
ultimately a self-knowledge of elemental subjectivity as constituted by mutual realization 
with reality; through such direct apprehension of the self as absolute nothingness the 
ontology of nothingness is attested. In the confirmation of the self through all things 
advancing as its ‘original part’ Knowledge as identical with Being retains a form of 
compliance in which truth is understood as certainty in the coherence of self and world 
in the realization of the real; that true knowledge is the convergence of self-awareness 
with the absolute reality of elemental subjectivity as confirmed by the mirrored 
presencing of world preceded by such awareness. These themes are to be addressed 
through consideration of the mutually constituted conditions of koto as mutual self-
emptying self and thing, self-awareness and non-objective manifestation, to elucidate the 
manner in which koto arises. Whilst both such awareness and non-objectivity have 
already been dealt with in their relation they are now to be seen in light of the new 
emphasis upon how as Being they are also Knowledge. 
 Koto as knowing of non-knowing is first formulated in terms of true self-
knowledge, the elemental awareness that constitutes and is constituted with the self-
realization of suchness as the self-awareness of nothingness. For Nishitani the essence of 
self is awareness, for the true self in its suchness such awareness is self-identical with a 
non-self-awareness. The self in its suchness is an awareness-sive-non-awareness that 
apprehends the non-objective in-itself and in so doing realizes itself in the real self-
realization of reality. Nishitani elucidates this traditional Buddhist theme of being unable 
to step back to grasp the self (the aporia of consciousness) through the example of the 
eye, that just as fire is fire as non-fire (not combusting itself) the eye is the eye as not an 
eye; seeing is rendered possible by non-seeing, “the eye’s not-seeing only comes to be a 
not-seeing in unison with the eye’s activity of actually seeing something. Likewise, that 
activity of seeing only comes to be a seeing in unison with not-seeing”299; the self-identity 
of an eye in its nonobjective mode of being in itself is the unity of seeing and not-seeing. 
The same situation pertains to elemental self-awareness so that “on the home-ground of 
the self, there is an essential not-knowing that is one with the knowing of the self.”300 
Self-awareness comes about as the knowing of the self is constituted by a not-knowing 
of “the self as an absolutely non-objective selfness, and the self-awareness that comes 
about at the point of that not-knowing comes down to a ‘knowing of non-knowing’.”301  
As the union of the question and the answer, the seer and the seen the self cannot be 
objectified as it is the openness in which both question and answer arise, “that which is 
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sought is simply that which is seeking…Being at the centre of one’s searching, it can 
never be objectified.” (Abe, BE66). Such non-objective knowing of the non-objective self 
in-itself arises through the self’s self-identity with emptiness, from its nature as the mask 
of absolute nothingness, and such essential selfhood is attested to in koto as the realization 
of such awareness. In terms of self-awareness the knowing of non-knowing is the 
realization (manifestation-sive-apprehension) of the self in itself (it is the self on its 
homeground), the being of the self is the awareness of itself as the process of sunyata as 
being-sive-nothingness; as self-emptying.  
 Such self-awareness renders possible both subjectivity defined as non-objectivity 
and thus the relation to objects through conventional knowledge; elemental subjectivity 
as non-self-awareness is the source of reflective self-consciousness as non-objective 
opposition to objects whereby the self as subject “comes about in the reflective knowing 
whereby the self knows itself”302. The self knows itself through differentiating itself from 
the objective. Subjective knowledge is made possible by the self’s knowing of non-
knowing in a parallel manner to the non-combustion of fire, “the self in itself makes the 
existence of the self as a subject possible, and…this not-knowing constitutes the essential 
possibility of knowing.”303 The ontological priority of the self that stems from non-self-
awareness is mitigated by how such not-knowing is self-identical with knowledge of 
objects, just as jitai is the non-substantial substantiality of reality-sive-illusion the self in-
itself is the identity of the non-knowing of non-self with “the various modes of being of 
the self – personal, conscious, corporeal, and so on – and constitutes, together with them, 
one ‘being’, one ‘position’.”304 The non-knowing of the self’s non-awareness that opens 
as the field of sunyata only is in unison with the subjective knowledge of the field of 
consciousness that it makes possible in concert with the non-objective suchness of jitai . 
 The primal identity of being and knowing that stems from sunyata’s existential-
ontological nature arises as the knowing of non-knowing that constitutes the home-
ground of the self is a circuminsessional relation so that “reentry to the point where things 
in themselves realize themselves nonobjectively and posit themselves (on their position 
or samadhi-being), means for the self a direct reentry to the home-ground of the self 
itself”305. The existential aspect of the self’s self-realization of itself as awareness of the 
process of sunyata is self-identical with the ontological process of the manifestation of 
things in themselves. Elemental subjectivity as self-sive-not-self is the manifestation of 
being-sive-nothingness; yet for sunyata to truly surpass all dichotomies and dualities 
elemental subjectivity must itself equally be an elemental objectivity. 
 The equiprimordiality of self and jitai lies in that the mirroring gathering of world 
“is not something apart from the very ‘being’ of all things themselves”306, the being of 
things as gathered is also the being of the self as essentially a knowing of non-knowing. 
Knowing of non-knowing comes about only as the joining of the self’s non-awareness 
and the non-objective in-itself of the thing. Sunyata as primarily a theory of self is 
explicated as the self’s constitution through a relation to things as the process of their 
manifestation and the return to the homeground of the original self is the realization 
(manifestation-sive-apprehension) of this process thus the coming to awareness of the 
self-realization of reality through the self in itself. It is in this manner that all things 
advance to confirm the self as its ‘original part’; koto as mutual manifestation of meaning 
is held to be the verification of the possibility of suchness in which both elemental 
awareness and the non-objective in-itself are mutually confirmed by the mirrored light of 
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world as arising through circuminsession. Such confirmation emphasises the precedence 
of the self in the presencing of world; “That things are means, aboriginally, that they 
express themselves; and that in expressing themselves they give expression, at the same 
time, to what makes them be, pointing it out and bearing witness to it (in the twofold 
sense of clarifying and confirming)”307. In advancing to confirm the self beings as jitai 
attest to the nothingness of elemental awareness through their manifestation whereby they 
express their suchness as constituted with such awareness in the knowing of non-
knowing, bringing the self to realization. “The dharma of things has at once the character 
of preaching the dharma and of obeying the dharma...what makes the dharma preach itself 
and obey itself...is the self as non-ego”308, the expression of the non-objective in-itself 
known in koto is ‘aboriginally’ the self-knowledge of elemental awareness, here 
confirmed as the real self-realization of reality by the manifestation of that reality in its 
suchness; sunyata is hereby portrayed as self-validating in both senses of the term. 
 Heisig portrays the necessity of the suchness of jitai to the self-realization of 
reality as the manifestation of absolute nothingness as laying in that “while it is only the 
mind that can ‘realize’ this in awareness, it is something that is already ‘realized’ in the 
fundamental structure of reality itself. Hence, the freeing of the self from ego-centredness 
is not something simply internal to the mind, but takes place in the encounter with the 
world as it is”309; the suchness of reality always is but only comes to awareness of itself 
through the enlightenment of man. That “The light that illumines us from our own home-
ground and brings us back to an elemental self-awareness is but the nonobjective being 
of things as they are in themselves on the field where all things manifest from their own 
home-ground”310 seems at first to mitigate the ontological priority given to the self by 
Nishitani, but as Heisig elsewhere emphasizes the field of sunyata that renders possible 
and is constituted by the non-objective suchness of things is self-identical with the true 
self. In one sense such a paradoxical condition of self and things both constituting the 
others homeground is in accordance with the circuminsessional relation, but this mutual 
constitution does little to mitigate the priority of the self if the suchness of jitai that brings 
the self to its homeground is preceded by that homeground, at most it renders the self of 
subjectivity mutually constituted with the non-objective but retains the paradoxical 
precedence of elemental subjectivity in the realization of that which brings about such 
awareness. 
 A notion of knowledge as coherence of self and world remains within koto, but 
this compliance through mutual constitution of self and non-objective jitai as koto occurs 
as the confirmation of the dependence of suchness upon elemental awareness. What is 
‘realized’ within absolute reality is not simply that awareness is constituted with that 
which manifests; the reality or existence of things advance and confirm the original self 
as that which brings them to being and this combined with the rejection of any notion of 
material realism means that the mutual compliance of koto as the identity of Being and 
Knowledge renders entities radically dependent upon awareness. Whilst awareness itself 
is also constituted, brought to being, in compliance with that which manifests, what 
thereby comes to awareness is the confirmation of the precedence of the homeground of 
elemental subjectivity, of the original self that in the earlier consideration of 
circuminsessional world Nishitani has claimed to precede that worlding that is known 
experientially in koto. The manifestation of jitai within koto that constitutes the true self 
yet requires that true self-realization has already taken place must precede the self in the 
same manner as self precedes world for them to be truly circuminsessionally constituted, 
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for the paradoxical sive of realization to truly overcome the estrangement of self and 
world. The extent to which the scientific disclosure of the field of nihility, once rendered 
less transitional in the self-identity of the fields, is to be returned to in chapter 3.4. 
 Nishitani defends the paradoxical assertions of the sive formulation with the claim 
that such paradox is only problematic to the conventional thought of the field of 
consciousness, but his paradoxes harbour further unaddressed paradoxes and tend 
towards an inequality within the equiprimordiality of the sive. This theme has been 
touched on before but now bears further elucidation in light of the relation between koto 
as meaning and the role of reason and paradox within the self-identity of the fields of 
awareness. Thomas considers koto as returning to Nishitani’s critique of reason as 
dividing actual and essential being and trying to reach the former through the latter and 
thus fail to reach apprehension of true suchness; “on the one hand, we have an ontic 
thinking, concerned with entities; on the other hand, a thinking of essential matters. The 
distinctions Heidegger and Nishitani draw in the realm of thought, then, reinforce the 
divisions to be overcome.”311 Heidegger's division of thought into calculative and 
meditative will be returned to in chapter 2.4, and the wider consequences of this 
distinctions for nihilism's self-transformation in chapter 3.1. Thomas finds such division 
in Nishitani’s claims of the paradoxical nature of reality; that “the truly true appears in 
the mode of paradox or absurdity...Where ratio is pushed to its extreme, the ‘irrational’ 
shows up. Where meaning is pushed to its extreme, ‘meaninglessness’ shows up. And yet 
what thus appears as paradox, irrationality, or meaninglessness, is truly absolute 
reality”312; the self-identity of the fields requires that reason re-emerge equally 
constitutive as irrationality within sunyata as the identity of the fields, the transcending 
of reason and meaning that constitutes reason and meaning must itself be constituted 
through them. Irrationality and meaninglessness would seem to pertain to the nullification 
of nihility, but sunyata as be-ification that overcomes the duality of being and nothingness 
must move across such transitional nihility to embrace both rationality and irrationality, 
meaning and meaninglessness, and contain both sides of such dichotomies as for non-
substantial substantiality. Neither reason nor irrationality can grasp the reality of suchness 
in sunyata, it must be their mutual constitution as within the sive formulation, a draining 
away of their opposition, which does so. As Unno says “the dynamic, living self ‘in-itself’ 
is realized only within the subject-object, I-It, I-Thou relationship”313, the absolute reality 
beyond reason is only realized within and as the field of consciousness constituted by 
traditional reason. 
 Despite the self-identity of the fields of awareness, of reason and paradox, sunyata 
as that identity retains a paradoxical presentation moved beyond all ‘why’; sunyata as 
beyond reason must be equally beyond paradox else it falls again to the estrangement of 
self and world found in the precedence of elemental awareness to world. The nihility of 
the paradox of representation that issues from field of consciousness is resolved by 
overcoming the duality of subject and object; yet the paradoxes Nishitani holds to be 
paradigmatic of sunyata as the disclosure of realities real self-realization retain dualities 
that are not overcome as in these cases paradox is a sign of suchness rather than the 
transition to it. 
 As said earlier Nishitani replaces a paradox he finds troublesome (that of 
representation) with a radicalized form of paradox he finds indicative of elemental truth 
or reality. For Thomas such a move remains in the framework of division between actual 
and essential being and the precedence of the suchness of jitai earlier said to be required 
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to balance his paradox is lacking through his favouring of one side of a dichotomy; a 
troubling tendency indicated in initial consideration of his stance towards both reason and 
the opposition of religion and science. In relation to reason it was said that Nishitani 
builds upon the Zen tradition of ‘hyper-reason’, the self-transcending of reason (that 
reason and meaning pushed to their limits emerge into irrationality and meaninglessness), 
but such a move mirrors that of technology where reason and subjectivity becomes the 
irrational mechanization of man as object. Sunyata and technology; both here seem to be 
a prioritizing of a duality that is intended to be overcome by Nishitani, a pushing through 
the transitional nihility of modern technology to the be-ification of sunyata. Yet in his 
moving from the false absoluteness of the field of consciousness towards its self-identity 
with that of sunyata he steps from immanent critique of reason as constituted with the 
irrational towards paradox unmitigated by reason, into the realm of nihility. 
 The self-transcendence of reason was earlier portrayed by Heisig not as its 
irrational negation but its intensification, a balance of reason and letting go of reason, yet 
it was also said that Nishitani places the ‘why’ of Existenz beyond the grasp of even a 
transfigured rationality, a reason he called ‘on the side of god or Buddha’. In light of the 
problematic status of the paradoxes in his thought Nishitani’s ambiguous relation to 
reason (and the related independence of the non-objective from elemental awareness in 
‘essential’ reason as the nonduality of seer and seen) becomes more troublesome. The 
self-transcending of reason that realizes its essence in the real self-realization of reality 
as nondual appears to finally dwell in paradox as absolute reality, as purely beyond reason 
thus the field of consciousness that is to be self-identical with sunyata. His favouring of 
certain paradoxes indicate the imbalance in the sive, the paradoxical presuppositions of 
his thought that as self-validating lay beyond reason are on his own account constituted 
in identity with reason that must thus remain equally constitutive of reality. 
 Kokoro as both ‘meaning’ and ‘mind’ that renders koto circuminsessional 
knowing leads Thomas to claim that for Nishitani “‘meaning’ is an abstraction, for it 
arrests the process and attempts an ideal correlation of thought, meaning, and matter”314 
in defiance of the Buddhist tradition of Nagarjuna for whom any such correlation was a 
reification of sunyata and suchness as ultimate reality was ungraspable even as koto. The 
impossibility of certainty in coherence between mind and reality is a holding open for all 
contextual meanings or vocabularies, adjudication between such may be possible on the 
level of conventional thought but the ultimate reality of emptiness as both an absence of 
intrinsic being yet not a denial of being cannot be apprehended as reason nor paradox. 
Within koto as compliant correlation with the paradoxical absolute reality of suchness 
there remains an element of the understanding of truth as certainty that was criticized 
within scientism, a certainty that as beyond reason is less open to doubt and the self-
transcendence of immanent critique; a certainty that issues from the mutual constitution 
of self and world at the homeground of elemental subjectivity as preceding world. There 
is a sense in which Nishitani’s thought remains within the sphere of that which it is to 
overcome, in a way this is valid within the notion of the sive, but it is the shared 
imbalances in the sive formulation and unreflective presuppositions (that as were said at 
the start Nishitani exhibits possibly more than the views he critiques) that remain in 
contradiction to other elements of his thought; every ineffable does not say the same 
nothing and not all paradoxes speak the same reality. 
1.6 Heidegger and Worlding 
The equiprimordial constitution of self and world is thematic throughout the Heidegger 







homeground of all other things (and vice-versa) a consistent concern. This relation of Da-
Sein also speaks the identity of self, world and nothingness for "Without the original 
revelation of the nothing, no selfhood and no freedom." 315 The subjectivity repudiated by 
Nishitani is likewise replaced by Heidegger with a variety of new vocabularies, but the 
core conception remained the same; humanity as an open project constituted by nihility, 
“a peculiar kind of nothingness: the temporal-linguistic clearing, the opening, the 
absencing in which things can present themselves and thus ‘be’.” 316  that remains 
inseparable from what is. 
 In Heidegger’s characterization of Dasein “as a creature of ‘distance’  or farness, 
a distance which alone could nurture  a  true  closeness  to  things  and  fellow 
beings...’homecoming’  not  as  a retreat  into  a native habitat but as a journey homeward 
through the most distant  peregrinations”317 Dallmayr finds a similar conception of the 
self as dwelling both in its own homeground yet also in that of all other things, 
approaching itself through what is radically other to it but that also lies closest to it so that 
the I-Thou (and I-Thing) relation is one of distance and nearness simultaneously. Despite 
holding as evident the affinities between the Heidegger and Nishitani's thought Dallamayr 
attributes a fundamental difference in that “After elucidating the status of world and 
selfhood on the field of sunyata, Nishitani curiously proceeds to drive a wedge between 
these two aspects.”318 Whilst I agree with Dallmayr that Nishitani takes a troublesome 
backwards step towards the estrangement of self and world there seems to be a similar 
lingering ontological priority in Heidegger’s thought throughout his corpus. 
 This chapter will explicate several variations of the gathering of world in 
Heidegger's texts, tracing the persistent yet changing nature of this affinity to shows its 
necessity and nature as a contextual problematic. Heidegger explored varied 
terminologies to explore the appropriative relation between self and world and speak their 
belonging. Many texts could have been chosen to explore the relation between Heidegger 
and Nishitani's understanding of world. 
 An initial brief consideration of the Umwelt in Being and Time will give way to a 
lengthier treatment of The Anaximander Fragment to highlight the affinity between 
Nishitani and what Heidegger conceives of as primordial western thought (a theme 
explored more in chapter 2.4), before concentrating most on The Thing due to its 
importance to the projected epochal transformation that is to achieve the self-overcoming 
of nihilism. Brief consideration will be given to Heidegger's other terminological 
formulations in relation to his shared concern with koto, although these texts will mostly 
be considered in the third part of the thesis. Emphasis will be on the paradoxes and 
problems already identified in Nishitani as scene setting for sections 2 and 3. 
Umwelt 
The integral identity of Dasein and world begins from Being and Time with being-in-the-
world, which like egoteki kankei entails each being or phenomena is both disclosed and 
constituted through relations with other beings. The mutual constitution of Dasein and 
world is broadly intended to show that as always already immersed within a world of 
activities and defined by relations with beings we are prior to subject-object division of 
field of consciousness. Being and Time thus mirrors Nishitani's concern with the paradox 
of representation, their thought sharing an impetus in overcoming the estrangement 
between man, self and world that underpins the nihilistic age. In broad terms that worlds 
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as a  totality of interpretations of significance in constant flux give rise to beingness based 
on Dasein's understanding also indicates the precedence of elemental subjectivity stems, 
as it does for Nishitani, from how we are our world existingly; absolute nothingness 
requiring the awareness of lived experience for its realization. These two themes already 
found in Religion and Nothingness will guide the reading of all the texts in this chapter, 
in relation to Being and Time consideration of the role of MitSein will be delayed until 
chapter 3.5 to accompany the I-Thou relation in Nishitani. The focus will instead be on 
Heidegger's discussion of Umwelt and Zeug due to its role as the first indication of the 
relation between gathering and emptying, and how it is the first tentative speaking of the 
identity of the danger and saving in that it contributes equally to the later conceptions of 
Gestell and the revelation of the freeing claim. 
The reflection on world begins from the Umwelt as the closest to Dasein and the one we 
are most proximally engaged in. This world is far from primordial so cannot be taken as 
truly paradigmatic, although as well as informing later theories of world the primordiality 
of the Umwelt in the epoch of Gestell will be seen as a more complex issue in chapter 
2.4. As worlds are inter-referential totalities that determine the beingness of the beings 
encountered in that totality the Umwelt can be taken as paradigmatic in this regard as 
equipment can never be considered in isolation. Zeug's Being is not innate to it as an 
essence but is only derived from the totality that the equipment is a part of; “Taken strictly, 
there ‘is’ no such thing as an equipment. To the Being of any equipment there always 
belongs a totality of equipment, in which it can be this equipment that it is. Equipment is 
essentially ‘something in-order-to…’. A totality of equipment is constituted by various 
ways of the ‘in-order-to’, such as serviceability, conduciveness, usability, 
manipulability.” 319 A being is not determined by a pre-given essence but by its relation to 
other beings similarly empty of essence, its co-equipment and the task they are used for; 
its existence precedes its essence. The totality is prior to its constituent parts and their 
meaning is derived from this totality, before any item of equipment is disclosed as 
meaningful “a totality of equipment has already been discovered” 320  
In his discussion of Zeug Heidegger introduces the distinction between the present-at-
hand and the ready-to-hand, the former mode of being relating to what is traditionally 
meant by existence (the presence or brute ‘thereness’ of an object) and the latter pertains 
to the mode of being exhibited by the Zeug caught up in our everyday concerns. 
Proximally we encounter beings as ready-at-hand; but the most primordial mode of being 
is less clear and will be addressed in chapters 3.4 and anxiety  concerning the relation of 
presence-at-hand and the homeground of jitai in relation to the reality of nihility. When 
grasped as ready-to-hand in terms of their ‘in-order-to’ Zeug withdraw from the horizon 
of significance into the background context of world, deriving their meaning from their 
relative absence, if they fail to withdraw and resist our understanding them in terms of 
the ready-to-hand they re-emerge as a form of presence-at-hand but still only in the 
context of and through relation to the ready-to-hand. 
 The breakdown of understanding based on the ‘in-order-to’s’ of foresight redirects our 
attention to the now fractured totality that is Umwelt bringing before us world as the 
horizon for meaning, “we catch sight of the ‘towards-this’ itself” and thus the whole 
“context of equipment is lit up” 321 and so “the world announces itself”.322 That the 
meaning of the world arises from Dasein’s projections is highlighted by the resistance of 
entities to the projection of that meaning. As the meaning of Zeug withdraws so too does 
the Umwelt as the horizon for understanding this meaning; revealing the need for a deeper 
 
319 Heidegger, Being and Time, 97. SZ 68 
320 Ibid., 98. SZ 69 
321 Ibid., 105. SZ 74 





field of awareness. The Umwelt cannot provide its own horizon or context for its 
meaning, this is instead provided the Dasein’s attempt to understand itself through 
projecting possibilities (the ultimate ‘for-the-sake-of’). Each new horizon of meaning 
requires a further step back to become intelligible or meaningful itself from within its 
own structure, this stepping back to find the ground of meaning ultimately terminates in 
nothingness as groundless. Zeug and the Umwelt (indeed any regional ontology world) 
as the totality of equipmental relations are empty of meaning  (characterized by 
nothingness as lacking in essence), the argument against essence revolves around a notion 
of an absence of meaning in the constituents of the Umwelt. The first sense of nothingness 
in relation to meaning is found in this rejection of substance ontology. 
As the being of Zeug is determined by their ‘in-order-to’ what they ‘are’ is dependent 
upon the referential totality; every ‘in-order-to’ is a ‘for-the-sake-of’. This ever-widening 
network of relations reaches its ultimate referent in the final for-the-sake-of that is the 
being of Dasein that is at issue; “the ‘for-the-sake-of’ always pertains to the Being of 
Dasein, for which, in its Being, that very Being is essentially an issue”323. Beings as 
ready-to-hand are disclosed through concern with Dasein’s own possibilities, the analysis 
of equipment and world is dependent upon the meaning of Dasein as temporality and 
care. The ultimate meaning and significance of the Umwelt ‘itself’ is derived from 
Dasein’s concern with its own possibilities as “Meaning is an existentiale of Dasein”324 
and all non-Dasein are unmeaning or devoid of meaning. 
The ontological priority of elemental awareness here is evident; Zeug derive their 
meaning from the needs of Dasein as embodied entity rather than being allowed to gather 
themselves upon their homeground. Yet. whilst the self-understanding of Dasein’s 
projections is what grounds the meaningfulness of the world as Dasein is its world 
existingly, then the Umwelt could be said to be for the sake of world itself. Both world 
and Dasein are the ground for each other, their meaning is mutually derived so both are 
their own groundless ground. In virtue of understanding itself in terms of projected 
possibilities Dasein’s disclosedness is characterised by being ‘not yet’325 its 
understanding is constituted by a present absence and the withdrawal of alternative 
possibilities, with the world as an ongoing projected defined by both actualized, intended 
and forever absent possibilities. Dasein as being-in-the-world leads to the notion of both 
beings and Dasein as without essence, and their existence as constituted by relations 
leading to a rejection of the notion of independence. As being-in-the-world Dasein is 
determined by a referential totality in relation to its self-identity, just like Zeug it lacks 
any intrinsic essence and instead finds its identity through emptying itself by giving 
meaning to other phenomena. This rejection of essence parallels Nishitiani's critique of 
the field of consciousness and also paves the way for a deeper notion of nothingness as 
encountered in anxiety that further explicates the rejection of essence in the direction of 
self. 
The breakdown of the Umwelt in the failure of the ready-to-hand to withdraw also 
highlights the breakdown of being-in-the-world itself in the experience of anxiety, 
pointing to the relation of mutual withdrawal or repelling between world and beings. The 
emptiness of Zeug is obscured by the meaning granted them by Dasein’s projections, the 
horizon withdraws when we are concerned with beings, and the beings when we are 
concerned with totality as horizon. As said in chapter 1.2 only one vocabulary or regional 
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ontology can be unconcealed, the circuminsessional world is an endless cycle of the 
revealing and concealing of different understandings; whether it can ever be otherwise 
will emerge as vital to Heidegger's notion of danger in chapter 2.5. The emptiness of both 
Zeug and Dasein as the projections of care are both revealed and concealed by the process 
of their mutual withdrawals (emptying) that allow the everyday disclosure of meaning, 
the condition of possibility for everyday meaning is to be found in the nothingness of 
Dasein as this process of disclosure. The Umwelt could be seen as the field of 
consciousness made possible yet obscuring the other fields of awareness, Heidegger's 
thought on Zeug indicates how nothingness constitutes the fields of conventional 
awareness but does  not reach those of nihility or sunyata. 
 It is the experience of anxiety that leads to the field of nihility; wherein both world and 
beings are stripped of all meaning and Dasein’s own meaning is threatened disclosing 
Dasein as one with world. The notion of the world as an inter-referential totality is the 
first indication of nothingness as the horizon for the disclosure of Being, but it is only 
through the disclosure of the Umwelt as meaningless through the mood of anxiety, 
wherein disclosure breaks down and reveals the uncanny nature of beings and the 
conditions for disclosure itself that this emerges as explicit. In anxiety both beings and 
the world withdraw simultaneously, anxiety shatters the Umwelt, bringing Dasein “back 
from its absorption in the ‘world’” as “Everyday familiarity collapses,”326 rendering the 
familiar into the uncanny. Although the everyday world is no more world-as-such as 
Dasein is Being-in-the-world and can never exist/be without world. This world-as-such 
later reveals itself to be part of operation of nothingness that allowed the world as 
meaningful and familiar to be disclosed, the nothingness of the world-as-such is the 
condition for the possibility for the disclosure of the world of beings around us as 
meaningful. It is the apparent transformation of the world in to meaninglessness and 
lacking significance with anxiety that reveals the true operation of the nothing. 
 
The Anaximander Fragment 
Heidegger's reflections on The Anaximander Fragment recalls a thought that not only 
prepares the way for his later discussion of the Fourfold and is within the same sphere of 
world presencing as circuminsessional, but also highlights issues and problems 
concerning thoughts retrieval of its origin to be taken up in chapter 2.4. Weinmayr finds 
Heidegger’s discussion of the fragment to bring him into strong relation with the thought 
of Nishida, and the framework of that comparison can be held as equally valid to Nishitani 
as it pertains to his predecessors use of the ‘logic’ of soku; Weinmayr translating the term 
as ‘simultaneous’ rather than ‘sive’ indicating the paradoxical element of the relation 
involving the simultaneity of the identical and non-identical. He finds such ‘simultaneity’ 
to be the core of Heidegger’s thought, laying behind numerous reformulations in the 
terminology used to indicate the mutually appropriative nature of reality that stems from 
Ereignis. The retrieval of the thought in the fragment aims towards the transformation of 
thought in the face of planetary technology, and can be seen as preparing the way for the 
things of the Fourfold that are later said to have not yet emerged through recovering that 
which is “concealed in the historical and chronological remoteness of the fragment the 
historic proximity of something unsaid”327. The retrieval of the origin of western thought 
is to prepare the way for foundational thinking as the basis for planetary discourse; 
whether Greek thought can supply be considered such an origin is discussed more in 
chapter 2.4. The language of gathering is used in relation to such a recovery, the Being of 
beings is gathered in the destiny of the fragment, and the withdrawal of Being since its 
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writing has gathered its history as an immanent eschatology within such history of Being. 
This eschatology means that which is at the most distant homeground of the west also lies 
before us and has gathered (made possible) the metaphysical withdrawing/dispensations 
of Being since. 
 Heidegger replaces the ‘arising and passing away’ of things in the traditional 
translation  of the fragment with “a movement which lets every emerging being abandon 
concealment and go forward into unconcealment...as a going which in its turn abandons 
unconcealment, departing and withdrawing into concealment.”328 A movement that brings 
beings into presence through the relation of concealment and unconcealment replacing 
the context of causation with that of disclosure or manifestation as meaningful presence. 
Beings are that which come to presence by lingering in unconcealment, so that 
“Unconcealment itself is presencing”329. Presencing is how Being discloses itself through 
unconcealment as the being aspect of being-sive-nothingness; being and nothingness, 
concealment and unconcealment, are not identical yet the Same as the process of Being 
or sunyata. Such a movement gives rise to the illusory appearances of eidos or substance, 
to that which the things shows of itself to us upon the field of consciousness, such  
“Appearance is an essential consequence of presencing...Only what appears can in the 
first place show an aspect and form”330. The process of presencing through the 
simultaneity of concealment and unconcealment inherently leads to the representative 
disclosures of consciousness, as presencing is first displayed as the appearance that issue 
from it. The mutual constitution of concealment and unconcealment are the source of 
appearances emanation, and and such simultaneity can be seen as speaking jitai 's 
gathering of itself in reality-sive-illusion. 
Lingering jointure 
To come to presence is to linger in unconcealment, and that which is present is self-
identical with that which is absent “for as absent from the expanse, it presents itself in 
unconcealment”331. Presence-sive-absence, being-sive-nothingness; both speak of the 
process of disclosure through that which is in its suchness shows itself whilst withdrawing 
in self-negation thus constituting the field of presence and absence as such. As previously 
discussed Heidegger and Nishitani both deal with the self-identity of Being and 
Nothingness yet in their presentations use terminology that seemingly emphasises one 
side of the identity, for Heidegger presence and unconcealment seem more determinative 
of absence just as emptiness is for Nishitani (rather than the equally valid ‘absolute being’ 
of be-ification). But whilst “the presently present and the unconcealment that rules in 
it...pervade the essence of what is absent, as that which is not presently present”332 
absence also pervades the essence of presence so that “In both directions presencing is 
conjointly disposed toward absence.”333 As one with absence that which is present is not 
in a state of absolute presence, it is only present in the movement of transition between 
concealment and unconcealment; “what is present is arriving or lingering insofar as it is 
already departing from unconcealment toward concealment. What is presently present 
lingers awhile. It endures in approach and withdrawal.”334. Such movement indicates the 
being-sive-nothingness in which each in-itself manifests from this self-identity within its 
homeground, the self-identity of presence and absence is how what comes to presence 
posits itself through lingering in the expanse, and in so coming to presence as appearance 
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“Everything present in unconcealment in this way presents itself to all others, each after 
its own fashion”335 with such presentation giving rise to the objective representations of 
the field of consciousness. 
 In such lingering gathering that which comes to presence does so in accord with 
and through the lingering of others, it “coheres in unifying presence, as everything 
becomes present to everything else within its duration; it becomes present and lingers 
with the others.”336 Such mutual lingering is not thought in terms of a collection of 
separate entities united by a higher being but as a single gathering that reveals the totality 
of world as mutual dependence. The fragment does not speak of a conceptual totality of 
uniformity or highest being as it predates such conceptual language that can think such 
universality, instead the unity of presence as the totality of what is present arises through 
the expression of Being through beings that come to presence through such expression. It 
is only later in the epochal history of Being that this totality is grasped metaphysically 
and with the emergence of nihilism “This grasping together (concipere) in the manner of 
representational concepts is immediately taken to be the only possible way to understand 
Being.”337 The disclosures of the field of consciousness necessarily result in this 
misinterpretation due to the withdrawal inherent in the appropriative relation, and it is the 
bringing of this errancy to awareness that is to prepare for the freeing claim and 
confrontation with technology dealt with more explicitly in chapter 2.2. 
 In that beings only presence in transitory lingering between approach and 
withdrawal, by concealment and unconcealment, Weinmayr finds the simultaneity of the 
soku as constituting how beings presence together as world.338 The openness in which 
beings come to lingering presence through transition is termed jointure and is constituted 
solely by the joining it renders possible, jointure enables beings and beings constitute the 
jointure, so that the world is as transitory and dependent as that which presences within 
it. If that which lingers in presence through the joining are beings that gather themselves 
in the movement between concealment and unconcealment then their mutual gathering as 
world or jointure can be seen in terms of the circuminsessional world that ‘is’ only in self-
identity with the gathering of phenomenon that constitute the world and are in turn 
constituted by it in simultaneity. This parallels how world and jitai only are as mutually 
gathered to one another and reflects how Ereignis only is in terms of the epochal meanings 
it gives rise to; the ramifications of this in terms of the ontic-ontological identity are to be 
discussed in chapters 2.3 and 2.6. That which is joined presences only as jointure which 
itself is constituted only as the joining of what is present; in that “Everything lingering is 
in each case only in a joining of what already is – but every joining is a joining that 
conjoins lingering things”.339 Weinmayr finds the question of priority between joining 
and jointure an ‘empty question’ since both are equally transitory; the gatherings of jitai 
and world are only as the mirroring of such gathering. 
Disjointure 
Jointure as lingering presence is contrasted yet constituted with disjointure as the 
insistence of what is present upon its endurance, upon its remaining in unconcealment 
rather than in transition. To linger awhile in presence is to stand in disorder, to cling to 
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oneself in continuance defying the circuminsessional order of jointure. Such is for beings 
in their presencing to strike “a haughty pose towards every other of its kind”340 through 
their persistence. In wilful persistence towards other beings that which presences in 
disjointure seeks only its own endurance crowding out all else that strives to come to 
presence, using them to gather itself in prolonged lingering so that “Everything that 
lingers awhile stands in disjunction”341. Such endurance in disjointure could be seen as 
the master aspect of the circuminsessional relation that if unmitigated renders impossible 
the mutual presencing of circuminsession, to linger in disjointure is to strive to have 
presence upheld by others through refusing to withdraw into concealment (non-self) to 
uphold the lingering presence of others upon their homeground. Such wilful desire for 
persistence is posited as the ground of representation by Nishitani; and when unchecked 
leads to the epochal understanding of Gestell in which “The totality of beings is the single 
object of a singular will to conquer. The simplicity of Being is confounded in a singular 
oblivion.”342 Yet such persistence cannot be simply negated; the circuminsessional 
relation requires servitude and self-emptying be constituted in identity with absolute 
mastery so that “This relationship of circuminsessional interpenetration harbours an 
elemental strife…this strife is at once an absolute harmony and an elemental peace…On 
the field of emptiness, elemental strife and elemental harmony are essentially one.”343  
 So too presencing as lingering is both approach and withdrawal, disorder and 
order; it is constituted by both jointure and disjointure, by the persistence of approach 
into unconcealment and the surmounting of this through the transition back into 
concealment. Disjunction is a fundamental trait of what is present and this insistence upon 
continuance that “asserts itself in presencing as such, which lets each present being linger 
awhile in the expanse of unconcealment”344 is constitutive of jointure; rather than being 
its simple negation their simultaneity constitutes the lingering expanse. Only in the 
disjointure of asserted continuance does the presencing of jointure as whiling between 
concealment and unconcealment come to pass. Disorder thus “haunts lingering itself as 
an essential possibility”345, presencing ‘is’ no other than the overcoming of this through 
solicitude and contains an essential danger of persistence in lingering in disjunction. In 
lingering within the jointure that which is present “surmounts disorder”346 by not insisting 
upon its continuance, jointure as the surmounting of disjointure is given by disjointure as 
tempered in its approach with withdrawal and so allowing the order of mutual presencing 
of world. Jointure as such order in mutual implication with disorder is the 
circuminsessional gathering wherein what is present “lets itself belong to the non-
present”347, to the non-being that constitutes their homeground and allows the 
surmounting of disorder as persistence through acceding to hold up all else through 
withdrawal. Jointure and the circuminsessional master-servant relation both speak of 
worlding as requiring the tendency that leads to nihilistic or wilful disclosures as being 
preserved in the primordial field of awareness that is self-identical with and enables them. 
This necessity of nihilism will be thematic and explicated in detail over section 2 in terms 
of samsara-sive-nirvana. 
 For Weinmayr this definition through simultaneous negation highlights the true 
sense of jointurehood as a mutual lingering of beings so that in joining “each being 
lingering awhile in a plural variety among other beings lingering awhile, which let one 
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another be in a reciprocal concern and consideration, appreciation and attention” 348. 
Showing solicitude to other beings is a condition for lingering in presence so that “Insofar 
as beings which linger awhile...no longer share the compulsion to expel one another from 
what is presently present, they let order belong”349. Such circuminsessional solicitude is 
the only way world is gathered as bringing beings to presence within jointure. 
Disjointure/disorder is a necessary facet of lingering, but one that must be countered in 
solicitude for the lingering in jointure to occur as the mutual gathering of world. Such 
mutual servitude allows each to attain to presence in their own fashion and in accordance 
with their suchness whilst not being reduced to metaphysical uniform unity.  If 
‘simultaneity’ as soku indicates that “Only a being that knows itself through others... as 
‘simultaneously’ presencing and absencing...is able to take itself back, in order to let the 
other be”350, then only as being-sive-nothingness thus constituted as circuminsessional 
can beings enable and allow each others presencing within compliant jointurehood and 
thereby make it possible for the realization of meaning. 
  
The articulation of lingering presence in terms of such circuminsessional simultaneity 
indicates the presencing of Being through the dual process of approach and withdrawal; 
being-sive-nothingness as the twofold absence (jointure) that enables presencing through 
mutual appropriative solicitude, bringing Heidegger’s retrieval of the origin of western 
thought into correlation with Nishitani’s elucidation of the disclosive process of sunyata 
as the core of the Eastern-Buddhaic experience of Being. 
 The ethical and experiential aspects of such solicitude are to be examined in later 
chapters, for now it can be noted that in repudiating the language of justice and penalty 
in the traditional translation of the fragment the way is laid open for elucidating a 
framework of originary ethics through the nonduality of the existential and ontological. 
Heidegger not only moves away from interpreting the fragment in terms of causal changes 
in the natural world but also defends Anaximander from attributions that moral and 
legalistic notions are projected upon his view of nature due to the ‘primitiveness’ of his 
understanding, locating the true meaning of such phrases prior to such notions. The letting 
presence of manifold being is said to be “anything but a kind of primitive and 
anthropomorphic representation”351 and Heidegger’s use of ‘reck’ as solicitude in place 
of consideration is an attempt to render less anthropocentric the process that allows for 
mutual presencing. The success, necessity and possibility of this move is to be addressed 
in chapter 2.6, for now it can be seen that despite the moving beyond anthropomorphism 
the insistence of endurance in disjointure involves a similar ascription of agency through 
active gathering as is seen in samadhi. The moral and juridical terminology Heidegger 
seeks to move away from retains a correlation with such anthropomorphic presentation 
in the master-servant paradigm of the circuminsessional relation, a presentation that also 
seeks to move prior to the notion of the division between ethics and ontology. 
Gathering of The Thing 
The relation of the mutual gatherings of jitai and world as the disclosure of meaning 
through self-emptying has evident and striking similarity with Heidegger’s discussion of 
how world arises as the appropriation of the fourfold in The Thing. The ‘thingness’ of the 
thing seems commensurate with the suchness of jitai , with the non-objective mode of 
being that as distinct from representation is how the thing posits itself upon its 
homeground through mutual gathering. Just as jitai as true self-identity or suchness lies 
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beyond the objectivity of substantial being or illusion, so too does the jug as a vessel 
denote “something self-sustained, something that stands on its own...As the self-
supporting independence of something independent, the jug differs from an object.”352 In 
his explication of the jug as thing Heidegger, whilst discounting traditional notions of 
objectivity, retains a place for such appearance as how the thing is first encountered upon 
the field of consciousness even as this limits the disclosure of it to the form it presents to 
us. As for the essential being of combustion; “the jug must first show its outward 
appearance to the maker. But what shows itself here, the aspect (the eidos, the idea), 
characterizes the jug solely in the respect in which the vessel stands over against the 
maker”353. The estrangement of subject and object in the initial encounter with both jitai 
and jug is inherent to the nature of such encounter yet also indicates the necessity of 
moving towards the in-itself beyond objective representation. Only non-representational 
knowing can grasp the non-objectivity of jitai , and conceiving of the true mode of being 
as vessel Heidegger claims “no representation of what is present...ever reaches to the 
thing qua thing. The jug’s thingness resides in its being qua vessel.”354The non-objective 
mode of the jug in-itself is its being as vessel, and the nature of vessel as holding is not 
formed from the jugs given structure but by the emptiness of the jug, “The empty space, 
this nothing of the jug, is what the jug is as the holding vessel.”355 The emptiness aspect 
of the jug both forms its non-objective mode of being and makes possible the aspect of 
its being that is represented objectively in the form of its eidos. As the making process is 
shaped and determined by the emptiness of the vessel then the objectivity of the jug issues 
forth from this non-objective, non-fabricated nature, just as the substance aspect of jitai 
emanates from its suchness as non-objective emptying; the emptiness of both direct 
attention towards their attendant objective form. 
 Jitai alone was unable to explain the manner in which self-emptying leads to 
disclosure, requiring the further step of circuminsession, so too is the isolated self-
gathering (its ‘self-support alone’) of the jug as vessel is not enough to define its thingly 
nature. The non-objectivity of the jug as thing lies instead in its holding (gathering) 
capacity as relational. Holding is said to consist in both taking and keeping, but these 
constituents are unified by the outpouring of liquid from the jug, “In the outpouring, the 
holding is authentically how it is. To pour from the jug is to give. The holding of the 
vessel occurs in the giving of the outpouring.”356 The jug gathers itself through emptying 
itself in service to what it is not, according to Dallmayr “the outpouring of a liquid is 
schenken, which carries the double sense of pouring and giving (or donating).”357 Such 
self-emptying is how the jug gathers itself as a vessel, its holding is constituted by its 
emptiness but such holding as its self-gathering or samadhi-being is equally constituted 
by its non-holding (self-emptying) so that “The jug’s jug-character consists in the poured 
gift of the pouring out.”358 Just as jitai gathers itself on its homeground only through a 
self-emptying in service to the gathering of all other things on their homeground so too is 
the self-gathering of the jug, its holding as a vessel, constituted in self-identity with the 
negation of its holding for others. Both the gathering of jitai and the thinging of the thing 
are related to themselves and others along the lines of Nishitani’s master-servant relation. 
Heidegger’s characterization of such a process is replete with language that evokes the 
free submission to others characteristic of the master-servant relation and the active 
capacity, the wilful abnegation of will, bequeathed to non-objective jitai in virtue of their 
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self-gathering. The gathering of the four is consistently portrayed as being of their own 
accord, as stemming from a freedom constituted through the solicitude of letting the other 
elements be. Such “appropriative mirroring sets each of the four free into its own, but it 
binds these free ones into the simplicity of their essential being toward one another”359, 
things are modest and compliant in their relation and in their freedom as the assertion of 
their own self-identity they are also bound to all others as upholding them through such 
gathering. 
 Through this the outpouring of the jug is itself possibilized by the self-emptying 
of each element of the fourfold gathered by the jug, in their self-emptying each element 
gathers at the homeground of the jug supporting its own holding and outpouring, yet are 
also gathered into themselves by the outpouring they make possible. In this mutual self-
emptying all the elements attain to their own nature, are gathered as what they are in-
themselves in the homeground of the jug in-itself that gathers them through its own 
outpouring, in this “gift of the outpouring earth and sky, divinities and mortals dwell 
together all at once. These four, at one because of what they themselves are, belong 
together. Preceding everything that is present, they are enfolded into a single fourfold.”360 
In the self-emptying that is the in-itself of the thing as vessel there is the prior gathering 
of world that like the circuminsessional relation enables the coming to presence of things 
upon the field of consciousness, the gathering of thing and of world is self-identical and 
the precondition for meaningful disclosure. 
 The first two elements of earth and sky are brought together “In the gift of water, 
in the gift of wine”361; what both elements give in their self-emptying brings them into 
relation with each other and makes possible the non-objective in-itself of the jug through 
its own self-emptying, through its outpouring that brings sky and earth to dwell together. 
As gathered at the homeground of the jug, the self-emptying of earth and sky is made 
evident through the jugs own outpouring that gathers the mortals and divinities that 
receive that outpouring whether in libation or consecration. Whilst the self-emptying of 
earth and sky through the outpouring of the vessel gathers mortals and divinities in 
receiving such libation it is less than explicit how in so receiving they are themselves 
similarly emptied. The earth-sky dyad can be seen as reflecting nature (or the earth of The 
Origin of the Work of Art) and the mortals-divinities historical societies (the world of The 
Origin of the Work of Art). The relation of world and earth in terms of art will be dealt 
with in terms of dwelling in chapter 3.3 and Heidegger's broader characterization of the 
'natural' in chapter 2.2, but here it can be seen that there is a tendency to construe the 
natural world in terms of a teleological narrative; Perotti gives such an interpretation in 
claiming that “The water or wine which is poured is also one of the things of the earth 
intended for men.” 362  The earth and sky empty themselves for the sake of mortals and 
divinities; these latter must also empty themselves for earth and sky and be constituted 
by this emptying for the Fourfold to be a truly reciprocal mirroring. If they are merely in 
receipt of outpouring then the gathering process remains in the framework of viewing the 
thing as for mortals and divinities. If to be mortal means to be constituted in mirroring 
the other three elements then our dwelling and identity is bound to and constituted by 
their outpouring, but human existence remains an ultimate end with the situation further 
complicated by the role of mortal as maker that is latter to be explicated. 
 Emerging into presence is the disclosure of that which is present as meaningful, 
and the mutual gathering of the fourfold and thing is how the thing presences. That “the 
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manifold-simple gathering is the jug’s presencing”363 means that in its non-objective 
samadhi-being a thing in-itself is gathered through its relation to the gathering of all things 
and so emerges into presence.  Presencing as the ‘beingness’ of that which is present arises 
as “All things ‘are’ in the home-ground of any given thing and make it to ‘be’ what it 
is”364; being (to be) is for a thing to gather itself in a process of mutual gathering and so 
make itself present. Such presencing of the thing is a transient gathering, appropriation 
“gathers the fourfold’s stay, its while, into something that stays for a while: into this thing, 
that thing.”365 Such staying is counter-posed to ‘mere persisting’, the lingering stay of 
that which presences instead temporarily brings the fourfold into a mirroring 
appropriation that constitutes such presencing so that what is present is no longer seen as 
the self-identity of substance. Instead that which is non-objective is brought into the 
homeground of the other, and in the manner of upholding each other in line with the 
relation of master and servant so that “What is gathered in the gift gathers itself in 
appropriately staying the fourfold”366 and such appropriation presences as the worlding 
of the world. 
  
The process that brings the fourfold together in mutual appropriation is termed the 
thinging of the thing, thinging as gathering makes the thing manifest upon its 
homeground, along with all other things as what support it on that homeground, in so 
making manifest it supports them in their own gathering upon their homeground. Such 
gathering is how a thing in-itself is disclosed as coming to presence;“The presence of 
something present such as the jug comes into its own, appropriatively manifests and 
determines itself, only from the thinging of the thing”367, presencing is appropriative as 
mutual gathering of both jitai and circuminsessional world. In so gathering “The thing 
things world. Each thing stays the fourfold into a happening of the simple oneness of 
world”368, as for Nishitani that a thing ‘is’ means that in its being (its coming to presence) 
the world worlds, the whole is gathered and expressed in each part through the self-
identity of the two notions of samadhi; that the gathering of the in-itself is the mirroring 
of the gathering of world as the mutual constitution of lingering presences. The 
terminology of presence shows how The Thing builds directly upon the thought of The 
Anaximander Fragment to explain in greater detail how lingering jointure comes to pass. 
 Such a mirroring in “lightening each of the four, appropriates their own presencing 
into simple belonging to one another.”369 Each elements mirroring of the other through 
the mutual self-emptying of appropriation brings the fourfold firmly into the framework 
of dependent origination, each element as emptying itself thus presencing is gem-like in 
reflecting the shared light that originates from none but instead from the interplay and 
mutual arising of each empty element. Such mirroring allows each of the fourfold to dwell 
in both its own homeground and that of all other elements and the thing equally without 
the illumination originating  solely from any, but only from such appropriative mirroring 
as the worlding of the world. Mirroring is said to not portray a likeness and so does not 
reduce the elements to a simple uniformity, despite the thinking of appropriation not being 
referred to by Heidegger as related inherently to the process of nihility (except obliquely 
in terms of such thought not yet having arisen and as first encountered in objective 
making’s inability to reach thingness) the uniformity that Nishitani said required the 
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transitions of nihility to repudiate is denied here also as “The united four are already 
strangled in their essential nature when we think of them only as separate realities, which 
are to be grounded in and explained by one another...the fouring does not come about in 
such a way that it encompasses the four and only afterwards is added to them as that 
compass.”370 Despite not insisting on their particularity each element retains its own self-
identity and avoids reduction to uniformity even whilst being appropriated into mutual 
presencing. Dallmayr holds that through the self-emptying element of the jug as non-
objective in-itself such gathering does not assimilate the four into uniformity remaining 
a mutual implication of neither simple identity nor bringing into relation of prior 
externals. Whilst the jug example seems to introduce a greater amount of determination 
into gathering than Nishitani’s general framework would indicate (each element of the 
four that are gathered do seem partially determined by the jug, the sky and earth could be 
gathered as other than water or wine) such determination is in accord with mutual 
constitution through solicitude so that the thinging of the thing happens “in a manner 
approximating Nishitani’s circuminsession.”371 
 Heidegger’s use of a single phenomenon, a single in-itself, however carefully 
chosen, does limit the comparisons that can be drawn; the thing gathers the Fourfold 
whilst the circuminsessional totality gathers things to each other. Heidegger's thought on 
jointure can then be used to extend the things gathering into a wider network but 
differences remain. He seems to give an instance of the circuminsessional relation and 
treat it as paradigmatic, selecting the jug through its easy exemplification of gathering 
through emptying the broad conception of which may apply to other things but seem less 
natural or persuasive when it comes to considering the hills, animals and sundries he ends 
the essay with in terms of outpouring. Earth, sky, mortals and divinities; each seems 
required for the true mirroring of Ereignis, yet not all things that are drawn from the 
natural world are so easily related to both earth and sky, and the integration of the mortals 
and divinities seems less integral to the outpouring, not all libations are in service to a 
consecration. Whilst the relation of the elements in the fourfold are in line with the self-
emptying of the circuminsessional relationship the elements themselves provide a 
narrower conception, in incorporating all things (the totality of absolute centres) sunyata 
seems broader in its scope even as both seek to bring all things to dwell in the homeground 
of the other. To an extent this reflects a difference in approach towards the same aim; to 
provide a model for man's dwelling in a homeless world of technology. Nishitani draws 
upon a more wide-ranging Buddhist doctrine to explain the self’s non-knowing of the 
non-objective in itself to overcome the estrangement of man and world through their 
mutual realization. Heidegger’s repeated stress of ‘simplicity’, his choice of natural 
elements and evocations of local climes, indicate a more specific vision of what such a 
goal entails, rather than seeking to primarily explicate the structure of disclosive 
realization he is painting a picture of dwelling in contrast to modern ways of living 
rendering man into the service of Being’s truth rather than mechanized efficiency. Issues 
concerning his selection of examples in relation to this aim will be dealt with more in 
chapter 2.3. 
 Despite possible differences in their stances toward technology Nishitani later in 
Religion and Nothingness uses an example near identical to that of Heidegger’s in The 
Thing in discussing the historicity of cyclical time. He remarks upon the rice harvest 
festival in which the first batch of wine from the crop is offered to the gods in the royal 
palace. Such a libation celebrates how “the generative force latent in the native 
soil…works to uphold the existence of man…all of this is based on a relationship between 
man and the gods…the gods and the land, man and the land, and man and man form as 
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one totality a socially and politically unified nexus”372. The context of the example is 
different, history as the repetition of the recurrent that the example refers to is held to be 
only one aspect of true historicity even if essential to the gathering of the world nexus or 
circuminsessional relation. But as an instance of the circuminsessional relation it maps 
onto Heidegger’s example of the jug, even if not taken as paradigmatic and primarily 
providing an account of how the world as gathering provides historical meaning. 
 The divinities and gods are mentioned in both examples, within the context of 
Nishitani’s example they are most explicable as relating to cultural identity through the 
mythical role of divine ancestry in Japanese pre-history. Such an understanding could also 
be seen in The Thing as building upon Heidegger’s earlier thought concerning Dasein’s 
destiny as the retrieval of heritage through emulation of cultural exemplars. The self-
emptying of the divinities would then take the form of bequeathing the repeatable 
possibilities of existence, possibilities constituted and verified by such repetition so that 
such destined heritage is gathered at the homeground of the mortals through the 
consecration of the outpouring, even whilst such repetition gathers the divinities upon 
their own homeground by affirming them as such destiny. The nature of such retrieval 
and what can guide it is to be the main concern of chapter 2.6, and raises issue of the 
projective nature of Heidegger's thought concerning the Fourfold soon to be touched 
upon. The sense in which the bequeathing of repeatable possibilities can be termed a self-
emptying, and the manner in which the divinities themselves can be characterized as 
empty and absent, is heavily related to Heidegger's view of the modern epoch as one of 
the gods default that is to be the main focus of the second part of the thesis. By providing 
the measure for man the divinities empty themselves and are thus marked also be an 
emptiness or absence, the manner of their absence is named by the poets who speak the 
worlding interplay of the Fourfold thus articulating how they dwell together so that man 
too may poetically dwell 
 Dallmayr holds that in Nishitani’s thought “there does not seem to be room for 
immortal gods, and perhaps not even for humans seen as mortals”373, taking such terms 
as polytheistic and rendered mute by nihility. Through Nishitani’s example of the festival 
divinities in the above sense can be seen to both indicate historical meaning as the 
repetition of the recurrent. But Heidegger also writes that “The divinities are the 
beckoning messengers of the godhead. Out of the hidden sway of the divinities the god 
emerges as what he is, which removes him from any comparison with beings that are 
present”374. Invocation of the Godhead brings a theistic resonance of Eckhartian lineage; 
but if the absolute nothingness of the godhead is seen as the absolute emptiness of sunyata 
the self-emptying of which is meanings manifestation then as heralds of the godhead the 
divinities relation to heritage is reinforced if the manifestation of such meaning is tied to 
the repeatable possibilities of existence. The relation of the epoch of absent gods to the 
absolute nothingness of the Godhead, and that of the divinities and poetry in terms of 
epochal transformation, will be returned to in-depth in chapter 3.2 after chapters 2.4 and 
2.6 prepare the way with consideration of nihility as the origin of the call to destiny and 
the contingent criteria for this call respectively. 
 Regardless of such differences in the context of comparing their thought on the 
conditions of possibility for the non-objective knowledge of the non-objective thing in 
in-itself both thinkers demonstrate a shared conception of the manner in which the in-
itself is apprehended. Such possibility arises from the interpenetration of homegrounds in 
virtue of the self-emptying of the non-objective in-itself that brings both the gathering 
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vessel and the elements of the fourfold into a radical proximity whilst maintaining their 
differentiation as a multiplicity; “the world’s worlding cannot be explained by anything 
else nor can it be fathomed through anything else.”375 Heidegger’s phrasing of how 
mutual gathering allows for the direct encounter of the in-itself through the non-
differentiated multiplicity of interpenetration relates to his characterization of Dasein as 
a creature of both distance and nearness. Through the staying of the thing the four are 
both remote and near as master and servant in the homeground of the other, such 
“Nearness preserves farness. Preserving farness, nearness presences nearness in nearing 
that farness.”376 The circuminsessional interpenetration renders all things both near and 
far to the homegrounds of the non-uniform totality of absolute centres. 
 The mirroring of the fourfold is a transmission into the homeground of the other 
in the manner of koto, obtaining the mind of the thing through the outpouring of mutual 
appropriation through which the manifestation of meaningful world is brought to 
presence and the thing in-itself is known through entering its homeground even as it is 
brought to the homeground of the self. When the thing is allowed to emerge into presence 
through this worlding then Heidegger asserts we are finally thinking the thing as thing, 
we are ‘called’ by the thing and when we respond our non-objective knowing that is 
required for the things realization “takes up its residence in a co-responding which, 
appealed to in the world’s being by the world’s being, answers within itself to that 
appeal.”377 By taking part in the mutual appropriation of the Fourfold not only is the 
manifestation of meaningful world brought to presence but also comes to pass the direct 
encounter with the in-itself through mutually appropriative self-emptying is to dwell both 
near and far and through the vigilance of mortals to step back from representative thinking 
into the realm of non-objective non-knowing, “As we preserve the thing qua thing we 
inhabit nearness.”378 
 Although the possibility for such knowing, and the form in which it occurs has 
been laid out how such a possibility is actualized is less clear. “Only when – all of a 
sudden presumably – world worlds as world”379 does the thing emerge as the mutual 
appropriation of the four, the ‘presumably’ seems to imply such presencing as mere 
theoretical possibility, the thinging of the thing remains an inherent possibility in the 
history of Being that has yet to come to pass. We have yet to be called by the thing as “if 
things ever had already shown themselves qua things in their thingness, then the thing’s 
thingness would have become manifest and would have laid claim to thought”380, yet they 
remain nihilated. Whilst for Nishitani the real self-realization of reality arises through the 
transformation of self-awareness in egoistic death the worlds presencing still awaits the 
call of Being that such a transformation must respond to; the divinities of the Fourfold 
cannot be the gods who have withdrawn in the epoch of their default, but those who have 
not-yet arrived. Unlike the circcuminsessional relation the thinging of the thing is not a 
constant occurrence but a futural ideal or projective retrieval of the essential nature of 
man. It is a project we are called to realize; the possibility and necessity of such a call, 
the presumed suddenness of worlding and why things have yet to call or if man as mortal 
has simply yet to respond remain to be elucidated. Heidegger's aim in The Thing is to 
describe the form or possibility of poetic dwelling; the necessity of which is dealt with in 
section 2 (specifically chapter 2.4 and 2.6), how it is to be accomplished in section 3. The 
manner, nature and necessity of the call are to be dealt with soon, but in this call there 
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emerges a possible divergence in the thought of Nishitani and Heidegger. Enlightenment 
for the former remains both a historically achieved event and a new dawn whilst in The 
Thing the call to such enlightenment has yet to come and cannot be reached through 
recollecting “former objects which perhaps were once on the way to becoming things”381; 
despite the influence of The Anaximander Fragment to reach the true origin of dwelling 
requires going beyond the Greek. Whilst both thinkers hold openness to the 
circuminsessional relation with things as necessary for non-objective apprehension as the 
realization of the thing in-itself the role of the self’s transformation in relation to this 
possibility contains differences in emphasis. 
Gathering the Region 
Through all the terminological reformulations this view of world essentially endures, 
whilst brief Discourse on Thinking is worthy of mention in this regard due to how its 
terminology has the greatest resemblance to that of Nishitani. This resemblance is partly 
due to its abstract nature which lacks the depth of Heidegger's other analyses, remaining 
vaguer on how worlding actually occurs than the writings on language, appropriation and 
dwelling. Here Sein gives way to talk of 'that-which-regions' which "gathers, just as if 
nothing were happening, each to each and each to all into an abiding, while resting it 
itself. Regioning is a gathering and re-sheltering for an expanded resting in an abiding"382 
a description of mutual circuminsession that names the appropriative mirroring of world 
speaks as that which both forms our horizon of awareness and manifests as that awareness 
in line with the former understanding of Ereignis as Da-Sein. 
 That-which-regions is only encountered in terms of what it makes possible with 
which it is self-identical; like jitai is only known from the appearances of the field of 
consciousness that-which-regions is "an openness which is filled with views of the 
appearances of what to our re-presenting are objects."383 Accordingly that-which-regions 
is the homeground behind the appearances whose representing it makes possible, "where 
everything belonging there returns to that in which it rests."384 As with the mutual 
constitution of jointure and disjointure that-which-regions is “at once an expanse and an 
abiding. It abides into the expanse of resting. It expands into the abiding of what has freely 
turned towards itself."385 In doing so that-which-regions “gathering all, opens itself, so 
that in it openness is halted and held, letting everything merge in its own resting"386; 
bringing jitai to rest in its own homeground and that of the other so that instead of being 
disclosed in terms of objective representation they are gathered to "rest in the return to 
the abiding of the expanse of their self-belonging."387  
 Continuity of thought between the texts is exhibited in references to the relation 
between the Fourfold and that-which-regions; The Thing is said to have shown that 
"things are things through the regioning of that-which-regions".388 This continuity can 
also seen in indicating a problem equally thematic for Heidegger as for Nishitani; the 
relation between realization and awareness as outlined in chapter 1.2 and the primacy of 
elemental subjectivity in this process of realization. Only thing, man and that-which-
regions together name determination; yet also that-which-regions “determines the thing,  
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as thing"389 but what determining is requires awareness of the nature of thought "by 
waiting upon determining and regioning with respect to man."390  
Koto and Language 
Heidegger's discussion of language is also replete with circuminsessional themes 
portraying language as that which brings together self and jitai in world; it is language 
and discourse whose "gathering power penetrates and pervades everything gathers in an 
preserves all it has gathered, not like an encapsulating shell but rather by penetrating with 
its light all it has gathered, and only thus releasing it into its own nature." 391 Heidegger's 
thought on language also brings him into his most explicit concordance with Nishitani in 
relation to the latter's characterization of the knowing of non-knowing. 
 Like Nishitani Heidegger brings together Being and Knowledge, arguing “that for 
something ‘to be’ means for it to disclose itself or to present itself”392  'to be' means to be 
disclosed as meaningful, thus to be known as such. In a manner parallel to Nishitani's 
discussion of koto Heidegger brings together knowledge and Being in the role of the 
mortal seer who apprehends the totality of presence through the nothingness of elemental 
awareness. Truth as the preservation of Being entails that the apprehension of the seer is 
indebted to that which brings the present to presence; “Knowledge embraces vision and 
remains indebted to presencing. Knowledge is remembrance of Being...Knowledge is 
thoughtful maintenance of Being’s preserve.”393 To partake in the circuminsessional 
gathering of world through preservation of jointure is both Being and Knowledge so that 
“Being, as the presencing of what is present, is already in itself truth, provided we think 
the essence of truth as the gathering that clears and shelters”.394 These equations of Being 
and Knowledge are implicit in the understanding of ontology as laid out in chapter 1.1; 
the requirement of elemental subjectivity flows from the requirement of awareness for 
Being, yet its precedence does not. The prior existence of entities (before they 'are' in 
virtue of our understanding) is an equal pre-requisite to Ereignis as Da or Sein, and 
whether their treatment of such appropriation does justice to this nullity of entities is to 
remain an open question in the chapters that follow. 
 Koto as a direct experience of jitai to overcome the paradox of representation is 
connected to Heidegger's phenomenological method by Kockelmans, who defines both 
as "to let that which shows itself be seen from itself the very way it shows itself" 
(Kockelmans RP128); thought attaining to the homeground of jitai in such a way that 
realizes and transforms both the self and what is known. Truth and knowledge accordingly 
become a process of increasing self-awareness (progression through fields of awareness) 
through reflection on jitai . Primordial truth as unconcealment is a relation between self 
as elemental awareness and jitai ; Da-Sein as the clearing for such is essential self. 
 Nishitani's citing of Basho in explicating koto draws him close to Heidegger's 
emphasis on poetic language as allowing phenomenon to speak by attuning oneself to 
jitai ; Unno characterizing poetic expression as what “issues forth from the ‘in-itself’”395 
Whilst never citing Nishitani Heidegger explicitly connects his though on language to the 
notion of koto; defining it as "the appropriating occurrence of the lightening message of 
grace." 396 and “the happening of the lightening message of the graciousness that brings 
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forth." 397. Koto as how meaning arises in apprehension is connected to how words issue 
from this showing, to give language as the entirety of the appropriative process; in 
language as koto-ba words are flowering petals emerging from suchness, jitai the mode 
of being of being of things allowed to flower of and in themselves. Heidegger connects 
Saying and koto ba in that both are how appropriation occurs in giving words to man and 
things. Unlike Nishitani Heidegger explicates how koto operates at greater length through 
his reflections on poetry and can help elucidate Nishitani's own characterization of koto. 
As relating to epochal transformation this will be fully considered in chapter 3.2 after 
consideration of nihilism in section 2. 
The Precedence of Self 
The ontological precedence of elemental awareness also stems from this shared 
understanding of knowing and runs throughout Heidegger's texts, beginning from Being 
and Time's claim that the understanding of Dasein alone guides ontological inquiry. The 
subjective elements of Heidegger's thought are often held to lessen as his works progress, 
but even within the Fourfold a tendency related to the primacy of the subject can be 
detected. That the mortal-divinities dyad appears to take precedence over that of earth-
sky was alluded to earlier, the precedence of the divinities will be explicated more in 
chapter 3.2, for now that of the mortals is to be considered. Last chapter it was said that 
Nishitani accords elemental subjectivity a precedence over world in circuminsessional 
gathering and a similar theme emerges in the role of the mortals in the fourfold and the 
making of the jug that renders possible its gathering. Although this is mitigated in light 
of the role of the call of Being through the thing the relation of the call to the mortals of 
the fourfold may lead to a re-convergence in Heidegger and Nishitani’s understanding of 
elemental awareness. In Nishitani’s terms the mortality of man in the fourfold can be seen 
as denoting that the self-emptying of mortals is the death of egoistic self; a self-emptying 
that allows man to participate in mirroring in virtue of the elemental self-awareness that 
allows for the realization of world as appropriative presencing. There is ambiguity 
between the connection of mortality and making; they are not simply identical as the 
vigilance of mortals is required for all thinging and Heidegger refers to non-made entities 
as things but it is only man as mortal that makes even whilst such making does not define 
mortality but is exemplary of how mortals elemental awareness allows for gathering. The 
role of making in The Thing is connected to the relation of building and dwelling in 
Building, Dwelling, Thinking; but the latter essay more concerns the accomplishment of 
dwelling than its ontological possibility and is to be dealt with in these terms in chapter 
3.3.  
It is the vigilance of elemental awareness that allows for making, but even in the unmade 
such awareness operates in a more fundamental relation to that which makes possible 
presencing than other elements of the four. Human making does not bring things to 
presence, “They do not appear by means of human making. But neither do they appear 
without the vigilance of mortals.”398 Making does not orchestrate or compel the 
appropriation or gather the fourfold, but as stemming from the elemental awareness of 
mortal vigilance it indicates the self-identity of such awareness with the field of 
possibility for presencing through which things manifest. Heidegger attributes a mitigated 
importance to the making of the jug in that it “lets the jug come into its own. But that 
which in the jug’s nature is its own is never brought about by its making.”399Although the 
non-objective mode of jitai , the jug as vessel, is not determined by mortal making, such 
making is required as a condition of possibility for the mutual gathering which the jug 
renders possible and the importance of its participation in the gathering seems somewhat 
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downplayed. It is the emptiness of the vessel that allows the gathering and outpouring, 
but the potter still shapes the void, still renders the gathering possible by providing the 
eidos or objective form of the jug through awareness of the void. Only those things 
capable of awareness of the gathering process can enable the jug as vessel to truly attain 
its non-objective mode of being and be realized as a thing in-itself. “The jug’s void 
determines all the handling in the process of making the vessel”400, the void may remain 
beyond the representative grasp of man but only through awareness of the void is the 
gathering of the jug brought forth, the possibility of the gathering of world through the 
fourfold rests in an elemental awareness of outpouring. For Nishitani such elemental 
awareness precedes the gathering of world as its ontological precondition, a similar 
awareness of gathering and outpouring seems to act as a precondition for the providing 
of the vessel that is required for the outpouring that gathers the world. If making is traced 
to its origin in the mortals of the fourfold then one of the four seems to make a twofold 
contribution to the gathering by rendering possible that gathering through elemental 
awareness that arises with and through the gathering it is also a precondition for. It is the 
mortals that both allow for the manifesting of the void that gathers in outpouring and also 
receive such libation; their self-emptying renders possible the self-emptying of the other 
elements in a more radical sense. 
 The role of making and its relation to mortals results from Heidegger’s choice of 
the jug as a paradigmatic example, his ending references to natural features such as hills 
and trees, and living non-human animals as things complicate this issue. That the natural 
features that constitute the earth and sky (that gather the water and nurture the vine) are 
themselves thinging things is in line with the circuminsessional understanding as the 
fourfold that gather in the thing are then themselves things that are also so gathered. But 
such unmade things do not lend themselves so readily to the etymological analysis and 
analogies of self-emptying as the jug and raise the issue of how mortals are appropriated 
in their thinging if not as consumers of this bounty; mere receivers of outpouring rather 
than taking part in the gathering through the fashioning of the vessel through their 
awareness of void. For mortals to still gather such unmade things requires that elemental 
awareness not be limited to the fashioning of actual vessels, but that this awareness of 
self-emptying void instead allows thinging as emerging into presence as world through 
the apprehension of that which gathers, through the awareness of self-emptying as 
absolute nothingness self-identical with Being that emerges in the homeground of man as 
mortal. In removing the made jug from being purely determined by man as subject 
Heidegger takes a similar step to Nishitani in rendering the thinging of unmade 
phenomena more dependent upon the awareness of mortal man; increasing the 
dependence of things upon self beyond that of objects upon the subject. 
 The mortals of the fourfold have death as their homeground, their homeground is 
the shrine of the Nothing as “that which in every respect is never something that merely 
exists, but which nevertheless presences, even as the mystery of Being itself”401. Only 
mortals can die and in so doing , through the nothingness of their homeground, apprehend 
the mystery and oblivion of Being in the realization of elemental awareness through 
egoistic death. As elemental awareness such death is the shelter of Being and mortals as 
its shepherds are the realization of such absolute nothingness in a parallel way to how 
elemental subjectivity arises as the field of sunyata that jitai and things as samadhi arise 
on, the emptiness or nothingness of the vessel’s void that allows for the outpouring as 
gathering seems to still be writ large in man as mortal. Mortals are understood in the same 
terms as Dasein as “the presencing relation to Being as Being”402, as the only thing that 
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in its thinging is aware of such thinging as the presencing of world; mortals alone in the 
fourfold have their appropriative presencing at issue for them and through apprehension 
of such allow for the coming to presence through appropriation of the four in the thing. If 
the gathering of the manifold in the thing is how Being comes to presence and such 
gathering requires the self-awareness of mortals as the nothingness through which 
presencing occurs then there remains a notion of ontological precedence in virtue of the 
mortal self’s relation to Being that allows the appropriation of that gathering, even whilst 
mortal awareness emerges only alongside and with the fourfold. Just as in Being and Time 
the call of conscience originates in Dasein’s own-Being the call that the thinking of the 
thing is to respond to issues from the homeground of man as mortal, from the shrine of 
Nothing as presencing relation to Being; a call that speaks both of the precedence of 
elemental awareness in the worlding of the world yet also of how such awareness requires 
the thinging of the thing to emerge as world for its realization.  
 A similar paradox as that within Nishitani here emerges; that to attain to death as 
the shrine of Nothing requires the appropriative mirroring made possible by the elemental 
awareness of mortality. Whilst not explicitly stated as doing so making through awareness 
of void introduces the same problematic of the existential realization of sunyata 
emphasizing apprehension over manifestation in the sive of realization, rendering the 
presencing of beings dependent upon the human self in a deeper sense even whilst having 
such elemental awareness constituted through the presencing it makes possible. This 
fundamental paradox was outlined in chapter 1.2 in relation to Ereignis in general, and  
 
can now be seen as applying to Heidegger's poetic conception of the grounds for our 
projected dwelling. 
 Just as for Nishitani the self stands outside the world as its ground, even whilst 
within the totality of the circuminsessional relationship of world it has no priority, the 
human element within the gathering of the thing retains an ontological precedence 
through elemental awareness at the homeground of the self making possible the 
presencing of world even though within the mirroring appropriation mortals have no 
priority in mutual constitution. This priority is partially mitigated by Heidegger's claims 
that whilst as a manner of disclosure of the non-objective the thinging of the thing requires 
awareness for its realization, the nonappearance of the thing to thought is not the neglect 
of man as we can only represent “what has previously come to light of its own accord and 
has shown itself to him in the light it brought with it.”403 this light is same as that which 
Nishitani ascribes to the natural illumination of non-objective knowledge of non-
objective mode of being that originates with things themselves not reason, but such light 
in both cases requires awareness of them to shine, illumination require both light and seer. 
Neither thing nor Fourfold are the result of the human but both require it for their 
accomplishment in line with the general characterization of Heidegger in chapter 1.2, the 
problematic nature of this for the self-overcoming of nihilism will be returned to in 
chapter 3.1. 
 The nature and role of men as mortal raises the issue of the dehomocentric element 
in Heidegger and Nishitani’s thought, the roles of self-awareness and also of non-human 
awareness; that “Men alone, as mortals, by dwelling attain to the world as world.”404 Only 
men as mortals, only the self from the homeground of non-self that is the shrine of 
Nothing, attain to the worlding that is the mirroring light of the field of sunyata, 
originating not in reason or man but only beheld (attained) by him, and thus requiring 
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elemental self-awareness to manifest on its homeground in a manner more primordial 
than any other element of the fourfold. Man as also a thing would seem to be a paramount 
thing; men alone attain to world through an awareness un-possessed by any other non-
mortal thing. As was said above in relation to nihility and uniformity, for Nishitani all 
things may die in the Heideggerian sense and his understanding of sentience is less 
anthropocentric than Heidegger’s. Not just in his occasional references to possible equal 
intelligences of other worlds (which Heidegger would presumably concede as Dasein) 
but also in respect to animal life of all levels of awareness that Heidegger characterizes 
as things, whilst man through appropriation into the mirroring of the four constitutes their 
presencing as alone among living beings man dies and so can bring about his own 
presencing.  
 The Anaximander Fragment contains the same themes of realization through self-
transformation as Religion and Nothingness and The Thing but with differences in 
presentation and emphasis when it comes to the precedence of self-awareness in relation 
to the realization that such awareness both constitutes yet requires that may help elucidate 
and reconcile these issues. To apprehend (realize) the jointure we must be that which can 
partake in the lingering joining of world in order for the jointure to be realized as what 
allows presencing; “translate ourselves to the source of what comes to language”405 in the 
fragment. Weinmayr's analysis of the fragment finds little of the priority of the self that 
lingers within Nishitani, instead seeing us as but one part of the happening of joining, 
equal to other beings and no more the ground of jointure than anything else luminescently 
in the world. Yet as was indicated in chapter 1.2 Weinmayr attributes the oblivion of Being 
to the greater tendency of man to insist on his continuance in presence than that of other 
such insistent beings; giving man power over the balancing of jointure and disjointure 
thus priority over Sein. The prioritized role of self-awareness lingers still in the lingering 
jointure in similar terms to the role of mortals in the fourfold. Man as mortal shepherd is 
prefigured in the role of seer as herdsman who preserves the gathering “only if he 
continues to hold the place of nothingness”406, to have as his homeground the shrine of 
Nothingness and retains the element of previous understandings of Dasein as the being 
for whom Being is an issue, as “that present being which, illuminating, apprehending, and 
thus gathering, lets what is present as such become present in unconcealment”407. It is 
through the elemental awareness of concealing and presencing that gathering in the 
jointure becomes possible, the apprehension required for realization stems from the self’s 
awareness of itself as constituted through such jointure. Through such elemental 
awareness the seer “makes-present and belongs in an exceptional sense to the totality of 
what is present”408. As in The Thing what is present is not a subject-dependent object but 
only comes to presence through the vigilance of mortals and unlike all else that lingers in 
jointure, unlike the other fourfold elements that gather, such elemental self-awareness 
belongs to the totality of gathering world ‘in an exceptional sense’. 
 If Heidegger and Nishitani were constructing epistemologies such precedence 
would be unproblematic, but for Nishitani transition through nihility replaces the problem 
of knowledge of things to that of their reality and the shared denials of idealism and 
material realism combined with the identity of apprehension and manifestation in 
realization render the human self more central to the reality of beings than in the subject-
dependence of the field of consciousness that is to be overcome for its homocentric 
implications. But a wedge may be driven between the manifestation and apprehension of 
realization in the thought of Heidegger. For Nishitani elemental self-awareness and the 
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field of sunyata are radically self-identical, such was the basis for his criticism of 
Heidegger as reaching only a relative nothingness still external to the self overlooking 
that “The epochal character of Being is the ecstatic character of Da-Sein...The ek-sistence 
of man sustains what is ecstatic and so preserves what is epochal in Being, to whose 
essence the Da, and thereby Da-Sein, belongs.”409 Both thinkers would seem to operate 
with an ontological equivalency of self and world at slight variance with the identity of 
elemental self and the field for the possibility of world. However Heidegger slips in a 
small qualification to such an understanding of realization in stating that “For us...the 
most readily experienced correspondence to the epochal character of Being is the ecstatic 
character of Da-Sein”410, implying that the self-identity of elemental self-awareness and 
Being is not totally determinative of the possibility of manifestation. The ‘for us’ perhaps 
denotes that the priority of self-awareness arises from us only experiencing nothingness 
as lived, as embodied through the personal and so necessarily experienced with a priority 
of self whose non-self nature lies in relation to what it is not. For Heidegger, who operates 
with a distinction of entities and beings thus opening him to Nishitani’s critique of Kant 
as only dealing with the aspect that things disclose to us, a way is open to preserve the 
independence of beings from elemental self-dependence in a way that Nishitani’s stronger 
identification of apprehension and manifestation through stringent denials of realism (yet 
also idealism) precludes. Heidegger's changing stance towards the presence-at-hand of 
entities in relation to Nishitani's though on scientific nihility is to be considered at length 
in chapter 3.4; whether jitai and releasememt require a notion of the Kantian 'object in-
itself' to balance Nishitani's prioritizing of elemental subjectivity in circuminsessional 
world. 
Pre-nihilistic nihility 
Heidegger’s thought on errancy in the essay may also shed light on how the self-
realization of sunyata requires that which such realization makes possible to have already 
come to awareness. Since “Oblivion of Being belongs to the self-veiling essence of 
Being”411 presencing and what is present are only revealed as self-identical so that the 
distinction between them is forgotten from the start of the history of Being. The process 
of sunyata as self-identical with the manifestation of things obscures the operation of that 
process resulting in the field of consciousness being taken as the only reality. This 
oblivion is “the richest and most prodigious event”412 as it is metaphysics, the route to the 
person Nishitani calls the highest conception of the person, a route that leads to sunyata 
via nihility. It is through the forgetting of Being that the route to Being is opened up 
through its making possible of what is present. Sunyata as a process of self-realization 
that already requires sunyata to have been realized emerges from the nascent experience 
of such awareness within the field of consciousness as permeated by nihility in such 
attestations as the paradox of representation that indicate and lead to the experience of 
Being’s oblivion. The forgotten distinction of Being and beings “can invade our 
experience only if it has already unveiled itself with the presencing of what is present; 
only if it has left a trace which remains preserved in the language to which Being 
comes”413, presencing only speaks as the relation to what is present, only through the 
objects of the field of consciousness. The oblivion of Being that is metaphysics, the 
experience of nihlity that is the obscuring of how sunyata makes possible the everyday 
disclosures of the field of consciousness, such are the routes to the hidden processes of 
meanings manifestation hitherto concealed and the manner which they are preserved in 
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their forgetting to allow for the self-realization as remembrance. The presumed 
suddenness of the worlds worlding in The Thing is here given more context and the 
possibility and necessity of such realization indicated through a shifting of the onus from 
the self’s achieving enlightenment through egoistic death found in Nishitani to the 
epochal sending of Being; that “When Being keeps to itself in its destining, world 
suddenly and unexpectedly comes to pass.”414 
 In raising such a possibility Heidegger turns again to the element awareness that 
is realized through such nihility, but such awareness does not precede the 
circuminsessional world that is constituted as sunyata. The real self-realization of reality 
is said to occur only “when Being itself advances to its farthest extreme, and when the 
oblivion that issues from Being itself undergoes reversal”415, in then asking “if Being in 
its essence needs to use the essence of man?”416 he goes beyond the assertion that the 
human essence is thinking the truth of Being through elemental awareness to place such 
awareness as the condition for presencing, but a condition claimed by Being that 
maintains precedence over elemental awareness. Such usage of man by Being is not be 
intended utilization in a technological sense, Heidegger instead aims to retrieve usage’s 
original sense of ‘enjoy’ as meaning “to let something present come to presence as 
such”417; as how Being presences as bringing to presence that which lingers. Being 
through using man brings to presence beings that linger between approach and withdrawal 
by providing the expanse of jointure, such usage “delivers what is present to its 
presencing...dispenses to what is present the portion of its while.”418 The understanding 
of usage as the gathering of lingering presence by Being through man as Da-Sein is the 
retrieval of what lays dormant in the technological understanding of usage that arises 
through the oblivion of Being’s withdrawal as metaphysics yet still preserves the 
possibility of such a destiny. The use of man by Being is how both come into their essence 
as and through each other in solicitude to lingering presence in jointure. Although both 
Heidegger and Nishitani hold that elemental awareness and absolute nothingness are self-
identical beyond even an integral relation the use of man by Being indicates that even in 
responding to the call of Being as originating from the homeground of mortality 
Heidegger has a lessened sense of human precedence in appropriation, but in such a way 
as to open up his thought again to Nishitani’s critique of remaining at the level of relative 
nothingness. Consideration of the ontological conditions for meaning now returns to the 
problematic themes outlined in chapter 1.2; namely how this mutual usage of Da and Sein 
is accomplished, how a relation can precede its constituents without its realization falling 
into paradox. 
 The idea of usage as the origin of utilization leaves the term dwelling close to the 
danger it emerges from. Whilst not a simple inversion of technological thinking that 
renders man a means for Being to presence through beings the extent to which the value 
of man becomes derivative in a manner paralleling mechanization is ambiguous, as is the 
possible derivative value the truth of Being has through its relation to man's essential 
nature. This ambiguous relation between the danger of nihilism and the retrieved dwelling 
that is to save is now to be the main focus of the thesis, exploring the historical narrative 
of Gestell 's emergence in Heidegger and the relation of the transitional field of nihility 
to science in Nishitani in order to elucidate the nature of danger-sive-saving, samsara-
sive-nirvana. This relation of nihility as ontological ground to its nihilistic realization,  
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and the manner and extent that which is to save from the realization is related to its nature 











2.0 The relation of Nihilism, Metaphysics and Gestell   
Ereignis and Śūnyatā as processes of disclosure are the origin of both the manifestation 
of nihilism and the more primordial experience of Being in terms of wonder and gratitude. 
These chapters will deal with how nihilism comes to be the definitive experience of 
nothingness; an explication of nihility's relation to nihilism in order to think Gestell as 
the return to the origin of both nihilism and that which saves thus the possibility of 
nihilisms self-transformation. The focus of the following chapters will be on Heidegger's 
formulation of nihilism in terms of Gestell as the current epochal disclosure that 
completes metaphysics and Nishitani's thought on science and the field of nihility. Some 
preliminary remarks on the history of metaphysics and field of consciousness that 
'precede' these culminations of nihilism will first be made to help provide context for the 
following chapters. 
Metaphysics as Desire and Representation 
The manifestation of nihilism in Western thought is characterised by Heidegger as 
metaphysics, defined as the forgetting of the ontological difference resulting in inquiring 
only as to beings instead of the truth of Being as their ground that enables metaphysics as 
its essence. The essence of metaphysics as nihilism is the self-withdrawal of Being 
(nothingness) that discloses meaning, metaphysics is how Being discloses through 
withdrawal so that the essence of nihilism is Ereignis itself. Metaphysics necessarily 
overlooks the question of Being to inquire into beingness  in terms of the intelligibility of 
the totality, reducing the mystery of Being to a rational framework. Metaphysics inability 
to reach its own essence is how Ereignis gives meaning through the withdrawal of Sein; 
it is the epochal history of responses to Being's withdrawal so that the history of 
metaphysics is the charting of manners in which Ereignis has given meaning. 
 Metaphysics is characterized by the representative thinking that forms the world-
picture; "that what is stands before us - in all that belongs to it and all that stands together 
in it - as a system." 1 Metaphysics strives to give an account of beings in terms of Being 
as ground and unity, "all metaphysics is at bottom, and from the ground up, what grounds, 
what gives account of the ground, what is called to account by the ground, and finally 
what calls the ground to account." 2 Metaphysics attempt to order beings as a unified 
system in terms of Being reduced to the highest being leads to Heidegger terming it onto-
theo-logic, as "The essential constitution of metaphysics is based on the unity of beings 
as such in the universal and that which is highest." 3  
 In seeking to grasp beings as a whole the root of metaphysics representation is 
desire; the desire to comprehend, to order the whole and articulate reality bringing 
permanence to dukkha. The relation of representation and desire is more apparent in the 
German Vorstellen, "to set out before oneself and to set forth in relation to oneself." 4 This 
evokes the notion of bringing things in front of man as a judge rendered central as arbiter, 
having more connotations of a wilful desire to objectify Being and dominate through 
representation. Such grasping is not purely epistemological as in searching for 
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foundations and fixed structure metaphysics also imposes hierarchical value structures 
centred around the subjective ego. Accordingly the modern epoch is marked by man's 
ascension to subjectivity through desire to understand that which is. Rorty inverts this 
notion; the need for certainty does not stem from desire but vice-versa as "it has turned 
out that the only thing we can be certain about is what we want. The only things that are 
really evident to us are our own desires"5 and so desire is prioritized as a result of the 
quest for certainty. In either case this world-picture is how the reality of what is comes to 
presence as represented by man leading to meaning becoming fixed or narrowed into a 
single possibility. 
Metaphysics as Gestell  
Gestell as the essence of technology is said to be "identical with the essence of modern 
metaphysics," 6 as the self-concealment through withdrawal in which "Being dismisses 
and puts away its truth into oblivion in such a way that Being denies its own coming to 
presence." 7  Despite such a shared essence their unity is not an identity but more a 
culmination. The End of Philosophy and the Task of Thinking identifies Gestell with the 
self-completion of metaphysics. Such completion is not simple termination but the place 
where philosophy "is gathered in its uttermost possibility. End as completion means this 
gathering"8 marking a shift from Heidegger's earlier position that "Through anthropology 
the transition of metaphysics into the event of the simple stopping and setting aside of all 
philosophy is introduced." 9  
 Heidegger uses the term cybernetics to denote this proliferation of and 
communication between independent sciences that is a legitimate completion of 
philosophy. The term also brings out the relation of Gestell as a governing process 
marking a shift in manners of communication and control; the greater regulation and 
arrangement of labour, and the reduction of language, art and knowledge to an endless 
flow of information. Whilst Heidegger names the epoch of Gestell the Atomic Age (and 
perhaps naively predicts this energy source will replace fossil fuels) the reduction to 
information seems increasingly pronounced over that of labour and Gestell might better 
be named the Information Age. This gathering is not a cessation of metaphysical thought, 
but the end of its developing into anything new, the exhaustion of its possibilities. This 
completion of metaphysics is the extreme point (thus possible turning point) of 
withdrawal resulting in the end of any essential differences between beings in the 
levelling uniformity of the field of nihility as metaphysics exhausts itself and its epochal 
history reaches a final disclosure. Metaphysics cannot reach its own essence of Ereignis, 
Gestell as the experience of the self-withdrawal of Being (Nothingness) as such can do 
so. As the completion of metaphysics Gestell is also the completion of nihilism heralding 
the possibility of a new epochal movement in the history of Being through the self-
overcoming of such nihilism in Gestell. 
The Field of Consciousness as Metaphysics 
The movement between the fields of consciousness and nihility mirrors Heidegger’s 
deconstruction of metaphysics, except whilst the essence of metaphysics is equated with 
nihilism by Heidegger, in Nishitani's schema metaphysics falls within the field of 
consciousness preceding the experience of nihilism on the field of nihility. Gestell itself 
would be the transition from consciousness to nihility; the dissolution of metaphysics that 
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at once both completes it and marks the self-transformation of representative thought into 
calculative. 
 Nishitani offers a parallel critique to that of metaphysics in how substance is 
understood upon the field of consciousness as what “is used to point out the essence of a 
thing, the self-identity in which a thing is what it is in itself. In other words, it is the being 
of a being”10, which “invariably restricts the selfness of a thing to the way that thing is 
disclosed to us on the field of reason”11 overlooking how such beingness is also 
constituted by nothingness. His critique of the subject (shutai) mirrors this as the notion 
of subject “merely points to man in himself insofar as he is laid bare to himself within 
himself, on the field of his own consciousness.”12 Subjectivity is only the self as it appears 
to the self upon the field on consciousness as standing opposed to the world and objects. 
This leads to the prioritizing of the subjective self and represents a “form of captivity or 
self-attachment”13 incapable of moving beyond its own representations (of both itself and 
objects). These categories of subject and substance are said by Nishitani to have 
consistently determined Western notions of Being, the Being of beings is seen as 
substance as beings are represented as objects from the perspective of the self-conscious 
subject upon the field of consciousness. 
 The subject-object duality upon the field of consciousness can be seen in the 
division of ‘actual’ (that a thing is, its existence) and ‘essential’ being (what a thing is). 
Traditional ontologies of substance seek to reach actual being through essential being, 
existence by way of essence understood in terms of how it becomes present to subjective 
consciousness. Such essence is claimed as only an objective representation in “terms of 
logos, as something that can be explained in terms of ‘logical’ structures or interpreted 
‘theoretically’. It is given as something that can be viewed from the standpoint of 
reason.”14 Heidegger indicates that Western metaphysics also begins from such a division 
in taking Being as ground; "that from which beings as such are what they are in their 
becoming, perishing, and persisting as something that can be known, handled and worked 
upon"15. Metaphysics as the search for ground also begins from the essential whatness of 
presence and "starting from what is present, represents it in its presence and thus exhibits 
it as grounded by its ground."16 For both thinkers the metaphysical reason of the field of 
consciousness concerns itself solely with essential being as ground and so “does not put 
one directly in touch with the home-ground of a thing, with the thing itself”17; it forgets 
the ontological difference and so cannot reach its own ground. 
 The centrality of the subjective or egoistic self within the phenomenal world of 
the field of consciousness is taken as both conventional and ultimate reality resulting in 
the self’s enclosing within itself and estrangement from the suchness of both self and 
things. Such a conception of self is an illusion resulting from the inherent subject-object 
division of the field of consciousness, an incapacity necessary to and befitting its nature 
along the same lines as metaphysics inability to think its own ground. This obscuring of 
the self's true nature and closing down of other possibilities of self-understanding will 
later be connected to Heidegger's understanding of Gestell in terms of danger. 
 This duality leads to disclosure upon the field of consciousness entailing a paradox 
in relation to representation that forms the core of Nishitani’s critique of traditional 
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ontologies; namely that “An object is nothing other than something that has been 
represented as an object, and even the very idea of something independent of 
representation can only come about as a representation.”18 Substance and self are thus 
objectified as representations, obscuring their true suchness through the dichotomization 
of subject and object that prevails throughout the representational thought of metaphysics. 
This paradox is said to have been made explicit in the work of Kant, deepening the 
understanding of subjectivity by rendering the self as subject resistant to objective 
comprehension opening the way towards the Great Doubt. Although this subject-
dependence is seen as the culmination (and beginning of self-nullification) of the subject-
object duality the nature of the critique of subjectivity as ground for the world of objects 
is problematic for Nishitani, as shall be later discussed in reference to the ontological 
priority he also seems to give the awareness of self.  
The Field of Consciousness as Desire and Destiny 
The separation of self and things through the subject-object duality on the field of 
consciousness is said to entail “that we are drawn to things, and that we in turn draw 
things to ourselves. (In this sense, ‘will’, or desire and attachment, can also be posited at 
the ground of ‘representation’.)”19 Nihilism in traditional Buddhist thought would be seen 
in terms of Dukkha; not so much suffering as the failure to recognize impermanence thus 
overcome attachments, mainly to the illusory ego leading to discontent at the realization 
of our own limits. The natural and necessary tendencies of desire and aversion are 
frustrated by impermanence that shadows every moment with death and loss. 
 Yet Nishitani’s inclusion of an element of desire and attachment is more 
ambiguous. Whilst in line with traditional Buddhist views of conventional 
discriminations stemming from the grasping of false ego and self-attachment the subject-
object duality and representation seem required for such wilful desires; if they are posited 
as also stemming from the ground of representation then this is coherent, if they are ‘at’ 
the ground in the sense of causation then this seems more problematic. 
 This was touched on in the last chapter regarding the accomplishment of the Da-
Sein relation, which mirrors how whilst the self’s reification of itself through the egoistic 
mode of being is always an act of the self “it is not something we are free to do as we 
please...The force of destiny is at work here, impelling us to be and to act in this 
manner.”20, a destiny that is not “something that simply rules over us and controls us from 
without. Nor is it merely something like blind will. It is a destiny that appears only in the 
shape of the acts we ourselves perform, only as one with our own actions.”21 The self-
identity of the self and Śūnyatā, of Da and its Sein, makes the grasping of the self on the 
field of consciousness a force that acts through us yet as us. The inevitability that governs 
the narrative behind the history of metaphysics and what this means for the free relation 
of Da and Sein once the illusory necessity of Gestell is exposed are to be addressed in 
chapter 2.3. 
 Related to this is the issue of how nihilism conflates the individual existential 
realization of nihility with its current historical form. Nishitani seeks to combine 
Buddhism with a historical approach to nihilism; samsara and dukkha originating in the 
attachments of the craving ego as eternal notions are merged with Western influenced 
ideas of nihilism as growing from the historical progress of modernity. Like Heidegger 
he “understood modernity as the result of a historical development that began with the 
middle ages, passed through the Protestant Reformation and the Renaissance, and ended 
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in the emergence of modern science.” 22 Ontology and Utterance even offers a shorter 
history of metaphysics to Heidegger, moving from Plato through Descartes to Kant, 
dealing with the attempt to reconcile the personal-impersonal self-identity to unify 
subject-object. 
 Yet this approach seems to introduce problems as well as resolve them. There is a 
tension between the various characterizations of nihility; as attuning us to a pre-existing 
abyss yet also emerging historically, as both transitional yet also self-identical with 
transhistorical sunyata designating 'real reality', between the advent of nihilism as a 
historical phenomena and  of nihility as constitutive of Dasein’s constitution (the 'why' 
behind nihilism's advent). If nihility as transitional and self-identical with sunyata is 
required to be passed through to attain enlightenment upon the field of sunyata then the 
linking of the emergence of the field of nihility with secular/scientific trends of modernity, 
the rendering of  nihilism a historical problem rather than eternal issue, seems to make 
sunyata as enlightenment dependent on the overcoming of a modern phenomena. The 
historical status of nihility thus needs initial clarification; is experience of nihility and the 
Great Doubt a personal transformation true and possible at all times, an historical 
destining like Gestell, or a continual possibility more easily realized in modernity. 
 These chapters will begin with anxiety and Doubt as the experiential entry point 
into nihilism. The nature of Gestell as a destinal disclosure (the historical manifestation 
of nihilism) and the supreme danger will be explicated in chapter 2.2 alongside Nishitani's 
thought on science. Chapter 2.3 will consider examples of nihilistic disclosure and what 
implications these have for the issues relating to historical nihilism. Chapter 2.4 will 
explore the relation of the danger to Ereignis thus that which is to save; the self-identity 
of the danger and the saving (nihility and Śūnyatā; samsāra-sive-nirvāna). Chapters 2.5 
and 2.6 will critique the notion of danger in terms of its viability and context respectively.  
Anxiety and Doubt as Call and Attestation 
Nothingness cannot be directly grasped in thought but only approached through beings, 
we can only experience or think nothingness through the withdrawal and nihilation of 
beings-as-a-whole. Despite its ontological priority it can only be encountered 
chronologically after beings as we are first always thrown into the totality. As the 
primordial is only revealed through the withdrawal of the everyday “the nothing is at first 
and for the most part distorted with respect to its originality” 23 and as belonging to Being 
must be encountered as at one with the totality through a “correspondingly original mood” 
24 that unifies the nature of Dasein as disclosure; anxiety. Anxiety and the Great Doubt 
will be dealt with together as sharing the same role; the experiential realization of 
nothingness as the structural unity of Dasein and ontological condition of metaphysics 
(the field of consciousness). In both we become our nothingness, it overpowers and 
possesses us. Both turn the questioner into a question and through the withdrawal of 
meaning open the way back into the nothing of the self. The nothing may be ungraspable 
in thought but anxiety as the experience of it allows it to be thematized, just as sunyata 
can only be experienced and then expressed imperfectly. This chapter will deal with the 
proximal experience of nihility that both attests to their ontologies and constitutes 
nihilism to prepare for later chapters addressing of nihilism and its self-transformation 
more explicitly in terms of their unity. 
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Attunement and Experience 
The nature of the experience of anxiety and what it discloses are intertwined, disclosing 
the Da of Dasein to itself so that we experience in ourselves what is thus disclosed. Brief 
consideration of attunement and the nature of experience in general will elucidate this 
before dealing with anxiety more specifically. 
 Dasein's state-of-mind reveals Dasein to itself as Da, it is the “primordial 
disclosure…in which Dasein is brought before its Being as ‘there’”25 grounding 
understanding by directing Dasein towards its thrown possibilities that understanding 
projects onto so “By way of having a mood Dasein ‘sees’ possibilities.”26 States-of-mind 
reveal the whole we are amidst and “this revealing – far from being incidental – is also 
the basic occurrence of Dasein.” 27 It is state-of-mind that makes possible the disclosure 
of meaning by allowing Da to relate to Sein through bringing Dasein before its essence 
as the Da side of that relation. Heidegger claims states-of-mind are beyond our control, 
they pertain to our throwness and that Dasein "has been brought into its ‘there’, but not 
of its own accord”,28 yet the Da-Sein identity also means it is none other than Dasein that 
brings us before the Da. 
 State-of-mind is an ontological structure not psychological phenomena, anxiety is 
ontologically prior to the experiences it enables and the range of experiences enabled by 
a state-of-mind share a commonality derived from it that all point to the more fundamental 
underlying attunement. Despite this Heidegger's later definition of experience also 
matches how we are called to face our anxiety. To experience something means "that this 
something befalls us, strikes us, comes over us, overwhelms and transforms us....we 
endure it, suffer it, receive it as it strikes us and submit to it. It is this something itself that 
comes about. comes to pass, happens." 29 In experiencing something we "attain it along 
the way, by going on a way...this something, which we reach along the way in order to 
attain it, itself pertains to us, meets us and makes its /// appeal to us, in that it transforms 
us into itself." 30 Stambaugh remarks that 'entering into the movement of waying' ties "in 
nicely with the literal meaning of the English word 'experience' which means to go 
through."31 and it is worth noting that 'to go through' also ties this definition of experience 
to Nishitani's charting of the progression through the fields to their self-identity. 
 This later definition of experience joins together elements of anxiety with the call 
of conscience as the ontic attestation to the possibility of authenticity, anxiety needs this 
further attestation as “The call of conscience, existentially understood, makes known for 
the first time what we have hitherto merely contended”.32 Whilst anxiety is to attest to the 
nature of the self as nothingness this attestation is only compelling in concert with the 
further experiential attestation of the call of conscience. The call of conscience in Being 
and Time is the first mention of the ontological meaning of nothingness, the call to the 
self from its own uncanniness/homelessness. It is note-worthy that this first treatment of 
nullity by Heidegger takes the form of being called to a task, of an imperative that acts as 
its own warrant by disclosing what is thus the deficiency in what ought to be. In this first 
call is announced the powerlessness and debt of Dasein towards Being, that in Heidegger's 
later thought summons us to thanks and sacrifice. The nature of the experience as a call 
is also axiological, or normative, as it forms the motivation for transforming the self-
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conception of man. It is not anxiety itself but the readiness for anxiety that is to result 
from hearing the call of conscience; it is not enough to experience nihility, the call of 
conscience and new saving epoch only have anxiety as their precondition. This call is 
silent as it speaks the nothing, conscience is a call to and from the nothing that appears 
uncanny and alien to the self lost in das Man. The called and caller are both Dasein so 
that the call of conscience is the call for the self to retrieve itself as nothingness and clarify 
its own essence as nihility. What calls us to thought is the absolute nothingness of self, 
not anything 'other' to me but only other to the everyday. The hearing and heeding of 
silence is to be more fully explored in chapter 3.3 in terms of poetry, the axiological 
elements in chapter 2.6. 
 To experience nothingness in the atunement of anxiety is to be transformed by it 
through submission, as this nothingness is nothing other than the self then the experience 
is one in which the self summons itself to transform itself into itself; the experience of 
nihility is one of self-transformation through the self's overwhelming of itself. It is this 
experience that first begins the process of realization that renders nihility from an external 
relative nothingness into the absolute nothingness of elemental subjectivity. The self 
realizes itself as Da, the mask of absolute nothingness, called underway towards an 
experience of the self-appropriation of nothingness that is other to the experience of 
nihilism. The self's calling itself along this way is how Ereignis comes to pass; the 
experience of nihility how appropriation occurs. As the existential realization of nihility 
(the meaninglessness and contingency of our endeavours) such Doubt is nihility as the 
nullification of the egoistic self; ontological nihility and existential doubt are self-
identical and without such existential realizations there is no ontological nihilism. 
The Nature of Anxiety/Doubt 
The threefold structure of anxiety as a mood will now be examined; that in the face of 
which we have anxiety, anxiety as such (the way it manifests ‘how one is’), and that about 
which we are anxious. 
Anxiety 
That in the face of which we have anxiety is no specific thing, it is not an anxiety-inducing 
entity even if the mood may be inspired by an ontic state of affairs; “The 
indeterminateness of that in the face of which and for which we become anxious is no 
mere lack of determination but rather the essential impossibility of determining it.” 33  The 
omnipresent indefiniteness of anxiety, that it is felt towards no particular being (no-thing) 
yet effects all beings, indicates “Being-in-the-world itself is that in the face of which 
anxiety is anxious” 34 so anxiety is in the face of Dasein itself as nothingness. Both world 
and Dasein are the ground for each other, their meaning is mutually derived so both are 
their own groundless ground, both beings and Dasein are without essence as their 
existence is constituted by relations. As being-in-the-world Dasein is determined by a 
referential totality in relation to its self-identity, it lacks any intrinsic essence and instead 
finds its identity through emptying itself by giving meaning to other phenomena. "In 
uncanniness Dasein stands together with itself primordially. Uncanniness brings this 
entity face to face with its undisguised nullity"35 note 'entity' in footnote ref to 1.1), since 
anxiety always concerns the structural totality of Dasein and arises from Dasein itself it 
is experienced as both indefinite and all-pervasive, originating everywhere and nowhere.  
Anxiety is not felt in the face of or for a single possibility or mode of being but in the face 
of the possibility of the impossibility indicating that in the face of which Dasein is anxious 
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is also what Dasein is anxious for, “is simply Dasein’s potentiality-for-Being”. 36 In fear 
we are afraid for a possibility of Dasein and thus turn away from what is fearsome and 
threatening to that possibility. In anxiety we turn away from Dasein as possibility itself 
fleeing to the everyday indicating that anxiety is both for and in the face of Dasein. 
 Anxiety as-such makes us feel 'uncanny/unhomelike’ by disclosing nothingness 
as non-meaning so that anxiety is experienced as the loss of everyday concerns and 
significance bringing “one back to the pure ‘that-it-is’ of one’s ownmost individualized 
throwness”. 37 Deprived of the everyday meanings it was once absorbed in as its attention 
is no longer repelled but drawn back to its own nature as nothingness. States-of-mind 
open up the world as a horizon of significance, anxiety opens up a horizon of 
insignificance, the referential totality is no longer experienced as meaningful, “it 
collapses into itself; the world has the character of completely lacking significance.” 38 
Both beings and the world withdraw simultaneously bringing Dasein “back from its 
absorption in the ‘world’” as “Everyday familiarity collapses” 39 rendering the familiar 
into the uncanny. This lack of significance reveals the resistance of entities to the 
projections of meaning, that non-Dasein “must be conceived as unmeaning, essentially 
devoid of any meaning at all.” 40 All that remains is the sheer giveness of entities, non-
differentiated regarding their significance, both entities and Dasein are disclosed as 
potentiality thus ready for either the projection of Dasein or the sending of Being. To 
experience the world as uncanny in anxiety is to experience it as without ‘why’, as 
obtrusive and resistant to our projections, bereft of the possibilities that define our self-
understanding all that remains is the potentiality of pure Da-Sein; nothingness as the 
condition for the disclosure of the now absent meanings. The complex relation of this 
unmeaning to the present-at-hand is developed more in chapter 3.4. 
 This is why when faced with our Da in anxiety we feel an ambivalence between 
panic and “peculiar calm” 41 an uncertain tension and nervous apprehensiveness of this 
new found homelessness in the wake of the withdrawal of meaning that settles into an 
uncanniness ill at ease with a world rendered unfamiliar. It is not a fearful flight but 
bewilderment in the face of entities sunk into indifference, this uneasy insecurity in the 
face of our own contingency is accompanied by a peaceful calm of freedom from previous 
bonds of the everyday, an exuberance at the new horizons opened by a return to one’s 
ownmost Being that is “in secret alliance with the cheerfulness and gentleness of creative 
longing.”42  
 How one is in anxiety reflects the other structural features, the indefiniteness of 
what it is in the face of that brings Dasein to face itself, “What is ‘it’ that makes ‘one’ feel 
ill at ease? We cannot say what it is before which one feels ill at ease. As a whole it is so 
for one…In the slipping away of beings only this ‘no hold on things’ comes over us and 
remains,” 43 leaving us amidst alien unfamiliar beings that we can no longer grasp as 
meaningful, in exposing this failure of meaning “(a)nxiety reveals the nothing” (ibid). 
Indefiniteness and unmeaning combined make us powerless in the face of anxiety, as it 
concerns our very nature as Da it can only be accepted or the doomed attempt be made to 
flee. This element of helplessness before an overwhelming experience of our ownmost  
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truth, and that to deny such an attunment is only to flee reality, transforms in the later 
works into the warrant for an awe-ful surrendering before the mystery of Being. 
 
Great Doubt 
These elements of anxiety are also found in Nishitani's characterization of the Great 
Doubt; that world and self are unified as a question, the paradox of alienation/isolation 
within non-differentiation, and the revealing of unmeaning. In the first essay of Religion 
and Nothingness Nishitani characterizes the religious quest as the question “For what 
purpose do I myself exist?” (pg3RN). Just as in anxiety Dasein is bought before itself 
through the loss of meaning “We become aware of religion as a need, as a must for life, 
only at the level of life at which everything else loses its necessity and its utility.”44 
Ontological enquiry as the study into the conditions for possibility of meaning always 
pertains to the question of ones own meaning and encounter with the nothingness of self 
and world, and is also thereby the study of the elemental selfhood revealed through 
anxiety as the precondition for meaning. 
 Ontology thus begins with nihility overcoming the self as “Nihility refers to that 
which renders meaningless the meaning of life. When we become a question to ourselves 
and...our very existence has turned into a question mark”45 in moments of self-
questioning the abyssal nihility of our being comes to the fore as the world withdraws. In 
the Great Doubt we are what is doubted and confronted so that Dasein faces itself as what 
is at issue, the question of our own meaning arises as the everyday world recedes. As 
anxiety is both in the face of and for our existence so does the self both doubt, is doubted 
and impels the doubting, the self does not engage in doubting, it becomes doubt; it realizes 
doubt in the sense of actualization-sive-understanding. The self does not encounter 
nihility but becomes nihility, in doubt the world and self are realized as one, the self is 
nullified so that “the separation of the within and the without is surpassed subjectively, 
and that nihility opens up at the ground of the within and the without.”46 
 This unifying of doubt and doubter ends the estrangement of the subject-object 
dichotomy of the field of consciousness by gathering the self and all things in the world 
into ‘a single question mark’ so that the Doubt is at both once reality and the self. Nishitani 
denies this is akin to the ‘absolute One’ of traditional metaphysics despite such uniform 
meaninglessness not differentiating between the subject and object, between what Dasein 
is anxious for and in the face of. Instead this shared absence of meaning retains an element 
of self-enclosure in which “all things appear isolated from one another by an abyss. Each 
thing has its being as a one-and-only, a solitariness absolutely shut up within itself. We 
call such a state of absolute self-enclosure ‘nihilistic’.”47 Deprived of meaning 
phenomena cannot relate themselves to each other and are experienced as radically 
differentiated even whilst the meaning that could differentiate them is nullified. Such a 
paradoxical union of multiplicity and non-differentiation would seem to bring nihility 
closer than ever to the characterization of sunyata, even for a transitional stage. Chapter 
2.5 will deal more with this relation of uniqueness and uniformity. 
 Great Doubts ‘greatness’ lies in that “The very condition of basic uncertainty 
regarding human existence in the world and the existence of self and others, as well as 
the suffering this gives rise to, are surely matters of the utmost, elemental concern”.48 
Greatness is thus conditional upon an experience of suffering and shared concern that is 
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not restricted “to the isolated self of self-consciousness but embraces at once the existence 
of the self and of all things.”49 Yet such Greatness is also absolute as it concerns the 
nihility of the self “at the foundations of its existence...To that extent the realization of 
nihility is nothing other than the realization of the self itself.”50 Like Heidegger Nishitani 
calls the denial of such elemental concern a flight from doubt, yet whilst such nihility is 
omnipresent and only uncovered in doubt/anxiety, it paradoxically only is when 
existentially realized within such doubt/anxiety. Anxiety reveals the essence of Dasein to 
be the nothingness that enables meaning, but this essence is inconstant; “the 
transformation of man into his Da-Sein that every instance of anxiety occasions in us” 51 
both reveal us as, yet also renders us, Da-Sein. This theme was first raised in chapter 1.1 
and is to be the focus of chapter 2.6. 
As Way Towards Death 
Both anxiety and the Great Doubt are seen as preparatory for and complemented by death, 
but whilst Nishitani's thought on the Great Death has affinities to Heidegger there are also 
significant differences. 
 The attunement of anxiety brings Dasein “face-to-face with the ‘nothing’ of the 
possible impossibility of existence,”52 so too does its equiprimordial understanding reflect 
this impossibility of projection; “Death is the possibility of the absolute impossibility of 
Dasein.” 53 As attunement is ontologically primary to understanding death first requires 
anxiety discloses to Dasein that it exists as thrown towards its end. Death shares the 
distinguishing features of anxiety; individualizing and inescapable as Dasein’s ownmost, 
non-relational possibility not to be surpassed, indefinite and constant it brings the totality 
of Dasein into view as being-towards-death and is proximally fled from even whilst the 
pre-condition for the resoluteness of authenticity. As the Great Doubt enables authenticity 
by shattering the ego of the they-self Nishitani also characterizes it as the way towards 
the Great Death; the death of ego (field of consciousness). The Great Death is the 
transitional process of nihiliation between the fields of consciousness and sunyata, the 
relative nihility that erodes the subjective ego self opening the way to the realization of 
self as absolute nothingness. The death of ego is thus characterized as "the realization 
(actualization-sive-appropriation) of the reality of the self and all things.”54 and this 
reality is both defined and enabled by nihility that allows the self  “to achieve a 
subjectivity that can in no way be objectivised.”55 
 Neither understand death as ontic demise but an ontological structure existentially 
realized through owning ones finitude as shadowing every moment of life; for both death 
permeates and reveals the ontological structure of existence as being-towards-death and 
death-sive-life, the personal realization of which through anxiety/doubt leads to the 
possibility of authenticity and sunyata. Just as death is encountered in every moment of 
life and Dasein cannot flee itself this abyss of our being is always present so that “In the 
case of death, we do not face something that awaits us in some distant future, but 
something that we bring into the world with us at the moment we are born.”56 Both see 
the existential realization of death as a liberation from inauthentic illusion, either from 
the understanding of the self in terms of das Man or subjective ego. For both this points 
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paradoxically indicates that such absolute nothingness only is as finite man and that Sein 
only is as its Da. 
 Despite these similarities Nishintani uses death to denote a wider variety of related 
ideas. His discussion of death in terms of the death axis in Science and Zen places it more 
with the resolution of the conflict between religion and science. In many ways it is a 
notion of death more consonant with Gestell that like the death of Being and Time is the 
possibility of the impossibility of possibility, that instead of calling us to authentic 
responsibility announces the possibility of a free relation to Sein. Whilst for both the 
question of reality is opened up by death in Being and Time this is an individualizing 
whilst for Nishitani's own-being is revealed as undifferentiated from others. The Great 
Death of the ego's passing is a transcending of duality, being-towards-death a gathering 
of the everyday repeatable possibilities into focus, a difference profound enough to say 
what they term 'death' is a different phenomenon in the works of early Heidegger. 
 In later texts the role of death for Heidegger began to change, and the mortality of 
man in the Fourfold came closer to elemental awareness that stems from the death of ego, 
resoluteness replaced with releasement introducing the element of non-willing. The self-
renunciation of the most mortal poet as a sacrifice for Being so that in appropriation for 
meaning man overcomes himself; "Being present is grounded in the turning-towards 
which as such turns the essence of man into it so that the latter may dissipate itself for it." 
57 As the notion of death shifted from individual resoluteness to the mortality of man 
similarities remain balanced by different differences, the variances in the negation of ego-
death and interpenetration of death-sive-life will be dealt over section 3. 
The Role of Nihilation 
In both of Heidegger's main reflections on anxiety (Being and Time and What is 
Metaphysics?) it reveals nothingness as what enables the Da-Sein relation (disclosure of 
meaning). In both it is the encounter with nothingness in anxiety that allows the disclosure 
of entities as meaningful beings in the everyday world by the repelling of Dasein’s 
attention away from its own nothingness towards inauthenticity and the reification of ego. 
By disclosing our throwness into un-meaning anxiety also discloses the necessity of 
projected meanings to render the uncanny familiar; the resistance of earth invites world 
and both are necessary to the strife of meanings disclosure. The experience of our 
nothingness is the experience of un-meaning that impels us to meaningfulness; meaning 
manifests both within us as nothingness and impelled by that nothingness that is our 
nature. This action of the nothing is termed nihilation by Heidegger, a “wholly repelling 
gesture toward beings that are in retreat as a whole, which is the action of the nothing that 
oppresses Dasein in anxiety.” 58 Heidegger’s later injunction that we should strive to fulfil 
our nature as shepherds of Being is foreshadowed here with the claim that “Being held 
out into the nothing – as Dasein is – on the ground of concealed anxiety makes man a 
lieutenant of the nothing,” 59 anxiety reveals us to be agents of the nothing, just as it will 
later be said that as mortals we preserve death as the shrine of the nothing. 
 In revealing the contingency and groundlessness of everyday meanings anxiety 
firstly discloses that it has been fled from. This is a two-fold concealment, not only do we 
flee from anxiety and our ownmost selves as nothingness but we forget that we are thus 
fleeing and that the meanings of the everyday are contingent, we first forget our essence 
as un-meaning then we forget that these meanings are contingent not necessary. This 
feature of anxiety is later interpreted in terms of the supreme danger of Gestell. If the 
Dasein of Being and Time is a personal self, and the man of Heidegger's later thought a 
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collective noun, then anxiety is the precursor to Gestell which itself is anxiety writ large. 
This marks a shift in Dasein's moods towards epochal attunements as authenticity moves 
from the individual resolution to the communal service to the nothing. Anxiety as 
Dasein’s direct experience of its own nullity is widened in scope to the experience of the 
nullity of Being that is nihilism (Gestell). Nihilism as withdrawal is the experience of the 
self's appropriation making anxiety epochal. 
 Like all moods Dasein proximally encounters anxiety in its inauthentic mode of 
being, disclosing the Da in the manner of turning away from it towards beings. As the 
referential totality of beings as a whole recedes into unmeaning Dasein is repelled from 
the looming nothingness towards beings, the horizon withdraws when we are concerned 
with beings, and the beings when we are concerned with totality as horizon. Dasein cannot 
grasp the nothingness so instead attempts to grasp the totality as it withdraws, thus are 
beings as meaningful highlighted as other to the unmeaning nature of the horizon that 
makes them manifest. The Umwelt nihilated in anxiety could be seen as the field of 
consciousness made possible yet obscuring the other fields of awareness, nothingness 
constitutes the fields of conventional awareness in such a way as to conceal itself. This 
everydayness is essential to Dasein due to the “existentially positive character of the 
capacity for delusion.” 60  Yet despite the everyday being proximal “the ‘not-at-home’ 
must be conceived as the more primordial phenomenon.” 61  Anxiety discloses how mood 
normally repels attention from itself to the world, and does so by disclosing the 
nothingness of Da-Sein that allows the process of disclosure. Anxiety is the self-
disclosure of disclosure, of the possibility for meaning; it shows nothingness as 
possibilizing both  authentic resoluteness and inauthentic turning away, as the origin of 
both the saving and the danger. Anxiety discloses falling and directing ourselves towards 
meanings as inherent to our nature as  structural features of disclosedness. In disclosing 
Dasein as its own project that must take responsibility for its null existence anxiety 
discloses “its Being-free for the freedom of choosing itself and taking hold of itself. 
Anxiety brings Dasein face to face with its Being-free for the authenticity of its Being, 
and for this authenticity as a possibility which it always is.” 62  Yet inauthentic attunements 
remain integral to the disclosure of meaning as they “bring us face to face with beings as 
a whole they conceal from us the nothing”63 as we flee from non-meaning into meaning, 
from nihility into the illusions of the field of consciousness with its everyday comforts of 
egoistic identity. It is awareness of the limitations of everyday disclosures not their 
complete dismissal that is necessitated by anxiety. 
 As the awareness of the nothingness that is required for the disclosure of meaning 
precludes the operation of the process of disclosure anxiety is necessarily a fleeting 
experience, as the condition of possibility for both authenticity and inauthenticity itself 
anxiety belongs to both and neither, it is a moment of nothingness and a return to some 
form of meaning is inevitable, with only potentially an authentic return featuring 
awareness of our ground as nothingness. To more fully grasp nothingness requires 
building on the temporary instances of what anxiety reveals, and nothing beyond this 
revealing. This is the root of the ambivalence between panic and calmness,  it is a state of 
purest potentiality that precursors a return to or significant break away from our previous 
way of experiencing the world. Thus there is an element of panic as old self-identities slip 
away yet also a sense of elation from the possibility of self-redefinition free from 
everyday meanings so that “Along with the sober anxiety which brings us face to face 
with our individualized potentiality-for-Being, there goes an unshakeable joy in this 
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possibility”64 the experience of the self being torn within an undifferentiated mode of 
Being, to be on the cusp of falling or freedom. 
 The Great Doubt as a mode of awareness is also such a call to both responsibility 
and freedom in awareness of nihility as primordial selfhood. It is only as grounded in 
abyssal nihility that the Great Doubt can be experienced, and the experience of it is our 
grounding in nihility, it is the existential realization of that nihility so that “Through it the 
uncertainty that lies at the ground of the self and all things is appropriated by the self”65 
and Dasein is brought before its responsibility for these uncertain possibilities. Nishitani's 
consideration of our karmic debt of finitude as an infinite responsibility, the burden-debt 
for all existence, will be considered more in chapter 3.5, but the karmic burden mirrors 
Heidegger's characterization of authenticity as responsibility for owning ones actions; 
resoluteness is wanting a conscience thus accepting infinite karmic responsibility, leading 
beyond the field of nihility. 
 Inauthenticity also plays an integral role in Nishitani' thought. The seeming self-
evidence of subjectivity is attributed to the tendency to reification of the self into ego that 
is constitutive of the very nature of self, as falling is of Dasein as the metaphysical animal, 
so that despite the impossibility of viewing subjectivity objectively “the self shows a 
constant tendency to comprehend itself representationally as some ‘thing’ that is called 
‘I’.”66 Such an inherent tendency towards self-attachment arises as  “ego and person from 
the very outset entail inward self-reflection, without which they cannot come into being 
as ego and person, it is only natural that this kind of self-immanent self-prehension should 
come about”67 through the proximal everyday experience of conventional reality upon 
the field of consciousness. 
 This is natural and proper to the form of disclosure upon that field; the 
conventional truth upon the field of consciousness is just as real as the Śūnyatā that 
constitutes its possibility, and the egoistic mode of self upon this field is not only 
ineliminable but justified within the context of applicability for such an egoistic 
vocabulary. In the same manner that inauthenticity is not pejorative, rather only the 
covering up of what renders it possible and the obscuring of the authentic mode of being 
that constitutes the self in concert with the inauthentic is condemned, it is only certain 
features of this egoistic mode of being that seem problematic. Namely; the mistaken 
identity of the field of consciousness for the sole-reality that brings with it the constant 
danger of “a confinement that inevitably ushers in the narcissistic mode of grasping the 
self wherein the self gets caught up in itself”68. Such self-attachment obscures the self-
identity of the personal self with the absolute nothingness that in their mutual constitution 
comprise the self-realization of reality allowing for such realization to surpass the 
estrangement stemming from the paradox of representation 
 This self-attachment is shattered in the nullification of the field of nihility, the ego 
as an object of its own representation is rendered non-objective as non-ego along with the 
entities that are deprived of the simple self-identity of substance, so that “the existence of 
the self and things is disclosed in their reality by sweeping off the cover projected by 
conceptualization.”69 The attempt of the self to reach itself representationally upon the 
field of consciousness falls victim to its own form of the paradox of representation so that 
“the human ego-self falls into an ever-deepening dilemma. At the extreme point of this 
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dilemma…the human ego must die.”70 The combining of both subject and objects into a 
single doubt as the nullification of the self is thus transferred into the objects that are its 
representations but in a reciprocal manner so that “the insertion of nihility at the ground 
of things means, in fact, that nihility looms up from the ground of all existing things, 
assaults us, and inserts itself into the ground of our existence.”71 The incomprehensibility 
of self and things in nihility arises from their previous reification as objects obscuring 
their essential nature and unity, and if the subject is the representer of objects the 
nullification of objects also reveals the nullity at the ground of the subject. The paradox 
of representation passes away on the field of nihility as both self and things are no longer 
objects so that “their cognition cease to be problems; the problem is the reality of things 
and the self.”72 There is a paradigm shift away from epistemological concern of how 
objects can be known by a subject to concern with the suchness of both and the manner 
in which they manifest; the conditions for their mutual realization.  
As Way Towards Wonder and Metaphysics 
Through nihilation nothingness enables Dasein to enter into a relation with beings, thus 
meaning, as the essence of Dasein is to have an understanding of Being through disclosing 
beings “Da-Sein means: being held out into the nothing…if it were not in advance holding 
itself out into the nothing, then it could never be related to beings nor even to itself.” 73  
Being and nothingness fulfil the same role in rendering entities meaningful beings, “The 
nothing does not merely serve as the counter concept of beings...In the Being of beings 
the nihilation of the nothing occurs.” 74   (Unmeaning is the condition of possibility for 
the disclosure of meaningful beings, so that “Only in the nothing of Dasein do beings as 
a whole, in accord with their most proper possibility – that is, in a finite way – come to 
themselves.”75 The nothingness of the Da is required not only for Dasein to find beings 
and itself meaningful, but also for what is un-Dasein and un-meaning to also come into 
their own essence.  
 Anxiety in the face of nothingness leads us to wonder and “Only on the ground of 
wonder – the revelation of the nothing – does the ‘why?’ loom before us,” 76 thus starting 
philosophy on its way, uncanny homelessness leading to wonder then awe at the mystery 
of Being. The fundamental function of nothingness as the unmeaning facet of Being in 
What is Metaphysics? is to invoke the mystery that compels the questioning of 
metaphysics and scientific inquiry that allows us to fulfil our natures as thinkers and 
explorers of meaning. Anxiety discloses meaningful beings as uncanny entities, as strange 
thus worthy of questioning; the brute ‘thatness’ of beings leads us to inquire into the 
mystery of Being; that beings ‘are’, and thus engage in metaphysical speculation, and this 
questioning is the essence of scientific Dasein that allows it to tear down the false 
necessity of everyday meanings. Wonder at meaning, the asking of nothingness is also 
the start of Nishitani's religious quest; it is the uncovering of what is forgotten and 
concealed necessarily by the field of consciousness and the bringing forth of the mystery 
that is concealed by the everydayness of the ego. Elemental subjectivity as absolute 
nothingness is thus disclosed in the mood of wonder; “the most appropriate mode of being 
‘aware of awareness’ is when we are in a state of ‘wonder’, as this enables us to perceive 
our openness, or ability to be aware, as an extra-ordinary mystery.”77 
 
70 Franck, The Buddha Eye: An Anthology of the Kyoto School and Its Contemporaries, 12. 
71 Nishitani, Religion and Nothingness, 136.  
72 Ibid., 137.  
73 Heidegger, What Is Metaphysics? , 103. 
74 Ibid., 104. 
75 Heidegger, McNeil, and McNeill, Pathmarks, 95. 
76 Heidegger, What Is Metaphysics? , 109. 





 Nothingness grounds both Dasein and metaphysics as “metaphysics belongs to the 
‘nature of man’…Metaphysics is the basic occurrence of Dasein. It is Dasein itself.” 78 
To question metaphysics is to question ourselves as Dasein and reveal the shared ground 
of both as nothingness. Metaphysics and science as responses to the silent call of wonder 
forget their ground, yet this ignoring of the nothing is fruitful as their inability to reach 
their own ground is precisely what allows the nothing to possibilize metaphysical inquiry. 
The inauthentic approaches to the nothingness of our Da are just as integral to the 
structure of disclosure as the authentic, indeed the purpose of the ontological unity 
disclosed through anxiety is the enabling of disclosures whether authentic or inauthentic, 
“this constant if ambiguous turning away from the nothing accords, within certain limits, 
with the most proper significance of the nothing.”79 Nothingness must remain the 
unthought ground of metaphysics in order for a conception of ‘beingness’ to be disclosed 
so “the truth of metaphysics dwells...in closest proximity to the constantly lurking 
possibility of deepest error.”80  This is later characterised as a progressive forgetting of 
Being in terms of the supreme danger yet is proper to the essence of metaphysics, the 
more Being is forgotten the truer metaphysics is to its essence. Nihilism is natural to man 
and the nature of this forgetting is to be inquired into further over the following chapters. 
 The formulation of wonder in terms of a question implies an answer, and this 
question of wonder that manifests itself as metaphysics in the search for an answer is the 
origin of philosophy. But the answers conceal the question, moreover they conceal the 
question as a quest. This question thus serves as a koan; nothingness is not its answer as 
there is no answer, only the setting on the way of thought through wonder. The question 
of the meaning of the self is realized as having no answer, only non-self in terms of nihility 
as bare possibility, the meaninglessness that allows for meaning. The desire to answer the 
question of wonder could be seen as the metaphysical impulse Buddhism and 
Heideggerian thought is intended to cure, our existence characterized by a homeless need. 
This impulse is what sets nihilism on its way, shrinking back before the abyss of self and 
world to flee to false metaphysical certainties. The question 'why beings not nothing?' 
may drive inquiry, but the greatest human tragedy is that if there is a meaning to the 
universe then it will be unsatisfactory to the minds that evolved within it; the need for 
something beyond the brute reality explicated through scientific investigation (pure 
nihility) does not entail anything other than a statement on how we have developed to 
require such explanation so are driven towards a mystery of our own making. 
Concluding Issues 
In short; anxiety discloses uncanniness, the dissolution of our conceptions of self and 
world that leaves us to encounter both as nothingness rather than the contingent meanings 
of the everyday that we seek to cover the nothingness with. As a metaphysical question 
nothingness brings us into question, it characterizes Dasein as the Da for meaning, beings 
as uncanny prior to their disclosure as meaningful and Being. Un-meaning is integral to; 
meaningful beings, those who find things meaningful, Meaning itself, and in all cases is 
ontologically primary as despite that beings are chronologically encountered as 
meaningful first this is only possible in virtue of unmeaning. Anxiety as the fundamental 
attunement cannot and should not be covered over or surpassed, it is not a form of 
suffering nor a distress we should leave behind. The experience of nihility is both the 
preparing of the way to sunyata by breaking through the field of consciousness yet also 
once realized with the self is itself sunyata. Uncanny homelessness is not purely 
transitional but continually permeates authentic retrieval. This primordial homelessness 
is later rendered historical by Heidegger and the relation of this to the self-transformation 
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of nihilism is considered later in terms of dwelling, divinities and the retention of the field 
of nihility within the unity of fields that is Sunyata. There are several issues raised by the 
above to be addressed over the coming chapters. 
 
Incitement 
Attunements are beyond our power coming over us and overwhelming us; especially 
anxiety which due to its  indefiniteness "can awaken in existence at any moment. It needs 
no unusual event to arouse it. Its sway is as thoroughgoing as its possible occasionings 
are trivial.” Nothingness cannot be thought, but anxiety as “experience is accessible (or 
at least presented) only through discourse of a traditional kind"81 so although we cannot 
think anxiety we can reflect on the experience once it has occurred and thus also try to 
instigate it through such reflections. Anxiety may be occasioned by the most ‘innocuous 
of situations’82 but it is far more likely to be occasioned by far-reaching experiences that 
bring the projections of Dasein into radical doubt, “The point at which the ordinarily 
necessary things of life…all lose their necessity and utility is found at those times when 
death, nihility, or sin...undermine the roothold of our existence and bring the meaning of 
life into question – become pressing personal problems for us.”83 Conditioning of the 
Great Doubt would seem in line with Buddhist meditative practice and leads Heisig to 
claim that Doubt is “not a simple blanking of the mind but a disciplined emptying of 
mind.”84 Stenson that “Nishitani's use of mood as a means of evoking insight is similar to 
Heidegger's”85 yet Nishitani also asserts that “When this Doubt appears to the self, it does 
so with an inevitability quite beyond the control of the consciousness and arbitrary 
wilfulness of the self”.86 There is a tension between claims of the powerlessness of man 
regarding anxiety/Doubt and that for their works to have impact it must be within our 
power to start ourselves and each other along this way. 
 Anxiety can be incited through meditation or exposing oneself to extreme life 
experiences, even if what anxiety discloses is ontologically prior to these they can still 
open a road back into their ground as the nothingness of Da.  A sense of the uncanny can 
arise through analysis of the familiar that renders it uncanny, but nihility is not uncanny 
until it is analyzed, the familiar is only rendered uncanny by existential analysis and 
questioning. Such incitement is integral to Heidegger's thought, Kirkland notes Heidegger 
“seems to wager that his reader is experiencing at present a certain distress”87 holding we 
must not “from dread of dread, i.e. in sheer timidity, shut our ears to the soundless voice 
which attunes us to the horrors of the abyss."88 The experience of nihility in anxiety is not 
enough, to go through nihility (to progress through the fields) one must want to have a 
conscience, so that “Wanting-to-have-a-conscience becomes a readiness for anxiety”. 89 
One must want to be enlightened and cured; which first means one must be persuaded 
one is sick through the solicitude of others. The role of such distress will be dealt with in 
depth in chapter 2.6, and will be returned to later in chapter 3.5's consideration of 
compassion as both choosing to have a conscience and inculcating the desire to have a 
conscience in others (Being and Time and Religion and Nothingness can both be seen as 
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such attempts at inciting such desire). The possibility that the danger only is as such in 
terms of an attunement to a projected saving will be a major focus of chapters 2.3-6. 
 If the ontological only is when realized as such then solicitude takes on the 
connotation of attempting to attune others to a reality that only is for them once they are 
so attuned. The issue is whether nihility understood as homelessness is primordial and 
just highlighted by the analysis, or whether it only is as existentially realized thus 
created/incited by the analysis. Whether the uncanny automatically and only is an 
experience of homelessness that impels us to seek a dwelling place or whether 
nothingness can be experienced other than as anxiety (not through homelessness as 
privation) in a way no longer bound in a relation of deprivation to the everyday is a theme 
to be explored in later chapters. 
Attestation 
As noted in the introduction Heidegger and Nishitani's thought proceed not from 
theoretical foundations but from experiential attestations, the history of Being is a 
charting of a sequence of experiences of Being culminating in the current epoch. Their 
thought's warrant rests on this accounts explanatory force compared to other conceptions 
of the self, the warrant of any such explanation lies in its ability to do justice to the 
phenomenon to which it attests within the context of what the inquiry is to ascertain. 
Ultimately their thought relies on the experience of self we have and opens the way for 
an obvious counter-argument of denying that one has had such an experience of anxiety, 
thus it cannot play such a vital role in the human condition. The fact that nihilism “is the 
common experience of countless numbers of reflective persons today”90 says nothing of 
those not amongst those numbers. Those who have not anxiously faced the Great Doubt 
have little purchase to move further through Nishitani's thought, for “There is no proof or 
disproof of what he is arguing…without the experience of having followed the path 
oneself”91 and personal attestation is only personally convincing. Strauss notes that the 
primordiality of anxiety “is not guaranteed by the experience itself. It can only be 
guaranteed by argument.” 92  Anxiety cannot be refuted, but its precise pertinence cannot 
rest on the warrant of pure experience alone, argument is required to show whether this 
is the result of a historical epoch or a fundamental attunement; anxiety alone cannot 
ground the narrative of epochal history or theory of the fields by itself. 
 Those who do not experience anxiety/Doubt are said to be in denial/flight, that 
their experience of nihility is faulty. In Being and Time Heidegger sees anxiety as flight 
from the stance of completeness, there is an axiology of autocthony. This is valid within 
its appropriate context of applicability (the analysis of the structural totality of Dasein) 
yet if we are not attempting to re-awaken the Being question through preliminary analysis 
there is no warrant for the call to authenticity. Only from the achieved self-identity of the 
fields do the earlier fields get apprehended as flight; thus only once we have realized 
sunyata do the flaws of previous fields get enframed as flaws. The realization of sunyata 
is its verification; that denial of anxiety is flight from it is not a truth until the resolute 
integralness that leads to sunyata is realized. This problem will be dealt with at length in 
chapter 2.6; that sunyata only is as existentially realized yet also acts as the condition (and 
normative warrant) for that realization; that the supreme danger only is so from the 
perspective of  a projected saving. 
Universality 
The question remains whether anxiety is the sole way to the realization of nihility or 
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whether other moods or self-experiences not linked to the experience of homelessness as 
privation can lead to ontological origin. Whilst agreeing that these experiences are of a 
universal nothing thus accessible to all I would also like to question their characterizations 
as universal experiences; that all who deny it only flee from anxiety and the only way to 
reach sunyata is through the doubt that leads to death. 
 The three fields for Nishitani are a necessary progression that cannot be skipped, 
this would seem to rule out other primordial moods leading to enlightenment, for him 
“the only route to philosophy was one that began in a nihilistic despair over the human 
condition, passed on to doubt over all of existence, and only then ascended to the wonder 
of emptiness”.93 But the claim that nihilistic despair can only be overcome from within 
does not entail that the wonder at emptiness cannot be reached through other moods 
without needing the transition through the despair of nihility (through an experience of 
homelessness as privation). To claim this requires that other modes of experiencing 
nihility are shown as incapable of reaching wonder. It may be true that the “real self-
realization of reality is possible only by overcoming nihility in and through our 
existence”94 and that Nishitani personally came to philosophy through nihilistic anxiety, 
he “began in despair, nihility, and negativity”,95 but this does not warrant his 
universalizing of that path so that it becomes the only way into sunyata. 
 Anxiety is the paramount mood as it discloses the totality of Dasein, its ontological 
priority results from its disclosure of what enables the disclosure of beings-as-whole at 
the same time as it discloses that whole.The grasping of the totality of Dasein is to be 
achieved through the analysis of anxiety as “one of the most far-reaching and most 
primordial possibilities of disclosure – one that lies in Dasein itself.” 96  Anxiety is 'one 
of' the most primordial possibilities, it is given paramount importance as “in anxiety there 
lies the possibility of a disclosure which is quite distinctive; for anxiety individualizes,” 
97 in individualizing Dasein anxiety brings it before its ownmost being in a way that both 
discloses and unifies the structural totality of Dasein in a way fitting the conditional aim 
of Being and Time. What is Metaphysics? matches the former concern as shown by the 
criteria for metaphysical questions; that “can be asked only in such a way that the 
questioner as such is present together with the question.”98 This indicates Heidegger is 
trying to think metaphysics in the same manner as Dasein, as a totality that can be 
grounded by something inherent in its structure that allows its relation to Being through 
comportment with beings. The concern with individualizing is no longer cited, the main 
unifying concern of the texts is the attunement that reveals the condition of meaning to 
be an inherent  relation with nothingness as non-meaning. Boredom and joy also reveal 
beings as a whole yet in such a manner that conceals the nothing. The indifference of 
boredom is akin to anxiety in disclosing the undifferentiated insignificance of beings yet 
does not lead to wonder; just as joy covers over unmeaning so does not disclose the 
nothing. Anxiety and Doubt are not pure attunements to suchness or the presence-at-hand 
of unmeaning entities, they are an attunement towards this as possibilities for (and the 
necessity of) meaning. Rather than pure experiences of nothingness they carry their own 
axiological pre-conditions to exist in this manner of attunement, a theme to be dealt with 
at length in chapter 2.6. 
 Awe and astonishment also turn us towards the whole and can disclose the nothing, 
calling us to realize the shared nullity of self and world, and share a similarly grounding 
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relation to the sciences, "Angst, as anxiety in the face of the abyss, and Scheu, as awe and 
wonder at there being anything at all, are two aspects of the same phenomenon." 99 What 
needs to be clarified is whether anxiety is a necessary step towards the experience of 
wonder at the mystery of Being, the sole gateway to the mystery that being is, or whether 
experiencing nihility in awe is an equally primordial mood that both reveals the whole 
and has the relevant characteristics. Most pertinently; whether the experience of awe can 
be reached in a manner without prior experience of homelessness as privation so that 
dwelling/Sunyata is attained from within the experience of nihilism as a homelessness to 
be preserved. As only occurring with the withdrawal of the everyday anxiety is primordial 
but never proximal. But under the claim of Gestell as anxiety made epochal such 
experience of nihility is both proximal and primordial, the experience of homelessness is 
then not a privation and lacks the element of the collapse of conventional thought and 
meaning. The primordiality of Gestell as return to epochal origin opens up new ways into 
the nothing that must also share certain other of anxiety's traits. 
Science and Awe 
Heidegger tends to denigrate scientific awe as mere inauthentic curiosity that does not 
reach the nothing, a thought that remains on the field of consciousness and in offering 
causal explanation covers over the mystery of Being. Werner Marx and many others assert 
that "It is a matter of fact that the aggressive self-assurance of Western man has led 
to...///...the loss of any sense of awe whatsoever in the face of what is in principle beyond 
his ken"100, that the way to wonder through awe is inimical to science as the herald of 
Gestell despite metaphysics being impelled by this sense of wonder and kept alive by it. 
 What is Metaphysics? foreshadows later identifications of science and Gestell in 
asking “What happens to us, essentially, in the grounds of our existence, when science 
becomes our passion?”101 the implied answer is that we forget the nothing, thus Being. 
Being and Time characterizes the attunement of science as the indifference of the present-
at-hand, also a stance of mechanistic death. Yet such a stance can also be related to an 
attunement of awe leading to wonder. This stance towards the present-at-hand shares traits 
with anxiety, the breaking down of accepted meanings by scientific levelling and the 
disclosing of the relation between entities and awareness in unifying their nullity. Whilst 
every “state-of-mind implies a disclosive submission to the world”102 scientific 
disclosures with their more reflective than projective attunement to beings seem to be in 
a way more submissive, “In such impartiality of inquiring, determining, and grounding, 
a peculiarly delineated submission to beings themselves obtains, in order that they may 
reveal themselves.”103 Wonder in the face of Being, philosophical astonishment and 
curiosity that beings ‘are’, grounds science as the quest to fully understand beings and 
our apprehension of them, to understand the process of reality's rising self-awareness. 
Emphasizing the element of surrender to beings within scientific disclosures, inquiring 
into beings on their own ground, could even be seen as a preparatory stage in Heidegger’s 
notion of releasement. 
 In his later writings Heidegger moves to an opposite view of science as 
mathematical projection, but that a form of scientific inquiry which “holds itself out into 
the nothing...understands itself for what it is only when it does not give up the nothing”, 
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104 opposed to the more narrow positivistic notion of science tackled by Nishitani and the 
later Heidegger, can be one of the higher forms of disclosure that will inform later critique 
of Nishitani’s theory as to the opposition of religion and science. Chapter 3.4 will use 
these hints in the earlier writings to expand a possible counter-view of science in his 
thought, the second half of the following chapter concerns Nishitani's thought on the 
existentialization of science towards this end. 
2.2 Nihilism as Destiny and Danger   
The Question Concerning Technology 
The chapters in the rest of this section will be guided by a reading of The Question 
Concerning Technology supplemented by other texts as needed to elucidate themes 
pertinent to the historical emergence of Gestell. This text was chosen as its 
characterization of Gestell in terms of danger highlights two of the themes addressed by 
the thesis; the axiological presuppositions of Heidegger's ontology, and in concert with 
The Turning the shared origin of nihilism and that which saves. The narrative of 
Heidegger's history of metaphysics itself will only be touched on when pertinent to 
addressing the general process of Being’s withdrawal (that the destiny of Being is its 
forgetting) and its culmination in the epoch of Gestell, rather than dealing with previous 
epochs themselves. 
 The clarification of The Question Concerning Technology's title through 
Heidegger’s initial defining of its terms provides a concise and helpful summation of his 
thought regarding technology to guide the following chapters. “Questioning builds a 
way...The way is a way of thinking,” 105 that leads through language; way was previously 
defined as being called to undergo an experience. The concern is with the status of 
freedom in the relation between humanity and technology, with enabling this free 
relationship; the way is to prepare a free relation that “opens our human existence to the 
essence of technology.” 106 The essence of technology to be thought is not equivalent to 
technology but how technology 'comes to presence' or 'endures as presence'; how the 
understanding of Beingness in the modern epoch comes to pass. The essence of 
technology is how beings are disclosed as meaningful in the current epoch; the essence 
of man (human existence) is to be appropriated into the gathering that reveals such 
meaning. 
 The concern with a free relation to the essence of technology requires we do not 
“merely conceive and push forward the technological, put up with it, or evade it” 107  as 
this is simply to comport ourselves towards technology and thus overlook its essence. The 
implication of this is that on our current understanding of technology we are not capable 
of a free relation. As for the attestation of nihility there is an element of irrefutability to 
Heidegger’s claim that “Everywhere we remain unfree and chained to technology whether 
we passionately affirm or deny it;” 108 that no-one has yet to achieve a way of relating 
freely to technology to compete with the way Heidegger charts. Heidegger uses his usual 
method of starting with what is proximal to build a way into the primordial; beginning 
with the ‘correct’ definition of technology’s essence as instrumental-anthropological to 
reach the 'true'. This instrumental conception frames the question of a free relation in 
terms of which constituent is using the other. Heidegger’s posing of the question if 
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“technology were no mere means, how would it stand with the will to master it?” 109   
indicates it is not to be the case that a ‘free’ relation involves the mastery of one 
constituent over the other; a free relation between human existence and technological 
essence would require that both enter into a free relation with the other. 
 The essays title can thus be read as 'being called to undergo an experience through 
language of the mutual freeing of the relation between human existence and the current 
epochal revealing of meaning.' That by thinking more deeply the relation between the 
essence of man and the essence of technology as how we reveal meaning (Da-Sein) both 
may be freed in their essential relation to one another. This endeavour can be seem as 
exemplifying the project of Heidegger's later thought, and contained within the unpacked 
title is the entire thrust of the Heideggerian Verwindung. This expanded title provides the 
framework for Heidegger’s thinking on technology that is now to be addressed. 
Gestell ’s Manner of Revealing 
Heidegger traces the way back into the concealed essence of technology through 
consideration of primordial notions of causality as indicated by the 'correct' definition of 
technology as instrumentality. The ‘true’ definition of technology is concluded to be 
bringing into appearance that is to “let what is not yet present arrive into presencing.” 110 
To bring to presence is to bring what is into its essence, such “starting something on its 
way into arrival” 111 enables what is to find its own way into presence as what it is. 
Heidegger names the shared nature of 'true' technology (techne) and thinging as poiesis; 
bringing-forth into unconcealment. The highest form of poiesis is said to be physis as “the 
arising of something from out of itself” whilst techne is its counterpart in that it “reveals 
whatever does not bring itself forth and does not yet lie here before us”.112 The ‘correct’ 
instrumentality of technology becomes the ‘true’ essence of technology as a bringing-to-
presence of meaning so that “Technology is a mode of revealing. Technology comes to 
presence in the realm where revealing and unconcealment take place, where aletheia, 
truth, happens.” 113  
 Modern technology's mode of revealing is characterized as moving further from 
the techne that complements physis and poiesis into “a setting-upon, in the sense of a 
challenging forth.”114 the unlocking-transforming-storing-distribution of energy. As a 
setting-upon technological revealing is characterized by unlocking and exposing directed 
“toward driving on to the maximum yield at the minimum expense,” 115 it could be called 
the will to efficiency (the causa efficiens as paradigm writ large). This manner of 
revealing is an ordering that reveals entities as “ordered to stand by, to be immediately at 
hand, indeed to stand there just so that it may be on call for a further ordering.” 116 As a 
challenging-forth it “puts to nature the unreasonable demand that it supply energy that 
can be extracted and stored as such,” 117 it is a demand placed upon what comes to 
presence that it do so in the form of useable energy. Of note here is the use of the terms 
'unreasonable' and 'nature', both of which are historically determined by their epoch and 
seem to have little meaningful sense beyond this, yet are used to indicate a flaw within 
that epochal understanding that gives them their current meaning. The possibility of 
adjudicating criteria for what counts as 'reasonable' in this regard will be explored further 
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in later consideration of the examples of challenging-forth Heidegger gives and the 
possible horizons for danger. 
 The nihilistic disclosure resulting from the completion of Being's withdrawal is 
accordingly characterized by challenging-forth (unreasonable demand that energy be 
supplied) and setting-upon (unlocking maximum efficiency) combining to reveal 
everything as standing-reserve (coming to presence as energy to be stored up and to-
hand); the revealing as standing-reserve conceals the presencing of a thing by bringing it 
to presence as energy to be ordered. In doing so Gestell "entraps the truth of its own 
coming to presence with oblivion"118 so that the setting up of what is as standing reserve 
conceals Gestell as a mode of revealing. 
Gestell, Man and Destiny 
Since Heidegger’s concern in the essay is to free the relation of man and Gestell he first 
clarifies the nature of this relation. In terms of the correct definition of technology man is 
unfree, in terms of the true definition of revealing man has conditioned freedom in terms 
of a co-responsibility. Challenging-forth as a revealing addresses and claims man to bring 
itself about as a mode of revealing, we are responsible for challenging-forth but only as 
already under the claim of Being as withdrawal so that “Only to the extent that man for 
his part is already challenged to exploit the energies of nature can this ordering revealing 
happen.” 119 Challenging-forth happens through us but is prior to us, the field of nihility 
is no more our doing "than is the realm through which man is already passing every time 
he as a subject relates to an object;” 120 that of the field of consciousness surpassed in 
nihility. 
 When we reveal what presences we are responding to not dictating 
unconcealment, it requires this response to come to presence but in so responding man is 
already claimed by the manner of revealing “so decisively that he can only be man at any 
given time as the one so claimed.” 121 We are appropriated by Gestell, but we can only 
ever be as appropriated; such appropriation is our manner of existence as the Da-Sein 
relation so that we are not so much enslaved by Gestell as we are Gestell as how this 
relation occurs in the current epochal withdrawal. Man is nihilism in his essence as "The 
essence of man itself belongs to the essence of nihilism and thereby to the phase of its 
completion."122 As starting man upon the way of revealing the real as standing-reserve 
Gestell is a sending that reveals a destining; an experience of being called by the self 
along a way from out of our own nothingness. The essence of technology as Gestell is 
thus defined as the “challenging claim that gathers man thither to order the self-revealing 
as standing-reserve”.123 Technology is not merely a framework or a way of presencing, it 
is a way we are claimed (as responding to a call) as challenged to challenge that which is 
to be unconcealed as standing-reserve, the current way we are appropriated into the Da-
Sein relation that for Heidegger has a greater reality than the mere procedures of ordering 
yet is nothing beyond its realization in them. 
 Gestell thus attests to the integral relation of man and Being outlined in previous 
chapters as it is through the claim of Gestell that Being addresses man in the modern age. 
As such a destining that calls to and claims man Gestell as the manifestation of nihility is 
how Being is in the current epochal withdrawal since Being is nothing other than the 
manner of disclosure it makes possible. Thus not only as belonging to Being is man 
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challenged to secure all beings for calculative manipulation but equally "Being itself is 
faced with the challenge of letting beings appear within the horizon of what is 
calculable".124 As the current form of the integral relation Gestell "places man and Being 
face to face in such a way that they challenge each other by turns".125 The mutual 
belonging of Da-Sein now comes to presence as a challenging; a "mutual confrontation 
of man and being...that determines the constellation of our age." 126  
 As always already appropriated by Gestell we are always already in a relation to 
it that defines us in our essence; and what mutual freedom means in this context depends 
on the co-respondence of our existence to such a claim. The question of this relation 
becomes “whether we actually experience ourselves as the ones whose activities 
everywhere, public and private, are challenged forth by Enframing,” 127 and “how we 
actually admit ourselves into that wherein Enframing itself comes to presence,” 128 or fail 
to hear the claim of Being that speaks in Gestell. Destining as such a call “holds complete 
sway over man. But that destining is never a fate that compels.” 129  
Gestell and Danger 
Freedom originates in our corresponding response to the call from the self itself that 
claims us in Ereignis; in the possibility of other appropriative destinal disclosures. To be 
appropriated by a destiny is to be claimed by one's own essential self in such a way as to 
preserve other possible destinal sendings; “Freedom is that which conceals in a way that 
opens to light...Freedom is the realm of the destining that at any given time starts a 
revealing upon its way.”130 Freedom as awareness of the possibility of other possibilities 
is conditional on the preservation of the concealed so that freedom “stands in the closest 
and most intimate kinship”131 with truth that as disclosure is marked by both revealing 
and concealment. A free relation would be characterized by an awareness of the nature of 
Ereignis and our responsibility as claimed for the preserving of alternate concealed 
possibilities; of the nature of our existence as appropriated so that “Freedom is a feature 
of a relation between human beings and forces above and beyond human control.” 132 The 
concern with the free relation leads Heidegger to consider of the lack of freedom in the 
current appropriation in terms of danger. 
 As epochal history is given by the withdrawal of Being all destining is “in every 
one of its modes, and therefore necessarily, danger.” 133 Every destining contains the risk 
that it directs us solely to that which is revealed rather than to the concealment which 
allows us to experience how we belong to the revealing. The withdrawal of Being into 
beings, means every revealing disclosure is a concealment of Being itself in the 
manifestness of beings making such danger inherent to disclosure. Being as withdrawal 
and nihilation repel man so that he may know both self and beings, yet they also "pull 
him along, suck themselves fast to his thoughts and actions and, finally, suck them into 
the withdrawing wake in such a way that man can believe that he is only encountering 
himself." 134 In nihilism the nothing that befalls Being is Being itself; "Enframing as the 
danger within Being, is Being itself".135 Such danger threatens freedom as the possibility 
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of other possibilities rendering the mutual appropriation of Da and Sein potentially 
unfree. 
 Yet despite this Gestell is worthy of being called the supreme danger above all 
other destinings due to its culmination of this withdrawal in a double forgetting that 
covers up human responsibility for accomplishing the claim of Being; that the withdrawal 
into concealment of Being is itself now concealed leading to the dangerous illusion 
Gestell is fateful. Such double forgetting is related to previous discussion of anxiety 
revealing fleeing as a twofold concealment and shows how realizing the nature of Gestell 
is the experience of anxiety writ epochal. Whilst other destinings conceal alternate modes 
of revealing Gestell conceals revealing itself, “threatens it with the possibility that all 
revealing will be consumed in ordering and that everything will present itself only in the 
unconcealedness of standing-reserve.” 136 As a total revealing Gestell conceals the 
possibility of other possibilities appearing as an inevitable fate and sole definitive reality 
by obscuring its true relation to human existence. In obscuring the claim of revealing as 
truth it obscures the mystery of Being and our relation to it; which since Being only is as 
its revealing in concealment means both the essence of man and Being is imperilled. 
 Hodge sees the true danger of Gestell as “an erasure of the autonomy of the ethical 
mode of questioning”137 through rendering metaphysical questioning redundant. 
Questioning as to the self and other are required for ethics and metaphysics yet with 
Gestell "The question of what it is to be human is forgotten along with the forgetting of 
the question of being, since humanity is the site at which being reveals itself”.138 Not only 
does Gestell threaten to subsume man into the standing-reserve but “the systematic way 
in which what there is can be taken up into technological relations” 139 provide no place 
from which to critique this understanding of the human. 
 Hodge characterizes ethics as the relation to the sending of Being (an open 
question of what it is to be human); Gestell obscures the forgetting of this relation thus 
the possibility of ethical questioning so that in Gestell metaphysics becomes ethics as a 
reified understanding of the human (self and other). The erasure of the ontological 
difference; “the closure of the gap between what there is and how it comes to be like that” 
140 is also the erasure of the difference between metaphysics and ethics as ethics requires 
a relation to sendings of Being to remain open to the future. This taking for granted of the 
human diminishes responsibility and reduces ethics to metaphysics by claiming to 
definitively answer the question of what it means to be human, as for ethical responsibility 
and freedom it is required that our Being always remain a question. Nihilism for Hodge 
is thus the conflation of metaphysics and ethics in humanism as a fixed theory of the 
human that makes “human beings more and more alike and interchangeable.” 141 Such 
uniformity marks the erasure of human relations through dissolving  the ethical-political 
distinction (and those of the public-private spheres, thus individual and community) 
disconnecting ethics from actual existence to become a generalized question rendered 
abstract as metaphysics leading to a proliferation of ethical disciplines to try and replace 
the lost ethos. 
The true danger is thus that the question of human responsibility (what it is to be human) 
becomes replaced by the acceptance of and accommodation to Gestell conceived of as 
coercive through an externalizing reification of absolute nothingness into relative. In the 
epoch of Gestell “the withdrawal of being in its extremity leads to being manifesting only 
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as nothingness”142 leading to the dissolution of ego in the field of nihility. The danger is 
that we now view nothingness as a technical function and fail to see it as a feature of 
ourselves instead projecting a disowned nothingness out into the world. Such reified 
nothingness (the relative nothingness of field of nihility) is then taken as an external 
constraint we must conform to obscuring the free relation to technology so human 
responsibility for its realization is obscured; “what is forgotten in relation to technology 
is that a series of human actions and decisions, admittedly undertaken without full 
foresight of all possible consequences, contributes to the danger.”143 
 At times Heidegger connects the danger more explicitly to the manner of revealing 
in Gestell, that Gestell as ordering "levels every ordo, every rank, down to the uniformity 
of production, and thus from the outset destroys the realm from which any rank and 
recognition could possibly arise."144 Or that the real danger is that “we will be in a position 
to make man in a certain way i.e., to construct him, purely in his organic being, according 
to the way we need him”145. That we ourselves become standing-reserve so that "Man 
becomes human material, which is disposed with view to proposed goals"146 and nothing 
else besides, the use of the term 'man' to denote an entity rather than relation to Being 
portraying the danger as concerning the understanding of organic nature in Gestell rather 
than its relation to other epochal disclosures. Whilst much of what Heidegger says on 
topics such as cybernetics and genetics seems to support this interpretation he more 
emphatically states that “precisely because man is challenged more originally than are the 
energies of nature, i.e. into the process of ordering, he never is transformed into mere 
standing-reserve.” 147 Whilst one aspect of the human condition is quantitatively closer to 
being subsumed into the enframing of standing-reserve another aspect retains a 
qualitative necessary separation from it. 
 At other times the danger is presented in terms of a dichotomous relation between 
calculative as opposed to meditative thinking. The danger is that "that calculative thinking 
may someday come to be accepted and practiced as the only way of thinking"148  so that 
"our unpoetic dwelling, its incapacity to take the measure, derives from a curious excess 
of frantic measuring and calculating."149 Gestell then becomes a constant tendency rather 
than a single epoch; the tendency to reveal totally opposed to that of reflecting on 
concealment that is a valid if limited and dangerous manner of revealing. These 
alternative yet related conceptions are considered more in chapters 2.4 and 2.5.  
 The linking of representational thought to desire leads Alderman to claim "the 
primary element in Western metaphysics is not its calculative rationality but its insistent 
aggressiveness." 150 that stems from the anthropocentric assumptions of science. That "it 
is the intrusion and not the calculative style of the intrusion that is crucial from the point 
of view of identifying the special characteristics of Western thought"151 seems contrary 
to Discourse on Thinking's claim on the true danger as calculative thought, and depends 
on the questionable relation of Heidegger's thought to anthropocentrism and the issue of 
science to be dealt with later. But the element of intrusion does cohere with the 
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'unreasonable' demands of challenging-forth and remains an integral element in the 
examples of Gestell Heidegger invokes.  
True Danger 
Despite such characterizations Heidegger is more consistent in claiming that rather than 
the specific manner in which Gestell reveals the real the true danger is how this revealing 
obscures other possibilities; it is not the disclosure of the real as standing-reserve but that 
the real is only revealed as standing-reserve. The true danger is not simply to the truth of 
the real, to man as claimed nor that which claims, but to the appropriative relation of 
claiming itself that constitutes the event of truth and both elements of Da-Sein integral 
relation. Thus the danger is equally to Gestell as from it, if Gestell is the current mode of 
how Being claims man then the true danger is Being threatening itself due to how it brings 
the real to presence through withdrawal. This is why Heidegger must talk of the mutual 
freeing of Gestell and human existence; Gestell endangers its own essence and is as in 
need of saving as man. 
 What Are Poets For? also deals with how man is differently endangered; that as 
challenged-forth in a more radical sense to other beings due our nature as claimed by 
Being we are more vulnerable to becoming "a function of objectification".152  "The danger 
that man will lose his selfhood to unconditional production"153 is more pressing since we 
are appropriated into the realization of challenging-forth itself. Man is unique among 
beings as we are challenged into ordering the standing-reserve as well as being so ordered; 
man as responsible for responding to revealing is himself ordered to order the real as 
standing-reserve. In so challenging nature Heidegger holds man belongs more originally 
than nature within the standing-reserve, but unlike other entities such belonging does not 
simply bring man to presence as standing reserve. This element of responsibility for 
challenging-forth seems to prevent man being purely appropriated into the standing-
reserve. The danger is not that man as ontic animal becomes standing-reserve but that 
man as Da reveals the real only as standing-reserve so that as appropriated into the 
realization of Gestell "man deliberately and completely blocks his path, already 
obstructed, into the Open. Self-assertive man, whether or not he knows and wills it as an 
individual, is the functionary of technology" 154 and thus contributes to the obscuring of 
his own essence, yet does so only as claimed by this essence. We thus become in need of 
protection in a way other beings are not as we are differently endangered, and this 
increased danger is to be related later to passing through such danger and venturing into 
the realm of that which saves.  
 Regardless of whether the complete incorporation of man into the standing-
reserve is possible or remains an aspect of the supreme danger the unique way man is 
endangered is in his essence as the site for the mutual appropriation of the Da-Sein 
relation. That the withdrawal of Being will culminate in the forgetting of the true self and 
rather than encountering ourselves as responders to the claim of a destining we mistakenly 
believe that “everything man encounters exists only insofar as it is his construct...It seems 
as though man everywhere and always encounters only himself.” 155  That our being will 
no longer be at issue but forever settled; Gestell making "the question of Being appear 
irrelevant and superfluous."156 and thus Dasein as a mode of being ceases. 
 Man's encountering of only himself and his constructs seems to connect the danger 
of Gestell with Heidegger's critiques of anthropcentrism; that the triumph of 
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instrumentalism results in "Being becomes subordinated to the goals and purposes of 
man."157 Yet that man himself being taken up into the standing-reserve remains an element 
of the danger indicates the triumph of Gestell is more properly the termination of the 
anthropocentric in that both ontic man and Da are now subordinated to the aim of 
flexibility and efficiency for their own sake. This subordination to challenging-forth is 
itself the dissolution of the anthropocentric in Gestell as a sending of Being, the centrality 
of subjective ego to the ordering of the objective is a prior phase to Gestell that dissolves 
the subject-object division on the field of nihility. 
 
Conclusions Concerning Technology; the Implications of Danger 
That the essential danger is that "Being itself endangering itself in the truth of its coming 
to presence, remains veiled and disguised. This disguising is what is most dangerous in 
the danger." 158  has three immediate implications. Firstly, that if Being is endangering 
itself due to the way it reveals through withdrawal then danger is unavoidable. Secondly, 
that the true danger is the belief in the totality of Gestell 's revealing rather than the content 
of the disclosure, although these are heavily related. Thus thirdly, the manner in which 
Gestell reveals the real can be preserved so long as the attendant danger of its concealing 
of other possibilities is countered which must be a continual effort against inherent 
danger. As necessary to disclosure the danger is not to be seen as negative, danger does 
not of itself necessitate the need for salvation through an alternate manner of revealing, 
only the need for wariness. These implications will be questioned over the following 
chapters. 
 This danger is a unitary threefold; that beings have their variety of possibilities 
obscured and are placed under 'unreasonable demand' in the standing-reserve, that man is 
no longer aware of his essential self as appropriated, and that Being as withdrawal is 
concealed and forgotten. Accordingly each element of Ereignis in endangered; and that 
such appropriation only is in terms of its ontic realization the danger must also be to man 
as ontic animal and psychological subject as much as to the Da of Sein. The first element 
of the danger relates more to the manner in which Gestell reveals, which renders the thing 
"as thing, unsafeguarded, truthless" 159 obscuring that as things beings are the site for the 
gathering of world. This element will be taken up more later in relation to science and 
present-at-hand entities as truthless thus unmeaning. 
 In relation to the danger to man two questions are raised by our unique relation to 
the challenging-forth of the standing-reserve that are both to be returned to in chapters 
2.5 and 2.6. Firstly; if being challenged to challenge-forth is how we are appropriated and 
we cannot lose this to become nothing more than standing reserve (if we can never not be 
Dasein) then what does this entail for the viability of the supreme danger that Ereignis 
could be totally concealed? Secondly; the extent to which we are responsible for 
conditioning this accomplishing and are capable of choosing to not accomplish (if 'self-
assertive' man deliberately blocks his path into the Open) pertains directly to the viability 
of the sheltering of the saving power. To what extent is the preparation for (thus co-
determining of) a new destining a denial of the current manner in which we are 
appropriated requiring a prior horizon to appropriation itself? 
Science and Zen 
Nishitani characterizes nihilism in similar terms to Heidegger; the erosion of the human 
essence in the mechanization of man that conceals the origin of this mode of disclosure, 
 
157 Alderman, "Heidegger’s Critique of Science and Technology," 45. 
158 Heidegger, The Question Concerning Technology, and Other Essays, 37. 





but there is a greater nuance in both the examples of nihilism cited and its relation to its 
opposing tendency (the reconciliation of science and religion). The core of this 
understanding is first explicated before following chapters deal with these examples, 
historical themes and reconciliation of science and religion; a division that will 
necessarily render the below picture too limited. 
 
 Nishitani's thought on nihilism as mechanization is most clearly put forward in 
the essay Science and Zen that parallels The Question Concerning Technology and so will 
be focus of comparison. Science and Zen explores the nature and origin of the 
confrontation of science and religion, seeking to resolve this antagonism through 
explanation of how it came to pass. The essay's critique of science and scientism traces a 
similar way to The Question Concerning Technology through the dangers inherent in the 
essence of science back to its origin that is also to be the source of the saving power. The 
science Nishitani discusses in the essay is the death axis (impersonality) as opposed to 
the religious life axis (personality) that feature in Religion and Nothingness; although in 
this essay they are described slightly differently as the “teleological perspective on the 
world the Tagesansicht (day-aspect) of the world in contrast to the mechanical perspective 
which is its Nachtansicht (night-aspect)” 160 with the former reducible to but not deducible 
from the latter. Despite the slight difference in terminology the relation of the axis 
(axises?) to each other (as dual aspects of disclosure) and sunyata remains the same, as 
does the role of nihility as both true reality and transitional.  
Science and Mechanization 
The precursor to the mechanistic view of modern science is said by Nishitani to be 
“implicit in Descartes identification of matter with extension”161 as the subjectivity of 
metaphysics leads to Gestell so too through the subject-object dichotomy does “each 
individual ego become like a lonely but well-fortified island floating on a sea of dead 
matter.”162 This led to the modern scientific view in which the world “came to be looked 
upon as an ‘external’ world possessed of its own laws and existing by itself alone.”163 The 
impersonal death axis precedes the disclosures of science as the condition of possibility 
for its worldview in a similar way to Gestell 's preceding of technology and similarly 
involves a totalizing mechanistic paradigm becoming falsely seen as the sole aspect of 
disclosure. This alienation of man and world ultimately results in the same total 
homelessness as Gestell so that “modern science has deprived the universe of its character 
as a ‘home’” 164 rendering it uncanny in a correlate manner to anxiety and the Great 
Doubt. 
 As the spiritual life axis of religious telos withers and the mechanistic death axis 
rises to dominance this “denial of the teleological view of the natural world by modern 
science necessarily results in the collapse of the whole system of teleology extending 
from the natural world through man to God.” 165 This leads to “the annihilation of all sorts 
of ‘eidos’ (or ‘substantial form’), not only the annihilation of the substantiality of visible 
things, but also the negation of the essence of life, soul, and the spirit” 166 like with the 
Great Doubt the forms of the field of consciousness (the telos of the life axis) are negated 
as meaning slips away from the world. By having “excluded teleology from the natural 
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world” 167  science, like Gestell, renders the real un-meaning as uniform energy so that 
“everything that exists in the universe under the rule of such natural laws is thought to 
consist of nothing but matter, devoid of life and devoid of spirit.” 168  
 This spreads to human awareness which also comes “to be regarded in the same 
way as the phenomena of the external world...processes governed by mechanical laws of 
nature (in the broader sense).” 169 Through this the true essence of man is forgotten as 
“sciences all too often mistake man himself for a mechanism. These sciences in turn have 
led man to make the same mistake about himself, and in this way have played a role in 
dissolving the substantial form of ‘man’, in annihilating the essence of man.” 170 Such 
mechanization is the greatest danger, it is the deathly possibility that human being in its 
essence could lose that very essence so that our existence would be forever ossified in a 
meaningless mechanistic world; “directly beneath the field of man’s being-in-the-world, 
and the field of the very possibility of that being, the field of the impossibility of that 
being has opened up”.171 That the telos of religion is replaced by an ‘abyss of death’ at 
the ground of the human means that  scientific disclosure renders “the universe...a field 
of existential death for...all mankind.” 172  
 Religion and Nothingness reinforces this picture in its analysis of how nihilism 
involves the inversion of the relation of control between man and machine, the nature of 
this historical emergence and examples of machine technology as correlate to ontological 
nihilism are dealt with next chapter, only the nature of the relation will be considered 
here. This inversion is held to be completely novel to modernity and characterized by two 
facets. Firstly that through the machines embodiment of the laws of nature “human /// life 
and work as a whole have become progressively mechanized and impersonalized”173 
through the abstraction of scientific rationality and rendering nature mechanistic. 
Whereas man controlled and realized the laws of nature in the development of machines 
now the laws as so embodied again begin to control us, “This situation is usually referred 
to as the tendency toward the mechanization of man, toward the loss of the human.”174 
Secondly, that this leads to “a mode of being in which man behaves as if he stood entirely 
outside of the laws of nature…a mode of being at whose ground nihility opens up”175 
estranging us from nature so that we behave as if we “were using the laws of nature 
entirely from without.”176 A reification of the nothing (Gestell /nihilism) into external 
coercive forces akin to Hodge's interpretation of the true danger. Like in Science and Zen 
this mode of awareness not only renders the natural world a mechanism but “has 
increasingly permeated not only the social structures of the modern world but the inner 
life of man as well”177 so that “the perversion that occurred in the original relationship of 
man to the laws of nature has taken the shape of a fundamental intertwining of the 
mechanization of man and his transformation into a subject in pursuit of its desires, at the 
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In both texts the loss of the human arises from “the mutual alliance of abstract, impersonal 
intellect and the mechanistic image of the world”179 with the result that “The world has 
come to appear completely unfeeling and altogether indifferent to human interests. The 
certainty of this manner of understanding rests not only on its ontic accomplishments but 
more so “upon the certainty inherent in mathematical reasoning” 180 bringing it into line 
with Heidegger's division between calculative and meditative thought. This picture of 
science originates in the mode of awareness on the field of consciousness, initially 
presupposing both the subject-object dichotomy and an understanding of the nature of 
truth as related to subjectivity. It's two-fold certainty is also grounded on the field of 
consciousness; objectively as factual knowledge, subjectively as “conviction as the 
immediate consciousness of self-evidence.” 181 But science cannot ground the 
concurrence of these forms, making scientism Nishitani's real object of critique as it 
“takes scientific certainty in itself to be the same as philosophical truth.” 182 thus adopts 
it “as the standard for a system of value. In philosophy, this is a dogmatism altogether 
divorced from science itself.”183  
Science as Existenialized 
Through this mechanization of man the subject-object dichotomy of the the field of 
consciousness is dissolved in a correlate manner to the Great Doubt as both man's inner 
life and the world of objects are rendered meaningless. Such “’nullification’...is nothing 
more than a display of the form of ‘illusory appearance’ essential to all beings”184  it is 
the disclosure of the unreality of the positive aspect of the sunyata process opening the 
way for the disclosure of the process in its entirety. Nihilism, like the Great Doubt, “is a 
sort of fate assaulting man as a ‘fatal’ question, so that man once more gets reduced 
fundamentally…to a question mark.” 185 requiring we think essence of science 
existentially. Such a fate is meant in the same sense as the destiny of Gestell ; just as the 
oblivion of Being is from Being so too are our actions upon the fields of consciousness 
and nihility “not something we are free to do as we please...The force of destiny is at work 
here, impelling us to be and to act in this manner.”186 For Nishitani destiny is also not a 
simple external compulsion or fate “It is a destiny that appears only in the shape of the 
acts we ourselves perform, only as one with our own actions.”187 That Da-Sein belong to 
each other means the falling of Being is manifested as our actions, Gestell only is as 
accomplished by us, so too is science an expression of the awareness on the field of 
nihility, and just as necessary to it as ego was to the field of consciousness; fields that are 
inextricable from the actions that constitute and are conditioned by such awareness, and 
as noted in previous chapters this mode of disclosure seems valid and natural in its 
appropriate context of applicability 
 It is not the nullification of the death axis itself that is the main point of critique 
but the failure to existentialize the problematic of science along the lines of the Great 
Doubt. It is the taking of positivistic science as paradigmatic and viewing “scientific 
certainty in itself to be the same as philosophical truth...scientific rationalism is adopted 
as the standard for a system of value”188 that Nishitani critiques. “In science as well as in 
philosophy, when it assumes the standpoint of ‘scientism’, all phenomena in the universe 
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are regarded as reducible to mechanical, material processes which are in themselves 
purposeless and meaningless” 189 yet those who hold this view still live purposeful lives, 
but we cannot simple live with this contradiction and try to instate one over the other “We 
must have the courage to admit that the ‘spiritual’ basis of our existence…has once and 
for all been completely destroyed.” 190 
 The focus of Nishitani's critique would seem to relate to a failure to realize the 
prior unity and balance of complementary axis; that science has necessarily obscured its 
own origin and requires revitalization to counteract the manner in which “the rootedness 
of the sciences in their essential ground atrophied.”191  When so viewed correctly “The 
life-inhibiting universe of modern science is thereby exposed as a field where death in the 
religious sense, or the Great Death as it is called in Zen Buddhism, is to be realized 
existentially”192 once existentialized science reveals itself as a social correlate to the 
personal religious quest of the Great Doubt. 
Science and Gestell  
The meaninglessness of uniformity and levelling (that in nihility all things are equally 
unreal) unites Gestell and science, but the death axis is characterized by a more explicit 
relation to the Great Doubt on the field of nihility than Gestell 's to anxiety, and as 
revealing real reality shares a relation to the disclosure of pure presence-at-hand in 
anxiety. Whilst the nihilation of What is Metaphysics? was purely an ahistorical 
precondition of disclosure, Gestell as anxiety writ large is not, despite the latter being an 
existential instantiation of the former. Nishitani more explicitly relates the experience of 
the self and world as meaningless on the field of nihility (which is largely spoken of in 
positive terms) to science and modern secularism (largely spoken of in negative terms of 
critique). The following two chapters will deal more thoroughly with the issue of this 
difference between the historic-social aspects of nihilism (its accomplishment through 
our actions) and the ahistorical disclosive aspects of nihility, and how this relates to the 
concrete examples of nihilism given by Heidegger and Nishitani 
 Like with Gestell the dominance of the death axis can also be seen as terminating 
the anthropocentric, such “utter detachment of the modern scientific view of nature /// 
from anthropomorphism”193 meaning “The image of the universe it sees is wholly exempt 
from the restriction of being an environment for man and is not in any sense man-
orientated.”194 The mechanistic de-centring of man contributes to the overcoming of 
anthropocentrism to balance any prior over-emphasis of the life axis, but in doing so itself 
obscures the sive/soku that unites them. Instead the question of man settled by 
metaphysics and the telos of religions is re-opened, yet in such a way that “it has been 
unable to make a contact with the essence of man and so has exposed its own inadequacy 
as a way of investigating man /// himself ”195 the social sciences attempt this but it is 
“impossible without an existential quest of man by himself. Only such a quest can open 
the way for really coming in contact with the essence of man, a way which can then serve 
to channel all the results of the scientific research on man and the world into investigation 
of man proper and lend them significance for that investigation.”196  Just as Gestell 
obscures its ground and endangers itself in its essence so too does science in reducing 
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possibility…has been impeded by the upheavals wrought by modern natural science, as 
well as by the later establishment of the social sciences.”197 Neither metaphysics and 
technology for Heidegger, nor science and mechanization for Nishitani, can address the 
question of themselves and their relation to man. Whilst Hodge interprets Heidegger as 
claiming the question of the human must remain open and to settle it is the actualization 
of metaphysics in nihilism for Nishitani the openness of this question is itself a sign of 
nihilism, as seen in how “Confusion reign's in today's world at the most basic level 
concerning what human beings are and how they are to live.”198 
 Whilst Science and Zen says science must become existential this is only a 
preparatory stage; Religion and Nothingness saying that some modern forms of nihilism 
become existential by making “the claim that only by taking a stance on nihility can man 
truly attain to subjectivity and freedom...Here the autonomy of man truly came into being 
for the first time. The anxiety of having nothing to rely on...was directly transformed as 
such into the standpoint of creative freedom...for the self-existence of man, nihility 
became a field of ecstatic self-detachment. Nihilism had become existential.”199 Yet 
despite this “the representation of nothingness in nihilism still shows traces of the bias of 
objectification, of taking /// nothingness as some ‘thing’ called nothingness”200 as external 
to existence of the self, although such objectification does not take away from nihilisms 
“awareness of the real experience of nihility at the foundation of ourselves and all 
things”201 these are traces only, showing nihilism once exstentialized is on cusp of its own 
self-overcoming. 
Shared Implications 
The same three implications regarding mechanization in Heidegger's thought can also be 
seen in Nishitani's; that the nihility leading to the scientific death axis is integral and 
ineliminable to disclosure, that the true danger is the totalizing of the scientific paradigm 
into scientism rather than its precise manner of disclosing (although again they are heavily 
related), with the shared implication that these nihilistic manners of disclosure are to be 
preserved even as their attendant dangers must be countered by continual effort. Just as 
Gestell too must be saved in a mutual freeing so too must the scientific death axis be 
saved through its existentializing then reconciliation with the telos of the religious life 
axis. 
 Despite these similarities Nishitani's thought highlights different problems than 
Heidegger's; nihilism for Nishitani is both real reality and also insufficient for real reality, 
required for existential realization even as it requires it; paradoxes that are to be 
questioned in chapter 2.4 that takes up this idea of nihilism as a necessary stage. For now 
we turn to the ontic examples of such mechanization and their place within the narrative 
history of nihilism's emergence before dealing with the reconciliation that is to save 
science and religion. 
2.3 Historical Danger 
Gestell as a revealing only is as our manner of comportment, in terms of how we disclose 
ontic entities. Whilst Heidegger emphasizes and focuses on the danger as ontological the 
ontological only is as its ontic realization so Gestell both results in and is comprised of 
behaviours with ontic consequences; consequences that are portrayed as dangerous not 
so much due to their concrete empirical effects but due to the manner of revealing they 
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attest to. The implications of this for the context of the danger, the projective criteria for 
its surmounting and its viability are taken up in chapters 5 and 6, for now the way such 
tendencies are not unique to Gestell and the implications this has for that which saves are 
to be considered. 
 Heidegger offers examples intended to highlight how in Gestell responsibility 
becomes mere production and stellen changes from 'bringing forth' the power of nature 
to 'challenging-forth' and exploiting nature as energy. Under the auspices of such an 
'unreasonable demand' "Not only are living things technically objectivated in stock-
breeding and exploitation; the attack of atomic physics on the phenomena of living matter 
as such is in full swing. At bottom, the essence of life is supposed to yield itself to 
technical production." 202  
 Whilst he makes clear that he does not appeal for a return to a prior more 
‘primitive’ state his attempt to highlight the differences between bringing-forth and 
challenging-forth seem prone to slip into this tendency. Because Heidegger gives no 
practical example of a step forward beyond challenging-forth there is a strong temptation 
to take his examples as suggesting just such a backward step; that whatever new destining 
issues from the sending of Being will be more reminiscent of prior epochal revealings 
than challenging-forth despite Heidegger's claim no such predictions can be made. The 
possibility of such predictions is considered in the second half of the chapter, his examples 
are first to be considered as raising issues pertaining to how determined by a single 
revealing an epoch can be  and whether such examples themselves rely upon a certain 
epochal understanding to act as criticisms of Gestell, both themes which will inform later 
chapters. 
 Heidegger's distinctions between windmills and hydroplants, sailboats and 
motorboats,  try to bring out how "Regulating and securing even become the chief 
characteristic of the challenging revealing” 203 so that flexibility and efficiency are sought 
for their own sake in an endless search for greater control. Yet in both cases the latter can 
be seen also as bringing forth the power and resistance of water and natural forces in the 
same ways the former do, albeit under a an altered epochal understanding of such forces. 
The distinction between a peasants ordering of the field in the sense of cultivating its 
natural enabling of growth and the mechanised food industry‘s challenging of the soil to 
increase efficiency through setting-upon also seems to be quantitative not qualitative. The 
difference is even conceivable as a fuller bringing-forth; if it is in the nature of the field 
to bring forth life through growing crops then the maximized yields of agri-business can 
be seen as enabling the field to fulfil itself more, bringing-forth its latent nature more 
fully. Gestell would then be a heightening of the 'unlocking' in medieval crop rotation, of 
the 'storing and distributing' of ancient granaries that saved up the fertility of the earth so 
that it would be on-hand at other times and more efficiently distributed. 
 The Rhine example is to bring out how its scenic features are “an object on call 
for inspection by a tour group ordered there by the vacation industry.” 204 Yet some who 
‘sight-see’ the Rhine may still be regarding it in the poetic sense and there is a pervasive 
element of homogenization in Heidegger's characterization of how we reveal the real. The 
paradigmatic example for Heidegger is the production of atomic energy, but only certain 
contexts see us conceiving of an entity in terms of atomic structure, and these contexts 
are far from dominant for the vast majority. The implications that the focus upon such a 
'chief characteristic' rather than cluster of competing understandings within both  
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individual and collective Dasein has for the viability of Heidegger's notion of danger is 
returned to in chapter 5. 
 If Gestell is chiefly characterized by the unreasonable demand upon nature with 
counter-examples intended to highlight approaches that "mesh with nature and do not 
simply 'set it up' for exploitation"205 then what what counts as challenging-forth would 
seem to be determined by a historical conception of nature. Heidegger gives a definition 
of nature as both beyond and concealed by the categories of the ready-to-hand and 
present-at-hand in Being and Time as "the Nature which 'stirs and strives', which assails 
us and enthrals us as landscape".206 On the Essence of Truth speaks of nature as the totality 
of beings as such; "Being as a whole reveals itself as physis, 'nature', which here does not 
yet mean a particular sphere of beings but rather beings as such as a whole, specifically 
in the sense of upsurgent presence."207 Whilst physis as self-arising might be taken as 
such an ahistorical conception that 'stirs and strives',  a notion of nature that surpasses and 
is not conditioned by Ereignis, the origin of meaning in the relation of appropriation 
seems to rule out Dasein disclosing a definition of nature 'itself' independent of any 
specific epochal understanding and provides for no prior horizon of judgement to provide 
criteria for claims as to what counts as an unreasonable demand placed upon it. Being and 
Time's characterization of seeing wind as 'wind in the sails' (ibid) as grasping nature as 
ready-to-hand also indicates that the nature revealed by the counter-examples of The 
Question Concerning Technology (such as the windmill) does not attain the level of 
purely 'that which stirs and strives'; but only of the epochally determined manner in which 
the ready-to-hand comes to presence. The dynamism implied by stirring and striving 
would also seem inapplicable to the inanimate nature of that which atomic energy is 
unlocked from; uranium cannot bring-forth its own potential and would seem to lay 
outside the understanding of nature as physis. 
 The term nature has a dual resonance; the 'natural world' as a collection of entities 
prior to human influence or technology, and 'what comes naturally' as the inherent 
tendencies or characteristics of a thing. What comes naturally for man as Dasein is to live 
in accord with the claim resulting from withdrawal; including how nature in the former 
sense is to be revealed. Nature as conceived under the claim of Gestell can make even the 
production of atomic energy a releasing of natural energy to stand-forth as it does in stars; 
fusion as a poetic testament to the most creative force in the natural world. This notion is 
to be taken up in later consideration of science and suchness; Gestell 's disclosure in terms 
of energy as revealing the homeground of jitai and the relation of this to Heidegger's 
changing characterization of scientific disclosure from presence-at-hand to the setting-
upon the real of Science and Reflection. 
 Heidegger's definition of nature (in both resonances), thus what counts as an 
unreasonable demand upon it, is seemingly based on a projected epochal determination 
that allows Gestell to be contextualized as a supreme danger. His critique on the basis of 
these criteria has led to ecological appropriations of his thought interpreting him as 
endorsing “more meaningful and natural ways of living that allows us to contact the 
mystery of nature”208. Man as shepherd of Being is often taken to entail shepherd of 
nature; seeing “ourselves as the ‘custodians’ rather than the ‘users’ of the world in which 
we live”209. Whilst Heidegger's lamentations that in Gestell "Nature becomes a gigantic 
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gasoline station, an energy source for modern technology and industry"210 easily lend 
themselves to such concerns they apply equally to the preservation of the environment as 
a resource indicating ecological ramifications are derivative to the true danger. At the end 
of The Thing natural features and animals, "heron and roes, deer, horse and bull"211 are 
also characterized as things that gather world; as of concern for the role they play in the 
appropriative mirroring in relation to gods and mortals. It is earth as ontological not ontic 
that Heidegger seems most concerned with, and whilst ontological earth may have an 
ontic correlate related to ecological concerns the latter is subsumed into a notion of human 
dwelling rather than an ethics of deep ecology. The nature that stirs and strives and exists 
beyond Ereignis or the to categories of the ready-to-hand and presence-at-hand is 
ultimately a conception in service to a projected saving of human existence. Heidegger 
cannot be truly appropriated to environmental ethics as he lacks a criteria of judgement 
for future destinings in terms of ramifications for the natural world that provided the 
conditions for the evolution of Ereignis itself beyond its service to human existence as 
claimed. 
 Hodge characterizes such ecological appropriation of Heidegger as “a one-sided, 
objectifying, externalising version of the crisis. More important that these objective 
effects are the transformations in human beings which both result from and cause the 
processes giving rise to these ecological effects.”212 Thus the most pertinent feature of 
Gestell in relation to ecological concerns is the divisive elimination of otherness that 
Heidegger places under the heading 'earth' that “leads to a suppression of wonder at 
strangeness...in favour of the accumulation of knowledge in the positive sciences, for 
which nothing is alien.”213 Hodge thus also joins Heidegger in his ceding of science to 
the positivists and the obscuring of the awe and wonder that as a compulsion towards the 
other is the source of scientific curiosity. 
 Whilst the examples in The Question Concerning Technology highlight flexibility 
and efficiency in regards to the demands placed upon nature as the essential traits of 
Gestell a great variety of negative ontic consequences are also attributed to Gestell, even 
when they are arguably equally present in former epochs. Given that environmental 
preservation is not necessarily incompatible with viewing nature as a resource, such as 
for tourism or future renewable consumption, the tendency to attribute misfortune 
specifically to Gestell when it comes to ecological concerns is questionable. But in the 
sphere of human relations the ease with which and extent to which Gestell can have 
various ontic ills attributed to it, even if they remain only contingently related to the 
supreme danger, is even more so and helps explain the appeal of Heidegger's critique. In 
relation to the transformation of the human (specifically the inter-human relations that 
form traditional ethics) Hodge links the claimed eclipse of otherness and wonder by 
science in Gestell to the exploitation of others caused when “the strange, the alien, the 
uncanny, the monstrous all the same find a site: they are placed by one group of human 
beings in other such groups.”214  
 Heidegger claims both "Modern science and the total state, as necessary 
consequences of the nature of technology, are also its attendants." 215 His relation to 
politics and ethics is to be considered more in later chapters but the linking of the total 
state and Gestell is often taken as a belated condemnation of fascism placing how others 
were treated by such total states under the aegis of Gestell. In relation to this Watts claims 
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Gestell "causes us to define cultural and racial differences that allow us, when we are 
powerful, to exploit those ‘not like us’.”216 Hodge that the “breakdown of the everyday, 
traditional ethics of community and a breakdown of the discrete groupings within which 
everyday ethics can flourish"217 in preventing the ethical question of what it means to be 
human also leads “to death for those who are not useful in relation to the needs generated 
by technical relations and technical processes”218 and informed the Nazi ‘approach to 
marked groups’. Yet not only is such divisive thinking nothing new but the breakdown of 
discrete groupings and communities through Gestell 's erasure of the ethics-metaphysics 
distinction would also seem contrary to such divisive thinking. 
 Heidegger's comments on Gestell as a levelling that makes the notion of rank 
impossible makes it hard to reconcile the placing of this ancient human tendency to divide 
and exclude as fundamentally stemming from a modern sending of Being. The reduction 
of humanity to a resource can lead to the camps but genocide and dehumanization pre-
date Gestell, and the open question of what it means to be human has in all epochs given 
rise to answers that excluded some groups. The camps were ideologically based on 
denigrating 'others' that had long been discriminated against rather than for the sake of 
efficiency; the very notion of a 'marked group' requires the community ethos Hodge 
claims would prevent it. The relation of otherness within Gestell is considered more in 
chapter 5 and later ethics chapters; here it is to be noted that the oppression and 
exploitation of others whilst taking a different form under the claim of Gestell is not 
integrally related to or dependent upon it. 
 It is in terms of equivalence not difference that the appropriation of the human 
into the standing-reserve is portrayed. Such a manner of exploitation is more related to 
an Orwellian vision of consumerism marked by built-in obsolescence. In such calculative 
thinking "the humanness of man and the thingness of things dissolve into the calculated 
market value of a market"219 in which "objects are produced to be used up. The more 
quickly they are used up, the greater becomes the necessity to replace them even more 
quickly and more readily....What is constant in things produced as objects merely for 
consumption is: the substitute".220 Yet again such commodifications of the human in terms 
of market value are not unique to the epochal understanding of Gestell. Many modern 
surnames originate in the identifying of the family with its economic function, the 
humanness of man was reduced to market value in the wergeld of the German tribes and 
slave markets of antiquity in an equally thorough sense as found in modern exploitative 
work practices such as Walmart's 'Peasant Tax'. 
 Despite Heidegger's separation of machine technology from the essence of 
technology it ultimately seems to be the only ontic correlate unique to the epoch and 
remains emblematic of Gestell in a way other ontic correlates are not; being the 
paradigmatic examples for both Discourse on Thinking and The Question Concerning 
Technology. The increasing flexibility and efficiency of ontic technology enables an 
increase or change in form of the tendencies highlighted in the other examples (an 
increase to be considered in chapter 5 as a shift from Gestell as partial to dominant 
understanding) in that "These forces, which everywhere and every minute claim, enchain, 
drag along, press and impose upon man under the form of some technical contrivance or 
other"221 suggesting the ontic correlates to Gestell are more related to devices rather than 
divisive thinking. 
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 Both the relation of otherness (human and non-human) and wonder to science and 
Gestell are critiqued in future chapters but the considered examples have indicated the 
most pertinent elements of ontic cases of Gestell ; an increase in the prevalence and 
tendency towards the exploiting and commodification of non-self thus ultimately also 
self. The realization of Gestell is not the individual disclosures of some humans as 
standing-reserve but the  maximization of human potential in total mobilization and the 
compulsion to control and dominate, to exercise power for the sake of more power in an 
institutional fashion rather than to render man a commodity in service to a further end or 
the power of the few. The ontic realization of Gestell thus seems only quantitatively not 
qualitatively different to the ontic states of affairs in previous epochs, and to focus on 
specific examples of revealing as standing-reserve obscure that it is no specific novel 
instance of revealing but the systematic totality of the framework that is critiqued. The 
difference between prior and modern disclosures seems to be one of the possibility of 
alternate revealings rather than how beings were actually brought to presence. It is not 
that challenging-forth did not occur but there was an "absence of the illusion of 
domination and the absence of the necessary attempt at domination in the earlier 
technologies"222 the necessity of the domination rather than its actual presence is most 
pertinent and such necessity cannot be fully articulated by specific examples. Yet that 
such a tendency is not new nor necessarily increasing but only emerging as more overtly 
systematic is obscured by the backwards look to highlight the differences, serving only 
to conceal the continuity of the withdrawal of being; portraying the quantitative change 
as qualitative. At times the implications of this can seem perverse or absurd; that in 
ancient times challenging-forth was not systematic so slavery was not the mechanization 
of man as standing-reserve whilst a 'Human Resources' department that tries to increase 
worker satisfaction thus productivity is. Each is an instance of the same revealing with 
only the possibility of alternate revealings having changed, such emphasis seems to do a 
disservice to the experiences of those so reduced as the context of ontic distress seems 
emphasized above actual human suffering. 
 The examples given in The Question Concerning Technology seem  primarily to 
highlight the increase in a tendency latent and ever-present within the very essence of 
revealing, highlighting the continuity of the process of withdrawal; the increasing 
emergence of nihility rather than a significant paradigm shift between disconnected 
epochs. The manner of disclosure in Gestell seen as the fullest revealing of the nihility of 
the real is inherent to the very nature of disclosure itself as conditioned by withdrawal, 
only reaching its fullest and most explicit manifestation in the challenging-forth of the 
standing-reserve. The epoch marked by Gestell thus retains elements of bringing-forth 
just as the disclosures and activities of previous epochs had elements of challenging-forth. 
This leads to a continuum full of grey areas, of uncertain distinctions between windmills 
and wind-turbines or hydro-plants and canals, rather than any clear-cut distinction 
between bringing and challenging forth. Heidegger claims that poiesis and Gestell are 
“fundamentally different, and yet they remain related in their essence” 223 as revealings, 
and in The Question Concerning Technology this essential relation pertains to that both 
are manners of revealing rather than any epochal co-existence. Taking other texts into 
account Heidegger's position as to the novelty of challenging-forth seems less certain with 
two possible interpretations of the relation between epochal revealings; that they 
represent radical paradigm shifts that determine distinct epochs, or that they form a linear 
process of shifting emphasis as a constellation of understandings that co-exist with some 
more prominent at times. 
 In The Age of the World Picture Heidegger addresses what seems to be traces of 
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Gestell in Greek thought through discussion of Protagoras' claim that man is the measure 
of things, claiming that whilst such thought prepared the way for later humanistic 
reinterpretation it remains qualitatively different as 'man' remains particular. The egō of 
Protagoras that tarries in the horizon of unconcealment, belonging in the midst of what 
presences and keeping safe its measure, is not the subjective Cartesian ego. Man's finitude 
is thus emphasized as such measure is not subjectively determined but granted by that 
which presences so that "there is given to him the measure that always confines a self to 
this or that."224 Such finite receptivity preserves the concealed and acknowledges that 
truth as unconcealedness determines that which presences, whilst the subjectivity that 
leads to Gestell sees all as accessible so overlooks the concealed and holds the 
unconcealed as stemming from universally accessible representation. Whilst this suggests 
a qualitative difference in concentrating on human subjectivity it deals primarily with the 
subject-object dichotomy that is dissolved in Gestell ; with the field of consciousness 
rather than the field of nihility. Discourse on Thinking is more specific in identifying 
Gestell as radically new, claiming "This relation of man to the world as such...developed  
 
in the seventeenth century first and only in Europe. It long remained unknown in other 
continents, and it was altogether alien to former ages and histories." 225  
 Contrary to this What are Poets For? seems to suggest that the revealing of 
challenging-forth has occurred previously but not in any systematically ordered fashion. 
It is only in the current age that such disclosure has begun "to unfold as a destiny of the 
truth of all beings as a whole; until now, its scattered appearances and attempts have 
remained incorporated within the embracing structure of the realm of culture and 
civilization."226 A trace of challenging-forth was there (Da) but has now quantitatively 
increased to emerge as the predominant understanding of beings as a whole; it is the extent 
of the ordering that becomes significant rather than the possibility of disclosing that which 
presences in terms of such ordering. Between the above two positions can be placed the 
claim that "the distinctive character of modern knowing consists in the decisive working 
out of a tendency that still remains concealed in the essence of knowing as the Greeks 
experienced it". A tendency latent yet related; whose origin was concealed yet present in 
the former revealing whilst not definitive of it. Challenging-forth was thus a possibility 
of prior revealings yet such traces of it were not experienced as such since they were still 
incorporated into another overall ordering. 
Epochal History and Linear Narrative 
The issue of the relation between the epochs, thus the nature and possibility of the danger 
of a sole epochal revealing, is rendered problematic by the way Heidegger uses the term 
Ereignis to denote both the originary event of Being's appropriation of man that begins 
the epochal history and the transitions between epochs within that history. The epochs 
that determine Being are realized through their giveness to man, the epochal history of 
Being given by Ereignis expressed through man. Being is thus the unfolding history of 
our appropriation and does not exist separate from this history; yet paradoxically is also 
what gives this history. Ereignis is transhistorical yet is also within history as the temporal 
sequence of epochal transformations; "Being is as the destiny of thinking. But destiny is 
in itself historical."227 
 The epochs are given through the withdrawal of both Sein and the mutual 
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appropriation so that "The history of Being begins, and indeed necessarily, with the 
forgetting of Being";228   with metaphysics. The histories of Being and metaphysics begin 
at the same moment (yet are not identical); when Dasein asks as to beings as a whole so 
that "beings themselves are expressly drawn up into their unconcealment and conserved 
in it...The primordial disclosure of beings as a whole, the question concerning beings as 
such, and the beginning of Western history are the same"229. The necessity of this history 
as Being's withdrawal derives from the ontological meaning of the 'not'; the need of 
human existence for Being's claim stemming from the nihility of our nature that manifests 
in progressive withdrawal culminating in Gestell. Ontological nihility is that which gives 
the epochal history of Being. In each epoch Being conceals itself differently determining 
that epochs understanding of the meaning of Being; the self-withdrawal in Ereignis is the 
nihility that gifts the clearing for meaning to come to pass. The history of Being is a 
succession of epochal grantings through withdrawal; a withdrawal that increases until it 
is no longer experienced as such and completes itself in the double concealment of the 
nothingness that gives and the giving so that history is the realization of the danger of 
nihility. History as destiny is inherent danger resulting from the manner in which history 
is given. Despite the vocabulary of danger Heidegger held that whilst metaphysics as the 
withdrawal of Being makes nihilism the fundamental movement of Western history such 
withdrawal “is not meant in a negative sense”230 so it is “not a history of decline, in which 
we stand”.231 If withdrawal into oblivion is not intended in a negative sense but only “in 
the Greek sense Lethe i.e., self-hiddenness, self-withdrawal of Being”232 as how Sein is 
appropriated in Ereignis then Gestell as the completion of withdrawal itself cannot be 
intended in the negative sense or compared as a decline from earlier epochal 
understandings such as poiesis. Yet danger implies negativity, and the greatest danger 
implies decline. If the history of Being is not one of necessary linear withdrawal or decline 
then the completion of this history in Gestell is too not to be considered in a negative 
sense, yet it is hard to interpret Heidegger's stance towards Gestell otherwise. 
 Both Heidegger and commentators on him oscillate between both implying and 
explicitly stating that metaphysics as withdrawal is a linear narrative of necessity and that 
there is no teleological relationship between the epochs. A linear interpretation would 
both bring Heidegger's thought on history into accord with Nishitani's on the nature of 
the progression through the fields; a narrative of nihilism that would also cohere with the 
thesis fore-having of the relation between nihility and nihilism. That once inaugurated 
there is a teleological necessity of progression through the fields in which “the 
contemporary era of modern technology inevitably unfolds from the history of Being, 
which finds expression in the evolution of Western philosophy”.233 Whilst Ma and Brakel 
hold Heidegger attributes such necessity solely to Western thought rather than any 
universal experience of nihility, I would claim Nishitani's Buddhaic experience of 
nihilism stems from same source (our absence as source of meaning) but has a different 
historical manifestation. 
 The inherent tendency of Being to disclose through withdrawal implies a 
necessary linearity; each epoch must have Being as more concealed, the exact nature of 
each epoch might not be fateful but that each is progressively more oblivious is a destiny. 
At times the precise sequence of epochs is also presented as a fateful necessity. Heidegger 
says that “modern world civilization is executing the transition to the final phase of the 
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epochal destiny of Being in the sense of a determination of Being as the unconditional 
orderability of what is, including being human (der unbedingten Bestellbarkeit alles 
Seienden, das Menschen mit inbegriffen)”234 and the notion of the final phase only makes 
sense in the context of a linear narrative. Such comments by Heidegger are often taken to 
mean he holds to a linear teleological process of withdrawal, yet his comments to the 
contrary also lead some to simultaneously both affirm and deny such a position. Bernstein 
claims both that "In Heidegger’s strong reading of the history of philosophy, the 
‘movement’ from Platonism to the nihilistic triumph of Gestell (enframing) is the 
inexorable working out of ‘prefigured’ possibilities”235 and yet Heidegger “is not claiming 
that there is a predetermined logic of history that is working itself out behind our backs 
and which entraps men in the iron grip of Gestell.”236 The Question Concerning 
Technology's distinction between fate and destiny casts doubt on the interpretation of a 
linear necessity, but refers to the coming self-surmounting of oblivion at its most extreme 
point thus does not entail that which came before was not inevitable given the origin of 
metaphysics, only that Gestell is not  necessarily an eternal fate. 
 Rather than a cumulative linear progression Hodge holds Heidegger believes that 
the epochs do not emerge from the previous ones but are granted by Language with each 
transition occurring when Language speaks man in a different fashion. Whilst the source 
of the epochal transformations is Languages own disruption of given meanings mediated 
by poets ultimately Heidegger's view of history is judged as “rendering completely 
inexplicable how one epoch might be replaced by another.”237 Sheehan also proposes the 
interpretation of seeing the history of metaphysics as a constellation of related 
perspectives on Being in which "linear progression is swallowed up in a grand circularity 
whereby these modes of beingness revolve around, and in the process hide, that which 
renders them possible."238 Each epoch arising from retrieving the same origin in a 
different manner. As was said in previous chapters on Ereignis if Sein is both self-caused 
and beyond causality then the epochs granted by Ereignis cannot result from each other 
in sequence but only from the same appropriative event. Withdrawal might not be an 
ongoing process but a consistent manner of how presence arises. Being does not 
progressively withdraw, Being withdraws in each epoch in a different way unrelated to 
previous withdrawal. But Heidegger's descriptions of the history of metaphysics often 
reads too much like a teleological narrative for such an element to be overlooked. If the 
transition between epochs is non-linear they would resemble sudden ruptures; a new 
understanding of the real spontaneously emerging. Yet the previous consideration of 
Gestell and poiesis would seem to favour the shifting of a cultural paradigm over time; 
The Question Concerning Technology's analyses of causality and etymology imply a 
direct relation between epochal understandings rather than abrupt changes in how man is 
spoken. 
 Heidegger may have wanted to avoid any possible reduction of epochal 
transformation to notions of causation or production related to Gestell to stress that “that 
the ontological event of appearing is acausal and, hence, incapable of being explained by 
any narrative...regarding how things may have been produced”.239 This onus on Sein as 
uncaused possibly leading to the tendency critiqued in previous chapters concerning how 
Heidegger's prioritizing of Sein as sending the historical modes of presencing means 
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“Ereignis seems to take on a generative, directive dimension that threatens to transform 
it into a metaphysical category, thereby undermining the nondualistic thrust of 
Heidegger’s thought.”240 The reification of the 'not' that gives making the relation of 
appropriation causal rather than the self-identity of absolute nothingness with its mask.  
 The possibility that Heidegger offers a seemingly linear narrative in service of his 
own projective interpretation is taken up in chapter 4. Such linearity may only apply to 
the narrative of the history of metaphysics; yet linear neccessity is denied to avoid the 
new destinal claim being "logically and historiographically predicted or to be 
metaphysically construed as a sequence belonging to a process of history" 241 since such 
appropriative destining determines history. Thus the new claim is portrayed as a 
recollection of origin rather than a linear progression. But Heidegger also says that once 
the epoch of Gestell is surmounted by a new destining then Gestell itself "is not simply 
submerged and lost" 242 or done away with; previous destinings endure and still influence 
the current revealing of the real in a way expressible as a linear teleology. The possibility 
of and ramifications in relation to the notion of danger of such epochal interpenetration 
are considered in chapter 5. 
 The situation is complicated by Heidegger's contradictory comments on the 
predictability of future destining. Heidegger claims "We do not know what possibilities 
the destining of Western history holds in store for our people and the West" 243 yet that 
we do know that as fundamentally nihilistic "its unfolding can have nothing but world 
catastrophes as its consequence," 244 despite its history not being meant in a 'negative 
sense'. That in the era of the atomic age "No one can foresee the radical changes to 
come"245 but that "technological advance will move faster and faster and can never be 
stopped"246 so that "No prophecy is necessary to recognize the sciences...will soon be 
determined and regulated by the new fundamental science that is called cybernetics." 247 
Heidegger speaks against the possibility of man foreseeing the future of Sein that is 
beyond his direct control, yet sometimes in the same breathe speaks such prophecies as 
if they were foregone conclusions. The notion of such inevitability is again considered in 
chapter 5, for now it is noted that predictability implies linearity, the impossibility of 
prophecy the opposite. 
 Despite his comments as to the impossibility of teleological necessity in the 
unfolding of the epochs Heidegger ultimately treats epochal history as a coherent 
narrative yet "failed to clarify satisfactorily the nature of that other kind of necessity 
which governs coherence"248 The epochs of metaphysics according to Heidegger can "be 
represented historically in their sequence as an event"; 249 an event that is not the history 
of Being as such but stems from the ongoing process of Ereignis. Whilst talk of sequence 
implies linearity that they are represented as sequence implies an imposed narrative 
subordinated to the purposes of the subject. His commitment to a new beginning causes 
him to deny a linear progression yet also to form a narrative based on the succession of 
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presuppositions. The coherence of the linear narrative would thereby arise from the 
projective interpretative moment. 
 Hodge identifies two aspects to the history of Being that Heidegger conflates; 
partially revealed sendings of Being that are a complete process beyond comprehension, 
and an incomplete but available historical narration of these (the related histories of Being 
and metaphysics). The linear narrative of the history of metaphysics is thus a projective 
interpretation of non-linear sendings, “Heidegger constructs this history of metaphysics 
as a history of words for being which conceals their origin in the sending or history of 
being.”250 The mysteriousness of the relation between Ereignis and the epochs only arises 
when the former is not seen in terms of Heidegger's futural projection (in terms of the 
unity of the ontological and axiological). 
 A linear narrative is both required for the coherence of Heidegger's thought and 
brings his thought into coherence with Nishitani's charting of the progression through the 
fields of awareness; in line with the thesis's fore-conception as to withdrawal 
progressively increasing to reveal pure nihility. Such withdrawal is not a decline nor a 
necessity yet despite their denial they are both required by Heidegger for the narrative in 
service to his projective interpretation. But the necessity of this narrative is the experience 
of the progression through the fields, an existential not logical necessity made necessary 
by its very process of realization so that the epochal history and its completion in the 
supreme danger only are in terms of the projective retrieval predicated upon it that acts 
as its own condition of possibility. The danger only is as danger in terms of a narrative 
that gets is coherence from that which is to save the danger. This raises the possibility of 
differing projective narratives relating to the nature of danger and culmination to be 
considered later after explication of the relation between the saving and the danger. 
2.4. The Danger that Saves 
Danger as revealing Ereignis 
Every destining “keeps itself everywhere concealed to the last” 251 and only when its end 
draws nigh, in the case of Gestell when heralded by physics, can its nature as danger be 
beheld and its power threatened by the possibility of other possibilities. Once the essence 
of technology is understood as a destiny the very possibility of the possibilities it conceals 
is opened to us and  Gestell brings to the fore the possibility of the mutual freedom of Da 
and Sein (human existence and Gestell) disclosing human existence as determined by the 
integral Da-Sein relation so that “we find ourselves unexpectedly taken into a freeing 
claim.”252 Only as completed can metaphysics be understood in its essence and the way 
opened back into its essence as Ereignis; a return to the origin of metaphysics that is 
required for the retrieval of new possibilities due to its exhaustion. When freed through 
retrieving the primordial notion of causality from 'correct' instrumentality Gestell as “the 
saving power lets man see and enter into the highest dignity of his essence” 253 as the 
mortal of the fourfold. Whilst there has yet to be the thinging of the thing "In the frame, 
we glimpse a first, oppressing flash of the appropriation," 254 so that the mirroring of 
world as the truth of Being first flashes "when Enframing lights up, in its coming to 
presence, as the danger, i.e., as the saving-power." 255 The realizing of Gestell as highest  
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danger for the first time reveals our belonging to Ereignis and is a transitive stage to the 
transformation of the danger through the experiencing of Ereignis as such. 
 The realization of Gestell is thus a transitioning from the field of consciousness to 
that of nihility. In the completion of metaphysics man discloses the real as standing-
reserve, as nothing; including his own subjectivity. The dissolution of the subject-object 
dichotomy into the reality of standing-reserve that marks the end of the anthropocentric 
dominance of modern egoistic subjectivity and a paradigm shift in the manner of 
exploitation parallels the movement between the fields of consciousness and nihility and 
is the ground for the beneficial transitional nature of both notions. Gestell as the 
realization of nihility is a necessary step towards understanding (realizing) Ereignis and 
thus becoming receptive to the transformation of Nothingness that is to be accomplished 
through us once we have prepared for it through thought. The turn in Being's self-
withdrawal occurs only at its extreme point; only as the supreme danger that exposes itself 
as total withdrawal can this take place by revealing the pure nihility of the reality of the 
real thus our existence. Alone amongst the epochs Gestell is the opportunity to realize 
that epochal destiny is defined by the withdrawal of Being. 
 Heidegger even compares the thoughtlessness of Gestell to letting a field lie 
fallow, "only that can lie fallow which in itself is a ground for growth"256 and a field must 
periodically lie fallow for such growth to be possible so that thoughtlessness is first 
required to prepare for that time when "the seed will come up and ripen."257 Whilst 
Discourse on Thinking also suggests the field of consciousness does not first need to be 
dissolved in nihility in claiming that "authentic releasement may come about without 
necessarily being preceded by such being-released-from horizontal transcendence"258 this 
is outweighed by contrary statements such as that things must "have become objects 
before they attained their nature as things" 259 and the understanding of the human as ego 
must have "likewise emerged before the nature of man could return to itself".260  
 The completion of metaphysics in nihilism (nothingness fully befalling Being) 
that makes possible the self-surmounting of Gestell is the realization of nihility as the 
origin of thought so that in Gestell 's indicating of Ereignis we are for the first time 
brought into the realm of essential religion according to Nishitani's definition of the 
actualization of such absolute nothingness as the self-realization of reality through our 
awareness. Only in Gestell is such awareness first realized in revealing the reality of the 
real as pure nihility, thus as the suchness that is self-identical with Śūnyatā; "Only there 
where the consummation of the modern age attains the heedlessness that is its peculiar 
greatness is future history being prepared." 261  
 The condition of possibility for the granting of the next destining is that this 
destining as danger comes to awareness; it is through the awareness of man (reflection on 
danger) that reality is to realize itself (Being turn towards its own essence rather than 
concealing that essence). Whilst this shows the supreme danger as indicating the 
possibility of saving the relation of the danger and that which saves must be deepened in 
light of Nishitani's reflections on samsāra-sive-nirvāna, and of the existential nature of 
such realization that is required for the ontological turn. 
The Necessity of Danger 
The identity of the danger and the saving power is thought by Nishitani in terms of the 
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self-identity of the fields. The fortuitousness of the oblivion of metaphysics shows its 
parallel to the field of nihility in that it is both self-identical to its origin and the way back 
to this origin; in Nishitani's terms only can the emergence of nihility as real reality indicate 
the possibility for the realization of the field of Śūnyatā as the self-transformation of 
nothingness through the realization of that very nihility. 
 The existential realization of Gestell as supreme danger was earlier defined in 
relation to anxiety as the experience of nothingness; the self calling to itself both from 
and to its own null nature. Homelessness when thought as such "is the sole summons that 
calls mortals into their dwelling";262 to think Gestell as the danger is to heed the call of 
the self as appropriated so that Gestell as the nothingness which befalls Being (Being's 
self-denial) is itself the call for us to dwell. From Gestell as Ereignis man is called to 
himself from and by the current way of appropriation. Dallmayr cites Heidegger's 
interpretation of Holderlin as indicating homecoming is a process of self-discovery 
through sojourn in otherness, that "Homecoming and being at home are not...ready-made 
acquisitions: they are possible only through intense estrangement or exposure to 
otherness; to this extent, appropriation is closely linked with expropriation, homecoming 
with the need for exodus"263. Homecoming first requires homelessness, meditative 
thought first requires calculative; we can only meditatively dwell if we have first 
experienced homelessness. Gestell or the field of nihility as homelessness are thus a 
necessary stage to the homecoming of true appropriation (nearness to Being); that like for 
Nishitani must remain in the final self-realization of their identity that transforms our self-
awareness. 
 The realization of this call reflects the identity of the ontological and existential; 
that authenticity as the personal existential correlate to Gestell 's self-surmounting also 
requires the sojourn in inauthenticity and the uncanniness of anxiety. As authenticity 
retrieves a destinal heritage the self-surmounting retrieves the latent possibilities in the 
origin of thrown Gestell. The projective moment of Gestell 's self-surmounting is the 
ontological correlate to the existential readiness for anxiety. The call of conscience that 
claims man is the voice of silence calling from man's essence as a relation to Being, thus 
it is the call of appropriation calling us to realize this self-surmounting. Resolute 
authenticity in anxiety is attending to the nothingness of self; the authentic response to 
Gestell as its self-surmounting is also to attend to this nothingness as origin. 
 As a relinquishing of the desire to overcome metaphysics (thus the desire to 
overcome the desire at the root of representation) the surmounting of Gestell is also a 
psychological event. The reflective return to origin (the realization of the identity of the 
fields) must be seen in the contexts of the identity of the ontological and existential as the 
self-surmounting is a transformation of both the origin of thought and the thinkers who 
realize this origin. Both personal authenticity and epochal transformation are self-
identical aspects of the call of appropriation (the call of conscience) that issues from the 
ground of the elemental subjectivity of the true self. Whilst Nishitani emphasizes the 
personal transformation through death of the ego for Heidegger the dual transformation 
of human existence and metaphysics emphasizes shared epochal understanding, but for 
both the self-surmounting of Gestell must be realized in a personal existential 
transformation (that as collective is also social). 
 The necessity of of this transitional nihility arises from the self-withdrawal that 
permeates disclosure, but chapter 3 dealt with how this narrative of withdrawal arises 
from a projective interpretation guided by the very realization it is the condition of 
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possibility for. Despite the identity of samsāra-sive-nirvāna, of the danger and that which 
saves, this narrative and the fact that such identity only is as a process of realization (not 
an end state) leads both thinkers to portray nihility/danger as transitional. The necessity 
stems from the need for the Turn, but brings no guarantee that such a transition will be 
realized. The nature of such realization now leads to consideration of its conditional 
nature. 
 Identity and Difference calls Gestell a prelude to Ereignis, but Heidegger's first 
raising of this prelude through quotation of Holderlin makes heavy use of conditionals. 
‘If’ there is truth in Holderlin's words then Gestell 'might' give rise to the saving power, 
and even if true then “according to the words of the poet we have no right whatsoever to 
expect that there where the danger is we should be able to lay hold of the saving power 
immediately and without preparation.”264   
 Gestell contains only “the possible arising of the saving power,” 265  it is both 
conditional and ambiguous; both its danger and its saving are conditional on its manner 
of realization or accomplishment, through man’s co-responsibility for the coming to pass 
of revealing. Its ambiguity arises through its relation to human existence, more strictly 
speaking how we relate our existence to Gestell as a destining that starts us upon the way 
of revealing. “Such ambiguity points to the mystery of all revealing, i.e., of truth” 266 the 
dual nature of technology, its radical ambiguity, preserves resonances of and parallels 
Heidegger’s earlier thought on authenticity and inauthenticity. Inauthentic challenging-
forth as ordering conceals Ereignis so endangers the relation to truth,  but Gestell comes 
to pass from the granting that lets us endure showing us as needed for truth thus indicating 
the saving power. These two trends ambiguously dwelling near to each other show us “the 
constellation, the stellar course of the mystery” 267 mirroring the dual nature of the field 
of nihility for Nishitani. Both Gestell and the field of nihility can be inauthentically 
experienced as anxious meaninglessness or authentically experienced as the integral self-
identity of self and absolute nothingness, and the manner of this experience of their 
realization would seem to determine whether Gestell is indeed a destining. 
 Gestell as given by Ereignis is called a granting by Heidegger “For it is granting 
that first conveys to man that share in revealing which the coming-to-pass of revealing 
needs”268  revealing the responsibility of and Being's need of mortals for bringing to 
presence. The essence of Gestell as a granting seems to be itself conditional upon man's 
adopting a free relation to it; challenging-forth as supreme danger is only a granting “if 
in this destining the saving power is said to grow.” 269 Gestell is a granting if as a destining 
it gives rise to the saving power, it only gives rise to the saving power if we begin to pay 
it heed. Heidegger's use of conditionals seem to imply the status of the essence of 
technology as a granting, is determined by our stance towards that truth. Gestell is a 
granting once seen as a destining that starts us on a way of revealing; it is only a destining 
when we realize it as such. 
 This is a consequence of the identity of ontology and its existential realization; 
that the ontologies of Heidegger and Nishitani are a condition of possibility for their 
existential realization yet are also only made possible by such realization. Gestell only is 
as both danger and destining on the basis of a projective interpretation based on the 
experience of Gestell as danger. This problem was outlined in previous chapters on  
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Śūnyatā acting as its own condition of possibility and is to be addressed over the following 
chapters in terms of the Turn as a projective moment. 
Origin of Danger and Saving 
The origin of both metaphysical and meditative thought is the withdrawal of Being that 
calls thought to Ereignis from the null self as so claimed. Such origin as "that from which 
and by which something is what it is and as it is"270 is the nothingness that both gives 
metaphysics and will give rise to its surmounting, and only is in terms of what it realizes, 
or can possibly realize. Nihilism names this realization of appropriation that is determined 
by the nihility of reality so that Gestell is the completion of this realization of Nothing. 
This problematic relation of realization relates to the previous discussion of epochal 
history in chapter 3, that this origin that is to be retrieved can be seen as pertaining both 
to ahistorical Ereignis that gives history (elemental awareness), yet is also to events within 
the given history of Being. The former sense is to be reached by stepping back along the 
way thought has traced in the latter sense so that "thinking in a way leads us away from 
what has been thought so far in philosophy"271  so that we may "behold it with respect to 
what constitutes the source of this entire thinking";272 oblivion itself as such that gives 
metaphysics. 
 Ma and Brakel explore the ambiguity in Heidegger's notion of origin; that the 
“expression seems to refer to the historically concrete beginning of 'European-Western 
philosophy.' On the other hand, Heidegger stresses that this term should not be 
simplistically taken in a literally geographic sense.”273 That the homecoming to origin 
that counters homelessness does not pertain to a nation but "in the context of a 
belongingness to the destiny of the West. But even the West is not thought 
regionally...merely as Europe, but rather world-historically out of nearness to the 
source."274 But this view is mitigated by Heidegger's references to Greek language (and 
thus its German descendant) as being most rooted in the primordial experience of Being 
so that “It is hard to believe that the German language as mentioned...is a reference only 
to something that is ontological or epochal, rather than to the German language as 
normally understood and used.”275 That the danger for Europe is that its thinking "is 
falling behind in the essential course of a dawning world destiny which nevertheless in 
the basic traits of its essential provenance remains European by definition"276 also roots 
Gestell as world-historical to a specifically Western source. 
 Ma and Brakel suggest these contradictions on the nature of historical origin can 
be reconciled by seeing them in “the epochal/ontological and ontic senses 
simultaneously”277 as both ontologically word-historical and in the more everyday notion 
of history as taking place in a specific time and place. Such a reconciliation would require 
simultaneity not to be taken as exclusive; if the Western metaphysics originating in the 
Greek is the only realization of the originary event then Being seems reduced to a single 
specific history. Such exclusivity is suggested by Heidegger's ruling out of a non-Western 
origin for the saving power; as he sees such manners of thought as sharing a 
fundamentally different origin even when those traditions stem from the same ahistorical 
sense of appropriation (albeit manifested in different historical actualities). But if it is  
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origin in the ontological sense prior to the Greek that is to be retrieved then the Greek is 
not the only way back into that origin. 
 Whilst the ontological sense of origin is Ereignis Heidegger's in regards to the 
linear narrative of metaphysics completed in Gestell "The beginnings of that 
interpretation reach back to Plato and Aristotle"278 placing the origin of that narrative in 
Greek thought with "the development of the sciences within the field that philosophy 
opened up"279. But such thought did not emerge in an intellectual or historical vacuum, 
whilst its historical origin may be lost to recorded history it can only be called primordial 
in relation to the incomplete narrative history constructed by Heidegger; the locating of 
the beginning in the Greek only makes sense in terms of the completion of metaphysics 
in the greatest danger. The Greek "is ultimately only one beginning of thinking among 
others and perhaps discloses the origin of thinking in a one-sided and distorted way"280 
an origin shared by other historical manifestations of nihilism. Western metaphysics is 
not a discrete historical process and Heidegger seems to overlook non-Greek influences 
upon it and to be “thinking metaphysically in accordance with a binary opposition 
between ‘East’ and ‘West’”.281  
 In terms of the narrative history the Greek is closest to an ahistorical origin thus 
the most fitting signpost to that which must truly be retrieved; closer than the metaphysics 
that it forms the earliest known influence upon. But if Heidegger's earlier comments that 
the origin gives history in a manner non-reducible to a linear sequence (and that Gestell 
is the first flashing of such Ereignis) are taken into account such ontological origin 
permeates every epoch of Western history. Greek thought could be no closer to the origin 
of thought that the epochs it precedes; and Gestell as the realization of nothingness 
(suchness/nihility) would be closer to the universal origin of human Dasein than any 
epochal stage of the narrative of Western Dasein. Heidegger later moves away from 
prioritizing a retrieval of Greek thought as a primordial experience, claiming "The natural 
concept of truth does not mean unconcealment, not in the philosophy of the Greeks 
either...only...in the sense of correctness and reliability, not in the sense of 
unconcealment...we must acknowledge the fact that alētheia, unconcealment in the sense 
of the clearing of presence, was originally experienced only as orthotēs, as the correctness 
of representations and statements."282 The Greek becomes a signpost on the way to 
Ereignis so that we must "experience alētheia in a Greek manner as unconcealment and 
then, above and beyond the Greek, think it as the clearing of self-concealing"283 to reach 
the true origin of thought. 
 Hodge questions whether an origin such as the Greek is capable of being 
identified, that Gestell and the Greek are not integrally linked to each other or inaugural 
Ereignis; “The irreversible historical event of the emergence of Europe as Europe seems 
to be conflated by Heidegger with the ontological event of the repeated self-presentation 
and erasure of ontological difference,"284 with such conflation previously mentioned as 
between the history of Being beyond comprehension and the incomplete historical 
narrative of metaphysics. Where Ma and Brakel see simultaneity Hodge sees unwarranted 
conflation that once removed means thought can return to questioning without returning 
to the Greek and that whilst Western metaphysics was conducive to Gestell did not lead 
necessarily to it. 
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Dialogue with Origin 
Such simultaneity and conflation are not mutually exclusive. A necessary connection 
between the two senses of origin does not entail a conflation of the ontological and ontic 
if this identity does not exhaust the possible realizations of the ontological origin; if the 
Greek thought that starts metaphysics on its way is seen as one signpost back to the true 
origin of that way. This possibility is considered in A Dialogue on Language where 
Heidegger accepts the possibility of a single shared source yet remains hesitant to the 
point of doubtful due to not yet having thought the nature of Western language that he 
sees as necessary preparation for such dialogue. Despite lamenting that as the Japanese 
language was unknown to him he did not know whether what he was "trying to think of 
as the nature of language is also adequate for the nature of Eastasian language"285 
Heidegger also presumes a difference in houses of Being that his self-professed ignorance 
would seem to rule out him making. His collaborator who thinks in both language-groups 
seems more hopeful; to the extent of taking the Western phenomenon of metaphysics as 
appropriate for certain Japanese terms (like Iki as aesthetics). 
 Heidegger claims Gestell must first self-surmount as a precondition for planetary 
dialogue; future thought might be planetary but the preparatory dialogue for this first 
requires separate responses to Gestell. The dialogue with the Greek origin that 
"everywhere comes to encounter us and approaches us"286 in Gestell "remains for us the 
precondition of the inevitable dialogue with the East Asian world" 287 that for "which 
participants are by no means equal today." 288 Ma and Brakel hold the dialogue has a 
misleading title as it is not true dialogue since “step by step Heidegger turns the essay 
into an elaboration of his own philosophy of language”289 as the search for the home of 
essential Western Saying. They conclude that Heidegger only engaged with Eastern 
thought in terms of a possible future dialogue once the Greek and Eastern origins had 
been independently retrieved as ways back to the true originary appropriation. Implicit in 
this is the idea that the Nothingness that befalls Eastern Being is not purely that of 
European nihilism under the guise of Gestell, else that which saves outside the West 
would have a wholly other origin to the danger. The origin to be retrieved as precondition 
for planetary dialogue must be one indicated by the early thought of its participants but 
in no way simply reducible to them. 
 The retrieval of the essential Saying of the Greek origin as leading to that of the 
universal sense of origin makes such a return the basis for universal dialogue; "The 
thinking of the unthought of this imperishable Western beginning, however...is also the 
liberation of thought from its parochial mould and its meeting with the unthought of the 
other few, really great beginnings in human history."290 The new beginning comes from a 
nihility that is not culturally bounded like the nihilisms it gave rise to. The origin of 
Western metaphysics is nothing Western, yet its realization as metaphysics is so. The self-
surmounting is achieved from this universal origin yet (perhaps correctly) for Heidegger 
retains its culturally bounded nature due to its relation to metaphysics. The transformation 
has universal source "Yet it is finite, in the sense that it does not claim to make an absolute 
beginning but can emerge only as mediated by the course of the Western metaphysical 
tradition and its thinking of Being, as still linked to that which it seeks to overcome."291   
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 If the retrieval of the ontic Western origin is preparatory to the inevitable dialogue 
to come then the Western surmounting of Gestell gets its meaning from the projected 
planetary dialogue that thus guides the retrieval of metaphysics. The planetary dialogue 
permeates and conditions the prior Western dialogue with its own historic origin, 
constituting the self-surmounting of Gestell and guiding what is to be retrieved from 
metaphysics; a universal sense of origin prior to both cultural realizations to provide the 
horizon for such a dialogue. Such is to be found in the affinities between Ereignis and 
Śūnyatā as the shared nothingness of Da-Sein; both houses of Being are founded upon 
this abgrund. 
 Man as determined by Da-Sein is a universal conception of the human not just 
Western man else it would be historically contingent rather than what gives history. Origin 
as ontological only seems to make sense with a universal aspect, all cultures have 
structures of meaning thus a shared relation to how meaning arises (the conditions of its 
possibility). Metaphysics as nihilism is a contingent cultural manifestation of universal 
nihility; the Greek is the earliest recorded part of this process that flows from universal 
Da-Sein not Western Dasein. If Ereignis gives history and is thus not part of its linear 
temporal structure  then this nihility that gives seems best understood as universal and 
innate to human disclosure given other affinities. 
 That the self-transformation of nihilism into the self-realization of reality is 
always of a specific historical kind means we can realize universal nihility only through 
its cultural manifestation that began in the Greek. Eastern thought cannot be solely used 
but can help contextualize Western nihilism and explicate its relation to original universal 
nihility; if the origin of Western nihilism is an instantiation of the universal origin of 
nihility then approaches to other manifestations are a valid aid. Whilst the self-
transformation of nihilism must always be that of a specific cultural manifestation of 
nihility Heidegger's onus on the Greek seems to be an over-emphasis on how such 
nihilism originates in a uniquely Western source rather than universal nihility. The 
supreme danger as necessary to all destining is a universal danger; that thereby can entail 
a universal response. The cure can only come from same source as the danger, but this 
source must be seen in ontological not ontic sense; with the latter (history of Western 
metaphysics) only indicating the former as what is to form future projective criteria so 
that pluralistic universality is the projective interpretation of the preparatory dialogue. 
Danger and Saving as Projective 
The possible conflation of the senses of origin in the narrative of linear withdrawal and 
Heidegger's talk of a retrieval of poiesis and primordial experience of Being leads to some 
commentators holding that “The world of the fourfold as articulated in ‘The Thing’ is 
essentially a Presocratic Greek world ruled by myth".292 But in such an interpretation of 
oblivion "we presuppose what we should perhaps not presuppose at all, that such a way 
to Being has at some time existed and that a thinking on Being has already thought Being 
as Being." 293 Given that Gestell is the first flashing of Ereignis (and Śūnyatā first requires 
the transition through nihility) the shared origin to be retrieved cannot be historically (or 
ecologically, theistically, mythologically, etc) interpreted as a return to a more natural pre-
metaphysical experience of Being. Yet the very notions of origin and retrieval, and 
Heidegger's earlier discussed projective narrative raise the question of on what basis the 
new saving epoch is to be projected if not such a return. 
 The completion of metaphysics is the condition of possibility for its self-
surmounting, but the projected self-surmounting itself determines the nature of what was 
completed by the gathering of its utmost possibilities. It is a projected destiny “that 
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permits the significance of the beginning of a process to be grasped only at its moment of 
completion.”294 Hodge remarks on how human existence as “structured through given 
meanings and the production of new meanings, in the twin structure of thrownness and 
projection”295 leads to Heidegger's narrative of the self-surmounting of metaphysics 
prioritizing throwness (claim of Being) in the history of metaphysics and projection in 
the overcoming of Gestell. This relates to what was earlier said on Heidegger's manner of 
interpreting the meaning of texts in the context of present concerns for the sake of 
projection; of previous thinkers as means for his futural projection based on his 
experience of a need. Hodge argues Heidegger's readings form a prospective history 
guided by his ethical commitments in which “He is using these readings to address 
himself to current and future conditions, understood to be in a state of extreme crisis”296 
opening him up to accusations that he reads modern oppositions back into the tradition 
and then declares the tradition to lead to them. 
 Mizoguchi considers how the grounding of the new destining in the prior historical 
unfolding of the shared origin makes the self-surmounting of Gestell essentially 
projective; "the world of the Fourfold presented in 'The Thing' covertly plays the role of 
fore-project for Heidegger's thought"297 that is anticipated as "the critical horizon for the 
ontological interpretation in a broad sense of the present technological world."298 Not 
only does the coming first thinging of the thing depend upon the completion of 
metaphysics; only such thinging enables the characterization of the 'deficiency' of the 
modern age to make sense. In the absence of a prior horizon for evaluating the new and 
old destinings (Gestell and Fourfold) Mizoguchi suggests that releasement as their 
simultaneous affirmation and negation provides this horizon; "The fore-project guiding 
Heidegger's thought may best be sought within the 'and' linking Enframing and the 
Fourfold - and the domain opened up through their relationship might provide for the first 
time a criterion for interpretation."299 That Heidegger is not so much aiming for the poetic 
dwelling of the fourfold but a horizon for a unifying dialogue between Gestell and 
Fourfold; between calculative and meditative thought. 
 The circular nature of interpretation and understanding is not necessarily thereby 
rendered into a vicious circle; but the fore-having of the projective moment must be drawn 
non-arbitrarily and held open to constant revision and whether what calls for thought from 
out of the self can provide criteria for the fore-having is to be addressed in chapter 6. The 
fore-having is derived from the call of the self as absolute nothingness that speaks of the 
need and destitution of the modern age, but this experience of destitution only is in light 
of the projection based upon it; Śūnyatā/Ereignis is both origin and what is retrieved thus 
beyond the normal horizon of significance from which criteria of retrieval are derived. 
The ground for the projection is the danger, but the danger only is in terms of the 
projection; Ereignis and Śūnyatā only are when realized as such. Yet both Heidegger and 
Nishitani, when speaking of Ereignis and Śūnyatā as ontological, speak as if such 
ontologies are operative even when not brought to awareness. That their realization is 
marked by the sive of understanding-sive-actualization suggests that as projective they 
are only operative when we realize them as such in the awareness of Da, a realization 
based on their being already operative thus a more vicious circle than normal projective 
interpretation. 
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 If the self-surmounting is taken as projective to allow the first thinging yet is also 
a return to the prior ontological origin of universal nihility the new destining must be 
radically new yet preserve the nothingness that manifested in Gestell from a universal 
origin as contingently shaped by the Greek experience of nothingness. 
Danger saves as danger 
Whilst The Question Concerning Technology talks of the danger indicating the saving 
power The Turning talks more of it as the saving power; "In the coming to presence of 
the danger, where it is as the danger, is the turning about into the safekeeping, is the 
safekeeping itself, is the saving power of Being." 300  As the advent of the saving power 
is to arise from a claim of Being that currently is as Gestell then Gestell does not simply 
reveal the possibility of saving, Gestell itself as the oblivion of Being is also that which 
saves. 
 Gestell is the current destining and any new destining must issue from the same 
origin that manifested as Gestell. The turn in the withdrawal of Being is "neither a 
destruction nor even a denial"301 of metaphysics but a full working out of the tradition 
that thus gives rise naturally to its successor through understanding its origin. There is 
only the language of metaphysical philosophy with which to try to articulate the new 
thought;  "only what has already been thought prepares what has not yet been thought".302 
The completion of nihilism in Gestell is also a restoration of metaphysics that "is the 
restoration of the oblivion of Being."303 The nothingness that belongs to Being is the 
essence of metaphysics that is to be restored. The self-withdrawal of Being (which 
belongs to its essence) is itself the essence of metaphysics; "The oblivion belongs to the 
difference because the difference belongs to the oblivion. The oblivion does not happen 
to the difference only afterward, in consequence of the forgetfulness of human thinking." 
304 Gestell as the completion of this is also accordingly "in its essence, the mystery of 
Being itself, a mystery that is unthought because withheld." 305   
 Such restoration and claims as to a shared origin implies shared elements drawn 
afresh, not simply that Gestell and the saving power have a shared essence as sendings 
but that Gestell as its own specific kind of revealing is related to that which saves. If every 
destining is necessarily dangerous and characterized by a manner of withdrawal as the 
way that Being directs us to beings then the destiny Heidegger seeks to retrieve will share 
such features with the metaphysical tradition that leads to the greatest danger. As was said 
in chapter 3 "If a change in Being - i.e., now, in the coming to presence of Enframing - 
comes to pass, then this in no way means that technology, whose essence lies in 
Enframing, will be done away with" 306 with the implication that if technology remains 
then Gestell as its essence must also still endure in some fashion (albeit altered). Not only 
is danger as such to be preserved in the new sending, Gestell as itself is to be preserved 
(saved). 
 The tension between transition and continuity within the relation of the new 
thought to that which shares its origin leads to an ambiguity in how any new destining 
may resemble Gestell. If the self-surmounting of Gestell is paralleled to the progression 
towards the unity of the fields then it must be asked in what way the field of nihility is to 
be found in Śūnyatā in the final realization of this self-identity of the fields; how the new 
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poetic dwelling is to be shaped by the Gestell that realized its shared null origin. One 
possible interpretation of such  simultaneous affirmation and negation of Gestell is a 
delineation of spheres of applicability, that Nishitani would deny as a simple restricting 
of religion and science to separate domains, another that it permeates the new thought and 
retains an identity with it. 
Spheres of applicability 
Heidegger's later dichotomy of calculative and meditative thought seemingly reverses the 
inter-penetration of the danger and saving power leading to the impression that the current 
epochal revealing is to be contextualized but partitioned from thought. That "There 
are...two kinds of thinking, each justified and needed in its own way: calculative thinking 
and meditative thinking" 307  yet we must also "pit meditative thinking decisively against 
merely calculative thinking"308 this distinguishes them as discrete and denigrates the 
'mere' calculative thinking despite saying each is needed. Whilst both thinkers stress an 
identity of fields, or of saving and danger, they also at times prioritize one amidst what 
should be a self-identical unity, as was said in the introduction at times both Heidegger 
and Nishitani seem to take a polemical approach that obscures the truth of their thought. 
 These comments imply calculative thought is to remain as it is rather than being 
transformed leading to commentators interpreting the simultaneous affirmation and 
negation of Gestell in releasement as a separating out of spheres of influence/applicability 
so that our approach to Gestell should be to "learn to live with it by not paying excessive 
heed to it or getting obsessed with surmounting it."309 Havas believes that Heidegger 
thinks we cannot resist Gestell but must "express our obedience to it in a form other than 
blind acceptance"310 and must instead confine technological-calculative thought to the 
appropriate aspects of our life without letting it dominate; "The doctrine of the will to 
power is the metaphysics of the marketplace; it shows us what it makes sense to say there. 
But it also tempts us to think that we are confined within the marketplace, unable to hear 
any voices from outside." 311 That all is required is a re-contextualizing of Gestell as no 
longer the sole possible disclosure; "that it become aware of its own foundations and 
through this self-awareness rid itself of the pretence of being the ur-voice of Being."312 
But this overlooks that beholding the danger is only the first necessary step and that 
without a transformation of Gestell itself "the attempts that are being made...to master 
technology with the help of traditional values"313 only attest to its power by treating the 
world of the marketplace as estranged from the self, reinforcing the alienation of self and 
world as in the subject-object dichotomy. 
 As was said in chapter 3 Discourse on Thinking also treats machine technology as 
the ontic correlate to Gestell leading to the free relation being portrayed in simpler terms 
of bondage to technical devices so that it is contextualizing machines rather than more 
radical change that is needed; "We can use technical devices as they ought to be used, and 
also let them alone as something which does not affect our inner and real core. We can 
affirm the unavoidable use of technical devices, and also deny them the right to dominate 
us, and so to warp, confuse, and lay waste our nature."314 The simultaneous affirmation 
and negation here seems to be towards technical devices not the essence of technology; 
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treating such devices as "things which are nothing absolute but remain dependent upon 
something higher"315 rather than a concern with the freeing or saving of Gestell itself. 
This lends credence to the view that Heidegger desired a contextualizing or partition of 
types of thought; that the affirmation of Gestell is simply the conditional acceptance of 
machine technology in a way that inverts a relation of mastery placing calculative thought 
in service to 'something higher'. This would seem to be a much less nuanced approach to 
technology than in his earlier concerns with the question. 
 Such a preservation of Gestell would maintain it in distinction from meditative 
thought rather than realize the identity of the danger with that which saves indicated by 
the simultaneous yes and no to technology. If Gestell is to affirmed then it must be so on 
the basis of the claim that it is, rather than its shared origin with poiesis or what it may 
lead to, and if it is to be denied simultaneously this cannot simply be delineating a sphere 
of validity, which would remain partial affirmation rather than true negation. Nihility and 
thus nihilism must  be affirmed and denied equally and totally; the simultaneous 
affirmation and negation cannot be a simple partitioning of spheres or contextualization 
that moves no further. What is needed is a realization of the self-identity of affirmaion-
sive-negation in releasement; that Gestell is the saving power and in the new epochal 
dwelling both the danger and saving are both affirmed and denied as the same since both 
calculative and meditative thought stem from the same claim of nothingness. The new 
rootedness to "be granted again to man, a foundation and ground out of which man's 
nature and all his works can flourish in a new way even in the atomic age"316 must be a 
rootedness specific to the current age, our flourishing remains one within the age of 
Gestell as what is already granted as our destining. Simply recognizing the contingency 
of technological understanding to re-contextualize it and behold the danger is not enough, 
although it is a necessary preparatory step towards realizing the self-identity of the 
calculative and meditative within nihility. 
 The affinities between Heidegger and Nishitani's thought on the danger also 
highlight  four related pertinent differences that bring out themes to be addressed. 
 Firstly; that for Nishitani the transition between the fields is a more personal than 
epochal transformation due to his greater emphasis on ontology as existentially realized, 
highlighting problems with how both thinkers deal with the relation between ontology 
and its existential realization. Secondly and related to this is that for Nishitani nihility is 
(like anxiety) by necessity transitional and must revert to the field of consciousness or 
pass beyond into that of Śūnyatā, whereas for Heidegger there is the danger that Gestell 
is a lasting or even final destining. Both of these points are to be addressed in the next 
chapter in terms of the tension in Heidegger's thought between the plurality of Dasein and 
the singular epochal understanding of Being and what this means for the viability of the 
notion of danger. 
 Thirdly; whilst the danger of nihility and Gestell are both portrayed as positive 
opportunities their relation to what came before differs in emphasis. The field of nihility 
is presented as more 'real' than that of Consciousness but Gestell is not presented as a 
more primordially real view of reality than metaphysical epochs, despite its closer relation 
to the indicating of Ereignis than that of such understandings. Combined with Nishitani's 
stronger emphasis on the identity of the saving and danger (samsāra-sive-nirvāna) this 
implies a different role for Gestell within the saving destining. The manner in which 
Gestell could be said to be revealing real reality and its identity with that which saves is 
to be the main concern of the third section of the thesis. 
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 Fourthly, whilst both the appropriative belonging of Da-Sein and the field of 
Śūnyatā are primordial and self-identical with nihility for Nishitani Śūnyatā has already 
been realized in the enlightenment of Bodhisattvas and does not represent anything as 
unprecedented as the thinging of the thing or as radically new as the coming destining. 
Thus Nishitani has a more readily defined set of criteria for the realization of that which 
saves; both narrowing its possibilities yet also providing a more well defined framework 
for the retrieval of those possibilities, the former point is taken up in third part of thesis 
the latter in chapter 6. 
2.5. Viability of the Danger 
The Nature of Danger 
An experience of danger presupposes a horizon of concern; the very notion of danger 
implies a threat to something taken as of value. The experience of danger in Gestell thus 
shares the structure of anxiety as its personal correlate;  just as anxiety requires a 'for' and 
'in the face of' the notion of danger requires a horizon of concern for what is threatened 
and a viable threat. For anxiety Dasein is both the for and in the face of which Dasein is 
anxious, so too for the supreme danger both the threat and threatened is Ereignis itself. 
But the anxiety of Dasein can be personally attested and relates to a very real possibility 
of impossibility disclosed in death. Such attestation and impossibility do not seem 
applicable to Ereignis. 
 Discourse on Thinking comes closest to presenting Heidegger's thought on the 
danger in the form of a traditional argument; if calculative thought becomes the only way 
of thinking "Then man would have denied and thrown away his own special nature - that 
he is a meditative being. Therefore, the issue is the saving of man's essential nature. 
Therefore, the issue is keeping meditative thinking alive."317 Two issues are raised by this 
argument. Firstly, if human existence simply is the appropriative relation and cannot come 
to presence differently then the danger of losing our 'essential nature' through the total 
obscurement of the Da-Sein relation does not seem viable. Secondly, if it is possible that 
human existence as Dasein may succumb to the supreme danger,  thus how human 
existence comes to presence be transformed, then the criteria for the preservation of this 
'special nature' must be established. The first issue is to be dealt with in this chapter, the 
second in the following chapter. 
Viability of Danger 
The question of the viability of the danger revolves around the issue of whether it is 
possible for the human not to be Dasein. As has been noted Heidegger at times seems to 
both affirm and deny this as a possibility but on ultimate balance his comments are to be 
taken as saying no matter how forgetful, fallen or inauthentic Dasein is we always are 
Dasein. The danger is not so much that we lost the nature of our existence as claimed but 
that we become forgetfully claimed in a certain way so as to prohibit the possibility of 
alternate epochal understandings. 
 If the supreme danger is that Gestell becomes the sole valid revealing of the real 
then the viability of such danger depends on whether any destinal understanding can be 
totally determinative of an epoch and the disclosures of Dasein. Whether Gestell as a 
manner of appropriation is so all-encompassing that counter-understandings and other 
possibilities are obscured completely and Ereignis ends 'itself' by no longer giving 
considering chapter 3's questioning as to the co-existence/interpenetration of epochal 
understandings. 
 





 Heidegger portrays each epoch as determined by a single understanding of the real 
that "holds complete dominion over all the phenomena that distinguish the age".318 
Identification of what counts as 'distinguishing an age' would seem to be determined by 
the single understanding of the real, that itself is made pre-dominant  in light of the 
features selected as distinguishing the age. If not all phenomena within an age distinguish 
it (as Heidegger implies in What are Poets For? with reference to scattered appearances 
of challenging-forth) then the perspective from which the judgement regarding 
distinguishing phenomena is to be made would seem to be from that of the single 
understanding of the real, that must itself have been gleaned from already pre-
distinguished phenomena. The question of what can be said to distinguish an age is not 
thereby rendered into a vicious circle, but nor must the question of how distinguishing 
phenomenon are to be determined by the projective interpretation be begged, and why 
Heidegger holds that it must be a single understanding that determines an age remain 
unquestioned. 
 The one who determines the phenomena that distinguish the age from the 
perspective of the single understanding is Dasein. Yet as was discussed Dasein names 
both the individual and collective and both senses of the term have differing implications 
for the question of whether their revealing of the real can be determined by a single 
understanding with complete dominion. Heidegger would perhaps suggest that those who 
reveal what distinguishes an age are the poets and pivotal thinkers; those who shape the 
shared destinal heritage whom the vast majority stand under the claim of. Watts point out 
the discrepancy that Heidegger must hold that “some leading-edge thinkers and poets 
who, well ahead of their time, have already been ‘appropriated’ by Ereignis, in spite of 
the fact that it has not yet become the epochal event of appropriation”.319 Heidegger is 
committed to the idea that the single determinative understanding does not have sole 
dominion over revealing (and if we can never not be Dasein, cannot have sole dominion) 
as the poets speak both of that which determines an age and also the possibility of its 
transition. The role of the poets is taken up later in consideration of that which saves but 
for now implies that Gestell is not the primary revealing for the poets who also stand most 
under the current claim. Whether that which determines the epochal understanding 
characterizes collective Dasein or pivotal individual Dasein in order to prevail over the 
phenomenon that distinguish an age it must also be realized by at least the majority of 
individual comportments. This raises the question of the possible extent to which a 
plurality of disclosers can be meaningfully determined by a single unitary understanding. 
 Harries holds Heidegger's world-view idealizes unity at the expense of plurality. 
That his view of Western destiny is too monolithic and "Only this linear view of history 
leads Heidegger to his despairing analysis of the present age as so deeply fallen that all 
attempts to criticize and reform are already caught up in that fall...Heidegger's one-
dimensional interpretation of the modern world is only a caricature of our world."320 By 
dealing with destinal history in terms of prominent thinkers Heidegger conceals other 
vocabularies that co-exist; he reinforces the danger of Gestell by concealing the dynamic 
plethora of disclosures that exist within each epoch. Bernstein accuses Heidegger of 
downplaying the plurality of Dasein in later works when he “speaks of man – not men or 
human beings in their plurality – beings who are at once alike and different in their 
otherness and who in their speech and deeds reveal their uniqueness.”321 Bernstein claims 
that in The Question Concerning Technology Heidegger “speaks as if there are a plurality 
of modes of revealing, but he only explicitly considers two modes; poiesis (bringing-
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forth) and Gestell (challenging-forth).”322 Whilst Harries also notes that in his treatment 
of the Fourfold Heidegger himself indicates other understandings still run throughout his 
narrative; it is not that Heidegger paints a monolithic picture as much as he seems to act 
as if it is when considering possible reactions to Gestell, overlooking alternative solutions 
to his own. Portraying each epoch as under the claim of a single understanding results in 
other modes of revealing, both past and projective, being concealed, creating a false 
either/or decision which results in seeing all human action as a variation of Gestell (cause-
effect) or the higher thinking of poiesis. The notion and viability of the supreme danger 
seem almost imposed upon the history of understandings by Heidegger's characterization 
of an epoch as determined by a single understanding. 
 Olafson holds that this failure to sufficiently differentiate Dasein as individual 
from Dasein as plural leads to the core problem for Heidegger stemming from how in 
Being and Time "he had associated being too closely with individual Dasein and as a 
result was unable to reconcile the singularity and unity of the one with the plurality of the 
other.”323 Olafson claims that this led Heidegger to assert Sein as too independent from 
entities and existence rendering the epochal understanding of Being singular and shifting 
errancy from a structural tendency of Dasein to a feature of epochal withdrawal. But this 
failed to clarify how Sein is prior to those through whose understanding it is realized so 
that “the problem of the unity and singularity of being as presence in its relation to the 
plurality of the entities that understand being or... think it.” 324 remains and leads to the 
seeming over-emphasis on the determinative nature of epochal understanding. 
 Since “Dasein reveals itself as rooted in its historical community only by 
exploring the full depths of its own subjectivity – of its finitude, its freedom, its guilt” an 
epochal understanding of Being (thrown historicity) only is as existentially realized 
within the existence of the individuals living under its understanding. Yet it does not seem 
possible for the reality of lived existence to be dominated by a single understanding of 
the real. Dreyfus highlights the problem when he gives an example from the film 2001 of 
a rational entity only wanting to use all capacities to the maximum and calls it “a brilliant 
expression of what anyone would say who is in touch with our current understanding of 
being.”325 But the current understanding of Being is not something separate from us, it is 
self-identical with the Dasein that needs it and is needed by it. Dreyfus implies there are 
those living in the cultural clearing of Gestell who are not in touch with the current 
understanding of Being, either they do not realize they are determined by it or that they 
operate with a different understanding of Being (to a lesser or greater extent). 
 But as was said previously if one is not realizing (understanding-sive-actualizing) 
the current understanding then one is not determined by it. Heidegger and Nishitani were 
said to be charting their own way of experience; how they are called from the self to 
undergo an experience of the self as nothingness. Gestell as a destinal claim is such a 
response when realized (experienced) as such, yet not all experience the call of nihility 
along the way they trace. In positing Gestell as the sole determinative understanding 
rather than the dominant tendency Heidegger implies those who do not experience this 
epochal claim are either in denial or not realizing they are so claimed, rather than realizing 
the current claim in a different fashion, potentially mischaracterizing the experience of 
many living in the shadow of ontological danger. If the ontological only is as its existential 
realization then it must be noted that many do not reveal reality simply in the manner of 
Gestell, thus indicating that other forms of disclosure are equally present. Distinction 
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needs to be made between the manner of revealing that orders the dominant social system 
and the experiences of those who are partially subsumed within that system. People may 
be partly enframed as passengers in the transport system used to fill planes but for many 
that flight is still a sublime experience bringing them into a greater appreciation of the 
heavens, an experience opened up by the nature of Gestell that thus enables greater access 
to and appreciation of alternate manners of revealing for increased numbers of people. 
 As a public realm Olafson suggests that in language “a kind of reconciliation is 
effected between the plurality of speakers and the singularity of the medium in which, as 
speakers, they move.”326 Language as a singular medium takes precedence over the 
plurality of the speakers as the way the singularity of Sein manifests in the plurality of its 
Da; the epochal understanding of Being as Saying requires a plurality of ontic speakers 
to manifest. The relation of man and language thus correlates to that of Da and Sein, with 
the poet as the conduit for this reconciliation. The relation of language and Ereignis will 
be addressed later with emphasis on the providing of guiding criteria for the epochal 
transformation through the poets naming of the gods. But it should be noted now that for 
Olafson this understanding of language fails as a reconciliation since it is “language itself 
that is being understood in terms of presence.”327 reinforcing the priority of unitary Sein,  
 
possibly due to the emphasis on the speaking of select poets rather than competing and 
complementary shared vocabularies. 
 Olafson claims the fourfold is a similar attempt at such reconcilliation; requiring 
the co-responsibility of the mortal maker to bring about the mirroring that claims us as 
Saying does. Language as Saying and Fourfold as mirroring both provide the contexts 
that make possible individual interpretations of meaning, the prior givenness that allows 
the uncoveredness articulated in human speech. Language and the Fourfold need their 
speakers and mortal makers yet retain a priority over their own conditions of possibility. 
Neither reformulation of the  tension in the relation of dependence between presence and 
existence (ontological and ontic), language and its speakers or the fourfold and mortals, 
satisfies Olafson leading him to conclude Heidegger fails to resolve the core tension that 
unifies his thought. 
Epoch and das Man 
Schatzki argues against Olafson, claiming he assumes Being must have a single clearing 
else be plural and that this is a mistake. For Schatzki the singularity of Being involves the 
commonalities and references between plural clearings; epoch is not mentioned by 
Schatzki but could be understood as "a commonality that holds between a plurality of 
clearings concerning the specific ways of being in which things can manifest 
themselves."328 Schatzki thus posits plural clearings each constituted by an individuals 
possibilities drawn from a communal destinal heritage that reigns as the epochal 
understanding. A parallel is thus drawn with the relation of fate and destiny in Being and 
Time, the latter is not a collection of the formers but prior to it and guides them, yet also 
does not consist in anything beyond them. An epoch (the singularity of Sein) would thus 
be the unifying theme of a plurality of understandings of the real; Language as Saying 
would be Sayings, as it is most properly under the withdrawals of Being which we stand. 
 In his later writings Heidegger talks of the clearing, in The End of Philosophy and 
the Task of Thinking the only reference to multiple possible clearings is the claim that 
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"presence as lingering in the open always remains dependent upon the prevalent 
clearing."329, which still implies a singular dominant understanding. In concentrating on 
Being and Time Schatzki overlooks Heidegger's later onus on a single epochal 
determination of all possibilities, and the issue of whether any single revealing of the real 
can prevail in all (or most / all significant) clearings. But whilst not fully defending 
Heidegger from Olafson's critique Schatzki does indicate how core notions from Being 
and Time can inform the characterization of Gestell from The Question Concerning 
Technology. One such way is how Schatzski attributes the resolution to the singularity-
plurality tension identified by Olafson to how the same present-at-hand entities are 
showing themselves in all clearings in common modes of Being, according to shared 
traditional possibilities. This invoking of the present-at-hand relies on Being and Time's 
stance towards entities as bereft of Being, and accords with the discussion of the 
homeground of jitai as that from which revealings of the real emanate. The notion of the 
presence-at-hand of entities is less pronounced in Heidegger's later thought, but its 
possibilities and relation to Gestell will be later considered in discussion of science and 
suchness. The more immediately relevant theme of Being and Time to the total nature of 
epochal understanding is that of das Man. 
 In making an epoch determined by a single understanding Heidegger identifies a 
tendency he previously attributed to das Man as structurally constitutive of Dasein and 
widens its scope to the destinal sending of Being. The Memorial Address gives the ontic 
correlates to ontological homelessness as television and other forms of mass 
communication that have become closer to Germans than their native village life, so too 
does Being and Time's discussion of the uniformity of das Man invoke how "In utilizing 
public means of transport and in making use of information services such as the 
newspaper, every Other is like the next." 330  Just as Gestell is the leveling of every rank 
down into uniformity the "care of averageness reveals in turn an essential tendency of 
Dasein which we call the 'leveling down' of all possibilities of Being." 331 Yet das Man as 
a primordial existentiale "belongs to Dasein's positive constitution" 332 as the  source of 
Dasein's ontological understanding, so that authenticity "is rather an existentiell 
modification of the 'they' - of the 'they as an essential existentiale." 333 The plurality of 
understandings levelled by Gestell and the uniformity of das Man are both manners in 
which metaphysics as nihilism preserves the treasures of Being as noted in chapter 4, the 
notions can be paralleled as both shelter possibilities preserving them for retrieval and are 
in necessary relation to an authentic counter-tendency. 
 Whilst das Man was a dominant revealing we tended towards it was also always 
integrally related to authentic retrieval as a counter tendency, it was the prevalent 
understanding of Being Dasein falls towards but far from the only mode of revealing. 
Furthermore Das Man did not seem to be an entire cultural understanding but one that 
was tied to a single identity within a society; what 'one' does was relative to ones position 
and role thus das Man was never a single unified force that determined entire epochs but 
a structural tendency within each context of disclosure. How 'one' reveals is dependent 
on context; challenging-forth is only what 'one' does in certain situations. An epochal 
destining seems more absolute than this in the determining of the possible self-
understandings of the individual; which themselves thus seem far more restricted. Human 
revealers of meaning are extremely capable of cognitive dissonance and grasping a single 
thing under many paradigms, of inhabiting multiple vocabularies as the situation 
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demands, and the understanding of an age is determined by the plural ontic disclosers 
who live under that claim. As Nishitani earlier noted; even scientists do not think 
scientifically in their personal lives. 
 The earlier noted move from 'Dasein' to 'man'; from 'mineness' to 'ourness', that 
accompanies shifting the onus on errancy from falling to the withdrawal of Being 
obscures the plurality of understandings operative even within the perspective of a single 
individual. The individual responsibility for disclosure is increasingly subsumed into a 
collective responsibility, disclosure becomes epochal-communal and Dasein's numerous 
worlds (Umwelt, etc) become a singular shared epoch. Through this shift moods such as 
anxiety that previously attuned individual Dasein now attune communal Dasein within 
an epoch. The fundamental attunement of moods become how we correspond to the 
epochal claim and moods that in Being and Time seemed ahistorical and possible of 
attuning Dasein in different ways in rapid succession now become historically discrete 
and all-pervasive within an age. Anxiety made epochal becomes Gestell, with all the 
attendent problems previously outlined in relation to how Heidegger and Nishitani 
universalize from their own experience in a manner that allows no counterpoint. 
 Rather than determined by a single dominant understanding an epoch seems best 
understood as a cluster of understandings that are related but non-reducible to each other. 
This plurality of understandings of the real are related to each other by a dominant 
attunement, but what characterizes the phenomenon that distinguish an age is this relation 
rather than the dominant attunement itself or any single understanding of the real. The 
understanding that determines an age is nothing more than the plurality of our societal 
understanding, that conditions the possible understandings of the individual. Heidegger 
tends to subsume such plurality into a singular understanding of Being, his shifting 
interpretation of the nature of Dasein results in a deceptively monolithic interpretation of 
epochal disclosure. Once such a view is taken it becomes inevitable that a total disclosure 
like Gestell will be perceived, but the viability of the supreme danger first requires that 
world-views be considered as inherently determined by single understandings. 
 If Gestell is the determinative understanding of the modern epoch then it is related 
to all phenomena that distinguish the age. One of the phenomenon that distinguishes the 
age is a proliferation of co-existing understandings and concern with the role and status 
of 'otherness', an increased embrace of pluralistic theories, multiculturalism and a 
resistance to totalizing narratives which informs the lived existence of those under the 
claim of Gestell as much as the unifying revealing of challenging-forth. Seeing Gestell as 
the sole understanding rather than a manner of relating a plurality of understandings leads 
to Dreyfus' claim that modern Western culture “is the only culture that tries to make the 
social and natural order total by transforming or destroying all exceptions”334 and that the 
only resistance to Gestell comes from marginal practices that are levelled. Yet Gestell can 
also be seen as the preservation of all marginal practices within a greater shared 
framework required for differences to open up. 
 If Gestell is seen as a dominant attunement that relates an increasing plurality or 
diversity of understandings, and this relation is what characterizes the phenomena that 
distinguish the age, then Gestell 's relation to alternate revealings of the real is more 
complex than that of a danger; even of one that also indicates a saving power. A 
multiplication of ontic ways of being seems to have accompanied the ontological 
totalizing of Gestell ; a more total and dominating attunement has paradoxically been 
accompanied by the relating of an increasing plurality of understandings. The relation of 
tension between Gestell and plurality can be paralleled to that of authenticity and 
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inauthenticity; two structural tendencies the tension between which opens up the clearing 
of the modern epoch. They could even be said to be mutually constituted; the attunement 
of Gestell providing a horizon of equality required for and realized by a proliferation of 
understandings a mutual homelessness that provides a horizon in which disparate 
vocabularies can dwell together. 
 The leisure industry, mechanization of agriculture, mass communication and 
universal yet narrower education; all demonstrate and are made possible by Gestell yet 
also enable increased numbers access to experiences conducive to more authentic 
multifarious ways of revealing. Hodge takes this “completion of metaphysics in the 
spread of technical relations throughout the world to be the occasion for the dispersal of 
philosophy to all human beings, in place of a more traditional exclusiveness”335 her claim 
that this can represent the realization of democratic ideals is to be considered more later 
in relation to ethics. This ambiguous tension within Gestell ; of the ethical danger of the 
loss of specific communal contexts, yet also the abolition of ethical specificity and the 
“implicit ethical commitment to a Euro-Christian will to superiority”336 highlights the 
double-edged sword of Gestell's levelling of rank and uniform universality. Gestell thus 
contains its own inherent resistance to its danger; it is necessarily related to a pluralism 
of understandings and this relation can itself provide an alternate saving power to poiesis. 
Whilst this balancing of a relation of mutual tension is reminiscent of the earlier discussed 
relation of calculative and meditative thought this tension is within Gestell not a balancing 
of Gestell ; the realization of Gestell as the sive of nirvāna-sive-samsāra rather than its 
contextualization as one element of such an identity. 
2.6 Context for Danger 
Dreyfus characterizes Heidegger's questioning of nihlism as asking “What is it to have a 
nihilistic clearing, how did we come to have one, and what can we do about it?”337 This 
overlooks the prior question 'what is it to have a clearing where nihilism shows up as 
problematic', as wanting to do something about it presupposes and indicates a further 
unarticulated clearing that sees nihilism as a problem. The greatest danger of the nihilistic 
clearing is the possible oblivion of the clearing as such; that this oblivion be grasped as a 
danger requires a prior horizon to Heidegger's articulation of that danger. If the danger is 
that this destining has the potential or tendency to be more enduring than any other, that 
this may well be the last destining unless we take action (or more precisely inaction) then 
it remains unclear why we should view this as a necessarily negative outcome, a value 
judgement that destining ought to follow this pattern is operative. Heidegger and 
Nishitani both posit the identity of 'ought' and 'is', this axiological element of their thought 
represents the limited nature of the koan as applying to those with a specific experience 
of nihility, there is a reliance upon a shared experience of the problematic; of the nature 
of modernity and the religious quest or experience of Being. 
 Human existence is entwined with nihilism as the self-withdrawal of Sein; the 
oblivion of Being with the meaning of Being. If the inherent tendency of the appropriative 
process is for Sein to progressively withdraw in order to reveal beings more completely, 
if destining is danger as such and Gestell the most dangerous destining as the fullest 
withdrawal of Being,  then the greatest danger is also the greatest revealing that discloses 
the bare suchness of the reality of the real, the pure nihility that surpasses what is disclosed 
on the field of consciousness in its reality. To be human is to disclose beings in virtue of 
our relation to Being as it withdraws, if Gestell is the most total disclosure of beings then 
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so long as the danger is beheld as such it may be seen as the most appropriate 
appropriation; the destining most befitting the nature of Ereignis. If Heidegger's 
conception of what it means to be human culminates in Gestell as the relation to that 
which claims then the imperative to move counter to the withdrawal that culminates in 
the double forgetting also moves against the nature of appropriation itself. The 
impossibility of conceiving of an epochal transformation which also "makes it impossible 
to conceive of the present framing...as a transient structuring rather than a permanent 
fixed frame of reference”338 is only problematic in concert with the desire to keep human 
existence as transitional. If there is a viable danger to the manner in which human 
existence comes to presence then why this radical paradigm shift is to be seen as negative 
rather than the fullest expression of appropriative withdrawal must be laid out. If the 
double forgetting of the supreme danger prevents anxiety (the realization of danger as 
distress) then such forgetting can be seen as a form of thanking; and those who forget 
rather than experience the realization of anxiety are more in accord with the current claim 
of appropriation as sheltering how Being comes to presence in the manner of withdrawal. 
As shepherds of Being and attending to how Being discloses itself we are called to 
respond to the claim of Gestell in such a way that preserves it as Gestell rather than 
attempt to prepare for an alternate destining, given that such preparation co-determines 
any epochal sending. 
 Whilst Heidegger characterizes thinking in terms of values as pure nihilism; as a 
forgetting of Being that "clothes itself in the illusion that it does think Being in the most 
exalted manner, in that it esteems Being as a value"339 this critique is limited to the 
reduction of of meaning to external chosen objects; to representational objects obscuring 
Being so that values becomes sole measure and goal. This limited notion of values stem 
from the desire at the ground of representation; "Value is the objectification of needs as 
goals, wrought by a representing self-establishing within the world as picture."340 Values 
as expressions of will are desires projected onto the world so form an aspect of Gestell as 
the desire to control and reveal totally, objects of choice rather than what claims us. As 
objects values accordingly 'are' only as for a subject and securing that subjectivity rather 
than meaning originating as a gift of Being; objectivity does not exhaust a things being 
"Every valuing, even where it values positively, is a subjectivizing. It does not let beings: 
be. Rather, valuing lets beings: be valid - solely as the objects of its doing."341 Heidegger's 
"opposition to values not as a rejection of value, but as a rejection of the subjectivism that 
he supposes is necessarily built into the affirmation of any system of values. His 
opposition to values is based in his sense of the devaluation of value inherent in supposing 
that there is value only because human beings make evaluations”342 it is valuation as 
devaluing rather than value as action-guiding that is critiqued. Just as Heidegger's 
opposition to humanism is not defence of the inhuman but the opening of new vistas to 
think against values is "to realize that precisely through the characterization of something 
as 'a value' what is so valued is robbed of its worth...by the assessment of something as a 
value what is valued is admitted only as an object for man's estimation."343 This view of 
value as as a pale shadow of true worth leads to the claim that "No one dies for mere 
values" 344 whilst preservation Being's truth demands sacrifice at the expense of our 
human being. 
 Emad regards Heidegger's critique of value as entwined with that of truth as 
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validity; as a critique of the desire for total disclosure of beings and Being so that 
"Heidegger's critique of value begins and ends by revealing the extent to which value is 
tied to, and embodies constant presence"345 rather than thinking in terms of withdrawal 
and concealment. Heidegger's claim that "thinking in values is the greatest blasphemy 
imaginable against Being"346 only serving to "to stress the inaccessible nature of the 
holy."347 Such critique is limited to values as conditions of preservation and enhancement 
in service of subjective will, of valuation as anthropocentric, but all action is guided by 
values if seen in terms of criteria for choice. A looser definition of values as what gives 
meaningful criteria to our lived existence is implied in Heidegger's identification of ought 
and is; values in a wider sense are just the 'ought', what is seen as worthy of preservation. 
The essence of value is that it is 'for' something, if all critique is also for something then 
Heidegger's critique of value is for the awareness of human existence as Ereignis; yet to 
be for something is to hold it up as of value, as worthy of reflection and sacrifice. 
Heidegger keeps his axiological assumptions as unquestioned background thus does not 
render them 'values' in his narrow technical sense, but certainly maintains them in looser 
sense. In preparing a new destinal understanding meditative thought seeks to preserve the 
understanding of our coming-to-presence as appropriated, criteria generated from 
attending to Saying that are to achieve this can be seen as values. Such values are integral 
to Heidegger's project and and the notion of value remains as a form of 'saved' calculative 
thought preserved in self-identity with meditative thought; an element of the field of 
consciousness that is transfigured and retained in sunyata as will soon be discussed in 
terms of anthopocentrism-sive-nonanthropocentrism. 
 Danger only is in reference to a criteria of value; by an evaluation of Being. But 
as the condition for the possibility of disclosing something as significant thus of value it 
seems difficult to discuss the appropriative relation that gives meaning in such terms, thus 
to make sense of how there can be a contextual horizon to apprehend it as endangered. 
Ereignis as the appropriative Da-Sein relation is the condition of possibility for horizons 
of significance, a horizon of significance is the condition of possibility for the notion of 
danger, it seems difficult to coherently discuss possible dangers to the condition of 
possibility for the very possibility of danger. Such a context often seems assumed by 
commentators; Dallmayr says Heidegger "carefully weighs the advances and losses of 
modernity"348 Dreyfus that if we overcome thinking in terms of value and calculation “we 
can, in each case, discuss the pros and cons”349 of Gestell. But such a weighing of pros 
and cons remains a calculation guided by a context of value thus within the remit of a 
particular epochal understanding rather than being capable of adjudicating between such 
understandings. 
 If the justification for any epochal understanding is that it is how Being claims us 
such sendings are in a sense beyond justification and we can no more or less question 
why we should accept a new understanding of the sense of Being than we can question 
why we should have accepted previous ones. This raises the issue of the basis on which 
Heidegger claims we should prepare for (thus co-determine) a new epochal sending. 
Gestell can only be critiqued from the perspective of another epoch, yet this would seem 
to require we already stand under the claim of such an epoch. There seems to be no basis 
for favouring any epochal understanding over another; Gestell as a bestowal of Being 
requires a horizon of criteria beyond epochal claims themselves to be seen as danger, a 
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horizon prior to the destinal sendings of Being itself. The priority of meditative or 
authentic understanding may be justified in the context of an ontological inquiry, such as 
Being and Time where the criteria of grasping the totality of our own way of being are 
derived from the aim of the questioning, but widening their applicability requires a wider 
horizon of concern. 
 A destinal sending is granted its warrant from the giving of Ereignis; a giving that 
withdraws. Only Ereignis itself can provide the horizon for criteria by which epochal 
revealings could be compared; that such destinings not conceal their own source of 
possibility thus that of other destinings. Zimmerman holds that “The issue of whether and 
how to resist the technological transformation of nature is made more complex by the 
following question: Does a phenomenalist ontology and its doctrine of anatma (no self-
existence, no essence) provide a basis for criticizing or resisting the technological 
disclosure of entities?”350 can an ontology of nothingness (Ereignis) as trans-historical 
itself provide historical criteria? That Gestell obscures its own relational condition of 
possibility can only serve as such criteria if our essence is taken in the traditional sense, 
if the 'special nature' of man as a meditative being to be preserved is both viably 
threatened and already showing up as worthy of preservation; “Yet the ‘law of the earth’ 
cannot be conceived as a ‘ground’ for things analogous to eternal essences.” 351 The prior 
horizon for Heidegger's experience of the danger and his notion of essential human 
existence must be considered in more depth. 
Heidegger, Humanism and Existence 
As discussed in chapter 2.2 whilst Heidegger occasionally uses essence in the sense of 
'whatness' it mostly denotes coming-to-presence; the way a thing presences/endures as 
granted. Essence can thus mean both the beingness of man (what we are) and how we 
come to be that (our appropriation). Our essence is not the eternal 'what' of man, but how 
we emerge into presence as appropriated, thus how we must be to accomplish this. The 
essence of human existence, man's coming-to-presence, is thus dwelling in openness 
through thinking on language that that is to free Gestell as Sein. Since coming-to-presence 
is an active engagement, and Heidegger believes we must come-to-presence by engaging 
in a certain way, his very notion of what it is to be human is guided by a presupposition 
concerning the way we are to dwell. Heidegger does not posit a metaphysical eternal 
'what' concerning man, but an eternal 'how'. 
 Heidegger's notion of essence, and his treating it as both a noun for how we are 
claimed and a verb for that process of appropriation, leads to a tension between seeing 
his view of what humanity is as both eternal and historical. The manner in which man is 
claimed is historical, that we are as claimed is not so despite this claiming only being as 
realized historically and (for the supreme danger to be viable) capable of not being so 
realized. Our existence as historical is related to Ereignis as prior to history, which thus 
makes the manner in which we exist historically (as claimed in Ereignis) ahistorical. If 
we are as claimed then what we are is thereby posited as an eternal essence; "Man is 
essentially this relationship of responding to Being, and he is only this." 352 In offering 
this strict definition of man Heidegger both renders questionable the viability of the 
supreme danger and conflates the noun and verb senses of essence. Heidegger holds to a 
set ahistorical interpretation of what it means for humans to be, one prior to any epochal 
claim but used as the projective horizon to adjudicate between such claims. That our 
existence has always been open and appropriated is taken as meaning it should always be 
so, the ought derived from the is,  despite that the coming to presence of this manner of 
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existence is marked by a withdrawal leading to oblivion; an oblivion taken as in need of 
countering (as a danger). 
 As outlined earlier Hodge holds the supreme danger is that the question of the 
human is given a fixed universal answer as Gestell appears to be the sole possibility 
restricting the diversity of relations to others and choices for the self. The question of 
what it means to be human must remain open and lived,  it is an experience, a process of 
transformation realized as but not reducible to metaphysics; “Thus the problem is not one 
of finding a more adequate answer to the question ‘what is it to be human?’, but of ceasing 
to want general answers to it at all”353 thus to move beyond the metaphysics that "regards 
such truth as the imperishable and eternal, which can never be founded on the 
transitoriness and fragility that belongs to man's essence."354 This forms the basis for 
Heidegger's critique of humanism; the human essence is to ask what it is to be human and 
metaphysical humanisms conceal this restricting possibilities. Hodge claims Heidegger's 
critique of humanism in Letter on Humanism is to free us “from the restrictive 
presumption that what it is to be human is given in advance of our individual and 
collective existences”355 which conceals the ontological difference as the condition for 
how things can ‘be’ thus conceals the possibility things could be different. Gestell 
represents “the failure to pose questions about what it is to be human. This failure conceals 
the fact that what it is to be human is different in different epochs, depending on the 
structural conditions constraining what possibilities present themselves to human 
beings.”356 More than a mere failure as metaphysical humanism "even impedes the 
question by neither recognizing or understanding it."357 
 For Hodge the non-givenness of what it is to be human is thematic in Heidegger's 
work; but for both her and Heidegger it is a given that to be human is have an open relation 
to these possibilities and be claimed in Ereignis. By concealing their ground humanisms 
conceal  “that the form of existence of human beings is quite different from the modes of 
existing of other kinds of entity, in that human beings have a relation to their essence and 
to their identity”.358 Yet this seems to define the human in contrast to non-human entities, 
which whilst Heidegger accepts as correct "when we do this we abandon man to the 
essential realm of animalitas even if we do not equate him with beasts but attribute a 
specific difference to him"359 which is to think "of man on the basis of animalitas and 
does not think in the direction of his humanitas.”360 Dasein is still necessarily a living 
being thus within the animalitas, the difference between defining man as 'living being 
with reason' and 'living being with relation to Being' seems uncertain. Both Heidegger 
and the humanisms he critiques define humans as what makes them unique amongst other 
entities; whether reason or that "Man alone of all beings, when addressed by the voice of 
Being, experiences the marvel of marvels: that what-is is."361  
 Heidegger says as proper only to man "ek-sistence can also never be thought of as 
a specific kind of living creature among others - granted that man is destined to think the 
essence of his Being and not merely to give accounts of the nature and history of his 
constitution and activities"362. This seems to overly stress that other animals are 
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"separated from our ek-sistent essence by an abyss"363 as prior to and the condition for 
Dasein is the animalitas of man, an entity as essential to Ereignis as the divine Heidegger 
calls "more familiar to our ek-sistent essence than is our scarcely conceivable, abysmal 
bodily kinship with the beast."364 Heidegger's claim our essence is not our bodily nature 
does not automatically entail such essence is integrally related to such nature nor 
separated by a gulf from other organisms. Only when claimed in appropriation do we 
dwell and have language thus preserve the Sein that determines us as Da. Heidegger 
claims animals have no relation to Sein as they are without language or relation to their 
own mortality; lacking awareness of death they are without relation to meaning and free 
possibilities. It would seem more accurate to say we cannot know whether animals have 
this relation to mortality (thus whether the relation to language is essential to Da-Sein) all 
we can say is that it is essential to all Dasein we can communicate with, an exemplary 
sampling bias. What beings can be named Dasein does not change the pre-eminence of 
Dasein, the former would seem to be an empirical issue related to the verifiability of 
different beings manner of awareness, the latter an axiological issue of the privileged 
value accorded such awareness. 
 Whilst they are not strictly identical Heidegger claims every humanism is a 
metaphysics and defined by determining our humanity "with regard to an already 
established interpretation of nature, history, world, and the ground of world, that is, of 
beings as a whole."365 As such humanism "is nothing but a moral-aesthetic 
anthropology;"366 the ethical correlate to metaphysical subjectivism "which explains and 
evaluates whatever is, in its entirety, from the standpoint of man and in relation to man"367 
taking the human to be the source of meaning and value. Heidegger's critique of 
humanism is limited to a narrow conception of humanism, that "the highest 
determinations of the essence of man in humanism still do not realize the proper dignity 
of man"368  and should be replaced by another aspect of human existence, so that 
"Humanism is opposed because it does not set the humanitas of man high enough,"369 he 
critiques humanism for not being humanistic enough. Accordingly humanism is "a 
concern that man become free for his humanity and find his worth in it...humanism differs 
according to one's conception of the 'freedom' and 'nature' of man."370 Heidegger's 
concern is also the freeing of man for his existence and as was discussed in relation to the 
examples from The Question Concerning Technology has an established interpretation of 
the nature of man that Gestell places an unreasonable demand upon. To think our 
appropriation in Ereignis "means to think the humanity of homo humanus. What counts 
is humanitas in the service of the truth of being".371 
 Heidegger accepts his thought "is a humanism that thinks the humanity of man 
from nearness to Being. But at the same time it is a humanism in which not man but man's 
historical essence is at stake in its provenance from the truth of Being."372 Yet he seems 
reticent to retain the term humanism as to "To restore a sense to it can only mean to 
redefine the meaning of the word"373, preferring to risk accusations of affirming 
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inhumanity to claim his thought "contradicts all previous humanism".374 But to redefine 
how man is to be taken essentially only contradicts prior forms of humanism in the 
narrowest and most incidental sense rather than the most essential sense of humanism as 
"meditating and caring, that man be human and not inhumane, 'inhuman', that is, outside 
his essence"375 in terms of which his thought in no way contradicts previous humanisms. 
Given his retention of the terminology of divinity and gods that is intended in a more 
radically different sense than his proposed changes to humanism this decision seems 
particularly perplexing. 
 Humanism in its prior metaphysical incarnations is best defined in terms of the 
concerns it shares with Heidegger rather than its relation to metaphysics. Metaphysical 
humanism with its onus on the rational subject and the anthropocentric is displaced by a 
humanism of Existenz with an onus on man as appropriated; but both operate with an 
antecedent notion of what man is and seek to form a desired futural projection on basis 
of this. The centrality of human existence as constituted by an integral relation remains, 
"that the essence of man is essential for the truth of Being, specifically in such a way that 
what matters is not man simply as such"376; and both Nishitani and Heidegger place value 
on Śūnyatā/Ereignis thus the humanity that constitutes such integral relations. 
 There are two conception of the human inter-twined in Heidegger's thought; as 
always open to the claim of Being, and as a determinative metaphysical understanding 
that is historically conditioned by that claim. Both are necessary to be human and are 
presupposed interpretations of the human, but only the latter is identified by Heidegger 
as such and critiqued on this basis. The claim that human existence is to remain open and 
should not fall into a fixed metaphysical understanding of itself is itself a fixed 
understanding of what it means to be human (to remain open to changes in the meaning 
of Being). Heidegger has a clear notion of what it means to be human; one that whilst 
historical and open is also ahistorical and fixed and seems to be in competition with 
metaphysical humanism rather than a prior horizon for humanism as such. 
 Zimmerman holds Heidegger's later thought was marked by an “attempt to 
abandon any remaining anthropocentrism discernible in his earlier work”377  but his claim 
that Da-Sein as the conditions for disclosure “cannot be reduced to anything merely 
human”378 overlooks that the essence of man as Da mutually constituted with Sein means 
the appropriative relation is the human. If to be appropriated is the essence of the human 
then the region for disclosure is not the ‘merely’ human but it is the essentially human.  
Nishitani, Anthropocentrism-sive-Nonanthropocentrism 
Nishitani shares this ambivalent relation to humanism in seeking a transformation of the 
human by bringing forth its essence as a relation to what is not human, yet also retains 
the primacy of this transfigured essence within the process of disclosure even if 
realization is not grounded on man alone as self-subsistent subjectivity. As noted in 
chapter 1.2 Nishitani and Abe even critique Heidegger as remaining too anthropocentric, 
metaphysical and subjective through retaining an emphasis on the self as grounded on a 
reified nothingness; indicating their intention towards a more thorough critique of 
humanism. Yet as previously discussed regarding his thought on elemental subjectivity 
and the self-identity of man with absolute nothingness Nishitani appears to re-centre man 
in more radical terms leading Heisig to conclude that “for Nishitani the structure of self-
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awareness was a paradigm of how all reality is constructed”379 as self-awareness is 
essential to the realization of reality in both senses of manifestation and apprehension. 
Heisig concludes that as the suchness of reality is revealed as the elemental subjectivity 
of self as non-self in the circuminsessional process of gathering and “this connection is 
not directly questioned, let alone justified, much of the anthropomorphism that is thrown 
out the front door returns creeping in through the back...the human is set more firmly at 
the centre of reality than it is in the subject-object model”.380 
 Nishitani's comments on other forms of possible higher sentience distance him 
from Heidegger's comments on the gulf between man and other animals and justify his 
claim to dehomocentrism in a narrow sense. Yet such awareness is taken as constituting 
the essence of man as opposed to jitai in general, and man as the highest currently known 
exemplar of such awareness can be taken as a truly universal paradigm. Whether or not 
the Da is gathered by one species or a certain select category of them the claim that 
religion in its ontological sense of sunyata must “hold true even for any other species of 
intelligent beings that might be living somewhere else in the universe...they ought to 
possess a cosmic universality”381 means not only is essential religion as found at the core 
of Zen held to be the most primordial articulation of the human essence but such an 
understanding of elemental awareness is truly universal; Nishitani's thought cedes more 
to non-human life only at the cost of reducing every other possible awareness to a human-
derived model thus remaining thoroughly anthropocentric. The priority of elemental 
subjectivity seems to go deeper than its requirement for jitai to attain their suchness, 
raising the question of how Nishitani's critique of anthropocentrism is to be understood 
and the extent to which the human self could be decentred without falling into a  
 
uniformity of value or meaningless aporia; the implications for the value of that existence 
that provides for the self-awareness of the self-realization of reality. 
 Nishitani's critique of anthropocentrism is mostly characterized as the overcoming 
of the conception of the human on the field of reason, of the self-enclosed ego and 
traditional subject, mirroring Heidegger's critique of humanism as metaphysical and 
sharing the same narrow focus. Such overcoming leads to an awareness “that goes beyond 
the perspective of the merely ‘human’ and stops to rest on a field rid of a mode of being 
determined by a ‘human’ ego”382. Its heart seems to remain the critique of an ontology 
based around the subject rather than a total critique of any notion of self-awareness “on a 
field that has gone beyond the scope of a man-centred outlook and taken leave of a 
subjective, ‘egoistic’ mode of being”383 as primordial, as outlined in chapters 1.4 and 1.5 
concerning elemental subjectivity. Given the human and egoistic perspectives are clearly 
differentiated by Nishitani a critique of the latter would not seem to justify claims to a 
‘radically dehomocentric’ worldview that moves beyond man-centredness. Instead this 
critique “points to the realization of a ‘new man’, that originates from the absolute 
negation of the ‘human’”384, and this ‘new-anthrocentrism’ of non-objective man is what 
replaces the old subject-centric view; not a cessation of anthropocentrism but its negation-
sive-affirmation. In line with Nishitani's other formulations this could be termed 'non-
athropocentric anthropocentrism' and pertains to chapter 2.4's discussion as to the relation 
of the fields of nihility and sunyata. Despite the negation of man a human self-awareness 
remains firmly planted centre stage even if the human essence that is such awareness is 
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no longer self-enclosed or oblivious to the thought of the ontological difference. The 
nature of Nishitani's anti-anthropocentrism (his humanism critique) must then be 
elucidated through the negation of man on the field of nihility in terms of the self-identity 
of axiology and ontology. 
 Simple non-anthropocentrism is to be found in the levelling of the field of nihility 
that renders man standing-reserve. Science and Zen's discussion of “the utter detachment 
of modern scientific view of nature from anthropomorphism”385 indicates that Nishitani 
agrees with Kasulis that “Modern scientific thinking, especially systems analysis, 
undercuts both anthropocentrism and egocentrism”386. Such a simple negation of 
anthropocentrism remains for him on the field of nihility and is as such unsatisfactory, 
but the impersonal view of anti-anthropocentrism must be incorporated into Nishitani’s 
reconciliation of the science religion dichotomy understood as the opposition of the 
teleological and mechanistic worldviews. The axiological implications of Gestell as the 
non-anthropocentric must be explicated to highlight the role it plays in the priority of self 
that comes about through the movement of anthropocentricism-sive-non-
anthropocentricism. 
 In defending against claims of simple non-anthropocentrism; Abe, and to a lesser 
extent Nishitani, seem more concerned with diffusing the Christian criticism that Zen 
overlooks the special place of man than with resolving the troublesome issues of self-
priority their replies raise. Kasulis interprets Nishitani’s theory of circuminsession 
whereby the world manifests at the homeground of even the tiniest thing as saying that as 
“every phenomenon is perfectly and completely preaching the dharma...From the 
standpoint of Śūnyatā, everything is equal”387. This is taken as problematic for 
Christianity as it means humans are as important to God as rocks and Christ is no more 
divine than the ‘piss and shit’ that Zhuangzi says contains the Dao. He attributes to 
Nishitani the view that the sacred is equally explicit and manifest in every phenomena 
and that Christians should kill Christ as Lin-chi claimed we should kill the Buddha. The 
self as manifestation of absolute nothingness mutually constituted with world entails that 
“I preach the dharma (thereby giving the world value), but so does every other thing 
preach the dharma as well. We each preach it fully insofar as we are emptiness’s emptying 
itself”388, and such an equality of value implies the levelling of the mechanistic worldview 
that truly decentres man as source of value and meaning. 
 Abe’s reply to Kasulis is to stress that whilst “From the standpoint of sunyata, it 
is true, everything is equal in its as-it-is-ness or suchness...This suchness, however, does 
not exclude, but rather includes everything’s distinction...Accordingly Buddhists, 
including Nishitani, may say that everything is equal in its suchness and yet each human 
being is more important in its distinctiveness than a rock...the symbol ‘Buddha’ better 
preaches the Dharma in its distinctive way than ‘piss and shit’.”389 If suchness denotes 
the in-itself expressed by reality-sive-illusion, or more specifically the nothingness of 
being-sive-nothingness as opposed to the distinction or differentiation retained within the 
sive, then Abe would seem to agree to an equality of value in terms of reality or 
nothingness, but that some illusory appearances better express suchness; and that we are 
to resurrect the Buddha after briefly causing his demise during the transition through the 
field of nihility. The human being is prioritized by its central role in the realization of the 
real self-awareness of reality; “suchness implies value judgement. Each human being is 
more important than a rock not to God nor to the human self, but to absolute no-thingness. 
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Precisely because each human being is more important than a rock to absolute no-
thingness, human beings and rocks are equal.”390; as was the case with Heidegger and 
metaphysical forms of humanism it is only the reason why man is the central source of 
value that divide the Kyoto and Christian commentators. Overlooking the implied 
reification of absolute nothingness in Abe's phrasing it seems unclear as to why the 
paradoxical equality of rocks and humans is grounded on the greater value of the human 
self, in what sense does equality flow from the greater value of the human as derived from 
its expression of and necessity for the realization of such phenomenon, given that the 
realization of human awareness is itself mutually constituted with and requires such 
phenomenon? The ontological priority of elemental subjectivity stemming from its role 
in awareness only translates to axiological priority if awareness of absolute nothingness 
is given value beyond that which it enables and is self-identical with; just as Ereignis only 
is as the epochal meanings it makes possible yet is given meaning and value by Heidegger 
beyond this despite meaning and value being dependent on specific epochal claims. 
 To address this issue of axiologicaly priority the nature of anthropocentricism-
sive-antianthropocentrism will be explicated using Abe’s essay Man and Nature in 
Christianity and Buddhism, a direct response to Waldenfels query as to whether the 
positive finitude of man is taken seriously in Buddhism. Abe’s defence of Nishitani in the 
face of claims he devalues the human are here joined with claims of his thoughts 
dehomocentric nature even whilst emphasizing the priority of self-awareness in things 
attainment of suchness, encapsulating the core problematic of Religion and Nothingness. 
In the context of human finitude as residing in the cycle of birth and death that is the 
concern of enlightenments liberation Abe holds that that “by going beyond the ‘living’ 
dimension to the ‘being’ dimension. Buddhism develops its non-man-centred nature to its 
outermost limits”391 to find the “appearance-disappearance (kimetsu) or being-nonbeing 
(umu)”392 that lies behind this cycle and as how beings manifest is said to be beyond any 
sort of ‘centrism’. The ‘outer most limits’ of the dehomocentric view does not necessarily 
entail a total overcoming of anthropocentrism, and to completely move beyond the 
personal self that is constituted as the mask of absolute nothingness may also be to move 
away from the nothingness that only ‘is’ in unison with its mask, as a living nothingness. 
 Abe stresses that in sunyata “both man and nature are equally enlightened and 
disclose themselves each in its own original nature”393, that the enlightenment of man is 
self-identical with the attainment of suchness for the things in the world and that in this 
“the non-man-centred, cosmological emphasis of Buddhism is very conspicuous.”394 But 
in the mutual manifestation of koto dehomocentrism paradoxically sits beside the claim 
that the primacy of the self arises from that “the very act of transcending man-centredness 
is possible only to a human being who is fully self-conscious”395, that the field of sunyata 
can only be attained by moving through the fields of consciousness and nihility due to the 
sive of realization joining the manifestation of reality inextricably to the self-awareness 
of man. The enlightenment of all things, their attainment of suchness, occurs only through 
the self-transcendence of human consciousness that is the realization of the field of 
sunyata, the real self-realization of reality, since “Man alone can be aware of universal 
transitoriness as such. Accordingly, the fact of transitoriness, common to all beings, is a 
problem to be solved by him as man.”396 The priority of elemental subjectivity stems from 
the necessity of investigating Being through our way of being, the regional ontology of 
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Dasein is fundamental ontology as only we have our own being as an issue so reach 
meaning of Sein through that of its Da. Chapter 1.5 said that for Nishitani the self-
gathering of jitai meant that every being has its being as an issue for it, and chapter 1.6 
that the priority of self was mitigated by the 'for us'. The previously noted imbalance in 
the equiprimordiality of ontological constitution, the paradoxical precedence of elemental 
subjectivity, is now rooted in the axiological dimension; that transitoriness (nihility as 
reality) is a problem man ought to solve. Non-aware beings as transitory lack awareness 
of the problematic of their transitoriness, and denial of material realism and objectivity 
makes their manifestation as transitory radically dependent upon the confrontation of this 
universal problematic by the human self. Only the negation of ego in the Great Death 
opens the way for the “transcending the duality of appearance-disappearance, i.e. the 
duality of being-nonbeing”397 that is the realization of sunyata from the standpoint of the 
sive. The subject-centred view of the field consciousness is replaced with the view that 
the overcoming of egoistic subjectivity is central to the meaning of all things, but just as 
an inversion of metaphysics remains metaphysical the prioritizing of elemental 
subjectivity as self-identical with absolute nothingness retains the centrality of man even 
whilst negating the human. The human as non-self remains as a non-objective absolute 
centre whose centrality is more radical and deeper than other such absolute centres 
circuminsessionally gathered through the precedence of elemental awareness. 
 For Abe the dissolution of all centrisms lays in how the realization of transitoriness 
joins the realizer and realized in accordance with Nishitani’s understanding of the essence 
of reason as the nonduality of seer and seen; the self as transitory realizes such 
transitoriness in the twofold sense of the term. In doing so the true self as the real self-
realization of reality “is no longer merely ‘human’…It is sheer being-in-the-world in its 
straightforward sense, existentially more essential than being-in-the-world as man.”398 
Existential self-awareness requires that the self grasp itself in its suchness as determined 
by that which is neither man nor self and to then return to the self-awareness of personal 
human existence; in the same manner as sunyata was the field of ‘be-ification’ that renders 
jitai substantial again but as non-substantial substantiality, or in which Dasein returns to 
the everyday world through authentic retrieval. Abe interprets the kingliness of King 
Samadhi as the existential realization of sunyata as meaning “one can be genuinely 
existential and personal only when one’s existence is based on the boundless 
cosmological dimension that transcends the human dimension. But this cosmological 
dimension is opened up, not objectively, but subjectively through one’s existential 
realization of absolutely universal transitoriness.”399. The primacy of the individual self 
is maintained but only as essentially non-self whilst the human remains an essential 
component to the process of the gathering of beings into world, the ego retains a mitigated 
role with the formulation self-sive-nonself through the subjective realization of 
transitoriness. As the self that acts as a paradigm for reality is the self as a non-self whose 
awareness is constituted by a knowing of non-knowing that is self-identical with the 
process of the manifestation of meaning as sunyata Nishitani remains anthropocentric. 
But here the ‘anthro’ is a man-sive-nonman, the egoistic/subjective notion of the human 
is placed within a wider context; man is ‘decentred’ but remains integral as constituted in 
essence by the relation to the non-human. Ultimately claims of sunyata as ‘radically 
dehomocentric’ appear to be polemical, the strength of the anti-anthropocentric claim 
misleadingly obscuring that the role of the transfigured non-self is still explicit, a negation 
of the ego that is reaffirmed in anthropocentrism-sive-nonanthropocentrism. 
 The claim that human being is equally transitory and has the same ontological 
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form of suchness as other sentient or inanimate beings does not necessarily contradict the 
belief that the realization of this through the manifestation of sunyata is only possible in 
the clearing of our Dasein. In the compliance of the awareness of realization to the 
suchness of kokoro Nishitani lessens anthropocentrism whilst retaining the centrality of 
human awareness in the self-realization of reality, but the nature of the mirrored light of 
world as issuing from the homeground of elemental awareness prior to circuminsessional 
interpenetration renders such compliance problematic. That Heidegger and Nishitani's 
though remains humanist or anthropocentric is only a criticism if it is accepted that 
ontology should (or could) be rendered radically dehomocentric, but highlights how the 
features of modernity they critique in regards to value/ethics remain integral, and perhaps 
inescapable, in their thought so their presentation seems polemical as intended to counter 
the over-emphasis of one side of the sive or appropriative relation. 
 It is in relation to the notion of value that Abe makes his only explicit divergence 
from Nishitani. For Abe the suchness of things and self differs as our suchness requires 
confrontation and overcoming the problem of ‘oughtness’ that “is inescapably involved 
in the problem of disobedience or non-compliance with logos or dharma”400, a problem 
only faced by the reflectively self-aware. In Abe’s view Nishitani limits himself to the 
ontological view of this ‘oughtness’ overlooking the axiological even when it is implied 
by his thought. This results in an undercurrent of unaddressed value judgements in 
Religion and Nothingness that relates to the issue of the centrality and priority of the self 
as “Suchness in which the ontological and axiological dimensions are dynamically 
identical can be fully realized in its deepest sense only in the human being who awakens 
to his or her suchness by overcoming the problem of oughtness in its most radical 
sense”401. Abe’s attempt to bring out the axiological implications of Nishitani deal with 
the core problematic within both his and Heidegger’s thought that stems from the mutual 
constitution yet precedence of the self in relation to the disclosure of world (that the 
horizon for meaning is also taken as of value despite being the precondition of value), a 
problem compounded by Nishitani’s ambivalent relation to reason when it comes to the 
justification of such values. Sunyata as both ontological and existential, or in Unno’s 
terms prajna as self-identical with sunyata within the knowing of non-knowing that is the 
real self-realization of reality, results in an axiological element to the paradox of elemental 
awareness being constituted by the realization of reality it also precedes. The equivalency 
of value in Abe’s cosmological of suchness is constituted with and by the greater value of 
the self as preceding such equivalency as its ground, a value that stems from the 
equivalency it makes possible. Nishitani and Abe do not just deny Hume’s belief that an 
‘ought’ cannot be derived from an ‘is’, in bringing them into identity through sunyata as 
a process of self-realization they render ‘ought’ and ‘is’ self-identical, grounding the latter 
upon the former whilst offering no more justification for the ‘ought’ than what is thereby 
grounded. Chapter 1.5 discussed how an element of truth understood as certainty in 
compliance with suchness remains in koto as the confirmation of the true self by all things 
of the world as that’s self ‘original part’; for Nishitani truth means enlightenment 
understood as the precedence of the self as identical with absolute nothingness. Given 
that sunyata as ontological is self-identical with the axiological truth is also derived from 
this ‘ought’. Being and Knowledge are identical so for Nishitani truth is ultimately value; 
not that truth and value originate from elemental subjectivity but that such elemental 
subjectivity is truth and value, and in this sense Nishitani’s thought surpasses  the modern 
subject-centred view in the priority given to the human essence if the meaning and value 
of reality. 
 This element of ‘oughtness’ raises issues of how sunyata operates as an injunction 
 
400 Abe, "Nishitani’s Challenge to Western Philosophy and Theology," 298.  





and the normative force in relation to the ontological necessity of the progression through 
the fields of self-awareness, returning us to themes of Nishitani's problematic relation to 
reason and the paradox of realization; how and what epochal criteria flow from the 
conditions for such meaning and whether an epoch or field of awareness can be 
meaningfully critiqued beyond its own  self-posited criteria. The issue is complicated by 
Nishitani’s claim to absolute universality and true reality, a reality that despite emerging 
historically is prior to any notion of time, just as Ereignis is the prior condition for 
meaning/value but emerges through them as discussed in chapter 2.3. 
Way as Imperative 
Zimmerman notes that in virtue of the priority of human awareness “Heidegger and 
Mahayana Buddhists...both also argue that this fact brings with it a distinctive 
responsibility: not to dominate or constrict the appearing of entities, but rather to let things 
be”. 402 From the role of human awareness within disclosure there issues an injunction 
that as pertaining to one’s basic stance towards self and world is more far-reaching than 
any simple ethical code. Heidegger focuses on the questioning that builds a way rather 
than the thought that strives for answers, but all questioning is guided by the fore-
conception of the answer it seeks and Heidegger's way is guided by an experience of the 
call of appropriation. All critique is for something, all preparation is co-determining even 
when provisional, and Heidegger clearly desires any new destining to be a certain manner 
of appropriation, in a stricter sense than just other to Gestell. A definitive metaphysical 
answer to the 'problem' is not offered, but a way of being is put forward as an existential 
answer to the danger of Being that only is danger in light of that which saves. 
 If Gestell could be prevented from culminating in total forgetting; challenging-
forth into standing-reserve maintained as a destiny that does not appear fateful, then this 
would still not seem satisfactory to Heidegger. Heidegger argues that the warrant for his 
‘thought’ is the same as that of any sending of Being, that "Each epoch of philosophy has 
its own necessity. We simply have to acknowledge the fact that a philosophy is the way it 
is,"403 yet as Rorty points out Heidegger also "makes all sorts of invidious comparisons 
between the less forgetful people...-the Greeks- and the more forgetful ones...us"404 
Heidegger clearly prefers some epochal understandings to others; but again the horizon 
and warrant for such judgements seem to be lacking; no normative framework exists 
beyond how we are currently appropriated. Hodge identifies a tension between 
Heidegger's construction of a history of Being wherein the epochs are equally how we 
are claimed and his attempt to counter Gestell with a new way of thinking, a commitment 
“to be justified, if at all, in terms of what it seeks to make possible and in terms of future 
developments.”405 Heidegger's commitment to this projective interpretation is what 
Hodge characterizes as the ethical element in his thought (which I have been calling the 
axiological elment). 
 Heidegger believes we should have a grateful realization of appropriation, even if 
this is counter to how we are appropriated in Gestell and so runs counter to the current 
claim of Being; despite also saying we are only as responders to this claim. Heidegger's 
critique seems to presuppose a notion of what the appropriative relation of Da-Sein should 
be (open to new epochal sendings) and thus wants Ereignis to be different (not leading to 
Gestell through withdrawal). As was said in the introduction to view the nihilistic manner 
Ereignis claims us as problematic (as a danger to be countered) is to render reality itself 
a problem. Our existence as appropriated is primordial truth; to truly be human then seems 
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to mean coherence with the process of Ereignis and a dispensation of Being (to realize 
both of Heidegger's conceptions of what it is to be human). Nishitani has an even stronger 
imperative element in aiming at enlightenment as a given notion of what our realization 
of absolute nothingness would entail based on Zen presuppositions. Despite reflection on 
nothingness being seen as a kōan there is a clear answer given by both; the attuning of 
the self to its identity with absolute nothingness, thus bringing-to-presence our existence 
in accordance with a certain way even if this is contrary to the inherent tendency to 
withdrawal embodied in the current epochal claim. The metaphysical notion of truth as 
certainty remains in the secure belief as to the truth of human existence as coherence with 
Ereignis that neither Heidegger nor Nishitani doubt. The need for such reflective 
preservation is an unexamined presupposition regarding human nature at the ground of 
Heidegger's thought, a belief he places beyond doubt and verification despite it moving 
counter to how Being has been as withdrawal. Alone this is not a criticism, only a 
statement on the nature of interpretation, but in combination with his assertion we can 
only respond to Being and not determine the new epoch it raises the question as to the 
nature of our responsibility for for the projection of the saving destining and by what 
criteria such epochal projection is to be adjudicated;  "it becomes unavoidable to ask 
whether or not Heidegger did set standards, did set forth rules for thought, poetic creation 
and action"406 and more pertinently whether epochal claims are capable of being subjected 
to such standards. 
 Whilst neither Heidegger nor Nishitani offer ethical codes both address the issue 
of how one should approach one's existence, and make recommendation in this regard; 
that we must live in a certain way to fulfil our true nature as absolute nothingness or 
shepherds of Being. Their thought implies an imperative; that we should favour certain 
destinings over others and strive (albeit in a unique way) to prepare to bring about such a 
change. The fact that such an epochal self-surmounting requires a shift in shared 
paradigms that are constituted by those that live under such claims means such changes 
require a communal discourse; thus some manner of justification is required for its 
effective realization and for Nishitani such realization is the only way Śūnyatā as 
ontological is. The warrant for the ontological element of their thought may be that "the 
best way of accounting for the possibility of our understanding of entities is to postulate 
that we humans simply are the temporal openness or nothingness in which entities can 
appear as entities.”407 Placing the mystery of Being beyond why is apt for an ontology; 
but not when normative principles are generated from within that ontology. The warrant 
for thought is that as called to thought it is our essence to 'think'; but if essence used as a 
verb not noun then it is only our essence to think if and when that is how we come-to-
presence. Ereignis simply is; no justification is needed. It is when the should/ought is 
attributed that it becomes required. Whilst both Ereignis and Śūnyatā are prior to the 
division between ontology and axiology/ethics in conventional thought they have 
implications for both requiring different standards of justification within the sphere of 
conventional thought, and both thinkers require the move into this sphere to realize their 
ontologies.  
Way as Warrant 
Dreyfus claims Heidegger's thought “must convince us by the illumination it casts on our 
current condition, especially on our sense of ontological distress or emptiness, if we have 
one”.408 The answer to the question of why we should counter Gestell by realizing our 
nature as claimed seems to require a shared experience of nihility as distress. As was said 
 
406 Marx, Towards a Phenomenological Ethics: Ethos and the Life-World, 29. 
407 Zimmerman, "Heidegger, Buddhism, and Deep Ecology," 244. 






previously a shared horizon of concern is required for Heidegger and Nishitani's thought 
to have impact on the reader; the warrant for thought is its response to the call of the self 
that claims us in anxiety. The necessity of the imperative to thought is nihilation as what 
impels us towards Being, that "thinking answers to the demands of Being in that man 
surrenders his historical being to the simple, sole necessity whose constraints do not so 
much necessitate as create the need (Not) which is consummated in the freedom of 
sacrifice."409 To experience the call in this way is what it means to have a clearing in 
which nihilism shows up as problematic; an experience of the responsibility for the truth 
of Being stemming from the freedom of elemental awareness that comes from its relation 
to possibilities of meaning. To see the greatest danger as a danger requires a specific 
experience of the call of the self in nihility, other ways of experiencing such nihility may 
lead to not encountering it as danger or to wanting a different way through it. Heidegger 
and Nishitani's kōans or ways require their readers to have experienced nihility in a 
similar fashion and are only as compelling as the extent to which their experience accords 
with our own. In portraying such a call as a universal ontology they both subsume the 
experiences of others into their own and strive to encourage others to realize the danger 
even if the danger only is for those who realize it in this way. 
 But if such ontological understanding is held as self-identical with an existential 
transformation communal in nature then the problem is whether such an experience can 
provide for meaningful discourse with those who do not experience the claim in the 
manner of distress. Marx asks of meditative thought as the pre-thinking of an epochal 
sending "is it possible to give an account of such thought in a fashion that admits of inter-
subjective validity and verifiability?"410 Marx finds it troubling that errancy as 
constitutive of disclosure removes the possibility of criteria for thought, that an epochal 
claim provides no standard by which "he who hears the claim might decide whether what 
he has heard is in a given situation right or wrong"411 whether the attending to the Saying 
of Ereignis is capable of setting criteria for discourse. Whilst Marx also points out this 
does not entail Heidegger is mistaken it does indicate that the communal discourse 
required for the realization of the epochal self-surmounting cannot be provided for by 
meditative reflection upon Ereignis alone. 
 In relation to Nishitani Chapter 1.2 raised the issue of how the progression through 
the fields as the self-realization of Śūnyatā was both ontological, existential, axiological 
and ethical; thus contains an imperative towards the progressive realization of the fields 
of awareness. As ethically normative as well as ontologically real self-realization is an 
injunction, but what is the nature of its necessity? Why should such self-realization be a 
priority? Why not stay tranquilized upon the inauthentic field of consciousness? If both 
Heidegger and Nishitani rely to an extent on experiential attestation then an altered form 
of normative force is still required for them to safeguard their ways in the face of 
alternatives. “If the no-self is a cipher for the ideal of the most radically detached, 
liberated, and awakened state that the human individual can attain, the value of this state 
needs to be clarified relative to other states of existence”412, if this is even possible once 
the nature of meaning and value are held open to radical questioning. The progression 
through the fields seems to be powered by an internal necessity; upon the field of nihility 
existence becomes problematic “But if existence is transformed into a question, then its 
disclosure in nihility cannot provide the standpoint for resolving that question”413, since 
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“Nihility cannot shake free of nihility by itself”414. The troublesome move comes in the 
claim that “this brings us to the necessity of having nihility go a step further and convert 
into Śūnyatā”415, as such necessity seems predicated more upon Nishitani’s 
presupposition of the viability of Śūnyatā than any formal argument. 
 Abe characterizes such necessity as arising from how in the attempt to grasp the 
self on the field of consciousness “the human ego-self falls into an ever-deepening 
dilemma. At the extreme point of this dilemma, the ego can no longer support itself and 
must collapse into emptiness…the human ego must die.”416 The ontological necessity of 
the progression is tied to the experience of the existential realization of the self and 
requires such experiential necessity to ground the ontological. In the essay Nishitani’s 
Challenge to Western Philosophy and Theology Abe gives three reasons why nihility must 
be overcome with Śūnyatā, but none seem to provide persuasive force for those not 
already beginning down the way Nishitani charts. Firstly; that from the perspective of the 
Buddhist tradition “one must realize true Śūnyatā without clinging to it nihilistically”417 
thus move beyond nihility’s objectification of nothingness, a statement of tradition not an 
explanatory argument. Secondly; he invokes Nishitani’s critique of Western philosophy 
to claim “that Western existentialism’s understanding of nothingness is still not 
thoroughgoing enough, and fails to realize the necessity of radical conversion from 
nihility to Śūnyatā”418, that authentic Śūnyatā has not been realized in the West is neither 
an argument for or against as the ‘ecstatic self-transcendence of nihility’ that has been 
reached may be the only viable endpoint, and such a criticism already assumes that 
nihility must be overcome with Śūnyatā. Thirdly; Abe claims the most important 
argument for Śūnyatā is that it is necessary “to awaken to ultimate reality”419 as this 
requires the overcoming of representation and dualities such as negative-positive through 
negating the negation of nihility in radical affirmation. This again seems to be a 
restatement of the nature of Śūnyatā and its necessity rather than an argument for the 
viability of such necessity. There seems to be a reliance upon the idea that there is a 
problem, thus there must be a solution, that is to be found in Buddhist doctrine; with what 
Abe claims as the most important argument simply being a restatement of these 
presuppositions. Nishitani and Abe seem to explain a position rather than argue for it in 
any traditional sense, they join Heidegger in having an experientially attested unargued 
for framework of value judgements, and such an approach may be unavoidable within the 
context of Nishitani’s aims (indeed Abe may be flawed in presenting ‘reasons’ for the 
movement between the fields). The necessity of Śūnyatā lies in trying to describe the 
mode of beings on their own homeground (in themselves) and resolve the question of 
nihility. It is only the element of quasi-ethical injunction that renders the warrant of the 
idea problematic, once the ontological sense of Śūnyatā is seen as identical to its 
existential realization and ethical ramifications (along with their social consequences), 
pertaining as it does to the self that precedes world and relating to the transformative 
injunction that gives rise to the progression of the fields yet is dependent upon this 
progression. 
 Nishitani criticized Cartesian doubt for not doubting itself, yet the Great Doubt 
itself is also portrayed as ‘doubt without doubt’ due to its nature as a primordial 
experience of the self; “Despair is the truly real Form of existence: it makes its presence 
felt as something that allows for no skepsis. Whereas skepsis is a matter for the dimension 
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of reason, despair belongs to the dimension of transcendence. It is the Form that existence 
itself assumes in the nihility that has opened up.”420 Strictly speaking no such experience 
may be doubted, only its relation to reality (even Descartes cannot doubt that he is 
experiencing what he is, only its veracity in the face of possible delusion), yet Nishitani 
claims a direct experience of reality validated solely by that experience. This may render 
it immune to skepsis for those who have undergone the experience but Nishitani also 
portrays this experience as the only form of reality (as the manner of existence on the 
field of nihility that is more real than that of consciousness) even when such nihility only 
is when realized. Science and subjectivism cannot question the cogito as their ground, but 
neither can Heidegger's thought question whether and why our existence is or should be 
conceived in terms of appropriation (nor possibly how it should be appropriated), nor 
Nishitani's why Śūnyatā should be realized. 
 It is not simply those who undergo the crisis of doubt who require the 
breakthrough to the field of Śūnyatā to soothe themselves, nor just that such doubt is the 
only path to Śūnyatā; the further claim is made that we should undergo such anxious 
doubt to reach Śūnyatā as something prior to but only realized with such doubt. If the 
doubt and the reality of Śūnyatā as existentially realized are self-identical, if the doubt is 
existential not epistemological, then a universalizing of ones existential condition and the 
correlate view that all others must affirm such elemental subjectivity as themselves is also 
posited. In the previous discussion of religion Nishitani was criticized for not questioning 
Buddhist presuppositions (such as the primordiality of field of Śūnyatā) and whilst he 
claims religion as an individual affair only understandable by those on the religious quest 
he also assumes the universality of this mode of experience as primordial. For Nishitani 
the warrant for the realization of Śūnyatā is that we already are this realization, but if 
realization is actualization-sive-understanding Śūnyatā only is through its realization in 
the Great Doubt that it makes possible. Justification is unnecessary if we simply are as a 
thinking being, but we only are this when we realize it in awareness. This problem has 
been touched on already but the added element of an imperative requires trying to explain 
to those not undergoing the nihilistic crisis that they require a breakthrough to that which 
is self-identical and reliant upon that which they are not undergoing. 
 The paradoxes in Nishitani’s thought are laid out explicitly by both himself and 
his foremost commentators, yet that they are not considered as problematic as the 
paradoxes within reason they are to overcome stems from a lack of self-critique regarding 
the axiological framework of that thought; of the normative force and value of realities 
self-realization in accordance with traditional notions of sunyata that retains a 
transfigured form of anthropocentrism within enlightenment. Chapter 2.5 began with 
reference to Discourse on Thinking's argument for seeing Gestell as the supreme danger, 
noting that meditative thought was to be preserved in order to save man's 'essential 
nature'; if the context of the danger is preservation of our essence as claimed then 
Heidegger also remains fundamentally anthropocentric. As said in chapter 1.4 the field of 
Śūnyatā is that on or through which things appear in their suchness but it is that which 
the self in its suchness appears as so too does sunyata axiologically conceived appear as 
awareness through which the equality of jitai arises grounded by man greater value for 
absolute nothingness, that itself only as man retains a homocentric worldview. The 
critiques of ego-centric value go hand in hand with placing paramount value on 
safeguarding the process of disclosure, the move away from secular modernity’s placing 
of man as measure of things due to his rationality moves towards his centrality in virtue 









with nothingness that is experienced in nihilism as the problem of the transitoriness of 
things. 
Epochal Criteria 
A horizon of comparative critique for epochs is implied and necessary to Heidegger's 
thought (and Nishitani's on why we should favour the awareness of one field over the 
other), Heidegger claims Sein is beyond our power yet wishes it to withdraw differently; 
but there are no criteria with which to judge between manners of withdrawal. The only 
possible source of such criteria is Ereignis itself which only is in terms of the way we are 
currently appropriated. Yet such calling to a way admits of no verification beyond the 
experience in thought to which a thinker is called to thus lacks the ability to form the 
communal discourse required for epochal transformation. Meditative thought is the 
awareness of the horizon for meaning, yet is also required to generate criteria for how to 
realize such awareness. The question is whether an epoch (Gestell or nascent/projected) 
or Ereignis itself can provide such criteria and whether it is possible to make a coherent 
case for adopting such criteria; does the manner in which nihility manifests as non-
nihilistic provide criteria for how it is to manifest apart from in negative terms (non-
nihilistcally)? 
 Hoy considers this problem in context of Being and Time claiming that whilst 
criticism is essential to the retrieval of heritage Heidegger "fails to support his insistence 
on the necessity of criticism with an account of how criticism is logically possible and 
with an account of the criteria for judging and evaluating different historical 
interpretations."421 It is not enough to say the repeatable possibilities of existence 
themselves are the only source of criteria for retrieval as this still requires us to choose 
the possibilities to guide the criteria. If Ereignis itself must provide criteria "The question 
is, on what grounds can such criteria be derived from 'merely' ontological conditions?"422 
The moving from ontological structures of meaning (Ereignis) to their ontic realization 
requires criteria for rational discourse that Heidegger needs yet cannot supply; "For the 
ontological account to have ontical force or applicability, further criteria for determining 
the validity or even the value of historical accounts must be specified."423  
Ereignis as Criteria 
Rorty interprets Heidegger as having a normative criteria of 'primordiality', that since 
shepherding Being requires the preservation of alternate possibilities of understanding 
"an understanding of Being is more primordial than another if it makes it easier to grasp 
its own contingency."424 The epochal understanding to be prepared for is to be thoughtful 
in maintaining awareness of its own contingency and preserving the greatest possible 
plurality of understandings of the real within itself; through the characters of the teacher 
and scholar Heidegger portrays noble-mindedness as "Apparently emptier, but richer in 
contingencies." 425  The criteria to be derived from attending to Ereignis would pertain to 
the preservation of as many possibilities concerning the guiding understanding for the 
revealing of the real with the constant danger inherent to all destinings meaning such wary 
beholding of the danger would likewise be continual. This was touched on earlier in 
relation to the connection between Gestell and plurality; an understanding within the 
danger in accord with the criteria provided by that which gives such danger. The 
provisionality of thought can be seen as responding to danger by maintaining awareness 
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of the contingency of any perceived claim and a conduciveness to alternate 
understandings so that the epochal claim to be prepared for would be marked by such 
traits. 
 Harries seems to support the criteria of contingency in pointing out that "the 
possibility of error cannot in principle be avoided, and that because of this the decision 
must continually be questioned and renewed or perhaps revoked."426 Yet the problem 
seems deeper than this; the possibility of error cannot even be identified in the absence of 
criteria to adjudicate coherence with Saying. Criteria must be provisional, but 
provisionally choosing a heritage to retrieve still requires an antecedent criteria for that 
provisional choice. Provisionality is a necessary condition for meditative thought but still 
requires content selected by provisional criteria drawn from somewhere in line with some 
standard. The need for a new destining to simple ensure there will be further new 
destinings is itself reminiscent of Gestell as efficiency for the sake of more efficiency; 
thought as goalless leading only to continued thought. 
 Harries claims criteria beyond heritage as repeatable possibilities of existence are 
needed for the choice of ones hero since "The past event becomes one which should be 
repeated only when it is recognized to be worthy of repetition."427 If Heidegger's thought 
on the Fourfold is projective then its force comes neither from the past nor future but his 
own current experience as  "There must be something about the present individual and 
his situation which allows him to recognize in the precursor's stance the measure of his 
own. If the present is mute without the voice of the inherited past, it is nevertheless only 
the present which can lend authority to this voice."428 The criteria for choosing a role 
model is self-validating as the choice is guided by what is chosen. This is the 
personal/psychological aspect of the problem of adjudicating between epochal destinings 
that form their own warrant, there is little explication of how we are to judge what is 
worthy of retrieval (thus to be preserved in the new destining) beyond conduciveness to 
preserving further destinal possibilities. 
 Whilst only as claimed in Ereignis "can there come from Being itself the 
assignment of those directives that must become law and rule for man."429 and "Only such 
dispatching is capable of supporting and obligating",430 Ereignis as such cannot grant 
prescriptive norms. The event of Ereignis itself "is not law in the sense of a norm which 
hangs over our heads somewhere, it is not an ordnance which orders and regulates a 
course of events: Appropriation is the law because it gathers mortals into the 
appropriateness of their nature and there holds them."431  The call of the self as 
appropriated cannot give concrete content nor prescriptive criteria, but in calling us to our 
nature provides the framework and possibility of such by indicating the origin thus 
contingency of such claims. 
 Heidegger holds that thought itself should not be "subjected to the presumptuous 
demand that it know the solution of the riddles and bring salvation" 432 as to do so is 
subject it to the demands of calculative criteria. Yet Heidegger seeks a more concrete 
indication of the new destining in the nature of Ereignis than the framework of contingent 
plurality; that entities be revealed as the things of the Fourfold so that the self may realize 
its true nature. Nishitani clearly holds his thought as fully in service to salvation as 
enlightenment and as an attempt to attend to our existence as claimed by Ereignis the 
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success of meditative thought as projective retrieval of origin would seem to place some 
demand upon thinking to prepare for thus co-determine the epochal self-surmounting. 
Taylor addresses how Ereignis as Saying itself determines how we are to understand the 
new destining, that "the clearing itself, or language itself, properly brought to light, will 
show us how to take it."433 In so attending to language Taylor gives Saying both normative 
and prescriptive elements; that in hearing Saying we also hear that "entities will demand 
that we use the language which can disclose them as things"434 so that in responding to 
Ereignis as Saying we must "think of the demands of language also as a demand that 
entities put on us to disclose them in a certain way. This amounts in fact to saying that 
they demand that we acknowledge them as having certain meanings." 435 Such submission 
to Saying that is to reveal entities as the things of the Fourfold is a submission to the 
nothingness anxiety reveals; of allowing the true self explicated in the ontology of 
nothingness to guide ones comportments through heeding the call of that self (Nishitani's 
elemental subjectivity as absolute nothingness). To act in accordance with the nothingness 
of self and world (their self-identity) so that "forgetting the self means opening it up to 
allow one's action to be guided by the authentic self, which, itself nothing, is one with the 
nothing of the world." 436  
 Spinosa echoes the claim that Ereignis "is the tendency of the revealing of 
language to reveal particular things in the mode that is best suited to the kind of thing 
they are"437 so that responding to Saying "would be a way of letting any particular thing 
show itself in its ownmost (most resonant) being."438 For Spinosa such responding is in a 
way that resonates with a specific way of life rather than the relation between such 
possible ways. Whilst Rorty take primordiality as criteria to mean awareness of 
contingency thus plurality Spinosa takes it as one in which "we become more sensitive to 
our relation with the thing as one that focuses our shared revealing practices...a primordial 
relation with a thing is one where the thing makes us sensitive (generally in the spirit of 
thanks or celebration) to the way of life we lead that makes us take cognizance of the 
thing in the first place."439 In letting-be we let a thing be as indicating our specific 
dwelling as most resonant rather than its contingency. Although Spinosa also indicates 
that Ereignis would draw together a collection of related revealing practices without any 
one dominating, so that awareness of contingent plurality remains integral to the true 
attending to Saying. 
 Negative criteria can be derived from both stances; not to understand beings only 
in terms of instrumentality and not to impose totalized understandings upon entities thus 
overlook their contingency. The stance of releasement must preserve a horizon for a 
plurality of possible meanings to allow things to manifest appropriately. But for things to 
manifest according to their own possibilities rather than as instrumental value still 
requires a horizon of meaning co-determined by our preparation to receive such a sending 
to understand what letting-be a being involves; criteria for adjudicating if we are letting 
it be. But when it comes to how entities are to speak to us there seems to be little guidance 
provided by Saying for how we are to know (realize) when it is the authentic self at one 
with the nothing of the world that is guiding our revealing of things. Taylor acknowledges 
this problem in commenting that Heidegger over-emphasizes the positive potential of 
Language overlooking that the inherent danger of language comes not only from its 
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devolution into a totalizing understanding like Gestell but that "much can be retrieved 
from the grey zone of repression and forgetfulness. There are also resentments and hatreds 
and dreams of omnipotence and revenge, and they can be released by their own 
appropriate words of power."440 Positive criteria are lacking for the 'shared revealing 
practices' that are to resonate with the demands of entities; as such resonance does not 
seem demonstrable beyond accordance with the current epochal claim (which in the age 
of Gestell forms the negative criteria for Heidegger). 
 To a let a being be only makes sense if we are letting it be in accordance with the 
sending of Being; the meaning of beings cannot be distinct from the epochal truth of 
Being which currently is as Gestell. Letting-be involves allowing a thing to realize its 
inherent potential through using it in a manner that is suitable to its Being but that it could 
not achieve by itself, "The question is at what point the use of a natural thing as Zeug in 
such a way as to realize its possibilities with respect to human concerns begins to impinge 
overly on the unfolding of its possibilities"441 which itself would seem to depend on our 
prior projection of what its possibilities are that determines what counts as an 
'unreasonable' demand upon its nature. For example; whether to allow the river to realize 
the potential of its course as energy source through hydroelectricity, the soil its potential 
for growth through industrial farming or to help the iron realize its potential sharpness by 
crafting it into nails are reasonable demands. 
 Guarding concealed possibilities for their own sake leads to lack of horizon for 
judging between them, and to let human being be under the current claim as challenged 
to challenge-forth is counter to letting other beings be as other to standing-reserve. Harries 
claims that Heidegger blocked any possibility of giving positive content to that which 
meditative thought prepares for so that the partial affirmation of Gestell previously 
discussed stems from that "Lacking the strength to oppose to this world another, better 
world, the philosopher acquiesces in the technological world, permits it to enter his life, 
and at the same time keeps his distance." 442  
Ontic criteria 
If more positive criteria cannot be found in Ereignis the criteria to guide our response to 
Saying must come from beyond the bare event of claiming itself, from how entities (both 
human and otherwise) as non-Dasein  claim us in Gestell as the current epoch. Meditative 
thought requires the criteria of a destinal claim to guide its co-determination of such 
sendings, and such epochal claims only are as accomplished through our comportments 
to self and others. The meaning and value of Ereignis only is as the manners in which we 
have been claimed; the openness for meaning is only as worthy of preserving as the 
meaning that comes to pass through it. Ereignis as the origin of meaning and value derives 
its own meaning and value from what comes to presence and cannot be considered as 
separate from this or provide a horizon for adjudicating itself beyond what comes to pass 
through it by our dwelling. To preserve human existence as appropriated in Ereignis 
requires elements of calculative thought not only for its realization but also to guide the 
conception of human flourishing that itself must be based on the presence-at-hand of the 
entities prior to Ereignis, the ontic entities (the animalitas of man) capable of suffering 
and joy that are prior to and the sole viable criteria for Ereignis. The issue of an horizon 
of concern for the danger returns us to the relation between Gestell and its ontic 
manifestations; that the ontic distress correlate to the ontological distress seen in terms of 
the current claim form possible criteria to guide the new epoch. 
 In previous discussion of ontic instances of Gestell it was said that the significance 
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of the supreme danger for Heidegger does not seem to rely upon the ontic consequences 
of Gestell, that it was the totalized revealing of standing-reserve rather than any specific 
commodification of man that formed the horizon of concern for the danger. The need that 
gives warrant to Heidegger's thought and originates in reflection upon the origin of 
thought "to preserve the truth of Being no matter what may happen to man and everything 
that 'is'...this sacrifice is the expense of our human being for the preservation of the truth 
of Being in respect of what-is"443 thanking is a sacrifice that "brooks no calculation, for 
calculation always miscalculates sacrifice in terms of the expedient and the inexpedient, 
no matter whether the aims are set high or low. Such calculation distorts the nature of 
sacrifice." 444 Whilst man does not die for mere values he is called to sacrifice himself for 
the truth of Being; that Heidegger lived through two world wars yet maintained his 
preference for the latter over the former speaks strongly of his commitment to the worth 
of Sein over the woes of its Da. There can be no weighing of the pros and cons of Gestell 
and specific ontic cases of Gestell separate from their incorporation into the total ordering 
cannot be used to indicate counter-examples from which criteria can be derived since it 
is the relation of these examples to the total ordering that it pertinent to Heidegger rather 
than the actual cases themselves. Yet Gestell is  inseparable from its realization in terms 
of these consequences and the strength of the claim that preservation of Being is 
paramount 'no matter what may happen to man' only heightens the need to question the 
warrant of such sacrifice. 
 Chapter 2.3 dealt with how Heidegger's thought could not be appropriated to 
ecological concerns, such would remain a simple non-anthropocentrism and within the 
sphere of Gestell. Although in line with some of Nishitani’s Buddhist and Daoist 
influences total equivalence in value of all life and the wider conditions for life is formally 
near identical with the equivalency of mechanization and ultimately a utilitarian ethic that 
simply spreads the notion of happiness or suffering to all beings. The tired old cliché that 
a deep ecology ethics cannot distinguish between the extinction of the Bengal tiger on the 
one hand and the eradication of small-pox on the other is easily diffused by considering 
the neurological capacity of a creature for suffering and its integrity to an ecosystem. 
Such a view treats beings as scientific objects of study but with the over-riding aim of 
minimizing sentient suffering rather than maximizing efficiency and can be seen as a 
transfigured form of Gestell /nihility that is affirmed in the Great Compassion or new 
epoch after its negation. For both thinkers the world of nature remains an ontic system 
and the responsibility to which we are called is not for the ontic world (although does 
concern it) but for the realization of Da-Sein (enlightenment). Yet these ontological 
concerns only are in terms of ontic comportments, so that criteria for any new epoch must 
necessarily involve responsibility for the other personal selves that are required as the 
mask of absolute nothingness and for the non-objective homeground of jitai seperate from 
the ethical homocentrism of elemental subjectivity. Only through human awareness does 
enlightenment come to pass and only man as the shrine of nothingness shepherds Being, 
but these themselves only are as an attending to the entity-nature of ontic beings. 
 For Heidegger it is not death by atom bomb that is the true danger "In this dawning 
atomic age a far greater danger threatens - precisely when the danger of a third world war 
has been removed."445 That despite the hardships of ontic homelessness "the real plight 
of dwelling does not lie merely in a lack of houses...The real plight of dwelling lies in 
this, that mortals ever search anew for the nature of dwelling, that they must ever learn to 
dwell."446 In terms of the 'unreasonable demand' upon our nature ontic death is a lesser 
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danger than the death of our existence as claimed so that "What threatens man in his very 
nature is the willed view that man, by the peaceful release, transformation, storage, and 
channelling of the energies of physical nature, could render the human condition, man's 
being, tolerable for everybody and happy in all respects."447 It is not this rendering of the 
human condition that is rejected, but the idea that they are to be achieved by means of 
embracing a certain appropriative claim; "that man still does not even think of the real 
plight of dwelling as the plight"448 by prioritizing mere ontic well-being. 
 Dreyfus holds that whilst Heidegger concludes “that focusing on loss and 
destruction is still technological”449 he is concerned with “the human distress caused by 
the technological understanding of being, rather than the destruction caused by specific 
technologies.”450 The greatest danger may lead to ontic distress but Dreyfus seems wrong 
in pinpointing human distress as of concern since even if Gestell leads to a lessening of 
distress Heidegger does not consider the danger any less severe. The danger that 
calculative thinking becomes the sole thinking seems distinct from the claim that such a 
state of affairs results necessarily in human distress, and Heidegger spends little time 
establishing any connection between the two. The idea of ontological distress divorced 
from correlative ontic distress caused by loss and destruction does not seem to be a 
coherent notion, the danger of Gestell only is for those in whom the distress is 
existentially realized in an ontic state of affairs. The double forgetting that characterizes 
the supreme danger entails that we no longer experience the oblivion of Being as a 
privation thus almost by definition feel no distress unless we are one of those for whom 
this absence is existentially realized as anxiety/Doubt. If the ontological distress of 
anxiety is not experienced then the prime concern remains the potential loss of the 
ontological relationship to Being regardless of the ramifications for the practicalities of 
human life; yet it seems to make no sense to talk of 'ontological' distress without a 
correlate ontic-existential realization. 
Gestell as criteria 
The event of Ereignis, the self-emptying of Śūnyatā previously laid out in terms of 
circuminsessional interpenetration self-identical with nihility, must itself be what gives 
content to the emptiness of resolve as self-emptying. The only standard for judgement of 
this new destining is the fore-conception of such saving that itself makes the notion of 
danger coherent; the experience of the circuminsessional structure that as a trace in 
Gestell calls us along the way that provides for its own critique. If Ereignis itself is 
accepted as an ultimate self-validating horizon (that is implies ought) Heidegger does not 
have to justify his criteria beyond attentiveness to Saying; but seems to lack criteria to 
prioritize any future destining that meditates on its origin without universalizing his own 
experience of such a call. The retrieval that sets this fore-conception itself lacks a horizon 
unless it comes from the current destining; destinings can only be evaluated in terms of 
other contingent destinings and we may change our thrown ethos through retrieval but 
the value criteria for this change are still thrown. Only the values of the present that are 
used to judge the past seem possible of lending authority as the claim of appropriation is 
mutually constituted with the meaning bestowed by the current claim; with the 
affirmation of Gestell and humanism within anthropocentrism-sive-nonathropocentrism. 
Ereignis itself forms the fore-conception for the projective surmounting yet Ereignis 
currently only is as what currently comes-to-presence under the claim of Gestell. As 
discussed in chapters 2.3 and 2.5 no ontic example indicates Gestell which is most 
pertinently a relation between a plurality of disclosures, so that it is the relation of these 
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ontic cases to the overarching plural understanding of Being that is pertinent. No isolated 
ontic example can either be ruled out of the saving epoch or used as an example of future 
dwelling separate from consideration of their relation to a plurality of understandings; so 
that it is the tension between plurality and totality that provides the critical horizon of 
retrieval guided by the relation between Gestell and Ereignis (between samsara and 
nirvana; nihility and sunyata). Ontic cases of distress alone cannot be used to derive 
criteria, yet as Gestell only is in terms of them they are also the only valid horizon for its 
critique. It is the manner in which they are related to Gestell as the mutual challenging of 
Da and Sein, as previously outlined in terms of how multiple understandings are related 
within the horizon of an epoch that provides the only possible projective criteria. 
 As discussed in chapter 2.4 the fore-conception by which the danger is as danger 
comes from the 'and' linking Fourfold and Gestell ; as the current thrown epochal 
understanding only Gestell once itself freed can supply the criteria for the new destining. 
Attending to the event of appropriation always is as mediated by the current manner of 
appropriation, determined by the 'and' linking the Fourfold and Gestell (the sive of 
samsāra-sive-nirvāna), so that the identity of the danger and saving (the unity of the fields 
of awareness) provides the horizon for the new epochal sending. The criteria for the 
projected moment of epochal transformation (nihilisms self-surmounting) can only come 
from the present understanding (the claim of Gestell) and the realization of its relation to 
that which gives this understanding, nothing else can guide the selection of the elements 
within the shared epochal understanding to be retrieved. The critique of any epochal 
understanding as a way to which we are called must be immanent to that way so that 
Gestell provides the context for its own critique and what is to be retained in the saving 
destining, as was suggested in previous consideration of plurality and planetary dialogue. 
 The criteria of attending to Ereignis (realizing the self as absolute nothingness) 
provides the framework for guiding a retrieval of Gestell as how Ereignis currently is, the 







3.1 Reflection, Action and Preparation 
Section 1 laid out the form and conditions of possibility for that which saves in terms of 
the mutual appropriation (self-identity) of man and absolute nothingness, Section 2 that 
Nothingness is the origin of both nihilism and its salvation/self-transformation as the 
realization of identity with reality (samsara-sive-nirvana); it is to transformed from 
relative to absolute. This section is to address how this transformation is accomplished; 
how the ontology of nothingness in terms of circuminsessional belonging is to be realized 
and nothingness unfold in the new destining through remembrance of Ereignis and 
responsibility for bringing forth this ontological nihility in a way befitting it. 
 The essence of nihilism is the truth of Being; the ontology of nothingness that 
'gives' metaphysics as a withdrawal experienced as nihilism. Nihilism as an experience 
of nihility can only be transformed through an alternate experience of the same 
ontological origin. That which gives (the nothingness of Da and Sein that calls to and 
from the self) must now be thought in a new way related to withdrawal and from the same 
origin. As metaphysics cannot think its own ground a new thinking from its origin is 
required to transform the essence of both man and metaphysics. As man only is in the 
manner of how we are claimed such epochal self-surmounting is also a transformation in 
human existence along Nishitani's lines of realizing the self as absolute nothingness; 
nihilism emerges from the nothingness of the human so is overcome in/through the 
human. These self-identical transformations of man and metaphysics are both retrievals 
through inquiry into the nothingness that gives man and metaphysics; this retrieval itself 
is the transformation. 
Nature of Saving 
In the turning of nihilism both human existence and Gestell must be brought into a free 
relation thus saved, and "That which genuinely saves is that which keeps safe"1 by 
fetching “something home into its essence, in order to bring the essence for the first time 
into its genuine appearing.” 2  The saving power is to allow Da and Sein to come to 
presence in the manner most befitting their essential belonging through realizing the free 
relation between human existence and Gestell. As a mutual freeing Gestell is also brought 
into its essence thus saved through the same realization of the danger that allows the 
saving of human existence, as realizing the truth of Gestell brings the possibility of saving 
human existence so too does realizing the truth of human existence bring the possibility 
of saving Gestell. 
 The saving power is to bring forth the essence of the human as the one who 
responds to the claim of a destining, as the field of nihility brings the self to face its 
nothingness and realize itself as absolute nothingness. As discussed in chapters 2.5 and 
2.6 this understanding of saving requires a projected notion of what the human essence 
should be for reflection on Sein to be what preserves our special nature. Through this Sein 
is also saved "as Being's coming to presence needs the coming to presence of man, in 
order to remain kept safe as Being in keeping with its own coming to presence in the 
midst of whatever is, and thus as Being to endure as present"3. How Gestell as the current 
coming-to-presence of Sein in Ereignis is saved is more problematic. To keep safe the 
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danger is to put it in proper place, but danger is omnipresent yet nowhere; "It has no place 
as something other than itself. It is itself the placeless dwelling place of all presencing."4 
To save Gestell as danger is to behold it as the danger it is; as inherent to the nature of 
destining due to the relation of nothingness to meaning. Such beholding preserves the 
danger thus brings Gestell into its essence not as a single (totally determinative) 
understanding of Being or epochally specific claim, but a continual possibility that 
indicates the origin of claiming. This latter theme is soon taken up in terms of the relation 
between plurality and absent gods (chapter 3.2), first how such saving is to be 
accomplished must be considered. 
Reflection 
Heidegger first recommends we reflect on Being to "experience to what extent we are 
called upon first to trace a path for such experiencing";5 to hear the call of self/nihility 
that frees our existence to be used by the self-surmounting of Gestell in our "essence that 
corresponds to that surmounting." 6 Such reflection as realization of the danger leads us 
back to our free existence so that the self-transformation of man can allow us to 
correspond to the self-transformation of Beings turning. Reflective thought as response 
to appropriation is how human existence comes-to-presence in the way most essential to 
our capacity to be so is how we are Dasein in the verb sense of essence. Science and 
Reflection defines such reflection as the response to the call of the self as appropriated; a  
"calm, self-possessed surrender to that which is worthy of questioning." 7 calling us along 
the way to where we are already claimed. Reflection is then the retrieval of the originary 
experience of ourselves as responders to Being (claimed in Ereignis); the realization of 
man and Being as both characterized by nothingness. To think Ereignis is to reflect on 
nothingness as the origin of meaning and hear the claim of the call of the self; thought as 
reflection is an experience, a process of being called underway. Reflection is thus a coming 
to awareness of the field of awareness, the bringing to realization of the self-awareness of the 
origin of meaning in Appropriation. 
 Through such reflection the realization of the possibility of the saving power 
begins with the bringing of Gestell to its essence (its saving) by “our catching sight of 
what comes to presence in technology, instead of merely staring at the technological”8  by 
attending to its true rather than correct essence. This prepares for a free relation to Gestell 
by acknowledging it as a happening of truth; yet the identity of the saving and danger, 
that Gestell saves as Gestell since it the is purest expression of this nihility (that only once 
completed can we ponder prior epochs) alone does not define saving. The call to reflect 
remains somewhat abstract; what is the nature of such reflection, and what is the content 
of the experience we are to reflect upon? 
Reflection as Preparatory and Provisional 
The nature of reflection must be both preparatory and provisional; this was first addressed 
in chapter 2.6 concerning the criteria of contingency for the preservation of multiple 
understandings of Being and allowing things to manifest as they are rather than how we 
will them to be. 
 Thought prepares for the coming to presence of Being, but such reflection on the 
essence of the danger is only preparatory for the self-transformation of the Da-Sein 
relation; a readiness to heed the call to experience Ereignis's turn. Our reflection must be 
“content with awakening a readiness in man for a possibility whose contour remains 
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obscure, whose coming remains uncertain." 9 In Identity and Difference Heidegger says 
such thinking of essential identity may require its own lengthy epoch during which we 
look "toward that which approaches us as the call of the active nature of identity between 
man and Being." 10  As preparatory thus transitional reflection is drawn into affinity with 
anxiety and the field of nihility, the reflector dwells in "that 'between' in which he belongs 
to Being and yet remains a stranger amid that which is." 11  Preparatory transition implies 
an awaiting for a new epoch, an ambivalence between how despite being needed for its 
accomplishment "Man cannot, of himself, abandon this destining of his modern essence 
or abolish it by fiat" 12 but only reflect on such need and freedom. Reflection as beholding 
danger is a precondition for the possibility for dwelling, also required is a new epochal 
sending. Yet this sending itself only is when realized through man and so first requires a 
new self-understanding, itself only possible in response to such a sending. 
 As that which saves will grow in its own time and man in "his essence is the one 
waits, the one who attends upon the coming to presence of Being in that in thinking he 
guards it" 13 any attempted realization of possible saving must be provisional and stem 
from an open response to the claim of Being. Heidegger contrasts the starting us on the 
way of reflection with the setting-forth of a pre-established rule or giving form to inherent 
tendencies of cultivation that requires a model in advance, instead we must reflect on our 
axiological assumptions; "Reflection is the courage to make the truth of our own 
presuppositions and the realm of our own goals into the things that most deserve to be 
called in question"14. Thought must be provisional as well as preparatory since "The ways 
of reflection constantly change, ever according to the place on the way at which a path 
begins, ever according to the portion of the way it traverses, ever according to the distant 
view that opens along the way into that which is worthy of questioning." 15 Thought as 
always under way is tentative response, yet chapter 2.6  raised the issue of whether 
Heidegger's own reflections question his goal, and preparation itself is a determining of 
what is awaited. Preparatory and provisional; these terms are seemingly at odds with 
heeding a claim in the extreme sense Heidegger indicates as preparation is an activity 
guided by criteria (leading to problem of adjudicating destinings in absence of already 
sent epochal criteria), and as shall emerge more over the following chapters consideration 
of poetry and dwelling by necessity determines what is sent. 
What we Reflect upon and Await 
The content of preparatory reflection is given positive formulation in that “human 
reflection can ponder the fact that all saving power must be of a higher essence than what 
is endangered, though at the same time kindred to it,” 16 indicating from where the saving 
power is to grow; from the null origin that gave Gestell. Such awareness of the essence 
of nihilism requires us to "reflect on old, venerable words the language of which gives us 
promise of the realm of the essence of nihilism and of its restoration." 17 As outlined in 
chapter 2.1's guiding definition The Question Concerning Technology is to build a way 
through language as language "is the primal dimension within which man's essence is 
first able to correspond at all to Being and its claim, and in corresponding, to belong to 
Being. This primal corresponding, expressly carried out, is thinking."18 Reflection as an 
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attending to essential language as poetry is how we prepare for the self-surmounting of 
Gestell, how Appropriation comes to pass by our reflecting on Saying. Such thought as 
correspondence is how "we first learn to dwell in the realm in which there comes to pass 
the restorative surmounting of the destining of Being, the surmounting of Enframing." 19   
 Language and man's relation to it is the matter of reflection, and preparatory 
reflection upon this has already set on the way to the surmounting, yet "It is of the essence 
of such transitions that they are, within certain limits, compelled to speak the language of 
that which they help us to overcome."20 Reflection on the history of language means 
preparatory thinking as attending to Ereignis "maintains itself necessarily within the 
realm of historical reflection".21 Reflecting on the historical emergence of Gestell is how 
we ponder the connection between the saving and danger; how we return to the originary 
primordial experience that gives history by withdrawing to enframe enframing and 
understand new ways are possible. Whilst the new destining lays beyond the prophecy of 
man it must be rooted in the tradition that culminated in Gestell ; "Only when we turn 
thoughtfully toward what has already been thought, will we be turned to use for what 
must still be thought"22 and capable of retrieving the null origin that was most fully 
realized in such oblivion. Thought must be freed in dialogue with its history to reach the 
origin of that tradition, not in the sense of its first thinkers but as chapter 2.4 laid out its 
primordial origin that provides thought with its matte and measure. 
 This matter of reflection is "the open region for everything that becomes present 
and absent,"23 and the specifics of what we are to reflect upon come from an attentive 
questioning listening of this phenomena. What we are to hear and respond to is the 
gathering of world explicated in Section 1 as the understanding of nihility lost in Gestell 
yet indicated/retrieved through it, just as Sunyata is prior to the Field of Nihility yet 
reached through it. Reflection requires allowing oneself to be appropriated by this inter-
referential totality of presencing thus bringing out (letting-be) our own essence more fully, 
reflection is a letting oneself be appropriated by thinking on appropriation. The relation 
to that-which-regions as waiting means "to release oneself into the openness of that-
which-regions"24 and to be held to our nature by this relation. 
 Reflection on language is to bring about the realization of the circuminsessional 
ontology laid out in previous chapters and accordingly first requires awareness of this 
nature of self; we "learn to ‘let beings be’ only by gaining insight into the nothingness 
that pervades all things.”25 That-which-regions as the circuminsessional totality only is as 
realized in man's awareness of belonging to it, yet the new epoch we are to be open for 
accords with the circuminsessional Fourfold as criteria derived from Ereignis (absolute 
nothingness as the origin that 'gives' destiny) and can be discerned by reflection on 
(heeding the Saying of) such nothingness. 
 Letting be is how we authentically bring-forth by allowing beings to unfold in 
terms of their epochal claim, allowing jitai to emerge as they are on their homeground. 
The axio-ontological identity entails this realization brings normative responsibility for 
jitai ; reflection itself is the warrant for this. The mutual lingering of jointure "does not 
happen at the behest of a subjugation suppressing one's own wishes under a moral 
imperative or result from bitter compromise. Only a being that knows itself through 
others...able to experience its own retreat and absence (non-being) as a genuine manner 
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of its selfhood, is able to take itself back, in order to let the other be, to make room for 
the other." 26 Yet this includes disjointure; letting beings be is also letting the self be and 
to let ourselves be is to act in accord with ourselves as claimed, thus also as challenged-
forth. 
Accomplishing Appropriation 
Chapter 1.2 spoke of Da and Sein's mutual need, this need has now emerged as resulting 
from a projected saving that defines the danger it is to counter. Yet the problem of how 
appropriation is realized remains. Being is both said to have no equal and that the turn 
happens without mediation, yet also that this turn is in need of man, who in preparing is 
both determined by yet also partially determining the nature of the new claim. Heidegger 
claims both that "The turning of the danger comes to pass suddenly. In this turning, the 
clearing belonging to the essence of Being suddenly clears itself and lights up." 27 yet also 
that "This may happen, not of and through itself, but in virtue of the readiness of man for 
a determination which, whether heeded or not, always speaks in the destiny of man, which 
has not yet been decided."28 Releasement and openness to mystery do not happen by themselves 
"They do not befall us accidentally. Both flourish only through persistent, courageous thinking"29 
yet we do not decide to inaugurate the new epoch nor its nature "Man is rather 'thrown' from 
Being itself into the truth of Being, so that ek-sisting in this fashion he might guard the 
truth of Being".30 Preparation makes no sense as an injunction if the manner of the claim 
in no way way depends on the manner of the preparation so that we partially determine 
that destining through the manner of openness we provide through our sheltering. That 
Heidegger makes recommendations concerning our preparation implies our 
accomplishing of appropriation shapes Sein, yet he remains committed to attributing a 
priority to Sein's arrival rather than Da's preparation both reifying Sein and inviting the 
criteria problems laid out in chapter 2.6. For Heidegger the realization of the epochal turn 
is beyond human agency yet requires human responsiveness to occur, a responsiveness 
attained through a relinquishing of will and ego (releasement and anxiety respectively). 
For Nishitani ego-death as the religious quest requires Sunyata as absolute nothingness 
yet is realized only within the personal self that as self-identical with absolute nothingness 
requires no sending beyond this; there is nothing to await. 
 As said in chapter 1.2 if 'Being' is heard in the sense given to it in Identity and Difference 
as standing for the Da-Sein relation as prior to its constituents and the clearing belonging to this 
essence that clears itself is the Da of man then the position becomes more coherent. We may not 
have the power to compel Being but what Being is is still determined by our communal actions 
and preferences, it is not a causal relation but a relation of definition. But this then requires far 
more than just 'awaiting', the reflection that prepares must be related to a more active sense of 
accomplishment. The new epochal appropriation requires both a sending of Being and that Dasein 
constructs “a thrown, partial understanding and interpretation of that sending;”31 as Ereignis that 
grants history is Da-Sein not just Being, and Gestell a mutual challenging encompassing both 
aspects of the relation. This responsibility towards accomplishing the turn is a collective one as 
the understanding that determines an age is nothing more than the plurality of our societal 
understanding that conditions the possible understandings of the individual. How is such 
realization to be accomplished; how do we 'do' it and thereby refuse it or alter the manner of its 
accomplishment? 
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Reflection as Action 
That Heidegger recommends we realize the saving power through reflection on the danger 
is often taken to mean that rather than taking any action contrary to Gestell we are to take 
a more meditative stance. Bernstein believes for Heidegger “the answer to the question, 
‘What are we to do?’ is to ponder, to recollect, to reflect, to question, to think, to prepare, 
to wait”32 Watts that “Heidegger does not suggest taking any practical action for dealing 
with the negative effects of technology”33 Staumbaugh claims that in Discourse on 
Thinking Heidegger "is not talking so much about the way we should lead our everyday 
lives as about what the philosopher should stop doing in order to get out of 
metaphysics."34 Yet it is within the everyday that we are challenged-forth and towards 
which releasement comports; epochal transformation requires more than changes in 
philosophy departments. Whilst reflection "reveals that the question of technology 
requires a questioning of what it is to be human”35 such questioning is only realized in a 
way of being human that forms an answer. A passivity and limitation of reflection to 
cognition is implied in the claim that Being's "truth will be given over to man when he 
has overcome himself as subject, and that means when he no longer represents that which 
is as object."36  Man and Being are saved when they “achieve their active nature by losing 
those qualities with which metaphysics has endowed them," 37 but reflection cannot be 
defined by negation alone lest it remain a relative nihility, and as chapter 2.6 addressed; 
all critique is as much for something as against. As an experience of what we already are 
the call must not only chart a way away, but also towards. 
 Discourse on Thinking characterizes the supreme danger in terms of  Will (desire) 
as at the ground of representation and objectification; the supreme danger manifests as 
the metaphysics of will in the subject, the willing of total organization that obscures the 
essence of Gestell. Reflection then involves a relinquishment of the metaphysics of will 
which only is as the subjective will/desires of the individual; thus the psychological 
realization of reflection is portrayed in terms of the abnegation of will that correlates to 
the ego's self-denial as it passes through Nishitani's fields of awareness. Non-willing 
means "a willing in such a way as to involve negation...willingly to renounce 
willing...further, what remains absolutely outside any kind of will."38 Releasement as the 
non-willing that negates will through will before even that trace of will evaporates; such 
preparatory willing to not have a will must (like reflection) be a continual yet sporadic 
state (preparatory and provisional). At times we must will as calculative thought is still 
tarried in by meditative, this attitude cannot be achieved once and for all but must be 
sporadically maintained in face of continual encounters with the technological world. Yet 
such releasement remains passive, an awaiting for Sein to brings us into Ereignis so "We 
are to do nothing but wait".39 But awaiting as beyond Will is beyond the passive-active 
distinction so cannot truly be said to not be an activity, sunyata as both affirmation and 
negation of the fields marked by desire, like the critique of humanism the denial of action 
pertains only to a narrow interpretation of activity. 
 Heidegger's talk of reflection and pondering cannot be mere cognitive activity; to 
counter nihilism, writes Takeichi, "One must existentially bring to self-awareness the fact 
that Being is immediately 'danger'"40 such existential awareness is a psychological lived 
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transformation to complement the self-surmounting of Being. Just as chapter 2.3 
discussed the ontic correlates to the supreme danger so too must the beholding of the 
danger as danger also has its ontic correlates; political movements and marginal practices 
that resist totalized understandings, or social movements concerned with safeguarding the 
environment. Both the initial preparatory reflection and the epochal transformation must 
have concrete ontic manifestations beyond abstract changes to will and representation lest 
reflection remain in the remit of Gestell as "The characterization of thinking as theōria 
and the determination of knowing as 'theoretical' behaviour occur already within the 
'technical' interpretation of thinking."41 Reflection is a questioning, questions a path. "If 
the answer could be given it would consist in a transformation of thinking, not in a 
propositional statement about a matter at stake,"42 as said on chapter 2.6 Heidegger and 
Nishitani provide an answer to the question of the human, one that can be indicated 
propositionally but only realized existentially and thus requires action. Mere activity is 
warned against, but if it is to avoid metaphysical dichotomies then true thought must also 
be action; calculative thought must dwell with meditative. Gestell must be affirmed and 
denied as "No age lets itself be done away with by a negating decree," 43  so abnegation 
of will alone is insufficient. Gestell cannot be countered by human action as currently 
conditioned by Gestell, yet such action can no more be rejected in favour of an abstract 
reflection than can Gestell itself; the reflection on the danger that is a simultaneous yes 
and no to Gestell must as such a partial affirmation retain an element of such activity. 
 "No merely human organization is capable of gaining dominion"44 over Gestell, 
yet the abnegation of will that is to free us and Gestell also involves humans collectively 
living in certain ways. The realization (accomplishment) of that-which-regions through 
our preparatory activity means "something like power of action and resolve also reign in 
releasement"45 so long as such action remain open for "a receiving of the regioning of 
that-which-regions"46 such receiving is also a realizing involving action (and higher 
action). Non-willing is not an activity but it is an achievement requiring social practices 
and personal endeavours conducive to realizing such a state of awareness (e.g traditions 
of meditative practice). The creation of such receptivity is an active process, willing to 
cease willing on a social scale or in an individual existence requires much activity. 
Waiting is then not passive, but a preparing for a certain form of epochal understanding 
that is accomplished in activities. Only a god can save us; but gods as mediators between 
man and the Holy are themselves constituted by their relation to mortal making (as 
addressed in chapter 1.6). 
 The nature of this transformed ontic way of life that corresponds to the epochal 
surmounting is to be addressed over the following chapters in terms of the relation 
between thought, art, poetry, dwelling and building. Reflection as action is realized as a 
form of dwelling thus building, if thought is not theory but a higher action then to reflect 
on art is to live (thus act) poetically-artistically; thought is a poetic building that traces a 
way. The dialogue of Discourse on Thinking (in which the scientist represents modernity) 
shows how releasement is to come about through attending to the saying of poetic 
teachers and thoughtful scholars; the conversation as the path to waiting is releasement 
itself. The building of our dwelling in the age of Gestell is guided by thought and poetry, 
yet such poetic thought "is not necessary for all, nor is it to be accomplished or even found 
bearable by everyone. On the other hand, absence of reflection belongs to a very great 
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extent to certain definite stages of achieving and moving forward." 47 How reflection is 
complimented by and requires calculative thought is to be thematic over the following 
chapters. 
Poiesis 
Despite the provisionality and rejection of prophecy Heidegger offers a possibility for the 
new destining to be realized, that the  “more primally granted revealing that could bring 
the saving power into its first shining forth in the midst of the danger” 48 to be prepared 
for through such reflection is to be retrieved from the poiesis of the fine arts that the 
Greeks also called techne so shares an origin with technology, and that inquiry into poiesis 
gives form to how the new destinal claim is to be prepared for. This shared origin means 
art is a non-arbitrary yet contingent choice for the revealing that can allow for the 
emergence of the saving power for “essential reflection upon technology and decisive 
confrontation with it must happen in a realm that is, on the one hand, akin to the essence 
of technology and, on the other, fundamentally different from it.” 49  
 Art is not strictly speaking to be the saving power; only what allows the saving 
power (new destining) to emerge through providing for a retrieval of the origin of Gestell, 
"in terms of its essence, art is a consecration and a refuge in which the real bestows its 
long-hidden splendour upon man ever anew, that in such light he may see more purely 
and hear more clearly what addresses itself to his essence." 50 Reflection upon poiesis is 
to prepare us to respond to the new claim by enabling the elements of the Fourfold to 
encounter each other. Heidegger claims that for the Greeks art as revealing safeguarded 
truth as it “brought the presence of the gods, brought the dialogue of divine and human 
destining, to radiance”;51 in allowing for the dialogue of mortals and gods the poetical as 
the essence of art brings forth truth by gathering the Fourflold in the thing, leading 
Heidegger to cite Holderlin in claiming that man dwells poetically upon the earth. 
 The poetic is named as the condition of possibility for human dwelling that is to 
be actualized by our attending to the nature of the poetic. The turn towards dwelling not 
only requires us to heed the poetic, but "How and to what extent our doings can share in 
this turn we alone can prove, if we take the poetic seriously."52 The nature of its poetry 
can indicate the extent to which man allows himself to be appropriated in any given epoch 
and the manner in which we accomplish that which Being grants. To dwell poetically is 
Heidegger's imperative, such dwelling is still part of our projected verbal essence and 
only is when realized as such, as outlined in chapter 2.6, yet is also portrayed as primordial 
and attested to by the danger itself  "For dwelling can be unpoetic only because it is in its 
essence poetic." 53   
 In his discussion of poiesis in The Question Concerning Technology Heidegger 
seeks the saving in the same origin as the danger rather than within the danger itself as 
danger, implying it is the origin of Gestell rather than Gestell itself that we are to have 
our free relation to; but the origin only is in terms of its current dispensation/realization. 
That which saves is to be retrieved from the same origin that gives Greek poiesis; the pure 
nihility of absolute nothingness that is itself indicated by Gestell as the revealing of bare 
suchness. Although thought is to reflect on tradition and Heidegger seeks clues as to the 
new destining in the Greek understanding of art such reflection must be a transformative 
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retrieval not a simple return as "The flight into tradition, out of a combination of humility 
and presumption, can bring about nothing in itself other than self-deception and blindness 
in relation to the historical moment."54 The status of the Greek as an origin to be retrieved 
has been addressed over chapters 2.3 and 2.4; if every epoch flowers from the same source 
in a non-linear fashion then the Greek experience of art as “that brief but magnificent 
time” 55 which art was but can never be again is no closer to the true origin (or a more 
original revealing) than Gestell. 
 Whilst art “may awaken and found anew our look into that which grants” 56  such 
a founding anew must differ from the Greek understanding of art in light of Gestell. As 
was said in chapter 2.4 such granting is conditional; the retrieval of poiesis may never 
occur "Instead, the rule of metaphysics may rather entrench itself...Or, everything that 
results by way of the step back may merely be exploited and absorbed by metaphysics in 
its own way"57 Heidegger's use of conditionals stresses that arts fostering of the saving 
power is only a possibility and also possible is that art will not foster it; that something 
else will or that nothing will. As said in chapter 2.6 no context seems possible for 
favouring poiesis over other possible savings. The new autochthony indicated by 
releasement and openness-to-mystery "which someday even might be fit to recapture the 
old and now rapidly disappearing autochthony in a changed form"58 must allow us to 
dwell in the absence of the gods by appropriating Gestell into a free relation that preserves 
the manner of revealing the real as challenging-forth (preserves nihility within sunyata); 
bringing Gestell into its own essence as the revealing it is rather then returning to any pre-
Gestell notion of poiesis. 
Saved Gestell  
Danger as danger is what saves,  "The saving power is not secondary to the danger. The 
selfsame danger is, when it is as the danger, the saving power." 59 Heidegger's discussion 
of poiesis implies that it is the danger inherent to the origin of Gestell as a destining that 
is to bring forth a saving power that itself will be other to Gestell ; "The danger is the 
saving power, inasmuch as it brings the saving power out of its - the danger's - concealed 
essence that is ever susceptible to turning." 60 Ereignis itself as withdrawal is the essence 
of both danger and saving. and only currently is as the epochal understanding of Gestell ; 
Being is the source of both awe and anxiety and its mystery is ambiguous in the same 
sense as Gestell. Heidegger’s belief that the more the way leads into the danger the closer 
it comes to the saving power implies that the danger itself must be preserved within the 
way of thought that is itself the growth of the saving power. All destinings are necessarily 
danger; danger must be embraced as such, what is needed is a destining that preserves 
that danger in sight so as to not become one that reveals in line with a single understanding 
but in terms of the relation between understandings. 
 Previously it was noted how the self’s realization both enables and is enabled by 
the attainment of the suchness of things, that the realization of sunyata paradoxically 
forms its own condition of possibility. Both Heidegger and Nishitani try to clarify what 
we already are yet remains obscured; yet if uncanny homelessness as revealed in anxiety 
is primordial, if things have never thinged and Ereignis/Sunyata only are in their 
existential realization then the field of nihility is equally primordial and never truly 
obscures the field with which it is identical and attests to. Both Gestell and Nihility 
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themselves as themselves must be integrally related to the saving power and suchness in 
order for Ereignis and sunyata to be realized. There are two related ways this saving can 
be emphasized, both seem consonant with Heidegger and Nishitani's remarks to different 
extents. 
 Firstly; that poiesis can be retrieved from Gestell as both necessarily contain a 
trace of the other. This was discussed earlier in relation to the examples Heidegger uses 
in The Question Concerning Technology; that the progression through the fields is a 
deepening of self-understanding that also transforms the self, a clarification of self. This 
would be a retrieval of the ‘original countenance’ we are all thrown into through virtue of 
our nature as nothingness, the elemental awareness that is the possibility of 
enlightenment. This relates to previous discussion on whether we can ever not be Dasein; 
the priority of the Da-Sein relation over its constituents means we cannot talk of Being 
prior to our having a relation to it. The self-surmounting can never be a case of regaining 
our relation to Being as our belonging to Being is so determinative that we cannot "even 
say any longer that 'Being' and 'man' 'be' the same in the sense that they belong together; 
for in so saying we still let both be for themselves."61 Heidegger seems to tend more 
towards this interpretation. 
 Secondly; rather than seeing the fields as containing traces of each other to be 
retrieved their self-identity can be stressed. That we are realizing what we already are not 
so much in the sense of a projective retrieval of latent or trace possibilities but that we 
realize samsara-sive-nirvana; that Gestell is the saving power as it already is, just as 
nihility is reality as it is in its suchness. In stressing the self-identity of the fields over the 
transitional nature of nihility, and the identity of Gestell with its origin then we can attain 
enlightenment because we already are enlightened and to dwell amidst Gestell as Gestell 
is already to be saved. The essence of Gestell to be freed/saved is not just that it claims 
but that it claims us in a certain way; we must learn to dwell within the destiny that is 
Gestell, so our dwelling is partially determined by the current danger as the specific form 
of that danger which it is. Art and technology would then be brought together reflecting 
the self-identity of calculative and meditative thought. Nishitani seems to tend more 
towards this interpretation. 
 Both thinkers speak the identity of nihilism and that which saves, yet as first said 
in intro1+2 their presentations downplay the retaining of nihilistic elements of experience. 
Nishitani in relation to the reconciliation of science and religion, Heidegger in relation to 
calculative and meditative thoughts mutual need (the 'and' linking Fourfold and Gestell 
as their sive). 
 The nothingness that befalls Being in nihilism (the danger) is also how Sein claims 
Da in Ereignis determining them both. Withdrawal (nihilation/forgetting) of Being is how 
it discloses (comes-to-presence), it is the essence of Sein that is to be saved, forgetting is 
as integral to human existence as remembrance. If the danger must be beheld as such and 
Gestell is the supreme danger then Gestell as the culmination of withdrawal once seen as 
withdrawal could be seen as the increase of the disclosive power of Being, a continual 
heightening of its mystery. Gestell is a twofold forgetting; but only one of these 
forgettings is the supreme danger; one is simply integral to Ereignis as withdrawal. Man 
is the being who both remembers and forgets "He is in the needful condition of being 
constrained by the one and the other"62 forgetting too is a form of thanking. Such 
preserving of withdrawal is to soon be seen in terms of holding open the absence-of-gods. 
The preservation of Gestell is constant anxiety without resolution thus dwells amidst 
homelessness (that as uncanny should be primordial and grasped as destiny). The stand 
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in nihility is to be maintained on a social/communal level in a pluralistic fashion to enable 
the individual attainment of enlightenment. 
Following chapter guide 
Poetically we must dwell else forget the concealed and lose the saving power (if such a 
change to our essence even be possible), but how we are to dwell post-Gestell is now the 
main concern; the nature of a return to poetic dwelling in the absence of the gods. Such 
dwelling must reconcile and contain the dichotomies of the calculative and meditative 
and the unity of the fields. Nothingness does not vanish at the completion nor overcoming 
of nihilism "overcoming is only attained when, instead of the appearance of negative 
nothingness, the essence of nothingness which was once related to 'Being' can arrive and 
be accepted by us mortals."63 ('Being' here designates the belonging of Ereignis; both Da 
and Sein). In Nishitani's terms when relative nihility becomes the absolute nothingness 
as true self (elemental subjectivity); how thoughts/disclosures twin aspects of revealing 
and concealment are realized in their self-identity by transitioning through yet retaining 
nihility. The following chapters will inquire into the possible saving power of Gestell ; 
clarifying dwelling and poetry's and relation to Gestell as criteria/origin of that which 
saves, what forms of art and dwelling would save Gestell and bring it into its authentic 
essence in a way that preserves the mystery of concealment. 
 Firstly how we accomplish our share of the self-surmounting by allowing beings 
to gather a place for Being through us thus saving of Gestell in terms of poetic language 
as the mediation of the singularity of Sein and plurality of Da that as ontological, 
existential and psychological is at once a transformation of both self, society and Being 
will be addressed. The human-divine relation is core of Heidegger's thought on the self-
surmounting so will first be explicated in terms of the divinities and absent gods. The 
plurality of possible manners of revealing the real would seem to be the key counter-
tendency to the supreme danger; letting-be must apply equally to understandings as to 
beings. How poetic dwelling draws its criteria from ontological nihility was addressed in 
chapter 2.6 and relates to chapter 2.4's discussion of the universality and plurality 
retrieved from Gestell as projective criteria for the planetary dialogue. Chapters 3.2 and 
3.3 will address how these themes relate to Heidegger's thought on poetry, dwelling and 
building. 
 Secondly chapter 3.3 will explore the role of Gestell as total disclosure in terms 
of the elemental objectivity required to balance one of the core paradoxes in Nishitani's 
thought. How Gestell as extreme withdrawal is related to the scientific revealing of brute 
nihility or suchness (jitai on its homeground that gives appearances) and the relation of 
science to anxiety and presence-at-hand will be considered. These themes are related to 
those of poetic dwelling as the receptivity to new words for Being can be found in 
experimental science as interpretations of elemental objectivity, poetry and art as not 
defined in opposition to scientific discourse but as belonging to the same realm of Saying. 
That "it is precisely the spectacular achievements of science and technology - atomic 
power and space flights - that remind man of his finitude. The antagonism between 
enframing and fourfold improperly absolutizes the methodical and technological 
tendency of our behaviour in the world, in order to oppose to it a different thinking as 
poetry"64 consideration of the viability of the danger in chapter 2.5 and the 'and/sive' 
linking Gestell and Fourfold in chapter 2.4 providing the context for this bringing together 
of opposed disclosures. Hodge also claims Heidegger fails to subsume the art-science 
relation into the Dichten-Technik relation concealing how the distinction between poetry 
and physics can be disrupted and that the latter, rather than representing the danger of an 
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enduring epoch, may be capable of inaugurating the new epoch by displacing “the 
humanist privilege assigned to literature, to poetry, to art, in favour of another form of 
thinking combining the expertise of science and of artistic creation”.65 
 Finally chapter 3.5 will consider the ethical and political implications of 
Heidegger and Nishitani's thought; the nature of the Great Compassion and whether their 
injunctions require a further ethical context to act as criteria. Themes first outlined in 
chapter 2.6 will lead to consideration of whether the ethical aspects of metaphysics are to 
be an integral part of any new destining. That if withdrawal is part of how Being discloses, 
if nihility is reality (and thus can't be rendered a problem) and essential to disclosure then 
Gestell as its fullest expression must be preserved as the framework for pluralism that is 
both ethical and allowing of ontological diversity so long as its tendency to totalization is 
beheld as the danger. 
3.2 Destitute Poets and Absent Gods 
“Wide open. Nothing Holy!” - First Patriarch Bodhidharma 
Previous chapters have referred to Language as how the relation of Da and Sein comes to 
pass, "the primal dimension within which man's essence is first able to correspond at all 
to Being and its claim, and in corresponding, to belong to Being." 66 However man is it is 
language that is speaking him; reflection is when we actively attend to this relation so that 
"primal corresponding, expressly carried out, is thinking";67 reflection on language is 
reflection on Ereignis as how we are appropriated thus how we are as claimed. As said at 
the end of chapter 2.1 it is through reflection on language that the self-surmounting of 
Gestell will come to pass from within language itself but requiring us, as our relation with 
language is how we realize the self-surmounting. We are to reflect on language as it 
pertains to the danger and saving; to the experience outlined in section 1 and how we 
attain this through the experience of nihilism outlined in section 2. Chapter 2.3 indicated 
epochal transitions are granted by Ereignis and responded to by thought; the creative 
language of poetry is a dual response and influence on this so that language in its essence 
is historical (thus reflection is on the history of words to free them). 
 The first half of this chapter will focus on language and poetry as Ereignis and 
reconciliation of the singularity of Sein with the plurality of Da respectively. The second 
half connects this theme to the absence of the gods to highlight the saving of Gestell. 
What do Heidegger's reflections on language say of Ereignis and its new sending? 
Language as Appropriation 
Through language we are appropriated and beings are disclosed as such. In his writings 
on language Saying becomes what Heidegger used to mean by Being and is now thought 
as Ereignis; "only Saying confers what we call by the tiny word 'is'...Saying releases the 
'is' into lighted freedom and therewith into the security of its thinkability."68 That language 
is the house of Being truly means that Sein only is in its appropriative belonging with Da, 
that "Language is the house of Being because language, as Saying, is the mode of 
Appropriation." 69 The relation of Saying and its speakers is the mutual need of Da and 
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insofar as he, belonging to Saying, listens to Saying, so that in resaying it he may be able 
to say a word." 70 
 The relation of language and its speakers occurs when "Appropriation 
appropriates man to its own usage...Appropriation is the way-making for Saying to come 
into language." 71 Heidegger's way is one through language that realizes Ereignis; "The 
way-making of Saying into spoken language is the delivering bond that binds by 
appropriating." 72 We are appropriated as called along our way by the nothingness of self 
(as outlined in anx chap) to undergo an experience with language; an experience of 
language calls us along the way to an experience of nihility and as such an experience of 
nothingness Appropriation occurs. 
 In his speech man as shepherd of Being also keeps Saying safe, our "speaking 
gathers the ways in which it persists as well as that which persists by it - its persistence, 
its presencing,"73 human existence as the place for Sein to come to presence means it is 
in human speech as response that Sein is sheltered and by which our share of 
appropriation is accomplished. The meaningfulness of language precedes any current 
speakers, but again is nothing more than those speakers and equally mutually 
determinative. Language needs speakers just as the Fourfold needs man but is beyond 
their control and prior to them, how does this relation come to pass and we play our part 
in it? 
 Saying as Sein is integrally related to Silence as Nichts. To speak is to show, "The 
essential being of language is Saying as Showing." 74 Saying is the revealing that also 
conceals and must precede speech; that which is unspoken is yet to be shown and still lies 
in concealment. The meaningfulness of world as prior to discourse and language as a 
silent saying means our speech is preceded by a hearing of the silent saying that 
constitutes the realization of presence. Our speaking corresponds  to the saying by 
listening to this unspoken; "Silence corresponds to the soundless tolling of the stillness 
of appropriating-showing Saying." 75 Poetic/essential language is silent indication 
originating from and expressing the voice of Being. 
 We accomplish (not cause) showing (Saying) by following the indication of what 
lets itself be shown. Thus speaking is a listening that attends to the mirroring/showing of 
language and responds to what we hear;  "Mortal speech must first of all have listened to 
the command, in the form of which the stillness of the dif-ference calls world and things 
into the rift of its onefold simplicity. Every word of mortal speech speaks out of such a 
listening, and as such a listening."76    As we can show in many ways; sign language, body 
language, all manners of artistry and creation, then these too must be forms of belonging 
to Saying thus Language. Speech is paradigmatic but by no means primary, as will emerge 
over chapter 3.3's consideration of art and building.  
Language and Fourfold 
How the Fourfold gathers can now be seen in language. Language is how things comes 
to presence; how the mirroring of the Fourfold occurs by calling world and things to each 
other by naming the elements; Saying gathers the Fourfold through the naming words of 
the poet. Naming brings beings to appearance through words, a gathering of meaning that 
also preserves the concealed possibilities of meaning. Such naming is always a response 
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to a call from the thing, poetry is thus the call to and from mortals that calls them to their 
mortality; an experience of being called to/from the self as nothingness. Such naming is 
a communal response, for Heidegger discussion is “to point out the proper place or site 
of something, to situate it” 77 in chapter 3.1 said that to place something in proper place 
was to save it. Discussion is what gathers a thing on its homeground; the discourse of a 
plurality of speakers how we behold danger and saving to gather,  call forth and respond 
to the Thing. 
 Jointure and disjointure move in accord with language as "Saying sets all present 
beings free into their given presence, and brings what is absent into their absence";78 it is 
the manner in which the circuminsessional master-servant relation is realized as through 
it "all things are open to one another in their self-concealment; thus one extends itself to 
the other, and thus all remain themselves; one is over the other as it guardian watching 
over the other, over it as its veil."79 The mirroring of world comes to pass in Saying "as 
showing, reaching into all regions of presences, summons from them whatever is present 
to appear and to fade." 80  Saying as "the gathering that joins all appearance of the in itself 
manifold showing which everywhere lets all that is shown abide within itself" 81 allows 
jitai to come to reciprocal presence; thus brings jitai to rest on their homeground; "brings 
all present and absent beings each into their own, from where they show themselves in 
what they are, and where they abide according to their kind." 82  
 This occurs in the poets naming that calls things to presence as the gathering of 
world allowing us to dwell. The essential language of poetry is how we speak the fourfold 
thus allow its mirroring to presence as world;  "The word makes the thing into a thing - it 
'bethings' the thing."83  Only once named in response to the call do "The things that were 
named, thus called, gather to themselves sky and earth, mortals and divinities"84 and 
allows the mirroring of the Fourfold. Things gather world, but first words gather things 
as that which"retains the thing within itself in such a manner that it 'is' a thing"85 preparing 
the thing as vessel and complementing the role of the mortal maker; a necessary precursor 
to the our dwelling as Ereignis occurs only “by virtue of beings, that is, works of art, 
deeds, things, and above all and first of all— words.”86 Words are the gathering “which 
first brings what presences to its presence," 87 yet also as a response do not precede world 
and thing; which themselves are also equiprimordial. The mutual appropriation of world 
and thing is an integral relation like Da-Sein, Heidegger names their relation dif-ference 
that "carries out world in its worlding, carries out things in their thinging. Thus carrying 
them out, it caries them toward one another."88 Naming brings about this identity of world 
and thing "It entrusts world to the things and simultaneously keeps the things in the 
splendour of world. The world grants to things their presence. Things bear world. World 
grants things." 89   
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      Poetry in naming speaks of the mutual appropriation of thing and world that is prior 
to that which it relates so that "In the bidding that calls thing and world, what is really 
called is: the dif-ference."90 Poetry is the calling together of world and thing into the dif-
ference where they are joined as the Fourfold to save each other. The poets word gathers 
the dif-ference by standing and enduring in the rift through speaking the silent 
appropriation of Saying. In naming the thing the word of the poet is the relation that brings 
together world and thing, as this relation the word itself is no-thing; "It shows what is 
there and yet 'is' not."91 The word is the giving that withdraws by giving, Ereignis itself 
realized through Sein's claiming of the poet who like the mortal maker shapes the word 
as vessel. We must try to name the relation of word and thing yet cannot directly 
experience it, only what it relates. 
Danger and Reconcilliation 
Man as Da accomplishes appropriation in reflection as a responding that forgets itself in 
ceaseless questioning so that "responding loses the character of questioning and becomes 
simple saying." 92 Such "Thinking gathers language into simple saying"93 so that human 
reflection accomplishes saying, yet Heidegger's thought on language also often seem to 
reinforce the primacy of Sein in Ereignis as "thinking in its saying merely brings the 
unspoken word of Being to language"94 so that the Da is passively appropriated as "Being 
comes, clearing itself, to language."95 Such was Olafson's critique mentioned in chapter 
2.5, which along with chapter 1.2 raised the issue of responsibility for epochal 
transformation and understanding, both communal and individual. 
 Word, Thing, Saying and Poet; all in a singing silent relation to mediate the 
singularity of Sein with the plurality of Da. We are to be obedient to language, "Obedient to 
the voice of Being, thought seeks the Word through which the truth of Being may be 
expressed.” 96 and we must sacrifice in order that “thought of Being guards the Word and 
fulfills its function in such guardianship, namely care for the use of language.”97 Yet the 
response-naming relation means the realization of appropriation (how singularity and 
plurality is mediated) remains mysterious, and as chapter 2.6 outlined such sacrifice and 
obedience to a mystery without criteria is its own form of supreme danger. 
 The supreme danger is the forgetting of our relation to language; that language is 
no longer a true revealing of hidden possibilities but only an instrument in service to 
efficient manipulation. Poetic language becomes metaphysical, no longer creative but a 
set interpretation of what it means to be human. That the supreme danger is both from and 
to Ereignis also applies to Language; even poetic language is inherent danger (devolving 
to idle talk or totalized understandings that allow for no criteria of critique), reflection on 
language is the beholding of this danger. That in the epoch of Gestell "Man acts as though 
he were the shaper and master of language, while in fact language remains the master of 
man...it is before all else man's subversion of this relation of dominance that drives his 
nature into alienation"98 implies it is man's inversion of this relation that gives rise to the 
danger. Yet the oblivion of Being stems from how "Language withdraws from man its 
simple and high speech"99 so that the danger in inherent to how language itself sends 
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meaning. The subversion of the relation requires language to have first withdrawn, yet 
such withdrawal only is as the subversion of the relation; whilst Language is to provide 
the reconciliation of singularity and plurality, explicating how Ereignis appropriates, it 
ultimately returns us to the problematic addressed in chapter 1.2. 
 If the provisional solution of chapter 1.2 is proffered; that integral relation means question 
of priority is meaningless; man is both Da and Sein as the hyphen between them, then "language 
speaks solely with itself alone." 100  Properly speaking there is no priority between Saying and its 
speakers as both are equally determined by the hyphen, leading Rorty to claim "There is just us, 
in the grip of no power save those words we happen to speak, the dead metaphors which we have 
internalized."101 We are alone with our responsibility, there is only man and the empty words of 
poets revitalizing dead gods. This would appear a more Sartrean than Heideggerian picture, a 
reducing of talk of Da and Sein to that of man alone heard collectively so that the poet alone crafts 
the name. What it could mean to be alone with our absent/dead gods is returned to later after 
looking to the divinities that have died and the poets that heed them. 
Poetry as Epochal Transformation 
The previously sketched role of poets in language means the reflection that saves must 
reflect on poetry. Poets and thinkers enable us to dwell in the house of Being, "Those who 
think and those who create with words are the guardians of this home".102 Thought and 
poetry are the same and different in responding to the silence of Being; in poetry wonder 
sings whilst in thought it does not, so that in facing each other as both Saying "poetry and 
thinking are in virtue of their nature held apart by a delicate yet luminous difference".103 
The close relation of poetry and thought "originates in that distance where earth and sky, 
the god and man reach one another"; 104 thinkers, poets and artists all articulate how the 
Fourfold are to belong together yet in different inter-dependent ways. Poetry and thinking 
are both related to Saying and through this relation belong to each other; poetry calls for 
reflection that itself brings poetry to its nature, Saying "is itself the occurrence of 
appropriation by which poetry and thinking are directed into their proper nature." 105 They 
mutually enable each other and Heidegger's thought was to aid poetry by thinking the 
relation between them as their mutual belonging and dialogue is required "to call forth 
the nature of language, so that mortals may learn again to live within language";106 for us 
to make our way into Saying. Alone neither thought nor poetry give voice to Saying. To 
do this we must think their relation by way of the relation of word and thing; this poetic 
experience with the word leads to the possibility of a thinking experience with language.  
 In his writings Heidegger at times seems to give both thought and poetry priority 
as enabling the other, most commonly poetry as only pure speaking truly reveals Ereignis 
and what "What is spoken purely is the poem." 107 Bruzina argues this is a necessary result 
of his attempt to "proceed from within this situation of distinction and division toward 
the 'other' worded 'Saying' he tries to find, promote, and follow...from within thought and 
from within poetry in their established separateness toward overcoming that dichotomy, 
toward a wording that...would be, simply, language as 'the Saying'."108 A struggle he never 
truly overcame, a true dialogue between thought and poetry perhaps impossible within 
the context of a philosophical corpus. From the same origin “The thinker utters Being. 
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The poet names what is holy.”109 yet that “we know nothing of the dialogue between poet 
and thinker, who 'dwell near to one another on mountains farthest apart'"110 despite 
knowing something of the philosophy-poetry relation implies that whilst Heidegger's 
preparatory thinking has shown the need for this relation it still awaits the sending that 
can inaugurate dialogue. 
 Thinkers speak Being as a listening response "in such a way that this speaking 
takes place as that which grants an abode for the being of mortals." 111  Such reflection 
ponders how danger is not a necessary fate by undergoing an experience of language that 
enables poetry as the naming of the Holy that responds to the call (accomplishes our share 
in epochal transition) and allows us to dwell. Thinkers are to attend to language preserving 
primordial meanings of words; "The thinkers who say Being prepare the way for the 
poetical, so that poets stay on the track of the divine".112 Poetry in turn gives content to 
thought and is preserved by such thought, filling in the context of reflective thought. 
Reflective thought prepares for epochal transformation, but poetry accomplishes this 
transformation of language so that the way built through language is one from 
metaphysical to poetic language through the mutual appropriation of poetry and thought 
in Saying to experience Ereignis as a freeing claim. 
 Language claims us to bring forth the thing and "the responding in which man 
authentically listens to the appeal of language is that which speaks in the element of 
poetry" 113 this response must be guided by those attending most to language, and this is 
the poets who submit/respond to the claim thus move us between the fields. The 
transformation of our relation to Gestell into a mutually free one is achieved through the 
creative ambiguity of poetry that (unlike metaphysical language) unveils new meanings 
and understandings. New epochal understandings are thus revealed and ambiguity of 
meaning also preserves concealed meanings. This frees the question of what it means to 
be human so that poetry “as creative of new forms of life is an ethical form of language, 
by contrast to a metaphysical subordination to already established interpretation and 
practice.”114 As the most projective form of language poetry is the purest expression of 
essence of language; "Projective saying is poetry: the saying of world and earth, the 
saying of the arena of their strife and thus of the place of all nearness and remoteness of 
the gods." 115 The Fourfold is the projective retrieval that makes Gestell the danger; 
Heidegger's projective interpretation of our essence is thus a poetic philosophy, the gods 
to come as the projection that determines previous divinities in terms of their absence. 
 This transformation is accomplished by poets who reconcile the plurality of Da 
and singularity of Sein, enabling the encounter of mortals and the Holy through the 
divinities whom the poets have prepared a place for in naming the thing. The poet is one 
who experiences the call to bring together word and thing through naming guided by the 
divinities. Poetry allows thing thus Fourfold to presence by naming the gods that claim 
us, we are responsible for this naming and by so naming poetry grounds our dwelling 
accomplishing Ereignis. The naming of the poet that brings together world and thing is 
how the divinities take part in the playful mirroring of the Fourfold. Whilst the Turn is 
said to happen suddenly it "does not take place by some new god, or the the old one 
renewed, bursting into the world from ambush at some time or other."116 but requires the 
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poets first to prepare a place for the divine by reaching into the abyss 
(nothingness/mortality) of absence to find the traces of the fugitive gods. 
 Chapter 1.6 asked the nature of the divinities and their self-emptying, they are 
now seen as introducing another element into the Fourfold (in addition to the mortals who 
also make and name) as "The divinities are the beckoning messengers of the godhead. /// 
Out of the holy sway of the godhead, the god appears in his presence or withdraws into 
his concealment."117 We only dwell when divinities partake in the mirroring, but they only 
do so when sent by the Holy. If divinities in the Fourfold are seen as denoting heritage as 
the repeatable possibilities of existence then as standing between mortals and the Holy 
poets are interpretative retrievers; divinities an interpretation through retrieval of how the 
poets feels they have been claimed. The naming of the mortal poet can then be seen in 
light of the making aspect of mortals; not only do they constitute an element of the 
Fourfold but they provide the place for the Fourfold in the shaping of language, preparing 
the thing (as physical vessel or name) and thus defining what is to be retrieved through 
that heritage.   
 As with Da-Sein the relation of the poet and word is one of mutual need, a need 
that originates in Sein that also determines the relation as poets must renounce control 
over words and thus let a thing be as thing by listening to the grant of Saying; 
"Renunciation says: a thing may be only where the word is granted"118 so that poetry's 
indicating of divinities  is "a letting come of what has been dealt out." 119 It is through 
renunciation that we experience the claim of Sein most fully, and poets exemplify the 
abnegation of will in their willingness to be so claimed. Poetry takes the form of 
releasements denial of will as outlined in chapter 3.1, yet also at the same time poets are 
more willing to heed Being that currently presences as willing; "They will nothing, in this 
sense, because they are more willing."120 They behold the danger and in response 
renounce themselves, as raised in chapter 3.1 the passive view of the preparation for self-
surmounting of nihilism conceals how renunciation itself is a determination of the new 
sending. 
 Chapter 2.6 questioned Heidegger's call for man's sacrifice for Being, such 
sacrifice is a thanking as  of Saying; "The speechless answer of his thanking through 
sacrifice is the source of the human word, which is the prime cause of language as the 
enunciation of the Word in words." 121  Poets submit to Saying, sacrificing themselves for 
Being as a thanking; such submission is a transformative self-denial, an emptying self to 
more fully partake in circuminsessional mirroring. In this way poets are trail-blazers who 
in their self-abnegation live "the mighty death in which he who died early leads the 
way"122 and are the most mortal of mortals. Poets are those who most readily face 
anxieties disclosure of the nothing that is experienced “most readily in the reserved, and 
most assuredly in those who are basically daring. But those daring ones are sustained by 
that on which they expend themselves- in order thus to preserve the ultimate grandeur of 
existence.”123 The self-abnegation of the poet is a response to the call of the self as an 
experience of nullity, akin to anxiety. Section 2 characterized Gestell as a form of anxiety 
writ large, a communal attunement to Sein as nothing so that oblivion is itself a thanking 
and a widening of precondition for individual enlightenment. 
 Poetry as silence is experienced in anxiety's erosion of meaning, as the call of the 
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self speaking of its own nothingness "One of the essential theatres of speechlessness is 
dread in the sense of the terror into which the abyss of Nothing plunges us".124 By 
bringing together speech and silence poetry reveals the nature of revealing as such 
requiring Nothingness as concealment; as silence/unsaying releases us from former 
meanings, yet is also a saying that gathers new meanings; thus is how new names for 
Being are accomplished; the silence of poets allowing Being to speak. As was said of Zen 
in intro 1 Heidegger also speaks loudly concerning the need for silence as to best indicate 
Ereignis "language requires much less precipitate expression than proper silence."125 
Responsive language is marked by silence and may lead to “a form of speechlessness, 
even madness, not, perhaps, as a result of having nothing to say, but from having no way 
to say it.”126 For Kotoh it is the experience of language as silence that is the most basic 
attunement to our nature as nothingness, the true language of self that "is an echo of true 
reality...the positive ground for the production of a language to describe the world"127 
silence as the source of language enables the transformation of our relation to language. 
This relation to anxiety means the listening response of the mortal poet "can then be 
described as a process in which the normal relationship between language and reality 
breaks down into silence, and language then revives through such silence"128 so we attain 
a true relation to creative language through anxiety. 
 If the divinities are metaphors for meaningfulness then the Holy that sends them 
is Sein, and the poets preparation for the Holy is the manner in which man accomplishes 
his share of Ereignis by preparatory reflection for the new epochal sending. The divinities 
are messengers of the Holy, yet the Holy (Sein) itself cannot be brought to presence; 
"there cannot be any immediate, that is unmediated, experience of the holy. But neither 
can there be a mediate experience of the holy which directly attains the holy as the 
immediate."129 Being and Nothingness are both only experienceable in terms of the 
meanings they make possible, the word cannot be named in words nor Being spoken, only 
indicated by the silent responding of poets. The divinities are thus only a trace of the Holy 
so the poet does not stand between man and the Holy, but between man and gods; 
receiving the epochal sending as mediated by the gods who "brings, collects, and shapes 
the holy into the impact of a single ray, through whose reception the soul of the poet is 
inflamed."130 Schuwer raises possibility that the poet indirectly attains the Holy which "as 
the immediate becomes mediated because its self-disclosure comes to pass in the poetic 
word, that is, in the language of the poet."131 Yet this shifts the mediation as accomplished 
by Da to once again emphasise the singular presence of Sein over the plurality of 
existence, whilst the relations of poets and gods is meant to illuminate the manner in 
which appropriation is accomplished (Sein and Da brought together). Chapter 2.5 cited 
Olafson's view that language ultimately fails to reconcile singularity and plurality within 
appropriation; Being needs Da yet cannot be mediated. This tension remains within 
poetry; the Holy needs the poet yet this mutual need is accomplished by its sending of 
divinities rather than their naming by the poet so that it is the gods not men who 
accomplish appropriation. 
 The problem first outlined in chapter 1.2 concerning Ereignis and sunyata acting 
 
124 Ibid., 393. 
125 "Letter on Humanism," 246. 
126 Hodge, Heidegger and Ethics, 88. 
127 Kotoh Tetsuaki, "Language and Silence," in Heidegger and Asian Thought, ed. G. Parkes (Motilal 
Banarsidass, 1992), 207. 
128 Ibid., 204. 
129 André Schuwer, "Nature and the Holy: On Heidegger's Interpretation of Hölderlin's Hymn "Wie Wenn 
Am Feiertage"," Research in Phenomenology 7 (1977): 235. 






as their own condition of possibility that poetry is to help reconcile also applies to poetry 
itself. Man only is mortal as appropriated by Saying yet "the very nature, the presencing, 
of language needs and uses the speaking of mortals in order to sound as the peal of 
stillness for the hearing of mortals"132 we must be poetic naming mortals in order to be 
called to our mortality, yet only are mortals as first called. We are only mortal when we 
dwell between earth and sky as opening up this space through taking our measure from 
the divinities; poetry as man's measuring himself in accordance with the earth-sky 
dimension allotted by divinities "brings dwelling into its ground plan...is the element 
within which human dwelling has its security, by which it securely endures." 133  Dwelling 
rests in the poetic as "the taking of measure by which the measure-taking of human being 
is accomplished." 134 Poetry thus accomplishes dwelling but itself requires we dwell as 
the space cleared by projective language that makes dwelling possible is only realized 
such by dwelling. This connects to the problem concerning Heidegger's stance to poiesis 
in chapter 3.1, there can be no return to the Greek, yet if poets are those who call forth 
thing and world Heidegger's claim as to the thing never thinging seems in contradiction 
to his characterization of what poetry once was. The word that brings together men and 
gods; "the word as it was once word"135 that allowed the gods to approach in Saying is 
clearly a concrete historical occurrence related to the Greek experience of poiesis as 
remembered in Holderlin. 
 Zhang seeks the solution to this problem in Being and Time's account of 
temporality and ecstatic unity “the poet must say according to the essence of poetry; but 
at the same time, the essence of poetry must be formed during the saying. To avoid a 
vicious circle, the poet can only petition for the existential time process of Dasein 
(historical, ecstatic, or situational human being).”136 Poetry is thus a projective retrieval 
of tradition, both a pre-saying of the coming epoch and an after-saying as a response to 
the call of Being (destitute poetry is between gods yet names them), poetry as a projective 
interpretation is thus between Gestell -and-Fourfold. Zhang holds this 'between' as origin 
of Being and Nothingness is what gathers and we must attend to as “poetizing must be 
constituted in between what the poet speaks and hears”137 so that poetry is the temporal 
aspect of circuminsessional gathering; the 'meanwhile' complementing 'in-the-midst'. The 
essential emptiness of man through self-abnegation must be realized “through the 
experiencing of which we are able to pay genuine attention to the coming time”.138 Such 
projective retrieval from the sive of Fourfold-and-Gestell that refers poetry back to 
temporality returns the issue to the problems of criteria for selecting such a heritage 
outlined in chapter 2.6; how do we know if the pre-saying is genuine? The pre- means 
preparatory and provisional yet has nothing to measure these terms against except what 
the poet names as measure; Zhang's answer relies on the validity and force of the 
projective interpretation, an interpretation that his answer was to explain. Ultimately 
Heidegger's understanding of poetry describes a case of the mystery of Ereignis without 
detailing how appropriation occurs. Response is an act of creation, hearing a preparation 
that determines what is heard, to know how this occurs requires a criteria and a wider 
context than the poet alone (given that divinities are shared meanings). 
 The difficulty for language's reconciliation of the tension between singularity and 
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plurality is that in occurring through individual poets it does not do justice to the plurality 
of speakers. Poets are uniquely claimed and their role and significance stems from what 
they personally heed; "The poet experiences an authority, a dignity of the word than which 
nothing vaster and loftier can be thought."139 Yet we cannot all be poets and the word of 
the poet admits of no verification nor doubt to those who do not share this experience, 
“Such an experience of Being is withheld from the greater majority of men- but then the 
greater majority of men are forgetful of Being.”140 If we are only Dasein when we reflect 
(and are not all Dasein), then poets may be mediators, but if we all are and must be Dasein 
then epochal transition requires we all be poets or that what they heed can be assented to 
by others in communal discourse. Poetry's relation to art is the further required step for 
this reconciliation as "such language permits the constitution of the being of a people - 
by opening up a historical space for its deeds and accomplishments as well as its failures 
and catastrophes."141 Poets as individuals enable communal dwelling through art, yet after 
Origin of the Work of Art Heidegger's examples of poetry relate much more to the work 
of individuals than any incorporation into a community of preservers. 
 Poetry would seem to have a wider definition than Heidegger's discussion of poets 
indicates; he appears to generalize from a small selection of ontic poems he takes to be 
most essential. As was pointed out in chapter 2.5 the choice of essential poetry is based 
on it's speaking of the phenomena which distinguish the age, yet the determination of 
what phenomena this includes is made by essential poetry. In order to judge a poet as 
genuinely claimed by the new epoch we must already stand under that claim; there is no 
way to adjudicate who  has been so appropriated until the event arrives. Just like the 
heroes and heritage of Being and Time poets and divinities still requires criteria to judge 
what is determinative of an epoch (thus genuine poetry), worthy of retrieval and futural 
projection. The poets Heidegger characterizes as most of the destitute age are those who 
experience homelessness (the anxious call of the self) in a similar fashion to him. If a poet 
hears the Saying of Being differently to Holderlin how are we to tell which is the call to 
follow? How do we judge whether Holderlin was a genuine poet claimed by Being or 
whether a contrary poet with a different divinity should be heeded? These problems have 
been thematic throughout the thesis, especially anx chap, 2.6. The provisional answer 
explored has been criteria stemming from preserving plurality of possible disclosures and 
elemental objectivity, heeding the saved claim of Gestell ; criteria comes from attending 
to Ereignis poetically so that preserving multiple meanings is how we dwell. 
 Chapter 3.1 called poetry a way of life, poetry must be wider reaching than the 
poetry Heidegger analyses to achieve a communal epochal transformation, how we as a 
whole and personally realize the self-surmounting of nihilism must be sought in the 
dwelling that follows from poetry. Poetic art is festival as the meeting of men and gods, 
and as a communal imperative must be subject to a wider warrant than the hearing of a 
single poet or thinker. Heidegger's examples of jug and temple are paradigmatic for such 
a reason. A new festival is needed and poetry prepares for this, yet also requires it. The 
full accomplishment of epochal transformation is considered more next chapter on 
dwelling after considering the nature of the gods we heed in a post-destitute age; what 
poetry is and must be in this destitute age. 
Poetry for a destitute time 
Heidegger portrays the epoch of Gestell as a double forgetting in terms of the failure of 
the divinities (sent by Sein) to arrive and gather us to dwell in the Fourfold; "Not only 
have the gods and the god fled, but the divine radiance has become extinguished in the 
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world's history...it can no longer discern the default of God as a default" 142 so we do not 
see age as destitute. In the destitute age of Gestell we are between the gods who have 
departed and the gods yet to come, it is a time of absent gods. 
 The poets of such an age speak and respond to the call and claim of the current 
epoch, of both the oblivion and the remembrance of "the oneness of the two, insofar as 
that oneness has already come to be as the saving unification"143 they speak of the 
common origin of the saving and danger (Ereignis). Thus the poet does not defuse the 
danger but allows us to dwell within it as the danger it is; does not try to alter 
homelessness or provide refuge from it (such as religion of a flight to the Greek). The 
poets for a destitute time take the homeless danger into its own essence, their speaking 
mirrors the thinking of the danger as danger in the saving/freeing of danger. They must 
speak the silence of Saying (role of nothingness in Ereignis) as the epochal origin, speak 
of our mortality (as ones who wait and are determined by the call, of our primordial 
homelessness) thus prepare for the new epochal sending. In such nearness to origin "a 
decision may be made as to whether and how God and the gods withhold their presence 
and the night remains, whether and how the day of the holy dawns, whether and how in 
the upsurgence of the holy an epiphany of God and the gods can begin anew."144 Such a 
decision is not made by the poets for the destitute age that Heidegger analyses, they are 
only preparing for the decision not yet heralding the new divine. 
 Instead poetry in this age must attend to poetry itself to keep alive essential poetry 
(as its relation to Saying) and prevent the poetic becoming completely forgotten; "'poets 
in a destitute time' must especially gather in poetry the nature of poetry." 145 The supreme 
danger threatens the very possibility of the divine so “It is the task of the poet to remain 
in the region of this absence in order to keep the space open for a return.”146 by poeticizing 
about poetry. The thinkers and poets for a destitute time are those who speak of the 
essence of poetry and its relation to thought and dwelling; thus of the potentiality of the 
self-transformation of the fields (self-surmounting of Gestell). 
 Heidegger's discussion of poetry favours the first approach outlined at the end of 
chapter 3.1; what is needed is poets who retrieve traces of the gods from the festival 
gatherings where "traces of the fugitive gods still remain for god-less men."147 revealing 
hints of the divine to prepare for its advent. Heidegger's phrasing “Song still lingers over 
their destitute land. The singer's word still keeps to the trace of the holy." 148 seems to run 
counter to his previous claims that the thing has never before thinged, which would seem 
a pre-requisite for there to have been divinities. This tension in his thought between 
projection and retrieval; whether the saving is a return or is only now possible for the first 
time thanks to the danger, has direct bearing on the traces destitute poets are to retrieve 
and speak; the sense in which the gods are absent as not-yet or once-were.  
 To now dwell poetically we must ask what gods are to be needed in the destitute 
time; awaiting the gods is preparing for them and as has already been said preparation is 
a form of determining; even awaiting itself determines/names the gods as those who may 
come yet are not. Heidegger's chosen poets speak the danger and its shared origin, they 
do not yet accomplish (realize) the possibility of the identity of the danger and saving 
(Gestell as the claim it is); a poet is still needed for the age that follows the destitute one. 
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 The new poetry must speak of man's self-identity with absolute nothingness, thus 
the poet for a destitute time speaks Ereignis as revealed in the silent heeding of its anxious 
call. Silence as readiness for the mystery responds to Saying and is thus required for 
poetry; but this is still the poetry of destitution. As sunyata requires beification and is 
equally absolute being as it is nothingness so too must the new poetry break the silence 
in a way that preserves and is permeated by it. Such poetry would speak of how we dwell 
within Gestell (how we preserve plural possible understandings in the face of 
withdrawal's inherent tendency to forget) and could fall within a different paradigm to the 
poets Heidegger holds up as paradigmatic of a destitute time; one that no longer discerns 
the default of God as a default but as itself that which saves. As said in chapter 3.1 poiesis 
cannot be simply restored so poetry must be born anew for the new epoch, preserving the 
absence of the gods default. Speaking such absence is one way of speaking silence, 
silence as to the gods would be another way of preserving them as absent. 
 How the phrase 'absent gods' can speak of both the danger and saving is now 
considered in relation to post-destitute dwelling; gods that return/remain as present-sive-
absent and speak the tension of plurality and totality within Gestell as sketched out in 
chapter 2.5. 
Absent Gods 
Given how carefully Heidegger chose his terms, always with an eye to their etymological 
roots and connotations, it is curious he chooses words such as God and gods; especially 
considering his decision to risk accusations of inhumanity rather than association with 
any metaphysical connotations of the term humanism. Why say only a God can save us 
now rather than 'only a new understanding of Being'? The gods as discussed in relation 
poetry are certainly not the ontic God and gods of everyday religions or metaphysics, as 
Gestell cannot simply be diffused by ensuring "other interests besides - such as, perhaps, 
the interests of a faith - retain their currency"149 through "mere 'religious experience'" 150 
that only attests to God's default. We cannot return to anything resembling old gods in a 
post-destitute age for “Heidegger knows full well that myths have historical contexts, 
historical meanings, and historical viability; he knows that when one context gives way 
to the next, the myth is no longer viable.” 151 Perhaps they are in honour to the words of 
Nietzsche and Holderlin who articulated the danger under such headings. Yet Heidegger's 
thought has its own headings of Being, Appropriation, heritage, destiny and mystery that 
seem equally apt and less entangled in extraneous religious concerns. 
 Heidegger was personally religious and if his thought is his way of experiencing 
Being then his way remains rooted in a fundamentally religious experience, in a personal 
crisis of faith and religious longing that has struck a chord with many of non-traditional 
religious conviction yet retained theistic yearning. Despite speaking against a flight into 
the refuge of past divinities and recognizing the necessity of homelessness Heidegger's 
experience of the loss of gods led to a desire for reunion thus an emphasis on anticipatory 
readiness in preparation for this desires fulfilment, he experienced Gestell as a yearning 
lack and awaiting, then universalized this experience as definitive of his age. Meditative 
thought on Ereignis says nothing on the existence of God; it is neither atheistic, theistic 
nor indifferent as "Only from the truth of Being can the essence of the holy be thought. 
Only from the essence of the holy is the essence of divinity to be thought. Only in light 
of the essence of divinity can it be thought or said what the word 'God' is to signify."152 
Yet intro2 discussed how the theism-atheism opposition does not correlate to religious-
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secular, and like Nishitani Heidegger remains anchored in a religious spirit and concern 
that whilst not simple theism remains fundamentally religious in a more limited sense that 
Nishitani's ontological definition of the term; 'God' must signify something for him rather 
than remaining empty/absent. The Christian themes of original sin and salvation through 
grace are omnipresent throughout Heidegger's ontology, and like Nishitani his comments 
are easily misappropriated into theistic interpretations reifing Holy Being as "powerful, 
mysterious, worthy of reverence and superior in every way to things and men.” 153 Poetic 
divinities are historical (thus secular in the original sense as opposed to eternity) rather 
than theistic but still retain the vague religiosity of salvation through faith in a power 
beyond oneself that is absent in the Greek and modern understandings that both lay closest 
to the origin. 
 As for Nishitani Heidegger's choice of terms leads to theistic implications 
concerning the nature of what will save, implications of faith and narrow ontic religious 
concerns. The divinities are but a single element of the Fourfold, the Holy not the only 
name for Sein, and the gods to come are not theistic beings or a simple return of what has 
fled. Faith is not the saving power and the default of the gods spoken by Nietzsche's word 
does not entail that "man put himself in the place of God, because the essence of man 
never reaches the essential realm belonging to God" 154 but that the dangerous relation of 
mutual challenging open an uncanny/homeless realm belonging to neither God nor man 
"but with which man comes once more into a distinctive relationship" 155  as claimed by 
challenging-forth. Yet the terminology of divinity often leads to a narrow focus amongst 
commentators on the meaning of the absence and awaiting of divinities. Umehara 
considers the problem in terms of whether we can survive without a god concluding the 
only options are that “[1] that man can survive without god and should become a kind of 
god himself (Marx, Nietzsche, Sartre, Camus, etc.); [2] that man must have a god and a 
new rebirth is possible for man by regaining his old beliefs in god (Berdyaev, Dawson, 
D. T. Suzuki, etc.); [3] that god is necessary, but he should not be the god of the past, and 
thus a new god must be sought, though mankind has not yet met him”156 claiming that 
Heidegger favours the third approach and that the new god must be revealed in the same 
place as the old. 
 Stambaugh questions why the place the old god revealed himself should be the 
place for the new and whether there is only one place, asking “Is it possible to separate 
god from his 'place' in this manner? What would the meaning of this empty place then 
be? How could it preserve itself as place until a new god appeared?”157 Umehara's later 
clarification that the phrase 'place for god' signifies “the meaningful centre in terms of 
which man can understand his existence and finitude...something in terms of which man 
can understand himself as something other and more than just 'the sum of his actions' 
(Sartre)”158 does not seem to answer these questions; why the term god, why a single 
place, and why the need to understand man in this way? This understanding of the gods 
coheres with chapter 1.6's connecting of them to the repeatable possibilities of historical 
existence, the new god is to be an ultimate 'for-the-sake-of' retrieved from destinal 
heritage. For Umehara the sole criteria for this 'for-the-sake-of' seems to be 'not man's 
actions alone' ( yet as chapter 2.6 said meditative thought for sake of more meditative 
thought resembles Gestell) as “in the absence of such a meaningful centre man's actions 
are becoming more and more monstrous”.159 This would seem both to place the 
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meaningful centre (god) in service of a further ethical imperative derived from our 
actions, thus rendering gods values in service to the sum of our actions (the use of 
divinities solely to preserve our essence as indicated in chapter 2.6 would be a similar 
conception), and also to overlook that our actions have always been monstrous, only our 
capacity has increased. The need for a single centre and abhorrence at the monstrosity of 
an empty place echoes the feelings of Heidegger who also only allows a limited set of 
options in his opposing of calculative and meditative thought, either a privative lack of 
the divine or a return to rooted autochthony; whether "man's work in the future 
still...thrive in the fertile ground of a homeland and mount into the ether, into the far  
reaches of the heavens and the spirit? Or will everything now fall into the clutches of 
planning and calculation, of organization and automation?" 160  
 Notable in its absence from Umehara's options is the fourth possibility; that there 
is to be no new god and man not become a god, we remain suspended between ether and 
Gestell 's clutches, homeless yet free. That the absence of gods renders us capable of 
dwelling in homelessness indefinitely preserving a place for gods who never arrive and 
remain defined by this absence in a manner other than default. Such would be a holding 
open the possibility for multifarious understandings of being by maintaining the divinities 
in continual absence whilst aware of such as absence to prevent the oblivion of a double 
forgetting. As once yet no more the coming of the gods is a return; a transformation of 
what gods are in light of the sojourn in homelessness. Heidegger says little on how the 
new gods must be different to the old in light of their tarrying in oblivion, how they must 
have taken this absence within themselves. What is most determinative of the gods in a 
post-destitute time is that they keep alive this destitution (preserve the beholding of the 
danger) and continually withhold themselves. This connects to poets as the sive of 
Fourfold-and-Gestell ; Zhang holds that Heidegger's poetic dwelling entails this dwelling 
in-between, that we “live between heaven and earth, past and future, brightness and 
darkness, subject and object, and exist as the final measure of the in-between's 
maintaining itself.”161  Poetry's silent preservation of concealed meanings entails we are 
not saved so much by an arriving god but by tarrying between the default and arrival. 
 An equal risk to the awaiting of the divinities is that they should actually arrive, 
lest we forget we only are as awaiting. Chapter 1.6 questioned in what sense the divinities 
were self-emptying in the playful mirroring of the Fourfold, and how this emptying was 
for earth and sky in a parallel manner to their emptying for mortals and divinities. The 
nature of this divine emptying that preserves gods as absent will now be considered in 
terms of homelessness, before chapter 3.3 considers how it must be accomplished, and 
chapter 3.4 its relation to scientific disclosures that allow earth-sky to stand on own 
homeground as they are. 
Homelessness as Primordial 
The default of the gods leaves us homeless and "From an existential-ontological point of 
view, the 'not-at-home' must be conceived as the more primordial phenomenon."162 The 
call of the self in anxiety reveals the absence of divinities as the primordial existence of 
man; uncanny homelessness is truly primordial and dwelling our flight from it. As called 
the mortal poet's soul "goes in its search toward the site where it may stay in its 
wandering... This fulfils the soul's being: in her wandering to seek the earth so that she 
may poetically build and dwell upon it, and thus may be able to save the earth as earth"163 
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integral to a poetic soul is its uncanniness/homelessness. Heidegger characterizes nihilism 
(thus Gestell) as the uncanniest/unhomeliest  "because as the unconditional will to will, 
it wants homelessness as such." 164 The primordial uncanniness of anxiety is the 
homelessness of Gestell, at once an historical epoch resulting from progressive 
withdrawal and primordial and the mood that impels philosophy as homesickness, the 
desire to be at home everywhere thus to exist amidst beings as a whole and to render 
world. There is a tension in Heidegger's thought between these understandings of 
homelessness as both primordial and derivative stemming from his problematic rendering 
of epochal history into a linear narrative as discussed in chapter 2.3 and 2.4. As derivative 
Heidegger connects homelessness to the metaphysical search to feel at home everywhere 
through constructing universal systems, avoiding coming to terms with how 
homelessness in its primordial sense cannot be dispelled. 
 Hodge claims that in a destitute age we lack a way of naming what there is so the 
gods are absent since “Neither ‘technology’ nor ‘humanism’ are words for being, but are 
indications of the unavailability of a word for being and of the difficulty of retrieving a 
relation to being”.165 This would seem to favour an interpretation of homelessness as 
derivative since the “overcoming of this homelessness requires a return of being into 
language and into theories of what there is, such that a context of a non-human otherness 
can be retrieved”.166 But despite the gods default the destitute age remains a poetic 
epochal claim, "This era is neither a decay nor downfall. As destiny, it lies in Being and 
lays claim to man" 167 in accordance with Ereignis so Gestell names Being as non-Being; 
one might say destitute poetry would rather speak nothing than not speak anything at all. 
Such homeless lack of naming is also related to what Hodge identifies as the most 
pertinent form of homelessness; “a homelessness to which struggling into the future, with 
no fixed hope of homecoming, is the only possible response,”168 the primordial 
homelessness revealed by ahistorical anxiety. Rather than any actual return of the divine 
this open-ended homecoming is a continual preparatory awaiting in which we poetically 
dwell between 'what is and how it comes to be that way'. 
 Whilst Hodge holds Heidegger prioritizes belonging to a locality to counteract universal 
abstractions (that metaphysics is a universal abstraction and ethics rooted in concrete existence) 
she also claims “it may be possible that an ethical retrieval will require a dislocation of the 
presumption that human being should have a sense of belonging to particular geographical 
locations, with particular gods for particular communities”169 so that the homelessness of 
godlessness becomes a valid form of dwelling in the new epoch. Homelessness would then be the 
maintaining of communal anxiety as the holding open for absent gods; it can never be mastered, 
resolved or dissipated, but only preserved in a resoluteness that maintains the danger as open 
possibility and preserves withdrawal. As said in chapter 3.1 to save the danger is to put it in its 
proper place, yet it is placeless and necessarily homeless. If Gestell as danger is to be saved as 
such, and the nihility of nihilism preserved in its self-surmounting, then its homelessness must be 
preserved as integral to the experience of dwelling in a post-destitute age. 
 Nishitani finds a similar meaning in Heidegger's thought on homelessness as covered over 
by metaphysics, "the veil of the homesickness, which is a longing for the home, a drive towards 
the home."170  that both prepares us for the homeland and preserves it. As outlined in chapter 2.4 
homelessness is necessary to homecoming; not merely as a preface but must be self-identical with 
the homeland in a post-destitute age. For Nishitani it is absolute nothingness that is the homeland, 
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this homeland is the homelessness of the Buddha who "went down to the basis of human existence 
prior to any sort of 'home'"171 a stance of absolute nothingness Nishitani characterizes as a 
'universal standpoint'. To dwell amidst transitoriness is to dwell amidst homelessness, to dwell in 
the transitional nihility that as absolute homelessness is at home everywhere; "In this Nowhere he 
is absolutely free. And in this absolute freedom he is everywhere."172 This homelessness is the 
dwelling of the self on its homeground as circuminsessional interpenetration that as primordial 
Nishitani characterizes as original countenance. Such homelessness is the true dwelling of the 
Enlightened (not just a sojourn before dwelling at home under a new god), to dwell in Sunyata as 
a post-destitute (post Field of Nihility) age retains an element of universality at odds with specific 
saving gods, a relation to the divine that preserves the absence of the gods and our homelessness. 
Homelessness as dwelling transfigured by passing through the destitute age is a universal 
dwelling at home everywhere thus nowhere, an absolute homelessness that is also an absolute 
dwelling; an appropriation of the nothingness of homelessness in sunyata as samsara-sive-
nirvana. The preservation of godlessness is that of the positive retention of the field of nihility in 
the self-identity of sunyata, so the new gods are ones permeated with their own absence, the holy 
with the profane. 
 Whilst for Heidegger it is the poets who herald the divine and indicate our relation 
to the gods for Nishitani it is the Buddha's (and the Bodhisattva's who followed him) 
example of homeless dwelling that highlights the required relation of man and 
nothingness (Da and Sein). 
Godless Saving 
Can only a god save us, or would his arrival be the greatest danger of all, continuing the 
metaphysical epochs rather than signalling the 'and' of Gestell -sive-Fourfold? Can 
instead the preservation of his default save both the essence of man and Gestell? Can 
Heidegger's emphasis on awaiting rather than the nature of the new gods be seen as 
indicating that it is the possibility of new gods that is desirable, not the actual advent of 
them? As for the double forgetting it is not the God's absence that is the true danger, but 
that this is not experienced as an absence. As mortals we dwell awaiting the gods; thus 
we can dwell in the absence of gods so long as we behold that absence as and for what it 
is so that it is godlessness rather than the god to come that is to save us, matching the 
preservation of withdrawal indicated at the end of chapter 3.1. The preservation of absent 
gods as a thanking of Being for its withdrawal, as forgetting too can be a form of thanks 
when held in remembrance. To save man as the one who awaits the gods must remain 
absent so we can await thus attend to Being, an  attending to the absence that maintains 
it as such thus safeguards the true essence of technology. The question of how we should 
live, which dangerous destining we should live under, is not one to be answered, but one 
to be kept open to safeguard concealment and pluralistic possibilities of Being. 
 If the thought of Heidegger and Nishitani is not a simple theism yet remains 
religious then the preserved absence of gods would not be a simple atheism yet remain 
secular. Not the denial of god but the experience of the default as not a lack or destitution 
at all, yet not simply through the destitute ages inability to perceive default but from the 
experience of such default as equally that which saves as well as danger. This was first 
indicated in intro2, the experience of Nishitani's ontological religion from the standpoint 
of the profane/scientific side of the sive. 
 The absence of the gods connects the difficulties concerning epochal criteria 
discussed in chapter 2.6 to Heidegger's understanding of poetry as awaiting such a 
sending. Poets naming the divinities as absent speak as to the impossibility of absolute 
understandings, of the contingency of heritage thus the holding open of destinies and the 
null origin of chapter 2.4 that is to be retrieved as destiny. Heidegger speaks of gods more 
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often than God; yet he most explicitly refers to God in the singular when referring to the 
coming saving power and, as was discussed in chapter 2.5, views an epoch as 
characterized by a single dominant understanding that determines the phenomena that 
distinguish an age. Dreyfus questions whether a single unifying new god “sounds either 
unrealistic or dangerous” 173 as “there is no interpretation-free criterion for testing a new 
god, and such mistakes are always possible”.174 Whilst Dreyfus considers this a risk of 
committing ourselves to something monstrous the problem is deeper as the very judging 
of something monstrous requires criteria provided either by the new gods or the horizon 
for their co-habitation. Whilst a plurality of gods might be better than a new God such a 
plurality would still require such a horizon, it is the absence of the gods that speaks the 
relation between understandings that allows the revealings to co-exist. The plurality 
inherent within the totality of a saved Gestell (as first suggested in chapter 2.5) is such a 
horizon thus an ever-open place for new gods that never come, a beholding of Ereignis as 
both the essence of the danger and saving. 
 To name the absent gods the word must speak an absence of meaning, Ereignis 
and sunyata are such words, but so too could be the scientific naming under Gestell that 
speaks the pure suchness of presence-at-hand. This connection of science and poetry will 
be the concern of  chapter 3.4. First how we are to accomplish dwelling as homeless will 
be considered in terms of art and building that does not reconcile mortals and divinities 
but brings-forth the latter’s absence as no longer default. 
3.3 Destitute Art / Homeless Dwelling 
The mirroring of the Fourfold as previously laid out is the ontological constitution of 
poetic dwelling. Its possibility stems from reflective thought's preparation for Sein's Turn 
from oblivion by attended to the origin,  preparation leading to a new epochal sending 
first heralded in poetry's attending to Saying. The thing and the divine must first have 
been named for there to be earth and sky to dwell on and under, mortals and gods for there 
to be dwellers; "Poetry is what first brings man onto the earth, making him belong to it, 
and thus brings him into dwelling." 175 In naming the divine poetry founds a world 
(epochal understanding) “in the triple sense of bestowing, grounding, and beginning"176 
that must the be realized through art and building and is nothing other to this. Not only 
do thought and poetry need one another but combined they are not enough, the divinities 
heeded are only one element of the Fourfold and making must first provide the place for 
their gathering. Poetry calls thing and world, building then accomplishes poetry's call; 
naming and making are equiprimordial in the Fourfold. The focus of this chapter is to be 
the relation between this sending to our accomplishment of it through dwelling (art and 
building). 
 Such poetry must be a communal endeavour and is not easily distinguished from 
thought. Reflection on origin leads to a poetic heeding that opens the space for art and 
building through which we dwell; but each of these 'ontological moments' is 
equiprimordial and without temporal sequence, with Heidegger at times making little 
distinction so that "Poetic creation, which lets us dwell, is a kind of building." 177 Like 
thought and poetry so too poetry and dwelling belong together “each calling for the other” 
178, whilst thought on dwelling itself is a form of dwelling and  "belongs to dwelling in 
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the same sense as building, although in a different way".179 That "Building and thinking 
are, each in its own way, inescapable for dwelling."180 but must listen to one another and 
remain within their limits can be seen as a form of the relation between meditative and 
authentic calculative thought; a saved Gestell as techne (retrieved as mortal making) that 
both complements and is required for meditative thought. As poets we bring forth the 
thing in naming, as builders we bring it forth in making. 
 The communal building aspect of poetry was indicated in The Origin of the Work 
of Art, that as itself a reflection on art and poetry "prepares its space for art, their way for 
the creators, their location for the preservers." 181 by attending to origin. Heidegger wrote 
for the reflectors and poets not the preservers leading to his thought seeming incomplete 
at times; a necessity flowing from reflection only being completed as a unity with poetry 
and building yet having to be presented in a distinct format. Whilst strife and mirroring, 
world-earth and the Fourfold, are related notions indebted to each other and the 
preservation of earth theme as concealed possibilities remain I'll be focussing on 
Heidegger's discussion of art in the context of the later texts, citing The Origin of the 
Work of Art when it is consonant and informative to these later texts, treating the artwork 
as a building that flows from poetry. The later texts can be seen as an elaboration and 
deepening of the earlier; world becoming mortals-divinities and earth becoming earth-
sky. The strife between world and earth gives way to the gathering of the Fourfold 
(paralleling the move from Anaximader Fragment to The Thing from chapter 1.6); the 
building that sets up the space of a world still preserves the earth but no longer wrests 
truth from it in a relation of strife. Mutually definitive opposition becomes a playful 
mirroring, yet both as sites for truth preserve the other element and bring it into its own 
essential nature. 
 Poetic art founds (or transforms) a people through unifying a shared historical 
self-understanding, heeding divinities as heritage to retrieve a destiny preserved by the 
dwelling of that people. To dwell is to respond to the Saying heard in poetry by preparing 
a place for the divinities spoken by the poet, such preparation is itself what constitutes 
mortality and dwelling rather than the consummation of the gods arrival that would once 
again set us on the way to metaphysics and propose a foxed answer to the question of the 
human. Whilst poetry's naming is the province of poets alone (the artist or poet may be 
claimed so not an individual creator, but is still individual conduit) the destinal claim is 
not solely mediated through individuals, it is as builders and preservers engaging in the 
artistry of the everyday that non-poets attend to Saying and validate the words of the poet, 
making them poets for the first time. The poet alone on the mountaintop across from the 
thinker cannot reconcile singularity and plurality and resolve the tension Olafson 
identifies; but the poet never is as alone, poets and preservers exist only through each 
other. 
 Ontological disclosure (meaning) only is as constituted by a particular ontic way 
of life, Being only through beings. As builders (creators-preservers) we accomplish 
dwelling and "Mortals are in the fourfold by dwelling"182 so we are only mortal as builders 
(as makers and cultivators, practical accomplishers of a sending). Building, Dwelling, 
Thinking brings out the priority of the mortal maker noted in discussion of The Thing. 
The openness for truth requires the thing be made "Hence there must always be some 
being in this open region in which the openness takes its stand and attains its constance." 
183. That only in the physical making of the temple is the possibility of the gods advent 
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accomplished. The emphasis on building, on the making of mortals, counters the 
emphasis Heidegger usually places on the sending of Being in the epochal turn by 
focusing on how we are to concretely accomplish thus co-determine that sending. In the 
making of the work "The artwork opens up in its own way the Being of beings...the truth 
of beings, happens in the work." 184 not as an external force but in a mutual constitution 
so that the making/building is strife/mirroring itself; clearing and work are in an 
appropriative relation. 
 Whilst any entity seems capable of being a thing and sheltering the truth of Being 
historical dwelling is gathered most explicitly in art as the expression of a communities 
understanding of itself in terms of its divinities (heritage) and the earth upon which it 
dwells and builds, in such a way that preserves the contingency of such an expression. 
Art remains paradigmatic building as it draws together making and naming (poetry and 
building) and is a collective event, the work's originating in art as both individual creator 
and a historical people as preservers reconciling the singularity of Sein and plurality of 
Da in a way that completes the role of language. This is achieved through the relation of 
its two features; createdness and preservation. 
 Createdness is the bringing forth of world and earth into their relation of 
appropriation that realizes them for the first time, world and earth like Da and Sein are 
integral so first established by the work which “opens up a world and at the same time 
sets this world back again on earth, which itself only thus emerges as native ground." 185 
The world is the possibilities of a destinal heritage (mortals and divinities), earth the 
origin of such possibilities rooted to their factical situation (earth and sky); "The world is 
the self-opening openness of the broad paths of the simple and essential decisions in the 
destiny of a historical people. The earth is the spontaneous forthcoming of that which is 
continually self-secluding and to that extent sheltering and concealing." 186 World defines 
itself as a possibility by indicating the concealment of alternative possibilities (earth) thus 
preserves them as alternatives, an such preservation counters the totalizing narrative of 
Gestell to shelter the saving power. 
 They are held in relation of appropriative identity that is realized as strife; the 
world strives to surmount earth since as self-opening it cannot bear the closed, earth as 
concealing/sheltering tends to draw world into itself. The work brings-forth strife as strife; 
heard in the later resonance in making the thing by our building we bring about the 
mirroring and show it as mirroring. Only in artistic building/making does world world as 
mirroring or strife; "In setting up a world, the work sets forth the earth...The work moves 
the earth itself into the open region of a world and keeps it there. The work lets the earth 
be an earth." 187. Earth is not passive  but "is that which comes forth and shelters." 188 
things as they arise. Despite its characterization as prior to our experience and indifferent 
to world the earth only is as such once brought into relation with world; it cannot form 
notion of elemental objectivity as it is akin to the object 'for us' discussed in section 1. 
Whilst there is a respect or even reverence for earth this is an ontological earth, which 
along with things only are in relation with the world of men rather than on their own 
terms. Chapter 3.4 will return to idea of scientific exploration as the letting-be of earth as 
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 Creation as bringing forth  clears the open region thus accomplishes appropriation. 
In relation to artworks Heidegger characterizes such creation as containing the essence of 
strife between world and earth, the appropriative identity is exhibited in the figure of the 
work so "Createdness of the work means truth's being fixed in place in the figure." 189 
Createdness accordingly does not withdraw like equipment but rather "the work is 
distinguished by being created so that its createdness is part of the created work." 190 and 
stands out from the work. This definition of createdness as founding a world is partly 
applicable to later thought on building; whilst the connotations of strife are lost the way 
the made being is required and related to an appropriative identity, and are themselves 
appropriated to one another giving measure to each other, is retained. The collapsing of 
the distinction between poetry, thought and building, and the introduction of preservation 
as a form of building rather than as required for the work indicate that this physical aspect 
of the work is no longer so vital in his later thought. 
 The Origin of the Work of Art claims Greek techne was "a bringing forth of beings 
in that it brings forth what is present as such out of concealment and specifically into the 
unconcealment of its appearance"191. Such craft as createdness happens in midst of being 
that grows of own accord (physis). Such techne can be interpreted as what must be 
retrieved in order to save Gestell by attending to its origin, but by the time of Building, 
Dwelling, Thinking "The erecting of buildings would not be suitably defined even if we 
were to think of it in the sense of the original Greek techne as solely a letting-appear, 
which brings something made, as something present, among the things that are already 
present."192 We must think beyond the Greek as a signpost back into ontological origin as 
sketched  out in chapter 2.4. 
 Post-Gestell building is not exhausted by techne and its preservers are not those 
that brought poiesis into its own.Like poetry such making as attending to Saying also 
features a form of self-renunciation; a relinquishing of subjective ego in the process of 
ontic realization. Levin considers such building and craft as the ontic correlate to 
releasement. The ontological and ontic only are as each other, like the poet the builder 
abnegates will in releasement to allow Being to emerge in beings by handling things with 
care for their depth and innate possibilities engaging in one of the ways we build of which 
thought is only one. Levin cites Heidegger's claim that  thinking means "to lend a hand to 
the essence, the coming to presence, of Being. This means: to prepare (build) for the 
coming to presence of Being that abode in the midst of whatever is"193 and gives such 
releasement both ethical and ontic interpretation in that we lend a hand to Being "every 
time we give a hand to other mortals; and we can lend it every time the hand we give to 
the various things we touch and handle is a gesture of care. The thoughtful maintenance 
of beings, moving out of respect for their ownmost, and even their most intangible ways 
of being, never fails to lend a hand to the coming-to-presence of Being."194 If such lending 
a hand is homecoming then it must first pass through the grasping manipulation Levin 
likens to how a child learns to handle things; Gestell is the learning process we must go 
through, learning of things to later release them. An apprentice must first learn of 
manipulation before becoming a craftsmen who utilizes it in true releasing of possibilities, 
and our building in a post-destitute age will never again be suitably defined in terms of 
Greek techne. Levin's understanding of making would appear individual and reliant upon 
the notion of innate possibilities; a master craftsmen is a solitary practitioner even when 
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directing others and one can only lend a hand to things if they reach out to meet us 
halfway. This notion has been previously critiqued (chapter 2.6)  in terms of the difficulty 
in determining the true possibilities to be brought forth, and will be returned to later in 
consideration of cultivation, but the characterization of the transformation of the fields as 
an extended learning process, both individual and communal, accomplished in the 
buildings of both construction and thought highlights the role Gestell must consistently 
play. 
 The individual craftsmen cannot alone provide the paradigm for poiesis for art is 
more than creation; the work only becomes so once it has attracted preservers; it is they 
who make it art. The work is created by one or a few, but making it an artwork “must be 
thought of as a collective creation.”195 Preservers respond to the truth happening in the 
work thus let it be as work. The complement to creation of preservation helps resolve the 
problem noted in discussion of poetry on the singular-plurality reconciliation. "Preserving 
the work means standing within the openness of beings that happens in the work." 196 and 
allowing it to guide ones actions and retrieval of possibilities, so that the truth founded 
by the work is heeded by and guides our comportments. 
 Art requires a resolute retrieval of heritage in those who engage with the art, it is 
only art when as preservers we realize latent possibilities of our origin indicated by it and 
thus an epochal understanding is founded. The creator-preserver relation is again one of 
appropriative identity in which "the creator and the preserver, originate, each in his own 
essence." 197 Preservers seems to passive a term for how such an integral relation is 
accomplished; building is preserving given a more participatory role in the founding of 
truth that heeds the poets words. Preservers (those who build once poet has named their 
dwelling) are the most important element in the epochal turn; they make the work into art 
and validate the poet's saying, making it a genuine heeding and addressing several of the 
issues raised relating to social discourse in chapter 2.6 et al. 
 The relation of poetry, dwelling and thought returns to the problematic originally 
raised in chapter 1.2 concerning the conditions of possibility for nihilism and its turning. 
Heidegger portrays dwelling as prior to building since "We do not dwell because we have 
built, but we build and have built because we dwell, that is, because we are dwellers"198 
yet such dwelling is nothing beyond the building that accomplishes the dwelling. Building 
is not a means to the end of dwelling, the two are essentially related and co-determined. 
Dwelling and the Fourfold are in relation of appropriative identity, building is how we 
are appropriated by that which is realized through such appropriation. To dwell we must 
first be makers/builders, yet we are only such when we already dwell; so they cannot be 
related as prior constituents. We build as appropriated to the fourfold mirroring yet such 
mirroring only comes-to-presence in and as our building. 
 Art founds a people, a 'we' whom are determined by that which we preserve; “we 
belong to traditions before they belong to, and are appropriated by, us”199 through the 
authentic retrieval of what we are already claimed by. But there must already be a 
community of preservers for the work to become art, a people are not so much founded 
in the sense of created but as clarified and transformed. Dwelling requires poetic naming 
of divinities yet also such naming first requires the work be made. Art both requires and 
enables the truth of Being; it only is as artists and preservers yet is also prior to them as 
they respond to it. Heidegger is aware of the paradoxical nature of his claim that "Truth 
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happens only by establishing itself in the strife and the free space opened up by truth 
itself." 200 so is not existent prior to the historical establishing that it enables; that the work 
must have "before its own creation and for the sake of its creation - have been brought 
into a relation with the things of the earth, with nature"201 and created its own origin. 
 Heidegger laments that art and truth must be described ambiguously, "truth is is 
at once the subject and object of the setting"202 into work of truth giving rise to this 
paradox of being its own condition of possibility. The thing is named in poetry, the site 
for it is built, the fourfold is gathered by what is built "in such a way that it allows a site 
for the fourfold. By this site are determined the localities and ways by which a space is 
provided for."203 Building is thus determined by the naming that calls the Fourfold, but 
this site is also a condition of possibility for the Four thus the naming; the paradox 
Heidegger notes in relation to art and work remains in Building as a form of higher 
activity that co-determines the fourfold in realizing it. This is the difficulty or articulating 
the appropriative Da-Sein relation whose paradoxical elements are posited by Heidegger 
as a mystery that cannot and should not be resolved. As chapter 1.2 laid out, the problem 
of priority is false if seen as an identity, but this identity is inevitably and consistently 
described as a duality; and in relation to the mediation of singularity and plurality the role 
of poetry over preservation seems to be overemphasized. 
 In relation to this Machado's reading of Heidegger on art is flawed yet 
illuminative; showing art based on a communal unifying experience, which although he 
denies can be poetic language showcases this aspect of Heidegger's thought on poetry. 
Machado criticizes Heidegger for overlooking nothingness in language so that “the 
description of the setting up of the world of the human being is severed from a 
consideration of negation as indispensable to such an enterprise.”204overlooking the role 
of silence and nothingness as difference (alternate possibilities of meaning). Preserving 
the concealed is essential to language and poetry, thus perfectly consonant with 
Machado's “primordial element of language as negation.”205  Machado identifies the 
difficulty in language acting as mediator of the Da-Sein appropriation206  but suggests a 
solution already present in Heidegger's thought, but whose importance is downplayed in 
his essay on art. 
 Despite near wilfully misinterpreting Heidegger's thought on nothingness 
Machado highlights a relation with the Kyoto school notion of Pure Experience that 
indicates the encounter with originary nihility (absolute nothingness / suchness) required 
for the new beginnings art. Machado criticizes Heidegger for seeing art in terms of 
discrete historical languages rather than as a universal, the community of preservers 
indicates why language not simply 'pure experience' is needed. But poetic art must also 
be preceded by a unifying experience in order for there to be a community of preservers; 
the poet attends to the attunement that binds together the people, an experience in the 
current epoch that indicates originary nihility through Gestell as anxiety writ large. 
Machado overlooks how far Heidegger in fact does pursue the question of nothingness 
but succeeds in offering a characterization of art that connects Heidegger more to 
Nishitani; art as “an invitation to pure experience...As such it is the very expression of 
identity, where questioned and questioner are brought together.” 207  and “the ontological 
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function of art...promotion of the union of total being as undifferentiated from nonbeing.” 
208  which is expressed in poetic experience so that art realizes the true self (Da-Sein / 
absolute nothingness) by bringing-forth circuminsessional interpenetration into explicit 
awareness. 
 Related to this is the issue of whether we have yet to dwell, the extent to which 
the Fourfold is projective. For Heidegger our age is one in which "great art, together with 
its essence, has departed from among human beings"209, and although Heidegger later 
moved away from viewing the Greek as an age of thinging their remains a tension 
between whether we always poetically dwell; whether we are ever non-Dasein as 
indicated in chapter 1.1. For Heidegger man is as dwelling; "when I say 'a man', and in 
saying this word think of a being who exists in a human manner - that is, who dwells - 
then by the name 'man' I already name the stay within the fourfold among things." 210 (But 
if there has not yet been a thing then it would seem we have yet to dwell, and are not yet 
mortals, yet becoming mortal is integral to our existence. The nature of our existence is 
to dwell yet dwelling is also something we only are when living in a certain way. This 
relates to Heidegger's conflation of noun and verb usages of essence mentioned in chapter 
2.6, man as mortal seems to operate both as a goal and pure description. As an ontological 
state of being dwelling both constitutes what it is to be human, "The way in which you 
are and I am",211 yet "also means at the same time to cherish and protect, to preserve and 
care for"212 specifically as tending/cultivating, and so contains an imperative as to how 
we should be upon the earth. The most obvious reconciliation of this tension was indicated 
in chapter 3.1; that verb sense is when we realize what we already always are. But this 
falls into problematic nature of how we only are this way when we realize it as such; it is 
not our essence prior to this. 
 Dwelling and mortality are an imperative or task we are called to by the 
nothingness we always are yet only is as covered over, meditative thought re-
appropriating us as outlined at end of chapter 3.1 so that truth and art are latent in each 
other as trace and only made manifest in creative projection. The relation of dwelling, 
thought and poetry returns us to the criteria for poetic projection, whether this notion of 
art/dwelling is itself a projected essence of the human and from where is drawn the criteria 
for art/dwelling. 
 Chapter 2.4  dealt with how Gestell is only a granting if man adopts a free relation 
to it, chapter 2.6 and 3.2 asked how we know whether the poet's word is genuine and to 
be heeded. The named divinities only provide measure “if preservers are willing to submit 
to them: are committed to protect the truth that is happening through the work as a 
standard-setting event of unconcealment.”213 The saying of the poet is genuine if a 
community of preserver's heed it, for thought, poetry and building are equiprimordial, 
although Heidegger often misleadingly speaks of them as separate or in a temporal 
sequence. We do not choose what art to preserve or poetry to heed; for before this heeding 
and preserving they are not art nor poetry. 
 Chapter 2.6 indicated that both the origin and criteria of any projected epochal 
sending would be combination of own absolute nothingness (plurality), ontic states, and 
current sending of Gestell. Truth arises from thrown nullity "when the openness that 
makes its advent in thrownness is projected."214, when poetry projects new 
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meanings/possibilities from our thrown heritage. Truth thus arises from nothing "if by 
nothing we mean the sheer 'not' of beings"215, from poetic projection that renders the at 
hand unbeing that "has lost the capacity to give and keep Being as measure"216. Poetry 
accordingly stems from an experience of anxious silence, the relation of which to the at-
hand differently conceived will be addressed next chapter concerning science and 
presence-at-hand. Projected criteria stem from both this nothingness yet as Zhang said 
last chapter poetry speaks from the in-between, it comes from nothing "Yet it never comes 
from nothing in that what is projected by it is only the withheld determination of historical 
Dasein itself." 217 Projection arises both from originary nihility and the current/previous 
epochal understandings, it opens an awareness of ontological nothingness and projects an 
understanding based upon the criteria derived from this drawing upon transformed thrown 
possibilities. 
 
Building as Saving 
It is in our creations that Ereignis is accomplished. We create truth, as such and as its own 
measure art has no antecedent criteria returning us to the problems of chapter 2.6. By 
attending to poetic saying we dwell and from this can be derived concrete context 
dependent criteria for the retrieval of a new destining and ontic way of life; but no criteria 
can 'say' that we must attend to saying and save our 'essential nature', nor decide which 
Saying we are to heed. Saving still requires a sending and cannot supply one, yet does 
provide a framework for adjudicating if it is a Saying that saves thus one to be heeded, 
not which saving. The preservation of earth may give criteria of provisionality and 
awareness of contingency but no indication of what contingent criteria to project, and the 
dangers of language in relation to communal identities means the notion of preservers 
relation to any universal enlightenment is unclear. This leaves open issue of whether 
Heidegger had a certain sending in mind and characterized building in terms of this, such 
as outlined in earlier consideration of the 'unreasonable' demand placed on nature. Once 
preserved the poet's word may guide us and give epochal criteria, but Heidegger is limited 
to an appeal to co-preservers who share his fundamental attunement. 
 Once granted what guide for dwelling flows from the desire for saving? As said 
in chapter 3.1 to keep safe is to bring something into its essence, to accord it its place. 
Building is how we guard the Fourfold and shepherd Being and through such building 
"give form to dwelling in its presence and house this presence."218 We save by building, 
keeping safe the thing called in poetic saying, a preserving that lets jitai rest on its 
homeground thus also saves/frees the essence of man and Gestell ; "The fundamental 
character of dwelling is this sparing and preserving."219 We save by constructing, 
cultivating, poetically naming, and thinking, in such a way to preserve the coming-to-
presence of the thing, to act in accordance with releasement as a reciprocal caring of 
Dasein and its dwelling place. 
 Since "dwelling occurs as the fourfold preservation of the fourfold"220 which 
“preserves the fourfold by bringing the presencing of the fourfold into things." 221 dwelling 
must save each element of the fourfold; the earth by not exploiting it, the sky by receiving it and 
keeping to the natural calendar and rhythm of seasons, the divinities by awaiting them, 
and mortals by guarding their capacity for death. Making must not be taken as instrumental 
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to the goals of man as subject but instead "takes over from the fourfold the standard for all 
the traversing and measuring of the spaces that in each case are provided for by the 
locations that have been founded."222 Art and building must reveal and preserve the 
strife/mirroring of the elements it brings together; this preservation provides the guiding 
criteria so that dwelling as attending to poetic saying is what generates criteria (which are 
that which is to be conducive to dwelling and awareness of Ereignis). The mirroring of 
the four means man as mortal must be attuned to the other elements gathered  
 
in the thing. Not as a total determination but a range of possibilities that guide the naming 
of the thing. 
 As "To set forth the earth means to bring it into the open region as the self-secluding."223, 
a commonly held major criteria for such making is to reveal that which resists appropriation into 
meaning. Heidegger's language in describing the Fourfold and characterization of dwelling is 
often given the sense of caring for and preserving ontic nature in sense of the epochal 
understanding of physis. This approach was critiqued in chapter 3.3, but can arguably be 
viewed as integral to the notion of preservation, although not to the extent of portraying 
“the question of the meaning of being as it stays with Heidegger throughout his life: what 
would it mean for human being to safeguard its home in nature?”224 Whilst the claim that 
“Heidegger’s argument that human being dwells poetically is the claim that human being 
can dwell in nature thoughtfully, creatively, and symbiotically rather than exploitatively 
and destructively”225 is partly right it is not the sole nor determinative feature of his 
argument. The relation of Fourfold-sive-Gestell to nature thought under the earth-sky 
dyad is more complex. 
 Building includes both construction and cultivation (of growing things of earth); 
and in focusing on the former in Heidegger does not address the question of what counts 
as an 'unreasonable' demand on nature raised in chapter 2.2 and 2.3. The 
gathering/mirroring is what bridge/jug as thing primordially is rather than anything added 
to it like a property, yet as discussed in chapter 1.6 it is harder to see the examples of deer 
and other 'natural' things as related to mortal making in the same way without imposing 
an anthropocentric teleology on nature and obscuring the naturalness of things. Even 
physis is a word for Being and to say that deer or trees primordially are things would 
seem to move counter to asserting that jitai on its homeground (in its suchness) is most 
properly no-thing. Whether beings of 'nature' are primarily entities of nature is to be 
considered next chapter, but for now the it must be noted that even in the later text the 
notion of cultivation relates strongly to a communal identity and not only to 'things' of 
nature. 
 This connotation is brought out by Young who, despite identifying building 
perhaps too strongly with physical constructs, observes that “Heidegger dwells on the 
heroic moment of place through creative activity that gathers the environment into a 
meaningful presence”226 rather than on the preservation of established meanings that 
would be more associating with cultivation. The originality of the artwork, that it  
“appears as an unprecedented revelation of the relation between world and Earth”227 
distances it from Levin's understanding of craft and the everyday building of the 
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preservers; art as poetry is paradigmatic in a way that building subsequent to the creation 
of the measure for unconcealment of beings is not. The privileging of the establishing of 
a world over its preservation might be explained by Heidegger's primary concern of 
epochal transformation, and a Nietzschean legacy of placing art over truth, with 
preservation being too connected with shared meanings reminiscent of das Mans keeping 
alive of possibilities for retrieval. Such a possibility is suggested by Young who sees 
preservation as forming a narrative given by how we dwell; “part of the creative and 
moral task of preservation is to reconstruct the connection of the past to the present in 
light of new events, relationships, and political understandings.” 228 Young also highlights 
preserving as a teaching, thus reinforcing the community of preservers, the meanings of 
everyday life are always repeated and reinforced “Thus preservation involves preparing 
and staging commemorations and celebrations, where those who dwell together among 
the things tell and retell stories of their particular lives”.229 Such remembrance “is 
ambiguous; it can be either conservative or reinterpretive,”230 both art and building rely 
on a community of preservers for meaning set forth by artists and makers, in de-
emphasizing the role of the preservers in artistic making Heidegger also downplays the 
dangers of levelling inherent in the manners of epochal transformation he outlines. 
The Problem of Examples 
To accomplish the new epochal understanding new examples of art and building must be 
found, and whilst Heidegger "does not view building as an art or as a technique of 
construction"231 his examples revolve around physically made things and works. Just as 
each element of the fourfold has its ontic correlates so too does the building that allows 
us to dwell amidst them, allowing for empirical statement to be made of our dwelling and 
how it is to allow for the self-surmounting. Chapter 1.6 provided such a paradigmatic 
example of understanding craft products as non-instrumental ways of gathering in 
Heidegger's consideration of the jug, noting it's limitations in highlighting features not 
transferable to other cases, that outpouring and gathering are not as clear in all things. 
Heidegger favours examples with a festival element; jug as libation to gods, temple as 
home for the divinities, etc. 
 That the temple is cited as an example in relation to both art and building is telling, 
partly as its original description cites all elements of the Fourfold in the earlier text 
showing the close relation of art and building. The temple establishes world by providing 
a referential context of meaning for the projects of shared destinal existence,  "The all-
governing expanse of this open relational context is the world of this historical people." 
232 that "first gives to things their look and to men their outlook on themselves." 233 by 
allowing them to measure themselves against the gods called by poets. Yet this relation 
to the divinities is more forced outside the temple and outpoured sacrificial libations, and 
in cases of examples where the divinities are less apparent they seem to find a place that 
is placeless. This draws into the remit of dwelling even examples The Question 
Concerning Technology portrayed as emblematic of Gestell.  In his claim the bridge 
"grants their way to mortals"234 so that they may linger and hasten "to and fro, so that they 
may get to other banks and in the end, as mortals, to the other side"235 and thus gathers 
man to his mortality Heidegger adds the caveat that  one of the ways the bridge does this 
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is as "tied into the network of long-distance traffic, paced as calculated for maximum 
yield."236 so that Gestell too is an aspect of dwelling as gathering. 
 Even if we forget we are on our way to the last bridge and before the divinities the 
bridge still gathers us as mortals, despite only being mortals when we remember we are 
as before the divinities.  If "that divine presence is obstructed or even pushed wholly 
aside"237 and we do not give thanks to the divinities the bridge is still said to gather mortals 
and divinities in the highway bridge calculated for maximum yield. A similar theme can 
be found in The Origin of the Work of Art  in which the absence of divinities does not 
prevent the strife of world, "In a world's worlding is gathered that spaciousness out of 
which the protective grace of the gods is granted or withheld. Even this doom, of the god 
remaining absent, is a way in which world worlds." 238 
 Examples of art and building, thus dwelling, are diverse and troublesome to 
define. Both as they are conditional on preservers, meaning there are a store of potential 
artworks not yet realized as such, and because they depend on specific localities and 
communities (different heritages, gods, earths and skies). To dwell in a place is to adapt 
to the thrown situation you inhabit and watch over it as it is; thus is a way we are as 
claimed rather than as a specific claim. Examples are thus claim dependent and unified 
only by their realizing of appropriation, such as the farmhouse Heidegger says gathers the 
Fourfold, we should not return to such dwelling but "it illustrates by a dwelling that has 
been how it was able to build."239 Because of this Heidegger's practical examples of what 
counts as dwelling fall into the same problems and confusions as those discussed in 
chapters 2.2 and 2.3; they tend to look backwards not forwards to what new dwelling 
must be and risk confusing the content of the example with what it is intended to highlight. 
 The portrayal of prior manners of dwelling also confuses the issue of the extent to 
which the Fourfold is projective, the tension between the claim that things have yet to 
thing and Ereignis is only now flashing for first time and that despite this we are as 
dwellers and have dwelt in the past is paralleled by Nishitani's relation to history; that 
enlightenment has occurred in the past yet also the self-transformation of nihilism is to 
allow reality's realization for the first time. Despite the Fourfold being a projective 
interpretation yet to arrive it would also seem there is no way to make a bridge that does 
not gather mortals and divinities; even if the gods and our mortality are forgotten the 
Fourfold is still gathered so we must still be dwelling. This relates to shifting emphasis 
on the 'is' and 'ought', of our essential dwelling in noun and verb sense; of whether in the 
destitute age of Gestell we do not already dwell. 
 There is also a difference between the paradigmatic examples depending on 
whether the mirroring of the four or strife of world and earth is emphasized. The former 
tend towards a more humble or mundane everyday practice and the latter more grandiose 
original events, with the former requiring the communal understanding laid out in such 
art to guide the building of the vessels for the fourfold. This leads to a divide in examples 
given by commentators between focusing on world-founding and preservation in 
releasement, between great historic events/trends and simple crafts (and a noticeable 
dearth of examples concerning cultivation). A crude characterization could divide such 
examples between poetry and building, but Heidegger collapses such distinctions even as 
he draws them, broadening building to include thinking, cultivating, poetry and 
construction. Art is not even the only poetic founding, instead "we must leave open 
whether art in all its modes, from architecture to poesy, exhausts the essence of poetry." 
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240 so that festivals or events can also gather a world; casting doubt on the requirement 
for the materiality of the work as demonstrating earth and createdness to fix strife in the 
figure; a festival to new gods is not made of stone but a transitory experience. 
 Dreyfus considers art as the clearing for strife to include all cultural paradigms 
that unify practices into coherent possibilities as exemplars for the beholder producing a 
shared understanding, not only the created works and made things of art and craft. For 
Dreyfus anything that unifies the practices and understanding of a community but also 
“shows that what is at stake cannot be captured in a system of beliefs and values” 241 is 
an artwork, the elements of the paradigm that actively resist totalization into a single 
narrative the earth that indicates no single interpretation can completely capture the works 
meaning; “the conflict of interpretations it sets up generates a culture’s history.” 242 In 
light of Heidegger's critique of  values and his stress on the preserving earth Dreyfus holds 
we must return to favouring unarticulated communal mores over individual subjective 
choice as only the relation to the non-subjective can “give consistency, meaning, and 
seriousness to one’s life”.243 Everyday understanding should not and can not be fully 
articulated as “our cultural practices can direct our activities and make our lives 
meaningful only insofar as they are and stay unarticulated...as long as they stay the soil 
out of which we live...What is most important and meaningful in our lives is not and 
should not be accessible to critical reflection”244  (so that “Mattering lies not in what we 
choose, but in ‘that on the basis of which’ we choose”245  and critical thought on values 
erodes this basis. 
 This over-emphasis on earth over world portrays Heidegger as an enemy of 
reflection as the courage to think our presuppositions. Dreyfus's example of the 
unarticulated notions of distance and bodily contact in various cultures as embodying 
important element of the human condition highlights the flaw in this view. Not only are 
these accessible to critical reflection but the investigation of behavioural patterns that 
explains and articulates them in terms of biological or social history does not diminish 
their power over us, and are not necessarily treated as a resource for manipulation because 
of it. Such articulation can be a reflection of curiosity and wonder that our essential 
natures are so unified, or an appreciation of the contingency of everydayness, a relation 
between science and wonder elaborated more in chapter 3.4 and anx chap. Such hidden 
communal meanings even seem to require the subjectivity that is entwined with values as 
"only where man remains subject does the positive struggle against individualism and for 
the community as the sphere of those goals that govern all achievement and usefulness 
have any meaning." 246 Only once the person as highest conception of man has appeared 
as the field of consciousness can the communal meanings of dwelling emerge through 
transitioning the field of nihility, subjectivity seems here to first provide basis for 
communal values Dreyfus argues for and remains in the self-identity of the fields of the 
future epoch. 
 The lack of anything in modernity that can solicit or sustain commitment from us 
that Dreyfus attributes to Heidegger's critique overlooks how commitments to contingent 
pluralism and values motivate so many and cause them to not be alienated from world 
and others, these are divinities who remain in having fled through ironic or contingent 
commitment that are as definitive as unarticulated structures of meaning. Dreyfus claims 
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"Heidegger holds that only some shared meaningful ///concerns that grip us can give our 
culture a focus and enable us to resist acquiescence to a state that has no higher goal than 
to provide material welfare for all" 247 but such welfare as highest goal can also be seen 
as a commitment to enable the condition for a plurality of understandings to be explored, 
plurality itself acting as the single shared meaningful concern. Thinking in terms of values 
does not deprive the world of meaning if  that meaning is the plurality of (epochally co-
existing) values, in Dreyfus terms the paradigm to be gathered is that we are explorers of 
meaning authentically aware of this contingency as dwelling under absent gods; bringing 
out the relations between understandings in against the backdrop of entities nothingness 
in Gestell. Chapter 2.6 dealt with the mischaracterizing of the experience of many living 
in the shadow of ontological danger in relation to this, it is not that “ultimate goals like 
serving God, society, our fellows, or even ourselves no longer make sense to us”248 but 
that they make a different kind of sense in a contingent pluralistic clearing. In a post-
destitute age certain ultimate goals and ways of dwelling can no longer act as paradigms, 
or even models or how paradigms should operate, just as post Being and Time Cartesian 
dualism can no longer act as a philosophical paradigm. 
 Most pertinently, just as chapter 2.3 et al laid out that no single example was 
determinative of Gestell, no single artwork or example of building can properly indicate 
a saving epoch; only the manner such works are related can do so. Whilst Dreyfus's earlier 
characterization was flawed his abstraction of art and building into inaugural paradigms 
does indicate the breadth of what can count as an example of artistic building and captures 
this relational element as no single artwork or case of building truly sets forth a paradigm. 
The role of world-founding "happens in a few essential ways. One of these ways in which 
truth happens is the work-being of the work." 249 yet others are also possible, leading to 
the later much wider notion of building. Bowie's suggestion that “revelatory jazz 
performances, of the kind that helped constitute the world of Civil Rights by establishing 
new forms of cultural identity, are not best seen as “works”...Martin Luther King’s “I have 
a dream” speech can be seen in this context as a happening of truth of the kind Heidegger 
is concerned with”250 and Dreyfus examples of the Jewish covenant, crucifixion, and US 
constitution as collections of events that accomplish shared destinal understandings 
indicate could be joined by similarly wide-ranging social events such as the UN 
convention on human rights. 
Post-Destitute Dwelling 
That poetically we dwell is often held to be the opposite of the homelessness of Gestell 
that is contrary to art (an opposition certainly at play in The Question Concerning 
Technology) obscuring earth and portraying itself as the sole possible epochal 
understanding and total disclosure of what is, an anti-art that would “conceal the struggle 
between earth and world and celebrate our ability to get everything clear and under 
control.”251 Yet in another sense we always are as dwellers, even as gathered under the 
highway bridge, so that Gestell too as a way we are claimed must have its artworks that 
gather this understanding; in our instrumental making an artistry is still possible so that 
"the technician is a kind of poet - a poet who makes technical beings".252   
 If dwelling is in its essence saving then it requires prior danger, it first requires 
nihility to be passed through before we can fulfil ourselves as essential dwellers. Chapter 
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2.4 characterized homecoming as a return to originary nihility; that all humans stand 
under Ereignis as masks of universal nothingness yet also within a finite context we 
recognize as contingent. The nearness of dwelling pertain to nearness to universal origin 
(homelessness). Homelessness is equiprimordial to dwelling in constituting our existence 
so that to truly come home is to realize absolute nothingness as the homelessness of the 
Buddha. If we must go beyond Greek poiesis to save Gestell, realize their shared origin 
in nihility, the question becomes what art will be in the post-destitute age that preserves 
both Gestell as Gestell and its origin as that which gave art as poiesis. Heidegger does not 
offer a suggestion as to the nature of art once transfigured by passing through the destitute 
age, "What art may be is one of the questions to which /// no answers are given"253 as we 
cannot know how the new epochal claim will occur. Homelessness rendered poetic by an 
art/building that preserves/beholds its origin and heeds absent gods. Rather than trying to 
counter Gestell with poetic art, the attempt to realize it as it is in terms of such art pursues 
the second approach from the end of chapter 3.1. To be at home as homeless and measured 
by absent gods can still be to dwell poetically. 
 As what prepares for and inaugurates epochal transformation the new saving 
epoch requires an artwork yet in a post-destitute age dwelling will be different after our 
sojourn in homelessness. Chapter 3.2 asked how post-destitute poetry must change, given 
Heidegger's wide definitions of art and building (ultimately only unified by the realizing 
of a claim) the manner post-destitute dwelling is to be realized need not bear surface 
resemblance to these examples, only being same in essence. They may be transitory and 
unlike anything defined as art or building in normal terms. 
 The divinities give measure to dwelling; post-destitute dwelling would 
accomplish the silence of absent gods as laid out in chapter 3.2's consideration of 
homelessness. Criteria of plurality and contingency have been posited, that we must 
preserve both the absence of the divinities and an awareness of this absence to remain 
those who await, expressly putting-forth the necessity of the preservation of alternate 
possibilities to any epochal understanding. Post-destitute art preserves earth by leaving 
the gods of our world absent, the work must show the possibility of alternate worlds. Art 
for the destitute age is to hold open for a new dispensation of Being that is awaited yet 
never arriving (an absent god), instead the play of Being and nature of revealing is fully 
revealed, the role of earth fully disclosed in such a way that preserves its concealment. 
The articulation of earth thus acts to preserve its possibilities in the sense of allowing for 
a pluralistic conception of Being in which disclosures stand side by side. As poetry for a 
destitute time attends to the essence of poetry, a post-destitute art must exhibit a self-
awareness concerning the nature of art and building; preservers would do so in self-
reflective awareness of preservation (counter-Dreyfus), it founds a people/community 
whose identity is permeated by a non-identity (a notion to be expanded in chapter 3.5 in 
consideration of politics). 
 In chapter 2.5 an epoch was characterized as comprised by competing voices 
which always have multifarious understandings of Being, suggesting Gestell was best 
seen as a relation between understandings characterized by a tension between both 
plurality and totality. Building is both a collective endeavour and a collection of 
endeavours; no single work can set forth what is determinative of an epoch, no artist or 
building although perhaps a collection of artistic movements or socio-cultural endeavours 
unified by a common horizon. The work must situate itself in relation to other such works 
in such a way that this relation is integral with strife as fixed in place with the figure, the 
works whose inter-relation determines the epoch must exhibit this relation, every temple 
indicating its place in the widest pantheon. Gestell as a relating of plural disclosures in 
 





the homeless absence of gods thus requires art that realizes this tension in the awareness 
and identity of its preservers; of the differences within the people founded by poetic art 
and the theme of universality as preparation for planetary dialogue thus that speaks of 
solidarity within contingency and plurality. This has been indicated earlier in relation to 
rights and values preserving  the differentiation in levelling and bringing to awareness the 
contingency of meaning that earth grants thus most conducive to the plurality necessary 
to preserve Ereignis. The elements of modern humanism that are the ethical facet of 
metaphysics and Gestell are to be retained as those elements of conventional reality (field 
of consciousness) that allow sunyata/Ereignis to be most fully expressed. Heidegger's 
anti-subjectivism led him to dismiss such approaches, but a saving place for them can be 
found, and may even be required, for them in the transfigured thought of the new epoch. 
  
Anx chap characterized Gestell as the call of the self writ large, thus a communal call to 
authentic retrieval that cannot be surpassed but must be beheld as danger to make us aware 
of contingency. The nihility of modernity is a social parallel to the call of conscience; “we 
are now, more than ever before in the history of Being, uniquely positioned to experience 
en masse the full impact of this groundless withdrawal of Being”254 thus the possibility 
of enlightenment. The articulation through critical reflection which Dreyfus identifies as 
the problem is the social setting for what saves as it contributes to preparing us for the 
freeing claim, to stand in nihility and to maintain such a stand could be a facet of a post-
destitute art concerned with aiding the transition to the field of sunyata. The 'uniform 
distanceless' of modern mass communications also brings about the possibility of a 
greater homecoming through spreading the experience of sojourning in homelessness. Art 
in such an age would then showcase the relation between levelling and plurality to 
preserve awareness of other disclosures, maintaining the danger in beholding it. The 
increased range of what can constitute building allows for political movements or 
scientific projects of exploration and discovery to replace art in traditional sense of 
Greece's 'brief but magnificent time'. In the information age communal projects that 
transcend culture and nation can also gather homelessness, works with no single creator 
or poet that thereby highlight the plurality of understandings of the real. The very 
proliferation of what can count as art is itself an indication of the world Gestell opens up, 
the setting back of the figure into multiple mediums highlighting multiple possible 
understandings. 
 Spinosa gives a pertinent example of films that "brought us into touch with our 
own ways of revealing things and people"255 a whole new art form for the post-destitute 
age that seems particularly apt at laying open a world by dealing inherently with an 
alternate perspective in more explicit terms; showing that many worlds share the earth. 
It's very historical novelty and reliance upon machine technology for both creation and 
mass distribution (itself part of the figure of such art) fits Poggeler suggestion that modern 
art could poeticize Gestell by incorporating machine technology within itself as a 
structural element so "it can limit these from within: the reminder of the finitude and 
limitedness of every formulation checks the extravagant proliferation of the scientific-
technological approach"256 to express how "Only enframing and fourfold together refer 
to the world"257 and bring out the -sive- of the projective verwindung. As it is a case of 
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the levelling of Hollywood and the independent cinema of marginalized groups and 
understandings it supports. 
 The possibility of plurality discussed in chapter 2.5 is a constant struggling against 
the totalizing elements in levelling that can be both liberating and oppressive to the 
marginalized (both individuals and groups). Leland identifies a form of this tension in her 
critique of the notion a destinal heritage can be retrieved from das Man understood as a 
single shared context of intelligibility that might not be conducive to solicitude, as “if that 
culture is fundamentally conflictual, a sense of solidarity rooted merely in a recognition 
that we belong to this culture is not likely to be achieved. The master and the slave are 
cultural ‘‘cohorts,’’ so to speak; yet the slave in rebellion is not likely to feel solidarity 
with her master based on their mutual cohort status.”258 As outlined in chapter 2.5 Leland's 
critique of Heidegger is misplaced and das Man can be seen as a critique of the politics 
of identity as eclipsing individual responsibility for self rather than capable of being 
critiqued by such a politics, but her identification of the plurality within each epoch can 
inform the notion of a dwelling that concentrates on a plurality of worlds. Leland's 
characterization of those in the borderlands is the homeless earth of a people yet to be 
truly founded, migrant and mixed populations yet to become 'a multicultural people' 
rather than a collection of cultural groups co-existing. Such a re-founding can be seen in 
political debates over 'British values and identity' within an increasingly demographically 
diverse nation. Such foundings throw established communities of preservers back to the 
earth for all worlds are defined in relation to their co-worlds; and this relation of worlds 
is what Gestell threatens to totalize in the Europeanization of the globe. Leland's view of 
identity politics is more a retrieval of resistance (of single counter understandings) that a 
retrieval of a pluralism that relates those understandings; Gestell is a more radical 
plurality than identity politics can survive in, an erasure of any dominant narrative for 
their to be reactions against. 
 Yet this movement is deeply ambiguous. Chapter 2.3 touched on Glazebrook's 
over-emphasis on the capitalist elements of Gestell, her connecting of this to wider 
impositions of developmental models through which “Eurocentrism disrespects, 
denigrates and ultimately displaces the world-opening truths of other cultures, and 
because of this rampaging through them, eventually destroys them”259 comes closer to 
Gestell, not capitalism per se but a relation to other possibilities that subsumes them into 
that reckoning. Glazebrook also warns of idealizing other cultures, and providing a 
criteria for the marginalization of pernicious practices such as honour killings or FGM is 
an element that must also be brought forth by a post-destitute building; plurality alone 
cannot form coherent criteria. Glazebrook also correctly identifies that levelling is 
counter-acted by material wealth divisions as these impose a hierarchy of rank, yet the 
welfare projects and human rights ideologies that counter the tendencies Glazebrook 
identifies stem from same epochal understanding. 
 These themes are to be expanded and the integral relation of ontology and ethics 
considered in chapter 3.5, the relation of welfare and compassion/solicitude and how 
wide-ranging social projects that wrestle with issues of plurality and totality, tolerance of 
intolerance, can be a poetic building for a post-destitute age. Firstly whether the sciences 
can help form an artistic paradigm that preserves earth as elemental objectivity and is 
related to awe and wonder rather than calculation will be explored in chapter 3.4; whether 
thingness names the homeground of jitai and does justice to the in-itself of the 'natural' 
world, of deer, tree, earth and sky. That the essence of science is exploration in awe of 
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mystery that shows finitude of man by showcasing entities resistance to our projects and 
observations; that on their homeground things are other to and prior to us (elemental 
objectivity). 
 Projects that articulate universal human rights or international co-operation; 
exploration of the wonders of the universe that show our nature in the face of its grandeur 
whilst allowing for discourse between non-final vocabularies. Individual building that 
when seen as a related whole allow both humans and other beings to come-to-presence 
under manifold understandings. Such broad building projects will be dealt with over the 
following chapters in terms of science, ethics and politics. Specific instances of such 
building will not be gone into in-depth as no single case ever encapsulates the paradigm, 
but might include Voyager, Cern, or the Mars rover that reveal wonder at  the ground of 
curiosity and reveal the finitude of man in the face of the universe that he is a part of. 
Heidegger's comments as to Sputnik are often echoed in the sentiment that “It is ironic 
that a generation engaged in space trips should have so little awareness of the "wholeness" 
of the cosmos”260 yet those projects are often bastions of awareness of such wholeness 
and striving to be part of it. 
3.5 Ethics and Politics 
Traditional ethics as relying on metaphysical interpretations of Being are radically 
questioned by Heidegger and Nishitani but the question of how we are to live is 
unavoidable and all systems of thought have consequences for this question, and such 
consequences are  the highest court of judgement philosophy can have. Lowith holds 
academic texts are in essential relation to their practical application which "justifies or 
condemns the philosophical theory that serves as the basis of this commitment."261 After 
reflective thought and critique we must return to the political, Strauss believing “To 
justify philosophy before the tribunal of the political community means to justify 
philosophy in terms of the political community...by means of a kind of argument which 
appeals, not to philosophers as such, but to citizens as such.”262  This element is especially 
vital for Heidegger, who requires a community of preservers to be won to the word of the 
poet in order to achieve epochal transformation.263  
Original and Practical Ethics 
Heidegger produced no strict ethics, yet his thought as a response to homelessness was 
an imperative guided by an axiology that permeates ontology. He called such reflection 
on dwelling and homelessness “in itself the original ethics",264 and we dwell only with 
others, gathering ourselves into communities of preservers. Such ethics concerns not rules 
or norms to guide action but the conditions of the possibility for these derivative ethics as 
“The possibility of ethics is conditional on the existence of an entity, for which being is 
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an issue...out of which emerges ethical questioning and the possibility of freedom.”265  
Such thought is both preparatory but preparation is a form of determination requiring 
accomplishing in a building manifested in ontic comportments (if not directives that guide 
them), the poetic dwelling that guides us "into the realm of the upsurgence of healing."266 
requires a more traditional conception of ethics to complement it. The question is whether 
this derivative ethics as the realization of that ontological structure is conditioned by it. 
The terms ethics and politics speak of the relations between our building, so that which 
saves as highlighting these relations is also the highest ethics as a building that expresses 
the relation between plurality and singularity/totality. 
 In their introduction to The Question of Being Wilde and Kluback criticize 
Heidegger for failing to provide for an ethics due to his consideration of man only in an 
ontological not practical framework overlooking how ontological awareness required 
existential realization that historically describes the ontological yet cannot be reduced to 
it. The ontological and practical are mutually constitutive so that "To disregard the 
practical dimension is to hinder the full realization of the ontological dimension" 267 that 
ontological transformation is only as practical ethically guided changes in lived existence, 
they are equiprimordial so that "the uniqueness of man, given him ontologically, is 
realized and preserved in a political, social and economic life. The legitimacy of the 
political framework is rooted in the ontological dimension."268 The political and 
ontological dimensions are both required for the realization of Ereignis, they are a unity 
that reveal each other to each other by the former as practical communication and action 
"reflects the ground of Being in so far as the ground proceeds to externalization, 
externalizing its Nothingness (unrealized possibilities) into something." 269 The 
existential analytic is not objective investigation into universal structures, our finitude can 
only be grasped finitely as “commitment can only be understood by an understanding 
which is itself committed”270 and the realization of a political form is how the ontological 
is. Ereignis only occurs as its epochal realization in a lived existence necessarily given 
ethical and political form. This first requires reflection to bring awareness of 
appropriation and the circuminsessional nature of meaning, but to preserve meditative 
reflection a form of such existence that remains conscious of itself as the dangerous 
realization of appropriation is also required; one derived from the current thrown epochal 
understanding retrieved in accordance with the criteria of preserving awareness of its null 
origin. Only when preserved by builders does the thought that saves become such so 
requires a social ethics equiprimordially constitutive with it. 
 Whilst Heidegger laid out the possibility of "a thinking of Being which would take 
place in the practical world of human existence...when we ask his texts for some guidance 
in understanding the process of embodying this thinking, we find that he has virtually 
nothing to say"271 focussing solely of reflection prior to sending. Heidegger's denies a 
social mandate for his thought since “today’s society is only an absolute image of modern 
subjectivity; therefore, a philosophy which has overcome the standpoint of subjectivity 
may not join in the discussion at all.”272 yet in calling for a change in how we conceive 
of society (dwelling instead of image of subjectivity) Heidegger calls for social 
transformation without engaging in discussion of the social consequences for such a 
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change. Partly as he saw himself as a thinker preparing way not a poet who would 
announce new sending, and partly as to do so would have involved incorporating 
calculative elements into meditative thought, thus subject it to presumptive demand to 
produce results, but this dichotomy must be reconciled as the calculative and meditative 
require and realize each other, despite yielding no 'results' Heidegger's thought requires 
such for its completion. 
 The identity of ontology, existential realization and axiology in Heidegger and 
Nishitani's thought means their ontologies are not pre-ethical but prior to the divide 
between ethics and ontology and of politics and ethics (as indicated by earlier 
consideration of the Anaximander Fragment). Heidegger's thought collapses the ethics-
ontology distinction, Letter on Humanism asking that if reflective thought is neither ethics 
not ontology "does thinking remain only a theoretical representation of Being and man; 
or can we obtain from such knowledge directives that can be readily applied to our active 
lives?"273 He places reflective thought on original ethics as prior to theoretical-practical 
division, yet grounds/contextualizes practical ethics, so is still integrally related to the 
question of ethical criteria. The ontological Turn as always actualized in self-identity with 
the ontic is also an ethical transformation with practical ramifications for lived existence;  
 
and as a projective moment requires guidance by future flourishing such that there is a 
primordial value system operative. 
 Whilst holding that “One cannot pose a question about Being without posing a 
question about the essence of man.”274 one also cannot address the social change required 
for this epochal reflection without at least provisional answers to the question of this 
essence that are to be realized in our existence. Hodge claims Heidegger is wrong to 
disconnect reflection from “any determinate answer, as given in the various humanisms 
grounded in philosophical anthropology, that is in generalized theories of what it is to be 
human” 275 whilst agreeing there is no answer and the question of the human must be 
open (preparatory/provisional). As necessarily open such issues must be constantly dealt 
with in an anticipatory manner (one which recognizes its contingency and opens up future 
as radical transformation) yet must involve a determinate (though provisional) answer to 
counter Gestell as the termination of asking the question of the human. Hodge argues 
ethics as recognition of the transitory nature of understandings of the human is the other 
to metaphysics instead of nothingness and is what keeps open possibilities and makes 
questioning transform the questioner. Nihilism is thus not countered by “the affirmation 
of nothingness but rather a revival of another aspect of the philosophical tradition, an 
ethical affirmation of the possibility of transforming not just the self, as in will to power, 
but the self in relation to being, to world, time, meaning and tradition.” 276 But Heidegger 
and Nishitani do not simply affirm nothingness, they affirm its location within the process 
of disclosure that situates nihilism as integral to meaning; the unmeaning that indicates 
the transitoriness ethics recognizes. 
 Questions of meaning and identity “prompt philosophical puzzlement and then the 
responses of either setting out a relation to these questions, in ethical enquiry, or 
attempting to answer these questions, through metaphysical construction”277 whilst 
Hodge sees Gestell as the collapsing of this difference between ethics and metaphysics I 
would argue it is the context for the necessary tension between these two approaches to 
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the question of the human. The epoch of absent gods would cohere with this ethical 
project of relating ourselves to these questions not answering them, “Ethics then would 
be the event of Dasein, revealed as a relation to being. It is an event, which opens out 
possibilities, rather than an occurrence, which presents what there is.”278 Gestell as the 
completion of metaphysics transforms ethics into a mediating of the continual tension 
between the the ontological and practical dimensions of existence so that Gestell makes 
“negotiation between abstractness and experience a constant feature of experience”.279 
For Hodge such ethical openness makes collective identity unavailable and unnecessary 
and modernity errs in the “doubly mistaken presumption that what previous societies 
constructed through superstition and prejudice can now be constructed through reason 
and debate.”280 Yet for preservers thus epochal transformation some form of shared 
attunement thus identity is necessary, an identity based in nothingness (equiprimordial 
with non-identity) as the practical realization of the circuminsessional relation. 
 What this means in relation to ethical and political particulars is returned to after 
considering related problems for Nishitani. 
The Bodhisattva and Ethical Discourse 
Wargo characterizes Zen as as apolitical, ascribing its success and Daoism's failure in 
Japan to “the fact that Taoism is very much concerned with the nature of government, 
whereas Zen is not”281 further claiming Japanese thought lacks “elaborate and systematic 
ethical proscriptions”282 favouring more community specific ethics. (Wargo's essay 
characterizes kami in similar way to Heidegger's gods indicating interesting parallels, alas 
beyond the purview of the thesis, but Shinto connection to Heidegger's view of primordial 
dwelling might be future topic). Given that Nishitani writes from the position of Japanese 
Zen it may be an unreasonable demand to expect anything resembling a traditional 
Western ethical or political philosophy. Asakura even posits a separation of ontology and 
ethics in Nishitani claiming “although his field of emptiness has no ethical element, 
ontology cannot be identical to morality, while it surely contains the latter as an important 
component”283 seemingly separating out the Great Compassion completely from the 
circuminsessional totality (or, at the very least, denying the Great Compassion as 
morality).This seems to deny the self-identity of absolute nothingness with its personal mask, 
accepting the 'amoral and impersonal' aspects of his thought without mitigation so that the real 
self-realization of reality “is also an affirmation of the controversial and even disturbing 
aspects of our world” 284 without also being a denial, and absolute nothingness no longer 
wears its mask as “It is realizable in its awareness and in its all-embracing and no longer 
personal compassion.”285  
 But Nishitani seems to be surpassing such dichotomies as personal-impersonal, 
affirmation-negation; and even the difference between ontology and ethics. The field of 
sunyata is not external to the fields of consciousness or nihility, self as the manifestation 
of absolute nothingness is not different from the mask of the conscious self; morality 
cannot be relegated to either a problem of the discriminatory mind nor absolute 
nothingness as the source of value/meaning. Jones distinguishes between an “enlightenment 
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experience and the resulting enlightened state”286 the latter is a return to differentiations and 
commitments of the field of consciousness, a return to ethics and politics. Such everyday 
commitments cannot be “derived in any simple manner from the mystical experiences 
themselves”287 but are informed by them and affected through the transformation of the ethical 
agent. 
 As outlined in chapter 1.5 concerning koto for Nishitani being is knowing so that 
compassion simply is how one is when enlightened. Nishitani's form of original ethics is 
the identity of compassion (karuṇā) for all and wisdom (prajñā) so that one's own 
enlightenment cannot be distinguished from helping to save (enlighten) others; 
enlightenment thus requiring ignorance as samsara-sive-nirvana. Nishitani collapses the 
enlightenment-compassion relation into an identity so neither is cause of nor in service to 
other; such is the Boddissatva vow; my enlightenment is less important than helping 
others achieve theirs, but in doing so I will achieve mine in the manner of the 
circuminsessional Master-Servant relation. 
 Fox considers Dogen in relation to ethics as the expression of Unborn (original 
countenance as sunyata), 'do no evil' “is the self-expression of the Unborn, and the practice of it 
is the Unborn itself in action”288 the injunction 'do not commit evil' “is, in a sense, the verbal self-
expression of the Absolute and its fulfilment is the active self-expression of the same 
Absolute.”289 The issue of warrant may thereby be settled; once released we simply are 
compassionate rather than a subjective agent who needs compassion justified to them, but 
still requires a guide for how to express such compassion. It is most commonly connected 
to provoking insight in others, “our obligation is not merely to do good in an amorphous 
fashion, but especially to do good which will provoke the awakening of our fellows”290 
yet discussion of solicitude will soon question whether this is an epochally conditioned 
notion of compassion. 
 For Zimmerman the ethical self-transformation of compassion/solicitude is 
grounded upon the realization of the ontology of nothingness as the "direct insight into 
the interrelatedness of things, insight that transforms the very structure of the one ‘person’ 
gifted with the insight.”291 But the view that liberation from egocentrism “frees one for 
spontaneous compassion toward other beings, human and nonhuman alike”292 and 
“enables one to become the compassion (Buddhism) or care (Heidegger) that one always 
already is.”293 overlooks that freeing and enabling alone are only conditions for such 
possibilities, necessary but not sufficient for their realization. Instead of living by moral 
standards “the Zen Buddhist achieves his humanity by letting go of external standards of 
value and by becoming more spontaneous.”294 Yet spontaneity alone is not enough and 
the claim that our doing “becomes just an expression of nature itself”295 once we are 
enlightened is problematic as a model of ethical agency in regards to social verifiability 
and knowing how to implement one's compassion (dukkha too is historical). 
 Enlightenment as saving others requires a means for doing so and a element of 
social engagement to fulfil the Bodhisattva Vow. To work for the enlightenment of all 
sentient beings requires many skilful means; in modernity one cannot rely on convincing 
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people to a leap of faith in God or Buddha (as Nishitani invokes in intro1), on paradoxes 
of representation, and if people are happy in avidya amongst the comforts offered by 
Gestell one cannot rely on distressful experiences of nihility to power them through the 
fields. Nishitani makes strong claims that entail far-reaching changes to our conduct and  
hefty investments of time and energy, this wording belies the epoch of Gestell in its 
implication of requiring justification, yet it is precisely this epoch to which the 
Bodhisattva now speaks and has its own forms of social discourse, this element of reason-
giving must be emphasized to save those under the aegis of the current epoch (who may 
never know dukkha like an Indian peasant 3,000 years ago). 
 Satori is explicitly self-validating and incommunicable so alone cannot fulfil the 
Vow that has a social imperative thus discursive element; communal discourses non-
dependent on others enlightenment (ethics and politics) are required to create the 
necessary conditions/attunements. This is related to the problem of poetry requiring a 
shared attunement (a poet must convince others the word they hear should be heeded to 
gather preservers otherwise the word they heed is not valid). Reason is not sufficient for 
enlightenment, but it is required, both initially and as part of final original unity. 
 Finnigan explores  how the enlightened can have ethical agency without conceptual 
discriminations, only direct awareness. Finnigan deals with spontaneity in relation to 
intentionality, whether this is return to original countenance or acquired, asking “when 
enlightened persons act spontaneously, do they do so in a way that is (at all) informed (however 
latently) by their internalized discourse, or are their actions purely automatic expressions of their 
inherent nature?”296 Intentionality and agency concern the possibility for action not whether the 
enlightened are capable of giving reasons to others thus drawing their revelations into the social 
discourse required for it to be realized, but her statement that “The deconstructive approach allows 
no room for a buddha to direct his behaviour, let alone to provide reasons that explain the 
directedness of his behaviour. In this model, a buddha simply reacts to particulars” 297 relates to 
the issue of communal verifiability and practical criteria. 
 She suggests the tension may be resolved by foundational spontaneity being required to 
cultivate spontaneity in action. The former only is when realized within and by the latter; as 
nothingness requires its mask. The unity of the fields explains the possibility for evaluative norms 
thus social discourse but not the criteria for the justification of norms to the unenlightened, how 
the enlightened may be spontaneously responsive yet “correcting his disciples' interpretations by 
means of his own interpretations presupposes that these discriminatory capacities are, to some 
extent, conceptualizable” 298 So that transmission of enlightenment requires joining enlightened 
action with the discriminations of field of consciousness. Nishitani's analysis does provide a 
solution to Finnigan's problem as the modes of thinking required for the agency she seeks are 
those of the field of consciousness that is realized as one with sunyata. The possibility for such 
action is thus explained, but such action also requires Great Compassion be joined by ontic criteria 
that Buddhahood alone does not bequeath, once we pass through nihility to realize the identity of 
conventional and ultimate truth what manners of discrimination should be retained? Finnigan 
appeals to the circuminsessional model to explain how the enlightened could gives reasons for 
their actions as “a buddha would be able to appeal to, among other things, his realization about 
the ultimate nature of reality (i.e., pratïītyasamutpāda), his desire to eliminate the suffering of 
others, and his intention to transmit his dharma to his disciples” 299 this would solve the 
intentionality problem but does not provide a model for discourse without all participants sharing 
such an attunement. 
 Hansen and Garfields's replies to Finnigan focus on the paradigm of skills but can 
communal ethical action itself be considered a skill? Hansen seems to apply a Daoist notion of 
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all ways (so long as done naturally) being equally meaningful, avoiding any naturalistic fallacy 
as “The existing discourse is all natural, but being natural entails nothing about being right or 
wrong.” 300 One can 'naturally' do some heinous things, and find meaning in them, to the horror 
and suffering of those around me especially if they're oxen, Butcher Ding cannot tell us whether 
we should be vegetarian. Garfield takes a stronger position presupposing we know what it is to 
be naturally moral and can therefore “eliminate the obstacles to its spontaneous manifestation” 
301 as our awakened nature. A Buddhist ethics would then be “about cultivation of virtue, 
elimination of vice, practice of path, and so forth—in short, about self-transformation, about 
transforming oneself into a buddha” 302 but transforming oneself into a Bodhisattva is all about 
the enlightenment of others not oneself, it is about being the teacher not a student to a master. 
From the position of enlightenment the discriminations of discursive reason that explain 
intentionality are critiqued by Hansen and Garfield, yet the skill of rational social discourse is 
also a way that must be developed for the Vow, an idea developed in consideration of Strauss later 
in the chapter. 
 The Bodhisattva are akin to Heidegger's poets, both know what saves and must 
try to transmit it to those who do not share their undoubtable experience, a  model perhaps 
suitable for a trusted teacher but difficult to apply to a social ethics. Just as there is great 
danger in heeding poets whose Saying admits of no verification there is a danger within 
Nishitani understanding of ethics; the enlightened “does not merely know truth, he is 
Truth and consequently does Truth, which is to say that he inevitably does no evil.”303 
Jones points out that “the skilled means used to end the suffering of others could 
involve a bodhisattva in violating any norm of the standard Buddhist code of conduct 
(while still living free from any consequences).”304 The placing of the enlightened beyond 
moral laws and the priority of others insight over their ontic welfare is dangerous given 
that beyond the gainsay of other enlightened ones there is no criteria for verifiability for 
enlightenment. There appears to be a relation of definition 'that action must be ethical as 
a Buddha is doing it' but this means we cannot tell who is a Buddha by their actions. 
Without a standard of  compassion separate from enlightenment how do we know we are 
acting from our Buddhanature, or more pertinently if those advising us are? There is no 
way to distinguish between the self-validation of an enlightenment experience and self-
delusion, and no way to validate if another is enlightened. 
Epochal Compassion 
When we reflect and realize we are challenged-forth "a longing necessarily awakens for 
a peremptory directive and for rules that say how man, experienced from ek-sistence 
toward Being, ought to live in a fitting manner."305 The need for ethical foundations in 
the face of contingency may only be desired because reality is unsatisfying to creatures 
who crave meaningful foundations, but they are also practically required in a social 
context (albeit in a new or lessened form). Philosophy as poetic reflection is preparatory 
and gives no answers “But the task of philosophy (let alone politics!) is not to be defined 
solely by analogy with such poetry.”306 Poetically we dwell, but man cannot dwell on 
openness alone; such open receptivity must guide and be guided by a concrete ethos that 
comes to pass through the epochal clearing. A context for compassion is required, a 
horizon that can determine the communal heritage to be retrieved and thus cannot be 
simply tied to that heritage but must stem from both Ereignis/Sunyata and its actualization 
in a thrown metaphysical heritage. The clearing for meaning and the meaning that comes 
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to pass in it are not separable, the former cannot be given value distinct from the latter 
and the meaning/value of Ereignis only is in terms of what it enables. 
 Lowith claims the pure awareness of Dasein "presupposes that all traditional 
truths and contents of life have lost their substance"307 so is an ontology for a nihilistic 
age. Ereignis itself as the projective saving that only is in terms of the danger it is the 
condition for means the emptiness of resolve thus solicitude is an epochal compassion, 
attuned to inauthenticity and homelessness as the greatest woes and thus is only 
compassionate by the framework of the projected epoch. Compassion needs its context, 
the notion of suffering varies (as Barnhart TCBE points out) as impermanence takes many 
forms and dukkha too is a historical concept. Compassion is epochal (salvation, material 
comfort, absence of suffering, equality) and compassionate action requires a shared 
understanding of cruelty, kindness and suffering. Calling another to their responsibility 
for own-most Being can be both state-funded drug rehabilitation programmes and an end 
to prohibition, or the dismantling of the NHS and refusal of state-funded rehab. 
 This returns us to the theme of generating criteria for the retrieval of ethics (new 
sending) from the nature of Ereignis itself; the relation between the preparation for a 
destinal sending and the criteria to guide such a retrieval, how they determine each other. 
The projective moment gets its warrant from the criteria of the present and Ereignis itself 
must provide the horizon for adjudicating the epochal understanding from which ethical 
principles are derived. Some of these criteria were explicated in chapter 2.6 in terms of a 
combination of attending to Ereignis as the preservation of plural possibilities guiding a 
retrieval of the plurality latent in Gestell as the realization of null origin; a contingent 
pluralism that guards against the supreme danger whilst preserving it. 
 Ethics is determined by the gods our poetry names or leaves absent and post-
destitute dwelling has been characterized as bringing-forth the plurality within Gestell to 
counter its totality. Multiple meanings of Sein cannot be grasped by a single perspective, 
so to truly let-be the homeground is to put forward a relational paradigm that allows many 
possibilities to co-exist. Yet the preserving of the marginalized against totalizing 
disclosure lacks criteria for judging when marginalized discourses should be eclipsed and 
how the plurality should be related. Pluralism must be preserved but within a framework 
of adjudication that does not totalize yet retains the ability to make critical 
discriminations, the plurality of Da carries it's own tension; namely the question “How 
can people simultaneously adopt a heart-bound and sincere willingness to embrace 
multicultural values with the utmost seriousness and yet regard them playfully and with 
complete humility as unable to deliver ultimate freedom by themselves? How can people 
both believe and critique without self-contradiction?”308  
To let beings be includes fellow human beings so that releasement is also an allowing of 
difference, yet paradoxically also an encouraging of uniformity in terms of desiring a 
conscience thus shared attunement. 
 Before moving on to consideration of the implications for political philosophy the 
possibility of deriving a stricter ethics from certain features of Heidegger's thought is to 
be considered. 
Ethical Form and Ethical Emptiness 
I speak therefore I am, and language is a communal activity, Saying the horizon of  
intelligibility that opens the Da. Dasein only is in terms of referential totality of world 
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that includes others “from whom, for the most part, one does not distinguish oneself"309 
so that "Dasein in itself is essentially Being-with...even when factically no Other is 
present-at-hand or perceived".310 MitSein essentially makes oneself collective and 
dependent, Dasein's care is also always concern for others as "So far as Dasein is at all, 
it has Being-with-one-another as its kind of Being," 311 so that  the call of conscience 
equally comes from Thou as it does Mineness. 
 Despite that “as Being-with, Dasein 'is' essentially for the sake of Others," 312 this 
denotes a shared world and precondition for empathy (both moral and perceptual) rather 
than any ethics with  no connotation of how to be with others. The nullity conscience calls 
us to is a guilt "sufficiently formalized so that those ordinary phenomena of 'guilt' which 
are related to our concernful Being with Others, will drop out." 313 The call solely calls us 
to appropriation rather than any claim, it "fails to give any such 'practical' injunctions, 
solely because it summons Dasein to existence, to its ownmst potentiality-for-Being-its-
Self," and is thus epochally neutral. In wanting to have a conscience (heeding the call of 
the self as nothingness) Dasein "on the null basis of its null projection, it has, in Being 
with Others, already become guilty towards them." 314  
MitSein means responsibility for self is also for others. Yet this same call is later portrayed 
as announcing the need for a new destining, so that solicitude is an epochal compassion 
for the destitute age rather than ahistorical structure of Dasein. 
 Heidegger focusses on the holy and hale whose malignancy concerns freedom 
alone not ontic suffering. The non-self that calls us to responsibility "is, equiprimordially, 
the existential condition for the possibility of the 'morally' good and for that of the 
'morally' evil - that is, for morality in general and for the possible forms which this may 
take factically." 315  and is the condition of possibility for the opposite of compassion, such 
concern is equally for, with, or against Others. This remains constant throughout his 
works; “The essence of evil does not consist in the mere baseness of human action, but 
rather in the malice of rage"316 and "To healing Being first grants ascent  into grace; to 
raging its compulsion to malignancy."317 Dasein means to be called to responsibility for 
Ereignis and the evil of malignancy is withdrawal and danger, the flight of gods and 
nothing more, true compassion is to then attend to the Holy as "what is distinctive about 
this world-epoch consists in the closure of the dimension of the hale. Perhaps that is the 
sole malignancy."318 This view has been questioned throughout chapters 2.3. and 2.6, that 
such malignancy belongs to an epochal understanding yet also is constitutive of what 
gives such epochs. 
 Heidegger talks of dwelling requiring 'kindness the Pure' to stay with our hearts; 
that "As long as this arrival of kindness endures, so long does man succeed in measuring 
himself not unhappily against the godhead." 319 The new epoch requires both kindness 
and sacrifice; but as the latter is self-abnegation of poets rather than any usual meaning 
of sacrifice so too is the former a kindness to counteract malignancy understood as the 
flight of gods. Kindness understood in terms of empathy is proximal not primordial as 
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“only on the basis of Being-with does 'empathy' become possible: it gets it motivation 
from the unsociability of the dominant modes of Being-with." 320  
 Solicitude must be distinguished from anything resembling the everyday (or 
'correct') understandings of compassion. Such "'welfare work', as a factical social 
arrangement, is grounded in Dasein's state of Being as Being-with. Its factical urgency 
gets its motivation in that Dasein maintains itself proximally and for the most part in the 
deficient modes of solicitude," 321 that treat co-Dasein as present-at-hand and are thus 
indifferent to their needs. Solitude itself has two possible modes; the inauthentic "In such 
solicitude the Other can become one who is dominated and dependent, even if this 
domination is a tacit one and remains hidden from him." 322 Authentic solicitude frees the 
others potentiality for Being "helps the Other to become transparent to himself in his care 
and to become free for it," 323 it focuses on the other as Dasein rather than to any specific 
'what' with which that other is concerned 
 Just as selfhood occurs in the space opened up between authenticity and 
inauthenticity so too solicitude requires a balance between "that which leaps in and 
dominates and that which leaps forth and liberates".324 Resoluteness brings the self “into 
solicitous Being with Others" 325   not only must we desire to have a conscience  "When 
Dasein is resolute, it can become the 'conscience' of Others," 326 calling them to face 
anxiety. Solicitude thus concerns itself with the enlightenment of others as true 
compassion and mirrors the concern of the Bodhisattva Vow. Solicitude is a refusal to 
take responsibility for others, but the attempt to call them to responsibility means 
encouraging others to face anxiety resolutely and bring their attunement into coherence 
with one's own, which itself requires an ontic realization in action, despite Heidegger's 
comments on 'welfare work' freeing the other to his freedom would first seem to require 
a level of material welfare for Dasein to be capable of realizing projects (the freedom 
from/with are related), the everyday sense of compassion that relates to material welfare 
would seem to include both authentic and inauthentic senses. 
 The 'correct' everyday view of compassion concerns itself with calculative action 
intended to alleviate physical suffering motivated by empathy,  the 'true' is solicitude that 
frees others for their appropriation,  promulgating reflection upon Ereigis in preparation 
for epochal self-surmounting. As noted in chapter 2.6 Heidegger's comments on the 
relation of homelessness to the lack of housing leads many to see his notion of compassion 
as having “no room for the immeasurable misery of the masses, the suffering of the 
oppressed, the countless, untold tears of those who neither think nor poetize.”327 Yet the 
correct and true are samsara-sive-nirvana, whilst the identity of the ontological and its 
ontic actualization indicates that the true danger only is as the 'correct' Heidegger's over-
emphasis on meditative thought as divorced from calculative does lead to an 
incompleteness in his thought, the relation of solicitude and 'welfare work' is an integral 
one, especially when welfare is a building that gathers. 
Olafson and MitSein as an Attunement of Trust 
The relationality of man would not seem to be normative but the ground of all social 
relations, despite this Olafson attempts to draw out a more concrete ethics from 
consideration of MitSein, holding a traditional normative ethics cannot be grounded but 
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that ethical constraints on conduct are still required and can be derived from the 
relationships between co-disclosers. This provides no single objective morality, Olafson 
noting the precariousness of ethical life with no compulsion nor obligation in the 
traditional sense being possible. 
 This precariousness arises from needing to trust (the reliance on the other that is 
equiprimordial with responsibility) yet always having to account for the self-interest of 
others, "and therefore there is always a pressing need to strengthen it in any way we can, 
even when our own interests may suffer."328  We are all at times on different sides of the 
relation of trust making us aware of 'natural obligations' such as honesty and helping 
others that form the minimum requirement for considering an other a moral partner. The 
Master-Servant circuminsessional dynamic means self-interest must be balanced with the 
interests of others and that the community of mutual recognition is always insecure, "we 
are compelled to live with the peculiar uncertainty that attaches to the status of the very 
commitments that we would like to think of as being irrevocable and free of all 
ambiguity." 329  Olafson tries to show this conflict of interests can also be seen in terms 
of others interests not limiting us but constituting our own well-being, a concern soon to 
be seen as shared by Strauss. 
 Olafson seeks ethics in the communal nature of truth, that art needs preservers. 
From the fact of plurality comes “something like the priority of certain interests over 
others - claims that, if sustained, would be expressed by an 'ought'. The datum for ethical 
reflection is, accordingly, a number of (possibly) conflicting claims to this status rather 
than a collection of brute facts and equally brute demands." 330  Ethical truths are not 
disclosed at-hand but are what “shows itself to be such that it constitutes a limit on the 
choices we can make." 331  so that ethical co-disclosure requires something that when our 
interests conflict “establishes a responsibility for them to resolve the issue between them 
in some other way." 332  For Olafson it is implicit that as co-disclosers we try to arrive at 
a common disclosure we can all agree on, shared responsibility for disclosure and 
community means an action must be co-disclosed as acceptable to those it affects rather 
than any other possible action. Co-disclosure of truth implies what I disclose must be 
compatible/complimentary with  what others disclose, responsibility entails the same for 
an action so that “if it can be shown to be preferable to any other in terms of the way it 
affects people's lives, then there is a sense in which these consequences will be the same 
for all; and in that respect it will be like truth." 333  
 MitSein is thus a form of ethical recognition so that if our actions affect another's 
interests then it is subject to their judgement as well as ours, in authentic MitSein there is 
thus an “obligation that can be satisfied only by a good-faith effort to understand what is 
being done on both sides in its relation to the two sets of interests."334 Yet the desire for 
authenticity is a conditional imperative, first posited to ensure the completeness of 
analysis and later transformed into  projected epochal understanding. In line with 
Heidegger Olafson acknowledges MitSein is the grounds for both good and evil, so 
fundamentally pre-ethical, yet maintains "What is fundamentally unjustifiable and 
therefore wrong is to deny our distinctively human commonality with one another by 
treating someone as though he or she were not a partner in MitSein and had no claim to 
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any consideration in decisions we make about how to act." 335  Olafson defines evil as 
“what someone does intentionally to pervert a system of human cooperation based on 
mutual recognition by making it an instrument of private and intrinsically unshareable 
purposes." 336 ; but evil is ultimately condemned as incoherent, yet coherence is a value 
of analysis not life and reality need not be coherent. 
 A motive beyond self-interest or coherence is required to build trust, legalistic or 
rights based systems are judged as insufficient as "the principle of the right is a principle 
of criticism and not of motivation"337  Ultimately it is necessary to make others happiness 
a condition of ones own. MitSein alone is not enough, MitSein be experienced/realized 
as self-emptying by building upon the need for moral recognition for our own happiness. 
Olafson (like Zimmerman) holds that once true relationality is realized "a distinction 
between self-interest and the general well-being will simply not be at all plausible." 338  
so that insight is compassion, but a separate motivation towards such realization is 
required; an initial motivation for trust arising from the legalistic and rights based theories 
Olafson dismisses  yet are required to complement MitSein. 
 There is an element of ontological need for others, a reliance on world as shared, 
that some element of trust and loyalty to the other is required for the ontology of 
nothingness to be realized, but this alone cannot provide a social ethic. The inter-
dependence of world says little of duty to others and only provides ground for 
responsibility towards others being integral to responsibility to oneself. Olafson lays out 
the possibility for both practices he wants to say are ethical and evil, but like 
authenticity/inauthenticity preferring one over the other requires a further step, that trust 
as precondition means "evil is parasitical upon good." 339  does not entail parasitism is 
bad; foetuses are parasitic upon mothers, children upon parents and students upon 
teachers. 
 It is true by definition that "the coming into being of a framework of mutual 
recognition is a necessary condition for the possibility of a violation of the ethical 
relationships predicated upon it." 340 , but this does not entail any imperative to avoid 
violation. Primordiality is warranted for ontological analysis and has no normative force, 
the claim that we cannot reject the constraints of MitSein without incoherence provides 
no injunction to coherence once metaphysical foundations of reason are abandoned. We 
cannot compel others to think rationally, to be enlightened, nor to act ethically; obligation 
applies to all "and compliance with it has to be predicated on their willingness to respond 
appropriately"341 , obligation only holds when the others hold to it also and so is fragile 
and conditional, yet must be treated as unconditional. To build upon Olafson's ground of 
ethics thus requires a shared attunement of trust, a community of preservers for the 
epochal truth of balancing a plurality of interests thus a return the political arena. 
Post-Destitute Politics 
As meditative thought is provisional/preparatory so too must the ethics that realizes it, the 
danger is that the “thinking which Heidegger himself characterizes as 'preparatory' is 
marked by a certain 'emptiness' or formalism"342 leading to the spectre of moral and 
political relativism. Hodge defends Heidegger from such charges as, whilst context 
independent, resoluteness is the condition of possibility for making truth claims which "are about 
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real, independently existing structures and are thus falsifiable. Thus the belief in the thousand-
year Reich was both false and falsifiable."343 Yet the commitment to such a belief does not seem 
similarly falsifiable without recourse to a system of valuation beyond that provided by Ereignis 
alone so that Heidegger's thought cannot rule out specific political projects.  
 Heidegger's later thought is often seen as characterized by a scrupulous apoliticism, which 
Bernstein considers itself to be a political position as “to condemn the ‘political realm’, to 
characterize it as only a manifestation of Gestell is an extreme political gesture – one that 
contributes to Heidegger’s exclusive focus on art and the poetic revealing as the saving 
power.” 344 Despite this Heidegger's thought does have political implications, even if just 
in negative terms of denying democracy was the best political form to realize poetic 
dwelling, and releasement as a form of activity beyond the active/passive distinction is 
still a form of engaged political agency based upon a retrieved heritage. Dallmayr holds 
that whilst Heidegger has little to say on ontic political decisions he can contribute to "the 
paradigmatic level, the level of a reassessment of Western metaphysics, including 
Western political metaphysics",345 that he is not apolitical but thought as highest politics 
radically questions current political ideologies. 
 Heidegger focused solely on preparatory reflection rather than the presumption 
demand that thought provide political solutions. Poggeler holds Heidegger's thought was 
“blind to specific political questions but which felt challenged by politics and got deeply 
entangled in it"346 asking “To what sort of philosophy does a thinking lead which, like 
Heidegger's, sees itself called to politics but fails in its concrete engagement?” 347 Such a 
politics must prepare the way for planetary dialogue through retrieval of universal 
nihility, yet cannot join Heidegger's denial of “a human 'right' to freedom of belief and 
security of life and that philosophy is foremost to defend this right.”348 Poggeler claims Heidegger 
misunderstood the autonomy of the political sphere, that it cannot be like preparatory reflection 
and “stake everything on the transformation of man, but must accept the fact that out of fear of 
the consequences of their actions human beings must submit these actions to norms” 349 the risk 
of destruction through technology brings with it a new responsibility for a pluralistic politics of 
prudence “and will not allow the actions of the politician the freedom that can be granted to the 
creative artist in his field.” 350 
 The political form to cohere with post-destitute dwelling  is to be one that expresses the 
relation between a plurality of understandings in the absence of gods providing a framework for 
epochal co-existence. Such politics must be retrieved from the null origin that manifested 
as Gestell ; saving Gestell and apportioning nihilism its place as an an authentic response 
to the current epochal claim that remains open to new possibilities by giving poetic form 
to the tension between plurality and totality. Meditative political thought guides and is 
self-identical with a retrieval of calculative thought preserving diversity among people as 
the ontic correlate to sheltering alternate possible understandings of Being and giving 
content to the clearing guided by the criteria of its preservation through beholding of the 
danger. Such a politics is inherently a work in progress that recognizes its contingency and 
insufficiency. 
 Wilde and Kluback hold that the State limits the existential realization of 
ontological/reflective ground, endangering it, yet that such danger is inherent in the 
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ontological's need for such realization. Such is the constant supreme danger; that "The 
possibility of estrangement from the ontological dimension in consciousness is the 
realization of it."351 That danger is inherent to destining necessitates a form of post-
destitute  politics that maintains awareness of this danger and in this regard they suggest 
that "The richness of Heidegger's thinking can be fulfilled by its union with the richness 
of Anglo-American political philosophy."352 Meditative reflection on concealed 
possibilities of meaning and a humanistic theory of rights complete and implicate each 
other. Heidegger denied democracy's role in the saving epoch, yet what we pick out as 
characterizing a political ideology is determined by our understanding of the age; which 
as indicated in chapter 2.5 Heidegger viewed in an overly narrow fashion, overlooking 
its capacity to counter its own danger through a retrieval of the pluralistic aspects of 
Gestell (that are inherently related to its levelling) found in liberal democracy facing its 
own tensions of multiculturalism, of preserving the Other whilst rendering it the Same 
and facing up to the contingency of its commitments. 
Strauss and the Liberal Democracy of Heidegger 
The relation of Heidegger to the problematic tensions within modern democracy is was 
outlined by Strauss who saw liberal democracy as in crisis due to the replacement of 
absolute moral principles with historically contingent values, that it “cannot live without 
an absolute basis and cannot live with an absolute basis.”353  This contradiction of 
awareness of and commitment to the contingency of conviction, that we must live by an 
answer to the question of the human whilst also holding that question open to other 
answers, was seen by Strauss as incompatible with a rational and universal ethics of 
human rights. Even if we try to ground reason as a debate between perspectives reason 
cannot ground itself so is caught in contradiction; both posited as adjudicating between 
commitments yet also making them immune to rational criticism. Justifying the reliance 
on reason without recourse to reason was seen by Strauss as “the most pressing question 
for social science today.” 354  Such mitigated relativism fails to understand the non-rational 
commitments of others, modern pluralistic liberal democracies cannot understand nor 
tolerate the intolerance and difference of others nor coherently condemn it; “the field 
within which relativists can practice sympathetic understanding is restricted to the 
community of relativists who understand each other with great sympathy because they 
are united by identically the same fundamental commitment, or rather by identically the 
same rational insight into the truth of relativism.” 355  Liberal democracy is a building 
requiring a shared attunement for its preservation, an attunement that like any other has 
no objective basis. 
 Strauss sought to save liberal democracy as a context for political discourse and 
counter its levelling aspect through an ideal never attainable but always sought, such 
saving requires a great thinker for the age “But here is the great trouble: the only great 
thinker in our time is Heidegger.” 356  who “declared that ethics is impossible, and his 
whole being was permeated by the awareness that this fact opens up an abyss.” 357 . For 
Strauss the first step towards this saving was the mutual critique of liberal democracy and 
socialism, the dangers of both being set forth as “the friend of liberal democracy is not its 
flatterer”,358 and such a friend is Heidegger, whose thought as a reaction to relativism 
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belongs to the question of “liberal democracy, or, more precisely, a liberal democracy 
which has become uncertain of itself or of its future.” 359  
 Reflective thought and political philosophy are in a relation of productive tension 
between critique of our guiding values and commitment to them. A philosophy aimed at 
epochal transformation requires political engagement and just as Heidegger's thought 
must be completed by a practical ethics so too must Gestell “return from the abstractions 
or constructs of scientistic social science to social reality, to look at social phenomena 
primarily in the perspective of the citizen and the statesmen, and then in the perspective 
of the citizen of the world” ; to counter its tendency to totality by retuning it to its 
belonging with plurality. From this perspective the function of philosophy is the 
resolution of disagreements between groups in a political community, “it is the duty of 
the good citizen to make civil strife cease and to create, by persuasion, agreement among 
the citizens”,360 to partake in preservation and build a horizon of attunement more 
primordial than any specific differences through developing the skilful means of rational 
discourse as itself a way. 
 We cannot simply accept liberal values but must “find the ground of the variety of 
comparative views in the human soul, or, more generally stated, in the human 
condition.”361 , in the ideal of a world society that requires “a world culture, a culture 
genuinely uniting all men.” 362  Strauss sees the claim that 'only a god can save us' as the 
need for a world religion we cannot make but must be receptive to in recognition that 
reason rests on an abyss, echoing Heidegger's call for planetary dialogue that by delving 
into “the problematic character of the Western understanding of Being, we may gain 
access to the deepest root of the East....From here one can begin to understand the 
possibility of a world religion.” 363  The necessary shared attunement for homeless 
dwelling that our building is to bring-forth. 
 For Heidegger modern politics of state are based on metaphysical subjectivism 
and from this Dallmayr concludes political theories based on a community of subjects are 
ruled out; nationalism, collectivism and communitarianism are eschewed as are  
"compactly or substantively ethical lifeforms, as found, for example, in the ancient Greek 
polis (held together by a common ethos)."364 Despite his preference for a locally rooted 
Volk held together by art the notion of such a people is inadequate to Heidegger's thought 
as "his nonobjectivist ontology and his stress on ontological difference should have 
suggested to him a greater heterogeneity among people".365  
 Dallmayr takes Heidegger's critiques of nationalism as implying such post-
metaphysical politics must be global. Compassion necessarily has a universal element, a 
solidarity for a 'we' that stand together, the self-emptying/abnegation of ego-death means 
an elements of universality is a criteria for the ethics of the new epochal sending. 
Nishitani's characterization of Great Compassion clearly implies such a universality that 
even extends beyond humanity Zimmerman claiming “enlightened humanity exhibits 
compassion equally for all beings, not just for humans”366 man may be of greater value 
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more universal overtones than Heidegger's who "does not see man as connected through 
a universal sympathy with everything that exists".367 
 Hodge sees implications for such universal solidarity in that Heidegger “makes it 
clear that there are better and worse ways of exercising care, on an individual level, which 
can be extended to insisting that the affirmation of collective Dasein must take place at 
the level of human beings as a whole and not at the level of arbitrarily delimited subgroups 
based on nationality and race”368 although perhaps not a kinship with abysmal bodily 
animals that remain things. Olafson also denies the ethical recognition of Mitein as 
limited to a single community, aiming for broadest possible 'we', but acknowledges 
Heidegger himself “disqualifies the mass of mankind for anything like moral 
partnership."369  But MitSein is the ground of such recognition, not a prescription to 
extend this to a wider community; it is the ground of any specific community not a 
universal community. 
 Heidegger considered the notion of a 'we' to remain a non-egoistic form of 
subjectivism connected to nationalism "Subjective egoism, for which mostly without its 
knowing it the I is determined beforehand as subject, can be cancelled out through the 
insertion of the I into the we. Through this, subjectivity only gains in power."370 
Universality for Heidegger is a sacrifice for a specific community that "established the 
possibility for a true community, where each nation exists on its own"371  in true mutuality. 
Yet this also requires a horizon in which to relate and adjudicate communities interests, a 
horizon reached through thoughtfulness as “By reflecting on what it means to be  human 
being, one sharpens one's awareness of what is common to all human beings” , to be a 
citizen of the world rather than a member of a discrete people. 
 Dallmayr holds that Heidegger's invocation of the polis as a dwelling place was 
meant as a political conception that preserves the nihility of Being in accordance with a 
co-letting-be of emancipatory solicitude rather than as bound by a common ethos; as "the 
arena of the perennial contest between being and nothingness, life and death - a rift that 
can be only partially remedied or domesticated by prevailing political structures";372 a 
politic system that holds open like an artwork. Once the metaphysical notion of people as 
subjective collective is surmounted the notion of a people as constituted in a response to 
Being remains "but instead of exerting dominance through popular sovereignty this 
community persists only as an absent presence or in the mode of refusal"373 as attending 
to essential Saying. Their homeland as the retrieval of null-origin "is not a factual political 
entity but rather a hallowed site completely resistant to possessive appropriation"374 as a 
shared horizon for understandings of the real that preserves Ereignis and increases our 
sense of awe and wonder at its mystery. 
 Dallmayr points to the ambivalence in democracy between its liberal and populist 
aspects; as subservient to individual rights yet seeking to represent a collective people, 
claiming "the recent upsurge of democracy is the upsurge of a paradox, the upsurge of 
something that seems theoretically impossible while it is practically affirmed." 375   
Accordingly the notion of  'the people' is an ambivalent presence and absence, a relation 
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of tension held open by absent gods. Heidegger's dismissal of democracy was due to his 
"identification of democracy with popular sovereignty (that is, with the kind of collective 
identity rendered dubious in our post-metaphysical time)." 376 seeing democracy only in 
terms of collective subjectivism that relies on the metaphysical authority of subject rather 
than the coming together of multiple perspectives and differences whose unity is elusive 
and forms the attunement for a community of preservers. In these “divergent tendencies 
which link themselves to the name 'democracy' one may see attempts to win back the 
covenant of the citizenry.”377 To express null origin by retrieving plurality from totality, 
requiring the tensions identified by Strauss to be put forth in the art of the post-destitute 
age through the building of rights and welfare. 
Building as Welfare and Rights 
Dallmayr sees such rights as a planetary dialogue (that as indicated in chapter 2.4 is to guide the 
retrieval of Western destiny) post-Gestell planetary thinking requires a global dwelling 
implying the political form must be one based in this and conducive to such dialogue; a 
being at home through homelessness. For Dallmayr this dialogue “is not a simple negation of 
universality or moral universalism, but rather a rethinking of /// human rights in a direction that 
gives primacy to considerations of global justice”378 that treats universality as a hope and 
yearning. Morgans comments on this (and Dallmayr later agrees) that this fails to escape 
relativism as “A 'hope or yearning' cannot be its own explanation without reducing values, 
et cetera, to mere constructions”379 and we cannot “claim an a priori to rights in order to 
mark out a space for counter-disclosure, dissent, and critique of the prevailing state of in-
the-world rights, formal and informal, in some time and place”380 without explaining 
compassion and the ontological presuppositions of this 'ought'. Dallmayr sees Heidegger 
as providing this; post-metaphysics the rights upon which modern liberal democracy 
relies cannot be given objective foundation or universal ground, but as a form of building 
are grounded on abyssal Ereignis as preserving plurality. The clearing and the meaning it 
makes possible mutually implicate each other; rights need a non-reductive ontological ground 
and Ereignis needs realizing in a system of pluralistic understandings. 
 Such rights must be balanced by equity issues as they can be both protection for the weak 
or weapons of the strong, we must always ask “Whose rights (or liberties) are asserted, against 
whom, and in what concrete context? Do rights-claims advance the cause of justice, equity, and 
human well-being, or are they obstacles on this road?” 381 Dallmayr gives the example of the right 
to property that “leaves untouched questions of the amount of property and the rightness of its 
exercise.”382 Rights cannot be those of rational subjectivity alone, they must include socio-
economic issues of public welfare and this tension between universal rights and their finite bearers 
be continually questioned and held open to change. 
 The nature of reck and jointure discussed in chapter 1.6 along the lines of the 
master-servant circuminsessional relation could be seen as carrying an imperative for a 
politics of equality of rights balanced by social equity, providing “the normative 
foundation for a right to belong to a political space.”383 Dallmayr draws out the ethical 
consequence that "juncture and hence justice is the readiness to let others be and to attend to them 
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with considerate care; by contrast, disjuncture or injustice involves the insurgence of selfish 
conceit bent on permanently monopolizing the space of presence while shuffling others out of the 
way." 384. Concluding economic and social practices should focus less on the current 
understanding of rights as equivalence that tends to "deteriorate into privileges, into the 
attempt to monopolize social control and to /// shuffle aside both past and future 
generations (or social groupings)" 385 by overlooking the difference in power and wealth 
of the bearer of those rights. Whilst I agree that attending to how we dwell together in 
jointure may entail attending to changing conditions of social equity rather than pure 
equivalence (rights), lingering jointure as transient presencing gives only a possible 
framework for justice rather than directly entailing or informing any such system. For 
Heidegger disjointure is equally essential to presencing and diversity as the debate over 
values is itself a value and debate entails the possibility of one side fading to permanent 
concealment. 
 Chapter 3.3 considered welfare and legal commitments to rights as a form of building; 
understandings are also things once the theoria-praxis dichotomy is eroded in the higher action of 
reflection. Political and legal rulings are also a form of art, highlighting the contingency of 
constitutions and limitation on majority rule that would be tyranny of levelling. The strife between 
the will of groups and individual rights is the figure to be set-forth in legal constitutions and 
welfare states to exhibit the tension of plurality and totality within Gestell. The institutions of 
socialist liberal democracies are themselves a way of dwelling under absent gods so that all 
engaged citizens are both the poets who name its issues and the preservers who make such issues 
bind a people together. 
Politics of Enlightenment 
Religion and Nothingness says little of politics or social activism and Zen like most forms 
of mystical thought sees society and politics as what we freed from not what is reformed; 
focusing on I-Thou rather than the We. 
 Jones holds mystics have no sense of social progress and view societies as collections of 
individuals to be enlightened with even Buddha himself only having socio-political effects as 
incidental since “Legislation or reward and punishment on a society-wide scale would be an 
external attempt to dominate and manipulate others against their will...Such force would be 
ineffective or even harmful. Behaviour may change but not the dispositions and hence not the 
person.”386 The view that as “people inherently have the capacity for enlightenment no 
special institutions are needed. A reform of social structures is insufficient, and the inner 
transformation makes any new societal institutions unnecessary 387 seems to overlook 
certain societal organizations are more conducive to realization of the Great Compassion, 
social measures to aid enlightenment need be no more domination and manipulation than 
does the student-teacher relation. The attempt to provide an arena for enlightenment need not 
be founded on force but social discourse, rather than regular socio-political concerns there is 
the need for a social ethic conducive to enlightenment and political criteria are thereby 
derived from sunyata. 
 Puligandla and Puhakka take a mitigated version of this view. Despite holding that 
society is by definition unfree and Buddhism “finds the realization of freedom in the ultimate 
renunciation of social and political institutions of every kind”388 they also conclude Buddhists 
should “work toward the realization of such a society as would be most conducive to the 
attainment of true freedom”389 without succumbing to the “delusion that social and political 
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revolutions are in themselves adequate for the attainment of freedom and enlightenment.”390  
They echo Heidegger's critique of man as commodity in chapter 2.3 and find common ground 
with socialism, going as far to claim that in opposing capitalism “Buddhism is led to advocate 
socialism, not because a socialist doctrine follows inevitably from some basic Buddhist 
presuppositions, but because, as a matter of expediency, socialism provides the best means for 
overcoming economic bondage and attaining the higher goal of freedom.”391 This highlights 
that a politics conducive to freedom is an integral component of the Bodhisattva vow, a 
revolutionary spirit that “neither begins nor ends in the realization of any form of social 
order. Paradoxically, them, it is precisely this fundamentally asocial, negative view of 
Buddhism on society that renders it a philosophy of perpetual revolution.”392 By this they 
hold Buddhism escapes from the 'paradox of the revolutionary' requiring a politics in line 
with its paradoxical self-identity of the fields; one that preserves both the personal 
individual and the absence which it masks. 
 Despite Japan's partial Westernisation Nishitani's thought cannot reasonably be 
held in the same relation to liberal democracy as that of Heidegger, yet the same holding 
open of meanings in continual immanent critique that sets forth the tensions within 
freedom coupled with issues of social welfare can be seen as complementing and 
following on from the political requirements of sunyata. 
Conclusion* 
It has been the aim of this study to approach the question of the experience of the self as 
it faces nihilism, and to do so from the point of view of the relation between Being and 
Nothingness as these concepts are discussed in the philosophies of Martin Heidegger and 
Nishitani Keiji. Rather than attempting to solve or reduce the tension between, on the one 
hand, the disclosure of meaning associated with Being, or on the other hand, the lack 
thereof associated with nihilism, a different path has been sought that renders that very 
tension productive rather than problematic. By offering a novel interpretation of the 
similarities and differences between Heidegger’s notion of Ereignis and Nishitani’s 
treatment of the Buddhist term Śūnyatā as “Absolute Nothingness” this study has 
proposed the essential role that should be met, affirmed, and embraced in human 
experience, rather than avoided, solved, or ignored. The comparative dialogue has also 
sought to render productive inconsistencies within and discrepancies between the two 
philosopher’s account of meaning associated with nihilism. Taken together, the differing 
paths through Ereignis and Śūnyatā as means of reaching the particularly modern form of 
nihilism, offers the possibility of a new reading of these two philosopher’s projects that 
does not reduce their thought exclusively to ontological, existential or ethical 
interpretations, where a new possibility for emancipation and the proper human 
comportment to nihilism can be gleaned from the unity of the interpretations—both their 
virtues and shortcomings—appropriate to these various domains.   
While both philosophers understand the necessary comportment in the face of 
nihilism as demanding a dual transformation of the human and the society the human 
evolves within, both under-develop this key feature. This study has thus sought to 
augment the dialogue between the two philosophers on this very point, thus pointing a 
way immanent to their respective systems towards a viable modification of the self in the 
face of meaninglessness, which does not simply reproduce the problem by treating the 
self as an autonomous subject separate from the world or the society it is embedded 
within. Thus, with a new focus undertaken here on the communal nature of 
Heidegger’s Dasein thought in tandem with Nishitani’s "true self" as "personal-sive-
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impersonal", a way forward is discernible, which capitalizes on the counter-tendency of 
nihilism, and remains within rather than retreating from the emptiness of meaning thus 
discovering a way forward, not to overcome but to modify how one abides within the 
modern crisis of meaninglessness, a way forward consonant with and immanent to a 
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